We study the model-theoretic aspects of a probability logic suited for talking about measure spaces. This nonclassical logic has a model theory rather different from that of classical predicate logic. In general, not every satisfiable set of sentences has a countable model, but we show that one can always build a model on the unit interval. Also, the probability logic under consideration is not compact. However, using ultraproducts we can prove a compactness theorem for a certain class of weak models.

The outcome set of a belief change operator is the set of outcomes that can be obtained with it. Axiomatic characterizations are reported for the outcome sets of the standard AGM contraction operators and eight types of base-generated contraction. These results throw new light on the properties of some of these operators.

Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: (X ∧ Y) ⊃ (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals.

Some reasons to regard the cumulative hierarchy of sets as potential rather than actual are discussed. Motivated by this, a modal set theory is developed which encapsulates this potentialist conception. The resulting theory is equi-interpretable with Zermelo Fraenkel set theory but sheds new light on the set-theoretic paradoxes and the foundations of set theory.

Substructural logics extending the full Lambek calculus FL have largely benefited from a systematical algebraic approach based on the study of their algebraic counterparts: residuated lattices. Recently, a nonassociative generalization of FL (which we call SL) has been studied by Galatos and Ono as the logic of lattice-ordered residuated unital groupoids. This paper is based on an alternative Hilbert-style presentation for SL which is almost MP-based. This presentation is then used to obtain, in a uniform way applicable to most (both associative and nonassociative) substructural logics, a form of local deduction theorem, description of filter generation, and proper forms of generalized disjunctions. A special stress is put on semilinear substructural logics (i.e., logics complete with respect to linearly ordered algebras). Axiomatizations of the weakest semilinear logic over SL and other prominent substructural logics are provided and their completeness with respect to chains defined over the real unit interval is proved.

Gödel argued that Cantor’s notion of cardinal number was uniquely correct. More recent work has defended alternative “Euclidean”' theories of set size, in which Cantor’s Principle (two sets have the same size if and only if there is a one-to-one correspondence between them) is abandoned in favor of the Part–Whole Principle (if A is a proper subset of B then A is smaller than B). Here we see from simple examples, not that Euclidean theories of set size are wrong, nor merely that they are counterintuitive, but that they must be either very weak or in large part arbitrary and misleading. This limits their epistemic usefulness.

Following a discussion of various forms of set-theoretical foundations of category theory and the controversial question of whether category theory does or can provide an autonomous foundation of mathematics, this article concentrates on the question whether there is a foundation for “unlimited” or “naive” category theory. The author proposed four criteria for such some years ago. The article describes how much had previously been accomplished on one approach to meeting those criteria, then takes care of one important obstacle that had been met in that approach, and finally explains what remains to be done if one is to have a fully satisfactory solution.

First we review highlights of the ongoing debate about foundations of category theory, beginning with Feferman’s important article of 1977, then moving to our own paper of 2003, contrasting replies by McLarty and Awodey, and our own rejoinders to them. Then we offer a modest proposal for reformulating a theory of category of categories that would actually meet the objections of Feferman and Hellman and provide a genuine alternative to set theory as a foundation for mathematics. This proposal is more modest than that of our (2003) in omitting modal logic and in permitting a more “top-down” approach, where particular categories and functors need not be explicitly defined. Possible reasons for resisting the proposal are offered and countered. The upshot is to sustain a pluralism of foundations along lines actually foreseen by Feferman (1977), something that should be welcomed as a way of resolving this long-standing debate.

Following recent developments in the literature on axiomatic theories of truth, we investigate an alternative to the widespread habit of formalizing the syntax of the object-language into the object-language itself. We first argue for the proposed revision, elaborating philosophical evidences in favor of it. Secondly, we present a general framework for axiomatic theories of truth with ‘disentangled’ theories of syntax. Different choices of the object theory O will be considered. Moreover, some strengthenings of these theories will be introduced: we will consider extending the theories by the addition of coding axioms or by extending the schemas of O, if present, to the entire vocabulary of our theory of truth. Finally, we touch on the philosophical consequences that the theories described can have on the debate about the metaphysical status of the truth predicate and on the formalization of our informal metatheoretic reasoning.

In this paper, I provide a thorough discussion and reconstruction of Bernard Bolzano’s theory of grounding and a detailed investigation into the parallels between his concept of grounding and current notions of normal proofs. Grounding (Abfolge) is an objective ground-consequence relation among true propositions that is explanatory in nature. The grounding relation plays a crucial role in Bolzano’s proof-theory, and it is essential for his views on the ideal buildup of scientific theories. Occasionally, similarities have been pointed out between Bolzano’s ideas on grounding and cut-free proofs in Gentzen’s sequent calculus. My thesis is, however, that they bear an even stronger resemblance to the normal natural deduction proofs employed in proof-theoretic semantics in the tradition of Dummett and Prawitz.

In this paper, we establish the first-order definability of sequents with consistent variable occurrence on bi-approximation semantics by means of the Sahlqvist–van Benthem algorithm. Then together with the canonicity results in Suzuki (2011), this allows us to establish a Sahlqvist theorem for substructural logic. Our result is not limited to substructural logic but is also easily applicable to other lattice-based logics.

While second-order quantifiers have long been known to admit nonstandard, or“general” interpretations, first-order quantifiers (when properly viewed as predicates of predicates) also allow a kind of interpretation that does not presuppose the full power-set of that interpretation’s first-order domain. This paper explores some of the consequences of such “general” interpretations for (unary) first-order quantifiers in a general setting, emphasizing the effects of imposing various further constraints that the interpretation is to satisfy.

Feferman (1977) argues that category theory cannot stand on its own as a structuralist foundation for mathematics: he claims that, because the notions of operation and collection are both epistemically and logically prior, we require a background theory of operations and collections. Recently [2011], I have argued that in rationally reconstructing Hilbert’s organizational use of the axiomatic method, we can construct an algebraic version of category-theoretic structuralism. That is, in reply to Shapiro (2005), we can be structuralists all the way down; we do not have to appeal to some background theory to guarantee the truth of our axioms. In this paper, I again turn to Hilbert; I borrow his (Hilbert, 1900a) distinction between the genetic method and the axiomatic method to argue that even if the genetic method requires the notions of operation and collection, the axiomatic method does not. Even if the genetic method is in some sense epistemically or logically prior, the axiomatic method stands alone. Thus, if the claim that category theory can act as a structuralist foundation for mathematics arises from the organizational use of the axiomatic method, then it does not depend on the prior notions of operation or collection, and so we can be structuralists all the way up.

We analyze the behaviour of declarations of independence between existential quantifiers in quantifier prefixes of Independence-Friendly (IF) sentences; we give a syntactical criterion to decide whether a sentence beginning with such prefix exists, such that its truth values may be affected by removal of the declaration of independence. We extend the result also to equilibrium semantics values for undetermined IF sentences.

The main theorem defines a schema of sound and recursive inference rules; we show more explicitly what happens for some simple special classes of sentences.

In the last section, we extend the main result beyond the scope of prenex sentences, in order to give a proof of the fact that the fragment of IF sentences with knowledge memory has only first-order expressive power.

In this article we present a new class of multiple contraction functions—the epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions—which are a generalization of the epistemic entrenchment-based contractions (Gärdenfors, 1988; Gärdenfors & Makinson, 1988) to the case of contractions by (possibly nonsingleton) sets of sentences and provide an axiomatic characterization for that class of functions. Moreover, we show that the class of epistemic entrenchment-based multiple contractions coincides with the class of system of spheres-based multiple contractions introduced in Fermé & Reis (2012).

In van Benthem (2008), van Benthem proposes a dynamic consequence relation defined as ${\psi _1}, \ldots ,{\psi _n}{ \models ^d}\phi \,{\rm{iff}}{ \models ^{pa}}[{\psi _1}] \ldots [{\psi _n}]\phi ,$ where the latter denotes consequence in public announcement logic, a dynamic epistemic logic. In this paper we investigate the structural properties of a conditional dynamic consequence relation $\models _{\rm{\Gamma }}^d$ extending van Benthem’s proposal. It takes into account a set of background conditions Γ, inspired by Makinson (2003) wherein Makinson calls this reasoning ‘modulo’ a set Γ. In the presence of common knowledge, conditional dynamic consequence is definable from (unconditional) dynamic consequence. An open question is whether dynamic consequence is compact. We further investigate a dynamic consequence relation for soft instead of hard announcements. Surprisingly, it shares many properties with (hard) dynamic consequence. Dynamic consequence relations provide a novel perspective on reasoning about protocols in multi-agent systems.

Feferman’s argument presented in 1977 seemed to block any possibility for category theory to become a serious contender in the foundational game. According to Feferman, two obstacles stand in the way: one logical and the other psychological. We address both obstacles in this paper, arguing that although Feferman’s argument is indeed convincing in a certain context, it can be dissolved entirely by modifying the context appropriately.

We develop a point-free construction of the classical one-dimensional continuum, with an interval structure based on mereology and either a weak set theory or a logic of plural quantification. In some respects, this realizes ideas going back to Aristotle, although, unlike Aristotle, we make free use of contemporary “actual infinity”. Also, in contrast to intuitionistic analysis, smooth infinitesimal analysis, and Eret Bishop’s (1967) constructivism, we follow classical analysis in allowing partitioning of our “gunky line” into mutually exclusive and exhaustive disjoint parts, thereby demonstrating the independence of “indecomposability” from a nonpunctiform conception. It is surprising that such simple axioms as ours already imply the Archimedean property and the interval analogue of Dedekind completeness (least-upper-bound principle), and that they determine an isomorphism with the Dedekind–Cantor structure of ℝ as a complete, separable, ordered field. We also present some simple topological models of our system, establishing consistency relative to classical analysis. Finally, after describing how to nominalize our theory, we close with comparisons with earlier efforts related to our own.

Primal infon logic was introduced in 2009 in connection with access control. In addition to traditional logic constructs, it contains unary connectives p said indispensable in the intended access control applications. Propositional primal infon logic is decidable in linear time, yet suffices for many common access control scenarios. The most obvious limitation on its expressivity is the failure of the transitivity law for implication: $x \to y$ and $y \to z$ do not necessarily yield $x \to z$. Here we introduce and investigate equiexpressive “transitive” extensions TPIL and TPIL* of propositional primal infon logic as well as their quote-free fragments TPIL0 and TPIL0* respectively. We prove the subformula property for TPIL0* and a similar property for TPIL*; we define Kripke models for the four logics and prove the corresponding soundness-and-completeness theorems; we show that, in all these logics, satisfiable formulas have small models; but our main result is a quadratic-time derivation algorithm for TPIL*.