A radiation transport code based on a Monte Carlo tool is used to simulate a protontherapy beamline designed to treat paediatric patients with intracranial tumours. Thetreatments are performed using the IBA gantry at the Proton Therapy Centre of the InstitutCurie. The treatment is undertaken at 178.16 MeV using the double scattering technique.The aim of this study is to present the Monte Carlo model of the transported proton beam,beamline and treatment room, as well as the experimental validation of the proton dosedistributions calculated by this model. The beamline components and the treatment room areaccurately modelled using the Monte Carlo code MCNPX. The proton source at the beamlineentrance is defined on the basis of IBA data, measurements and calculations. Measured andcalculated relative proton dose distributions in a water phantom are compared for thevalidation. Depth dose profiles, including pristine Bragg peaks and a spread–out Braggpeak, and lateral dose profiles are studied. A general good agreement was found betweencalculated and measured distributions with discrepancies of less than 2 mm. Relativeproton dose distributions are therefore considered to be correctly described by oursimulated geometry and proton source parameters. The Monte Carlo simulation will be usedsubsequently for radiation protection purposes: calculation of secondary neutron dosesreceived by treated patients of different ages.

In 2011 the IRSN conducted several assessments of atmosphericradioactive releases due to the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident (March11, 2011) and of their impact on Japan’s terrestrial environment.They were based on the IRSN’s emergency management tools and onthe abundant information and technical data gradually publishedin Japan. According to these assessments, the main release phaselasted from March 12 to 25, 2011 and impacted Japanese land in twoevents, the first on 15 and 16 March, in which the main radioactivedeposits were formed, and the second from March 20 to 23, whichwas less significant. The highest amounts of radioactive deposits werefound in an area extending upwards of several tens of kilometersnorthwest of the plant. Lower amounts were discontinuously scatteredin an area extending up to over 250 km away. Initially composedmainly of short-lived radionuclides, the deposits’ activity sharplydecreased in the subsequent weeks. Since the summer of 2011, cesium-134and cesium-137 have become the residual deposits’ main components.According to IRSN estimates, in the absence of protection, the dosesdue to exposure to the radioactive plume during the atmosphericrelease phase may have been potentially higher for people who remainedin coastal areas up to several tens of kilometers north and southof the damaged plant. Thereafter, people living up to 50 km northwestof the plant, outside the 20-km emergency evacuation zone, were potentiallymost vulnerable to residual radioactive deposits over time.

Dans une centrale nucléaire (CNPE), la localisation despoints chauds est une préoccupation importante, car ils participentà la dose que reçoivent les intervenants, en particulier lors desopérations de maintenance. Depuis 2010, EDF et le CEA ont entreprisd’adapter une nouvelle génération de caméra gamma, GAMPIX, pourdisposer d’un instrument portable dédié à cet usage. Ce systèmepermet de superposer une image gamma à une image visible, afin delocaliser les sources radioactives présentes dans un environnement.Des essais sur site au CNPE de Tricastin ont été associés aux développements spécifiquesréalisés par le CEA, afin d’appréhender les conditions particulièresrencontrées en CNPE, à la fois environnementales et radiologiques :l’énergie relativement élevée des gamma du cobalt 60 (1,17 et 1,33MeV) et la présence d’un bruit de fond ambiant permanent. Cet article présenteles principaux axes du cahier des charges initial, les développementsréalisés pour y répondre, et les résultats obtenus lors des campagnesd’essais. Même s’ils étaient uniquement dédiés à la qualificationde la caméra gamma, les tests réalisés ont montré des résultatstrès prometteurs, par exemple la mise en évidence de lignes de fuitele long d’une protection biologique ou le mouvement d’un point chauddans une tuyauterie (par rapport à sa position identifiée). En dernier lieu,les développements futurs sont évoqués.

The European Platform on Preparedness for Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response andRecovery (NERIS Platform) was established in June 15, 2010. The Mission of NERIS is topromote the involvement of different stakeholders and improve public confidence incapabilities of the key players in management of nuclear and radiological emergencies inEurope. The NERIS Platform encourages European, national, regional and local authorities,technical support organisations (TSOs), operators, professional organisations, researchinstitutes, universities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and national and localstakeholders to co-operate in emergency management, and to facilitate access to expertiseand technology in maintaining competence in the field of nuclear and radiologicalemergency management for the benefit of European countries and citizens. The vision isthat by 2015, the self-sustaining NERIS association exists, and by 2020, all Europeanorganisations being members of the association are sharing common views and commonapproaches and are developing and using compatible technology and methods for consequencemanagement of the emergencies. The NERIS Platform has, in September 2012, 43 memberorganisations representing stakeholders with a wide range of backgrounds, e.g.authorities, emergency centres, research organisations and the academiccommunity. The Strategic Research Agenda (SRA), being under preparation, will provide thebasis for priorities of future research and development in order to achieve the vision.The SRA therefore will communicate the future research needs, but will also be aninstrument for creating synergies, co-operation and coordination internally between theNERIS participants and externally with activities taking place within other internationalforums.

Multi-slice computed tomography (MSCT) has proven inseveral studies to have a high diagnostic accuracy for the detectionor exclusion of coronary artery disease. A major concern with coronaryMSCT, however, is the associated radiation exposure of patients.Recent studies suggest that use of a 64-slice scanner is associatedwith a non-negligible lifetime attributable risk of cancer. Severalstrategies can be used to reduce patient exposure in coronary MSCT.The purpose of this multicenter study was to investigate the effectsof the adjustment of tube voltage and current on radiation doseand image interpretability. MSCT with retrospective ECG gating was performedin 315 patients. The dose-length product (DLP) in the patients enrolledwith the dose reduction protocol resulted in a 36% overall reductionin the mean radiation dose (911 ± 289 mGy.cm) compared with thestandard protocol (1427 ± 226 mGy.cm, p < 0.001).Nevertheless, image interpretability was maintained. This studyon coronary MSCT demonstrates that the radiation dose can be significantly reducedby parameter optimization, with maintained image interpretability.

Interventional cardiology procedures (ICPs), while providing important benefits topatients, also contribute to their radiation exposure, in particular for the organssurrounding the heart. This paper addresses the issue of radiation exposure to the lungand bone marrow related to coronary interventions in terms of organ doses for coronaryangiography (CA) and percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), and riskassessment of potential radiation-induced cancer. Dosimetric information on 2095 ICPs fromFrench patients was collected. The median lung dose for CA alone was 34 mGy for men and 22mGy for women and the median bone marrow dose was 8 mGy and 4 mGy, respectively; doseswere slightly higher for CA and ad hoc PTCA and nearly twice as high forCA and elective PTCA. Based on the French national mortality registry and BiologicalEffects of Ionising Radiation VII models, spontaneous and radiation-induced lung cancersand leukaemia were estimated. For men and women aged at least 60 years old at the firstICP, excess risk of potentially fatal cancers attributable to radiation ranged from 0.4%to 4%. This study provides evidence of the potential risk of radiation-induced cancerafter an ICP. The limitations of such calculations are due to the difficulty of takinginto account patients’ possibly shorter life expectancy than in the general population,linked to their comorbidities and coronary disease. Nevertheless, risk estimates can beused to illustrate the beneficial role of optimisation of doses delivered to thepatient.

Afin d’évaluer les conséquences des rejets radioactifs provenant des réacteursaccidentés de la centrale nucléaire de Fukushima-Daichi sur l’environnement terrestrefrançais, l’IRSN a renforcé son plan de surveillance en échantillonnant notamment de lavégétation de prairie, du lait et de la viande des troupeaux en pâture entre avril etnovembre 2011. Ces prélèvements et ces mesures ont, entre autres, permis d’évaluer dansdes conditions de dépôts réels la chronologie des transferts du césium-134 de l’herbe aulait et à la viande. Les premières mesures significatives en 134Cs apparaissentdans l’herbe et dans le lait cinq à sept jours après la première mesure significative dansl’air. Les activités maximales atteignent 0,4 Bq.kg–1 d’herbe fraiche et0,028 Bq.L–1 dans le lait. Dans la viande, les premières mesuressignificatives apparaissent mi-avril avec une activité maximale mesurée de 0,036Bq.kg–1, avec de fortes variations d’une espèce animale à une autre. Lescoefficients de transfert moyens calculés sont proches de ceux disponibles dans lalittérature avec 0,22 j.kg–1 pour la viande de mouton, et de 0,09 et0,0014 j.L–1 pour le lait de chèvre et de vache, respectivement.

L’utilisation médicale des rayonnements ionisants estdevenue la source d’irradiation la plus importante à l’échelle mondiale.Les connaissances et aptitudes des professionnels utilisateurs deces rayonnements déterminent la mise en œuvre des mesures de radioprotectionrecommandées par les organismes internationaux et nationaux. Lasituation de la radioprotection dans les pays africains est préoccupanteen raison de la faiblesse des lois, règlements et organismes de radioprotection.Nous rapportons les résultats d’une enquête effectuée dans des serviceshospitaliers détenteurs de sources de rayonnements ionisants à Yaoundé,capitale du Cameroun. Plus de la moitié des professionnels enquêtés ontun niveau moyen de connaissances des principes et normes de radioprotectionet plus de 80 % n’ont jamais bénéficié d’une formation continueen matière de radioprotection.

The European Basic Safety Standards Directive (EU, 1996) contains a chapter onintervention, which, to a large extent, is dedicated to emergency planning and response,but without detailed requirements. A new Directive will consolidate all existingDirectives and thus broaden the scope to all exposure situations and categories ofexposure, including the protection of the environment. This new text follows thesituation-based approach recommended by ICRP (ICRP, 2007). The requirements for emergencypreparedness have been worked out in more detail, and the use of reference levels foremergency response is highlighted. The accident in Fukushima prompted reflection on theEuratom legal framework, including the Basic Safety Standards, the arrangements for theearly exchange of information (ECURIE) and legislation on the nuclear safety of nuclearinstallations. A “stress test” of EU nuclear power plants has been undertaken, whichincludes on-site emergency response. The results of this exercise will allow theCommission to report, by the end of 2012, to the EP and the Council, and to propose newlegislation as appropriate. This may extend to the harmonisation of off-site emergencyresponse and communication arrangements among Member States. Meanwhile, an informalcoordination mechanism is being set up with the Heads of European Radiation ProtectionCompetent Authorities (HERCA). With regard to the legislation on maximum permitted levelsin food, there will be further reflection on the consistency between the controls in placeafter Chernobyl and after Fukushima, as well as their consistency with the values for theplacing on the market of food and feed in the EU in the event of a future accident.

During and after the Fukushima accident, the IRSN collected and interpreted the resultsof radiological measurements performed on foodstuffs of terrestrial origin published byJapan's Ministry of Health between mid-March 2011 and July 2012. Analysis of the findingsshows that the accident's date, livestock-rearing practices and the deposits'characteristics had a decisive influence. The fact that radioactive fallout occurred veryearly in the growing and breeding season largely explains the moderate contamination ofmost foodstuffs of terrestrial origin, notably in the areas with the largest deposits. Inthe case of dairy products and meat, feeding imported fodder to livestock in stables, acommon practice in Japan, compounded the calendar effect. Measurements published in Japanhave also borne out the particular sensitivity of mushrooms, including cultivated species,and game.

The concentrations of natural radionuclides in 6 differentcolors of volcanic tuff stones which are derived from the Cappadociaregion in Turkey were determined using gamma-ray spectroscopy witha HPGe detector, and the mineralogical composition and formula ofstones were determined by an X-ray powder diffractometer. The averageactivity concentrations of 238U, 232Th and 40Kare 50.7, 58.6 and 717.6 Bq.kg–1, which are higher thanthe world averages of 35, 30 and 400 Bq.kg–1, respectively.The radium equivalent activities (Raeq), external hazardindex (Hex), and internal hazard (Hin) associatedwith the natural radionuclides, alpha (Iα) and gammaindices (Iγ) were calculated to assess the radiationhazard of the natural radioactivity in the volcanic tuff stones.The average indoor annual effective dose equivalent is 0.1 mSv.All values of the indoor effective dose are lower than the exemptiondose value of 0.3 mSv. The calculated radium equivalent activityvalues vary from 60.31 Bq.kg–1 to 281.32 Bq.kg–1 witha mean of 189.78 Bq.kg–1. All values of radium equivalentactivity are lower than the world average. The average indoor absorbeddose rate (Din) for volcanic tuff stones, calculatedto be 21.18 nGy.h–1, is lower than the world averageof 84 nGy.h–1.

An interim edition of the IAEA Safety Requirements document: “Radiation Protection andSafety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards” (BSS) was published inNovember 2011. The revision of the BSS was coordinated by a BSS Secretariat consisting ofrepresentatives of the IAEA, FAO, EC, ILO, UNEP, PAHO, WHO and NEA/OECD. The BSS takesinto account the Fundamental Safety Principles, the findings of the United NationsScientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and the 2007 recommendations ofthe International Commission of Radiological Protection (ICRP) and other applicable ICRPstatements and publications. This paper provides an overview of the revised BSS, includingrequirements on preparedness for a nuclear or radiological emergency and to remediation ofareas contaminated by residual radioactive material following a nuclear or radiologicalemergency.

The activity concentrations of primordial radionuclides(40K, 226Ra and 232Th) in fivedifferent types of commonly used building materials in southwestNigeria were measured using a low-background NaI(Tl) detector coupledto an IBM-compatible multichannel analyzer. The highest mean concentrationof 40K, which was 887.5 ± 101.3 Bq.kg–1, was obtainedin gravel. Also, the highest mean concentrations of 226Raand 232Th were obtained, respectively, in sand and brick samples.The lowest mean concentrations of 40K, 226Raand 232Th, respectively, were obtained in brick and cementsample. The annual gonadal effective dose (AGED) and other radiologicalparameters were estimated from the activity concentrations of theradionuclides. The highest mean values of the AGED and radium equivalentactivity concentration obtained were 359.1 μSv.y–1 and110.9 Bq.kg–1, respectively. All these radiological parameterswere below the maximum permissible levels recommended for safe useof materials in building construction. It can therefore be concludedthat these materials do not pose any radiological hazard to thedwellers of buildings constructed with them.

The gamma-ray exposure build-up factors of raw materialsof bricks (soils and fly-ashes) in the state of Punjab were investigatedfor the photon energy range 0.015 to 15 MeV up to 40 mfp penetrationdepth by the geometrical progression (GP) method. Appreciable variationsin the exposure build-up factor (EBF) are noted for the raw materials.The EBFs of the raw materials of bricks change depending on thephoton energy, penetration depth and chemical composition. The build-up factorsare low at low and high photon energies, whereas they are very highin the medium-energy region. The peak energy of the EBF for soilsis 0.3 MeV and 0.2 MeV for fly ashes. The EBFs of the raw materialsof bricks are also compared with those of bricks of red mud andcommon brick materials. Common bricks were found to have the lowestgamma-ray EBF. This study should be useful for emergency preparednessplanning and emergency dose estimation for future planned nuclearpower plants in the state of Punjab.

In France, the activities carried out by the “small-scaleholders” of nuclear materials are organized by a specific regulatorysystem which defines in a detailed way their obligations and themeans of control of the government. The first part of the articlepresents the legal framework relating to the use of nuclear materialsby small-scale holders in civilian fields. The importance of thedeclaration of the nuclear material inventory is clearly emphasizedand must be prepared and transmitted to the Institute for RadiologicalProtection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN) every year. The second partdescribes how this declaration is used to provide basic informationfor the competent Ministry and the inspectors to check the correct applicationof the regulatory requirements relating to physical protection andto the control of nuclear materials. Finally, the last part presentsthe on-site inspections carried out by sworn and accredited inspectorsunder the authority of the competent Authority, which provide anoverall picture and allow an evaluation of the risks of theft, lossor diversion of these materials.