Within the last ten years there has been increasing interest in tritium behaviour and distribution in the environment. This is based partly on empirical findings that tritium discharged mostly as HTO can become transformed into organic forms in environmental samples. An international workshop was convened in France in 2012 to gather the scientific community interested in organically bound tritium to share their experience and to establish a current state of knowledge. This paper summarises the outcome of the workshop, which aimed to improve skills concerning OBT (Organically Bound Tritium) determination, transfer and behaviour in the environment. In order to improve OBT measurement credibility, it was decided to conduct and promote OBT analysis through inter-laboratory exercises. This practice will reduce uncertainty in OBT analysis results, providing better OBT model validation data and public dose assessments.

As part of the ongoing European project NERIS-TP, a revision has been made of some parameters influencing dose estimates in the European emergency management decision support systems RODOS and ARGOS. On the basis of survey data, the estimates of the time fractions typically spent indoors and outdoors over longer time periods have been revised. On the basis of measurement data, also new values for the natural ventilation rate governing early ingression of contaminants into dwellings have been derived for different parts of Europe. Other potential parameterisation improvements for the decision support systems are discussed.

We used CR-39 detectors to evaluate radon activity concentrations in several habitations of Bamako. The calibration factor of the dosimeters was determined experimentally with known radon activity concentrations inside a radon chamber, and was also simulated with MCNPX. The experimental and simulated calibration factors are, respectively, kexp = 0.119 ± 0.017 and ksim = 0.126 ± 0.007 tr.cm-2.d-1.Bq-1.m3. Indoor radon activity concentrations in Bamako were found to vary from 70 ± 18 to 154 ± 35 Bq.m-3. No significant differences were observed in the mean radon activity concentrations compared with five other African countries. Taking into account an occupancy factor of 0.8 and an equilibrium factor of 0.4 for radon indoors, the effective dose rate ranges from 1.77 to 2.35 mSv.y-1. In all cases the radon activity concentrations measured were below the action limits recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Statement on Radon.

The improved use of collective dose following the 2007 ICRP recommendations is studied for nuclear and radiological emergency situations. To study the accumulation of low individual doses to the collective dose the collective dose is calculated as a function of the minimum individual dose for three cases including nuclear as well as radiological accidents. It is found that the use of collective dose in this way can have an added value in nuclear emergency preparedness and response in particular related to decisions on overall protective actions following an accident.

The Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) of the International Atomic Emergency Agency (IAEA) is the global focal point for preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological incidents and emergencies irrespective of their cause. In the area of preparedness the Centre continuously works to develop standards and guidance for strengthening Member States’ preparedness; practical tools and training programs to assist Member States in promptly applying the standards and guidance; and organizes a variety of training events and exercises. This paper provides an overview of the information presented in the IAEA Safety Standards and Guidance in the area of emergency preparedness and response.

In Germany, the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) has asked the German Commission on Radiological Protection (SSK) to provide advice on the revision of the German “Radiological Fundamentals for Decisions on Measures for the Protection of the Population against Accidental Releases of Radionuclides” (Radiologische Grundlagen). A working group has been established to guide the preparation of a new version of that document. It was asked that the revision has to consider most relevant publications of international bodies such as ICRP, EC and IAEA. Therefore, the ICRP recommendations 103, 109 and 111 have to be considered together with the draft documents of the European Union and the IAEA Basic Safety Standards. Recommendations of working groups of NEA (WPNEM) as well as the EPAL working group of HERCA (Heads of European Radiological Protection Competent Authorities) will be also taken into account. Within the discussion it turned out that the practical application of the new recommendation for professionals working in the operational community is extremely important. As the current recommendations are widely accepted and operational all over Germany, it was investigated to which extent the current procedures can be taken over with minor modifications.

In Finland, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is the competent authority and the national warning point with respect to bilateral and international agreements. STUK has drafted proposals for new guides for intervention levels in different phases of an emergency to be adopted by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) in Finland. These guides are written separately for early phase and intermediate phase of a radiological emergency. STUK selected 20 mSv effective residual dose from all exposure pathways during the first year of an emergency as the reference level. This overall goal has been supplemented with the following general guidance; if a projected dose without protective measures is during the first year: (1) higher than 10 mSv, it is necessary to perform protective measures; radiation expose is dominant in decision making, (2) 1–10 mSv, protective measures are usually justified but other factors effect decision making, (3) below 1 mSv, the protective measures may be carried out especially if they are easily feasible; other factors are dominant in decision making. More specific criteria are given for separate countermeasures as a projected dose in a certain time period or as an operational intervention level (OIL) in a quantity which can be directly measured (external dose rate, magnitude of surface contamination, concentration level) or as a trigger (such as plant conditions). This paper presents the main intervention levels and criteria to be used in a radiological emergency for members of the public.

HPA is updating and consolidating its advice on radiation emergencies and recovery. Current advice was published in 1997. Since 2007, the ICRP has issued a set of recommendations to elaborate its guidance for emergency exposure and existing exposure situations. It is expected that the European Basic Safety Standards, when published, will also reflect the ICRP recommendations. The new ICRP guidance represents a marked change in approach, with emphasis placed on optimisation of whole protection strategies using reference levels of residual dose. These new concepts as well as the relevant lessons identified following the Fukushima accident will be included in the new UK advice document. The scope of the UK advice includes reactor and transport accidents as well as releases from waste stores, reprocessing and defence activities. The revised advice will consider the initiation of emergency countermeasures based on averted dose criteria and optimisation of the subsequent protection strategy based on reference levels of residual dose. The advice will illustrate that the type of protection strategy selected depends on the contribution of different exposure pathways over time to projected dose, and this will vary according to the scenarios considered as reasonably foreseeable. Due to the potential impact of the advice, a wide range of stakeholders are being consulted. In particular, feedback will be required on the potential for adapting current practices for sheltering and stable iodine prophylaxis to situations involving longer duration releases or those with a prolonged threat phase. The advice document will contain guidance for emergency planning and response, criteria for the withdrawal of emergency countermeasures, factors to consider during the transition to an existing exposure situation and the management of long term contaminated areas. It is the first time that the whole spectrum of advice will be presented in a single publication, which is expected to be published in 2013, following a public consultation process.

The nuclear reactor remote monitoring system of the federal state of Baden- Wuerttemberg (KFUe BW) is realized according to the renewed “recommendations for remote monitoring of nuclear power plants” (BMU, 2005a). The spectrum of the system covers both, pursuit of operational procedures, and incidents or accidents. The KFUe BW provides a measurement network and information system for operational parameters at the plant sites as well as radiological and meteorological measurements in their vicinity. For the Ministry, it preferentially serves as an instrument of nuclear supervision. This paper gives a brief survey of the system architecture and concentrates on the role of the KFUe with respect to the determination and evaluation of the radiological situation in the range of off-site emergency management.

During nuclear or radiological emergency preparedness and response a processing pipeline is put in place at the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority to produce assessment reports of the current situation, its likely evolution with time, and recommendations on protective actions. Within the processing pipeline raw data is more and more refined towards these end products as experts, advisors, and decision makers collect, analyze, portray, annotate, filter, arrange and rearrange, share, approve or dismiss, and publish content. Emergency procedures and guidelines assist and guide them through the process, as do information and communication technologies. The inner working of the processing pipeline is in constant flux as information and communication technologies develop and allow better facilitation of the process, and as social and political demands change. The present article describes the overall working of the pipeline, and how it has recently been improved by the KETALE collaborative software. The focus then shifts to the new ICRP recommendations and how the new national emergency guidelines are planned to be implemented within the KETALE software. The KETALE software has greatly increased the throughput of our emergency processing pipeline and improved product quality.

The new recommendations on emergency exposure situations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) advise a reference level for the residual dose in a range of between 20 and 100 mSv effective dose (acute or per year). At the same time, the protection strategy should account for the simultaneous consideration of all the exposure pathways, as well as all of the protective actions. Similarly to other countries, the actual Belgian nuclear emergency plan is based on individual projected doses (thyroid committed dose and total effective doses) and independent protective actions that mainly focus on the early phase of an emergency situation. The two approaches are compared in this study on the basis of the projected and residual dose calculations obtained using JRODOS and the Belgian Noodplan models for different radiological or nuclear accidental scenarios. The comparison has been made by considering separately the early and the late phase contributions. The ingestion dose has been investigated from the predicted deposition values and compared to the single level of the ICRP 109 recommendations.