Will President Obama lose votes in 2012 because of racial prejudice? For 2008, we estimated, via a carefully controlled, national survey-based study, that on balance he lost about five percentage points in popular vote share due to intolerance for his race on the part of some voters. What about 2012? There are at least three possibilities: (1) the presidency has become postracial, and the vote will register no racial cost; (2) intolerance has increased, and the vote will register an increased racial cost; and (3) intolerance has decreased, and the vote will register a decreased racial cost. Our evidence, drawn from an analysis comparable to that carried out for 2008, suggests Obama will pay a racial cost of three percentage points in popular vote share. In other words, his candidacy will experience a decrease in racial cost, if a small one. In 2008, this racial cost denied Obama a landslide victory. In the context of a closer election in 2012, this persistent racial cost, even smaller in size, could perhaps cost him his reelection.

How relatively good or bad were the economic performances of our past presidents? The answers to this question remain unclear. Most evaluations of presidential performance cloud the issue with partisan bias and subjective judgments or mix economics together with other policy areas. To address these shortcomings, this article uses new data from the Measuring Worth Project to calculate the relative economic rankings of the United States presidents who served from 1789 until 2009. It analyzes up to 220 years of data on economic growth, unemployment, inflation, government debt, balance of payments, income inequality, currency strength, interest rates, and stock market returns to estimate an economic grade point average for each president. Then, these estimates are used to test for correlations with other variables to generate hypotheses regarding the conditions for superior and inferior economic performance.

In this article results are presented from a conditional logit model of vice presidential selection that correctly predicts Mitt Romney selecting Paul Ryan as his vice presidential running mate in 2012. The model, which correctly predicts 14 of the 20 contested major party vice presidential nominations from 1960 through 2008, suggests that media exposure, political experience, having served in the military, age, and gender/racial/ethnic diversity are significant factors in selecting a vice presidential candidate in the modern era.

This symposium presents 13 articles forecasting the 2012 US national elections. Included in this collection are the eight national and one state presidential vote forecasting models published in PS: Political Science & Politics during the 2008 elections along with three additional forecasts and one article offering a composite of the forecasts. Although the focus remains on the presidential contest, as in past years, several articles extend their scope to cover the congressional elections as well.

Democrat Barack Obama is going to defeat Republican Mitt Romney by a comfortable margin in the 2012 presidential election. This forecast comes from a statistical model that uses the primary performance of the candidates and a cycle in presidential elections to predict the presidential vote. In plain English, Obama has history on his side as well as the fact that he was unchallenged in the primaries. The model, called The Primary Model because of its heavy reliance on primaries, covers elections from 1912, the beginning of presidential primaries. Since 1952, however, only the New Hampshire Primary is used; we justify the choice of New Hampshire at some length.

The 2012 presidential campaign takes place at a time of deep political division in the United States. Democrats and Republicans differ sharply over Barack Obama's performance in office as well as a wide range of issues ranging from government spending and health care to immigration and gay marriage. These divisions are shaping the strategies of the candidates and the outlook for November. Overwhelming majorities of Democrats and Republicans, including overwhelming majorities of independents who lean toward a party, can be expected to support their own party's nominee. As a result, the outcome will depend on which party does a better job of mobilizing its supporters and appealing to a small group of swing voters in 10 or 12 battleground states.

The importance of the economy in US presidential elections is well established. Voters reward or punish incumbent party candidates based on the state of the economy. The electorate focuses particularly on economic change, not the level of the economy per se, and pays more attention to late-arriving change than earlier change. On these points there is a good amount of scholarly agreement (see e.g., Erikson and Wlezien 1996; Hibbs 1987). There is less agreement, however, on what specific indicators matter to voters. Some scholars rely on income growth, others on GDP growth, and yet others on subjective perceptions (see Abramowitz 2008; Campbell 2008; Holbrook 1996b; also see Campbell and Garand 2000). In our work, we have used the index of leading economic indicators, a composite of ten variables, including the University of Michigan's index of consumer expectations, stock prices, and eight other objective indicators.

Election forecasters face increasing turbulence in their relevant environments, making predictions more uncertain, or at least apparently so. For US presidential contests, economic performance and candidate profiles are central variables in most statistical models. These variables have exhibited large swings recently. Before the 2008 US presidential election, the economy fell into a Great Recession, and the candidate of one of the two major parties was, for the first time, a black man. These unprecedented conditions were trumpeted in the media, with heightened frenzy over the “horse race” question of who was going to win the White House. In the press, many forecasts appeared, taking different forms—polls, models, markets, pundits, to name some—offering a broader range of possible outcomes than ever before. Just looking at the predictions of the statistical modelers alone, we find that for 2008 many teams offered estimates of the incumbent (Republican) vote, ranging over an 11 percentage point spread. At one extreme, Lockerbie (2008) forecast 41.8% while at the other extreme Campbell (2008) forecast 52.7%. Of course, other methodologists offered their own, different, forecasts. The media, in its various forms, added to the hyperbole, aggressively reporting different forecasts on an almost daily basis.

This article presents forecasts of the 2012 presidential and US House of Representatives elections. The presidential forecasts are of the national two-party presidential vote percentage for the in-party candidate and are based on the trial-heat and economy forecasting equation and its companion convention-bump equation. The House election forecast is of the net seat change for the Democratic Party from 2010 to 2012. This forecast is produced from two versions of a seats-in-trouble forecasting equation.

According to the Bread and Peace Model postwar, American presidential elections should be interpreted as a sequence of referendums on the incumbent party's record during its four-year mandate period. In fact postwar aggregate votes for president are well explained by just two objectively measured fundamental determinants: (1) weighted-average growth of per capita real disposable personal income over the term, and (2) cumulative US military fatalities due to unprovoked, hostile deployments of American armed forces in foreign wars. No other outside variable systematically affects postwar aggregate votes for president.

Although research at other levels of elected office has shown that incumbency has a powerful, additive effect on votes (Hogan 2004; Jacobson 2009; Krebs 1998), these effects largely have been ignored in presidential forecasting models (but see Abramowitz 2008). Instead, some scholars speculate about the conditional effects of incumbency; specifically, the decreased applicability of the retrospective model when the president is not on the ticket leaving the somewhat-harder-to-blame-or-reward vice president to represent the administration. The difficult-to-predict 2000 presidential election generated some discussion on this point. Although I and others argued (Campbell 2001; Holbrook 2001; Wlezien 2001) that part of the explanation for the forecasting error in 2000 lies with Al Gore's failure to embrace the Bill Clinton-Al Gore record and reinforce retrospective voting, others indicate that the retrospective cue may generally be weaker when the president is not on the ticket (Campbell 2001; Lewis-Beck and Tien 2001; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001). Indeed, Campbell (2001; 2008) argues in favor of only giving half weight to presidential performance variables when the vice president, rather than president, is representing the incumbent administration. The logic here is simple: absent the president on the ticket, it is more difficult to frame the election as a referendum, leading voters to attach less weight to incumbency-oriented considerations. This is not to say that factors such as presidential approval and economic performance are unimportant when incumbents do not run, only that these factors might matter less.

Do our models of political behavior bear any resemblance to reality? Forecasting elections is one opportunity to assess whether our models of voting behavior are accurate. Over the past few decades, political scientists have been willing to put themselves out there to forecast elections. Explaining a past event allows us the ability to retrofit our models before we make them available to the broader community. In short, forecasting elections provides us the opportunity to develop humility. The forecasting community has done a reasonable job over the past few elections. Aside from 2000, forecasters have been largely accurate. Even in 2000, the forecasting community can claim a modest victory. The community was right about the popular vote winner; it just happened that the popular vote winner lost the election that counts—the Electoral College.

In March 2009, at a time when President Obama was basking in the glow of the honeymoon with the public every new president enjoys, I asked, “Will Barack Obama be a one-term president?” What prompted me to pose so impertinent a question at so hopeful a time was that the Office of Management and Budget was projecting that that year the federal government would spend 28% of gross domestic product (GDP). This amounted to a 7% point increase compared to the previous year, the largest peacetime one-year jump since 1930. The most recent estimate for 2012 is that federal outlays will take up 24.3% of GDP, up 3.5% points since 2008. This is the second-largest peacetime increase from one election year to the next since 1880, edged out only by Franklin D. Roosevelt's first-term surge of 3.6% points.

For more than two decades, political scientists have created statistical models aimed at generating out-of-sample predictions of presidential elections. In 2004 and 2008, PS: Political Science and Politics published symposia of the various forecasting models prior to Election Day. This exercise serves to validate models based on accuracy by garnering additional support for those that most accurately foretell the ultimate election outcome. Implicitly, these symposia assert that accurate models best capture the essential contexts and determinants of elections. In part, therefore, this exercise aims to develop the “best” model of the underlying data generating process. Scholars comparatively evaluate their models by setting their predictions against electoral results while also giving some attention to the models' inherent plausibility, parsimony, and beauty.

The election forecasts presented in this article indicate that control of the White House after the 2012 election is a tossup, that control of the US House will likely remain in Republican hands, and that although closely fought, the Republicans have the edge for control of the US Senate. These forecasts were made on July 15, 2012. Obama was predicted to receive 51.3% of the two-party popular vote, 301 electoral votes, and to have a 57.1% chance of winning the Electoral College. The year 2012 was forecast to be one of stasis for the US House, with almost no change in the number of seats controlled by the Republicans: they were forecast to pick up two seats, and to have a 75.6% chance of maintaining their majority. Lastly, the Republicans were predicted to pick up five seats in the US Senate and have about a 61.6% chance of attaining majority control.

Since 2008, the economic fallout from the subprime mortgage crisis has led to the defeat of a number of incumbents in the world's major democracies. For instance, in the former EU-15, eight countries (including France) have ousted their incumbents in favor of new leaders. The United States is no exception, and the 2012 US presidential election will see Barack Obama running for a second term during difficult economic times. After hitting a high of 10% in October 2009, the nation's unemployment rate decreased to 8.2% in May 2012. Nonetheless, this is still 0.7 percentage point higher than what Ronald Reagan faced in 1984 or what confronted George H.W. Bush in 1992 as they ran for their second terms. Looking at measures of presidential popularity for the month of May since 1980, Barack Obama's approval rating is at 46% in the Gallup polls, which is the third-worst rating after George W. Bush (30% in 2008) and George H.W. Bush (39.4% in 1992). Given Barack Obama's approval rating and the current national unemployment level, must we conclude that Barack Obama is irremediably on the ropes against Mitt Romney in 2012?

Nearly all forecast models of US presidential elections provide estimates of the national two-party vote (Campbell 2008). Each of the nine forecasts published in the 2008 forecasting issue of PS: Political Science and Politics made national popular vote total predictions for the major party candidates, while only one provided an expected result in the Electoral College (Klarner 2008). These national vote models are assumed to be reliable forecasts of who is likely to win the general election. In most cases, this assumption is reasonable. It becomes problematic, however, at precisely the point that forecasts are most interesting: when elections are close. In tight elections, national forecasts can and have produced a “winner” different from the actual winner. Consider the forecasts and ultimate outcome of the 2000 election. Each of the 2000 presidential election forecasts predicted vice president Al Gore to win a majority of the two-party popular vote, which he did, but none correctly predicted governor George W. Bush to assume the presidency (Campbell 2001). Never in US history have White House residents been determined through a national popular vote. Presidential elections are decided through contests in the states and the District of Columbia. The forecast model we developed explicitly models the presidential contest based on factors inherent to these 51 jurisdictions. This modeling approach allows us to make a projection of the Electoral College result, which popular vote estimates cannot.

We explicate the precise role that one specific emotion, disgust, plays in generating political acrimony. We do this by identifying the link between the different dimensions along which moral judgments are made by those espousing different political ideologies and the different emotions which undergird these evaluations. These assessments reliably track along liberal and conservative dimensions and are linked to the way values associated with purity and sanctity elicit greater degrees of disgust among conservatives. Here, we review a growing literature showing how disgust affects the psychology of politics through its influence on the cognitive and emotional processes that govern judgments of morality, as well as its direct impact on specific policy preferences. We then apply these findings to the nature and tenor of political discourse and suggest some ways that disgust might affect the character and function of democratic debate and tolerance. Finally, we discuss what these findings mean for public policy.

In fundraising, potential candidates who do not collect sizable amounts of “early money” may be effectively eliminated even before the start of the Iowa Caucus. This winnowing raises concern about the impact money has on narrowing the field of candidates from whom voters can choose. To better grasp patterns of successful fundraising, we explore where candidates obtain funds during the preprimary and primary periods. We use individual contributions data from the Federal Election Commission during the preprimary and primary periods of the 2008 Republican presidential nomination contest. Findings suggest that although California, New York, and Texas provide disproportionate amounts of early financing, the ability of presidential aspirants to broaden their support is indicative of campaign success.

In the run up to the 2010 midterm elections, pundits and politicos often talked of an “enthusiasm gap” between Republicans and Democrats. Although conventional treatments have typically equated these gaps with changes in turnout and the composition of the electorate, we argue that the term better describes the participatory patterns of highly engaged voters. Using multiple data sources, including a geocoded, county-wide study that tracked yard sign displays between 2008 and 2010, we examine the visible evidence of enthusiasm gaps in voters' neighborhoods. Our findings echo recent narratives, yet suggest that scholars have missed important dimensions in their examinations of these “wave” elections.