Transforming conceptual insights about gender into political practice is a critical element of feminist scholarship in the field of political science. This transformational project often entails engagement with activism and advocacy. Examining particular activist modes of translation has been the focus of my own scholarship beginning with my work in the Women and Politics program and at the Center for American Women and Politics while in graduate school at Rutgers. Feminist theorizing, Grosz explains (2010, 96), “enable[s] us to understand the logic at work in culture, social relations, or individual psychology, its points of vulnerability and its capacity for change.” Moreover, feminist theorizing is self-consciously normative; it is about exposing, explaining, and elaborating that which makes possible systems of injustice, with the goal of bringing forth a more gender-just reality.

They do look awfully romantic, those chocolate brides in Victorian gowns and matching pink bouquets. But just as the romance of the wedding often belies the more mundane realities of marriage, the romance of the movement that has come to call itself “marriage equality” may blind us to how difficult and long the struggle for real political equality will be. After all, traditional gender roles have not gone the way of the dinosaur. Why should we expect this to be true of hierarchies based on sexual orientation, particularly if the vehicle for inclusion is the institution of marriage?

As global society has observed the rise of women's rights and their development in a context of globalization, much research has focused on the conditions under which women's rights are acquired (e.g., Fallon 2003; Ferree 2006; Viterna and Fallon 2008). These include domestic conditions, such as democratization, economic development, and women's representation in national politics, as well as transnational conditions, such as neoliberal restructuring and transnational women's movements. Most studies, however, focus merely on one dimension of women's rights or explore one case in depth. Few studies compare cases of women's rights cross-nationally or longitudinally. This limitation can create much confusion in determining the factors that are influential or negligible for women's rights. By replicating and extending a recently published article focusing on women's social rights (Yoo 2011), I seek to distinguish the factors that are more and less influential in explaining women's political, economic, and social rights globally.

Iris Young was a wide-ranging political and social theorist whose works transformed the study of democratic theory, theories of justice, multiculturalism, nationalism, and group rights, among others—all of this in addition to her enormous contribution to feminist theory. Young left not only specific substantive legacies but also her method as a critical social theorist: She sought to undertake projects that helped make sense of the claims and analyses made by progressive social movements, including feminist movements, by providing a philosophical grounding for those claims and analyses. She trained her critical eye on political and social institutions, aiming to expose relations of domination and other injustices.

Women who ran for office in 2018 used a variety of strategies on the campaign trail, with some highlighting more masculine traits and others more feminine traits, but the latter was more common than in prior years. We ask how effective these strategies are for trait evaluations, perceptions of leadership and competence, likeability, and vote choice and how this effect varies based on respondent’s views about the role of women in society. To explore these relationships, we use data from a two-wave panel conducted in the winter of 2019. Results from our experiment show that female candidates who highlight more masculine traits are perceived as more agentic, less communal, and more competent, and, importantly, they do not appear to suffer from a backlash effect. Those higher in sexism also evaluate women who display these qualities as more competent, though as less warm and likable.

The popularization of intersectionality within political science, feminist scholarship, and activism has constituted nothing less than a paradigm shift (Hancock 2007a). Politics & Gender has been a critical actor in enabling change within our discipline. However, this development has been hard won and there remains much to be done to operationalize intersectionality in line with Black feminist theory, and to center women of color and other intersectionally marginalized groups within scholarship. This article both traces the evolution of intersectional approaches within Politics & Gender over two decades and articulates pathways for future gender and politics research which aims to employ intersectionality. We employ quantitative and qualitative analysis of articles’ foci on different inequality structures and categories, their methodological approaches, and how they employ the concept of intersectionality. Subsequently, we argue in favor of approaches which center rather than include diverse intersectionally marginalized groups, emphasize the normative commitments of Black feminist theory to transformative justice rather than liberal inclusion, analyze intersectional structures and institutions as well as individual experience and identity, treat the constitution of categories and groups as contextual and contingent, dare to address the dangers of “women” as a theoretical starting point, and challenge fundamental raced-gendered assumptions of liberal democracy.

Feminists protesting gender-based violence and state violence have been instrumental to contesting the status quo and the shifting discourses, modes of organizing, and registers of protest in Senegal. Some 40 years after the emergence of Yewwu Yewwi, a major feminist movement, Senegalese feminists have returned to radical feminist organizing, despite increasing anti-gender backlash. In this essay, I draw on interviews with feminist activists and politicians between 2013 and 2022 to analyze the March 2021 protests in Senegal in light of previous protests. I argue that the intertwined dynamics of class, gender, and generation are critical to understanding the protests. I do this following the example of some feminist academics who have used intersectionality as a method, theory, and research agenda (Collins and Bilge 2016; Mohammed 2022). Innovations in protest strategies have allowed activists to overcome generational and ideological divides between feminist and women’s rights organizations, as well as within feminist movements, and to resist strategic alliances between patriarchal and political powers.

Recent debates within Women, Peace and Security (WPS) scholarship (e.g., Bergeron, Cohn, and Duncanson 2017; Elias 2015; True 2015) have underlined the need to position the WPS agenda in the context of broader feminist security analysis as defined by early feminist international relations scholars (e.g., Tickner 1992). More precisely, this requires integrating feminist security studies (FSS) and feminist political economy (FPE). At the center of these largely theoretical reflections is a concern that gender-responsive peace-building efforts have too often been undermined by postwar neoliberal economic processes. This essay provides an empirical contribution to this debate, taking the case study of Ukraine as an atypical example of how WPS has been adopted and implemented for the first time during an active conflict. The integration of FPE and FSS proves especially relevant for a country in conflict, where economic austerity policies come along with increased military expenditure. The essay illustrates that the bridging of security and economy is entirely absent in Ukraine's WPS agenda, which has largely prioritized military security while failing to connect it to the austerity policies and the gendered structural inequalities deepened by the ongoing conflict.

The point of departure for this study is the recent work of Burden (2008) on the “gender gap” in partisanship in the United States. He shows that the preponderance of Democratic identification among women is partly a function of the measurement of party identification. When respondents were asked “Do you feel that you are” rather than, more traditionally, “Do you think of yourself as” a Democrat or Republican, the sex gap narrowed to statistical nonsignificance. Burden's explanation for this result lies in the psychology of partisanship. The traditional “think of yourself as” (or cognitive) question primes women to consider their partisanship as a social identity, which in turn activates the stereotypical association between women and the Democratic Party. The “feel that you are” (or affective) question encourages a deeper, more personalized response, rendering social identity less relevant and thereby nullifying the effect of that stereotype.

As Julia Adams and Ann Shola Orloff rightly point out, one of the purposes of my essay “The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State” (2003) is to complicate our understanding of what it means to view events, institutions, and ideas under a gender lens. Our society exhibits multiple logics of gender, that is, in varying ways that “masculinity” and “femininity,” as well as less heterosexual gender ideas, are defined and interpreted. In that essay, I suggest that a traditional meaning of masculinity less noticed recently by feminists, that of the husband/father as loving protector, has been mobilized by the Bush administration to justify both war abroad and the domestic contraction of civil liberties. Part of the lesson I wish to draw for feminist theory is that these varying gender logics may have loose or contradictory relationships to the comportments of actual men and women, especially today. Some women may stand in “masculine” positions, as soldiers or firefighters, and many men may stand in “feminine” positions, as fearful and protected citizens. Gender is better thought of as a set of ideational and social structural relationships that people move through, rather than attributes they have attached to their persons.

Although the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been heralded as a success story for gender justice, in practice prosecutions of sexual and gender-based crimes (SGBC) have often ended with acquittal at the court. Gender studies in international relations explain the lack of successful SGBC prosecutions by looking to the influence of older gender biases in international law, which preclude the successful implementation of the novel Rome Statute provisions criminalizing SGBC. This article suggests that “forgetting” the gender justice norm insufficiently explains the outcome of the ICC's SGBC prosecutions. The article argues that ICC judges “remembered” another norm of criminal justice, long forgotten in international trials – strict compliance with the personal culpability principle – which has resulted in tension between different visions of justice in the court's practice: delivering substantive justice for SGBC victims v. safeguarding the defendant's rights by upholding criminal law principles.

Immigrants seeking asylum in the United States face an unpredictable area of the law. Nonetheless, gay male applicants for asylum seem more likely to succeed if they present evidence of persecution that includes allegations of rape; gay Asian immigrants are less likely than other men to be granted refugee status even when they report having been victims of rape. These two findings suggest that immigration judges, officials with the Bureau of Immigration Appeals, and appellate court judges read and interpret the gender, sexuality, and persecution of the applicants before them through lenses colored by racial expectations. An intersectional analysis of gender, sexuality, and citizenship shows that whereas immigration law is unstable, Western conceptions of sexuality are static and that ethnicity influences judges' conceptions regarding the gender of citizenship.

Historical perspectives form the backdrop and the context for much work on gender in comparative politics scholarship, yet history itself has rarely been incorporated as the lens through which the theorizing of gender occurs. The current growth of interest in gender studies in American political development is strangely not reflected in contemporary trends of historical institutionalism within comparative politics (see Gretchen Ritter's essay in this issue). Although scholars of comparative politics working on gender or women almost always incorporate historical perspectives in their analyses, history is generally drawn on as background or to provide context. History itself is generally not the primary focus of their analysis and historical processes are not used to generate theory. It has been only recently that scholars, especially in the field of historical institutionalism (HI), have begun to think about new ways in which history could be used to develop theory and create new empirical knowledge in the field of comparative politics and gender.

Since Donald Trump took office in 2017, the White House has issued several clear anti-LGBTQIA signals and initiatives. Reflecting on Trump's election as U.S. president, many political scientists have analyzed his rise in the context of the literature on American political development (e.g., Skowronek 2017) and comparative governments (e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Some of this work has received significant media attention and attained a popular readership. The American political development analyses have often focused on the lens of political time and potential party realignment, exploring the possibility of a “disjunctive presidency,” which foretells the demise of the coalition that has enabled the Republican Party to dominate U.S. politics since the Reagan Revolution of the 1980s. Comparative work in the discipline argues that Trump initiatives are threatening to democratic principles, portending a turn toward authoritarianism that parallels the rise of right-wing authoritarian leaders across the globe.

Female attorneys at the U.S. Supreme Court are less successful than male attorneys under some conditions because of gender norms, implicit expectations about how men and women should act. While previous work has found that women are more successful when they use more emotional language at oral arguments, gender norms are context sensitive. The COVID-19 pandemic prompted perhaps the most radical contextual shift in Supreme Court history: freewheeling in-person arguments were replaced with turn-based teleconference arguments. This change altered judicial decision-making and, I argue, justices’ assessments of attorneys’ gender performance. Using quantitative textual analysis of oral arguments, I demonstrate that justices implicitly evaluate gender performance with different metrics in each modality. Gender-normative levels of emotional language predict success in both formats. Function words, however, only predict success in teleconference arguments. Given gender’s salience at the Supreme Court and in broader society, my findings prompt questions about the extent to which women can substantively impact case law.

What is feminist about feminist evolutionary theory, and how valid is the feminist evolutionary analytic approach for understanding violence against women globally? What has evolutionary analysis got to do with legal enclaves, pluralism, and inequitable family law, and how do they cause violence? And, moreover, is legal change, specifically adopting and diffusing similar liberal family status laws worldwide, the best strategy for ending pervasive and egregious violence against women? Valerie M. Hudson, Donna Lee Bowen, and Perpetua Lynne Nielsen's article, “What Is the Relationship between Inequity in Family Law and Violence against Women? Approaching the Issue of Legal Enclaves” (Politics & Gender. 2011. 7 (4): 453–92) raises theoretical, empirical, and praxeological questions for feminist scholars of politics and international relations that this Critical Perspectives section takes up with essays from six contributors selected from an open call for papers.

Although women's representation in Haiti is generally very low, the number of women judges has increased since the demise of authoritarianism and violent conflict in the 1990s. This case study explores why. I find that “gender-neutral” judicial reforms aimed at strengthening the judiciary have done more for women's judicial representation than explicitly gender-targeted policies, which still lack implementation. Donor-supported reforms have introduced more merit-based and transparent appointment procedures for magistrates (judges and public prosecutors) based on competitive examinations. This has helped women circumvent the largely male power networks that previously excluded them from the judiciary. The judiciary remains understudied in the scholarship on women's access to decision-making in fragile and conflict-affected societies; this article contributes to this emerging literature.

I seek to engage the authors in a deeper interrogation of their claims, particularly that societies can mitigate the evolutionary legacy of patriarchy by limiting the influence of religious/cultural enclaves and instead promoting universalism, as exemplified in CEDAW and international law. I challenge and politicize this alleged “choice” between universalism and cultural/religious enclaves/relativism, as it ultimately rests on a series of too-easy dichotomies (secular/religious, western/nonwestern) that may inadvertently stymie collaborative attempts between “western” and “non-western” feminists to challenge inequitable family law and gender violence. Hudson, Bowen, and Nielsen (2011) do offer critiques of western states. They are careful to point out nuances, subtleties, and complexities with their concept of religious/cultural enclaves. They also convincingly broaden the concept of gender equality beyond formal political rights to the kind of social, legal, and economic justice encapsulated in equitable family law and freedom from violence. And, they provoke an examination of why and how gender equality and gender violence are linked. But I suggest that their empirical research might have better traction by taking seriously two problematic implications of championing the “universal” as necessarily progressive: the failure to recognize patriarchy as part of universalism; and the inattention to why and how religious/cultural enclaves are patriarchal.

In my recent explorations of black women as subjects in research-length articles that employ intersectionality, I discovered that black women are rarely, if at all, the sole subjects of such research projects (Jordan-Zachery 2011). This analysis focused on articles published, between 1996 and 2010, in two political science journals that are often ranked at the top—American Political Science Review and Journal of Politics (see Garand and Giles, 2003, on the issue of journal ranking). Also included were two political science journals whose central focus is women and politics, generally defined—Journal of Women Politics and Policy and Women & Politics. My analysis was limited to research-length articles with a U.S.-based emphasis. The data suggest the following trends: Research on intersectionality tended to treat black women in a monolithic manner; only a certain group of black women served as research subjects (elected officials dominated the research); and research tended to focus on structural and political intersectionality while ignoring representational intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991).

We examine cultural and ideological barriers to gender equality in a young democracy, Indonesia, where women’s political representation has increased slowly since democratization, but where survey results point to declining support for women’s political leadership. In both country and comparative literature, the effect of ideological factors—including religion—on voter support for women candidates is contested. Using results of a nationally representative survey, we group respondents according to a “political patriarchy” index. We find that being a Muslim is a strong predictor of holding patriarchal attitudes; university education is associated with gender-egalitarian views. Patriarchal views, in turn, are associated with opposition to increasing Indonesia’s gender quota and with lower levels of self-reported voting for female candidates. Our findings suggest that patriarchal attitudes drive both policy preferences and voter behavior. We conclude that Indonesia’s recent conservative Islamic turn likely underpins widespread—and increasing—opposition to gender equality in politics.