The aim of this paper is to show that the argument put forth by Bell and Hallett against Putnam's thesis regarding the invariance of meaning for quantum logical connectives is insufficient to establish their conclusion. By using an example from the causal theory of time, the paper shows how the condition they specify as relevant in cases of meaning variance in fact fails. As a result, the conclusion that negation undergoes a change of meaning in the quantum logical case is left in doubt. The paper proceeds in three stages. First, a summary of Putnam's argument for the invariance of meaning in the case of quantum logical connectives is provided; this is followed by a review of the criticisms advanced against it by Bell and Hallett. Finally, it is shown how the main claim upon which their major criticism rests is unfounded.

In his new book What is a Law of Nature?, David Armstrong gives an account of functional laws on the basis of the theory, originally proposed independently by Armstrong himself, Dretske, and Tooley, and further developed in this work, which asserts that laws are relations of necessitation between properties. On the theory, properties and relations are universals, and so a law is a relation between universals and is itself a universal. There are two reasons why Armstrong's account of functional laws is worth discussing. First, any theory that purports to be about laws that are investigated by science–I assume that we are only interested in such theories–must cover functional laws and not merely be adequate for generalizations about ravens or grue. Second, Armstrong claims that the main rival to his theory, the regularity theory of laws, cannot give a satisfactory account of functional laws (p. 22 and p. 37, all references to What is a Law of Nature? unless otherwise stated). If this is true, and if Armstrong's theory can provide a satisfactory account of functional laws, then this may incline us towards his point of view.

Clark Glymour (1980) defined bootstrap-confirmation as a three-place relation: “Evidence E bootstrap confirms hypothesis H with respect to theory T.“ By an ingenious choice of examples, David Christensen (1983) has shown that Glymour's definition is satisfied in a class of cases in which confirmation seems to be highly counterintuitive. Responding to Christensen's criticism, Glymour (1983) revised his 1980 definition of bootstrap confirmation, by introducing an additional condition that rules out Christensen's counterexamples.

In this note I test a specific thesis about the dependence of philosophy of science on science that Laudan presents in his Science and Hypothesis; namely, that the sciences were justificationally prior to the philosophy of science. I argue that Laudan's historical case studies show a justificational priority that goes the other way. I also argue that the justificational role that in Progress and Its Problems the history of science is alleged to play vis-à-vis competing conceptions of scientific rationality is not apparent in Laudan's argumentation in favor of his suggested analysis in terms of problem-solving effectiveness.

In several places we have argued that ‘fitness’ is a primitive term with respect to the theory of evolution properly understood (Rosenberg 1978, 1982, 1983; Williams 1976). These arguments have relied heavily on the axiomatization of the theory provided by one of us (Williams 1970). In contrast, both John Beatty and Robert Brandon have separately argued for a “propensity“ interpretation of “fitness” (Mills and Beatty 1979; Brandon 1978); and in Brandon and Beatty (1984) they attack our view that “fitness“ is a primitive term in evolutionary theory, concluding that a definition by way of propensities is possible and preferable. Here we reply to their criticisms, and argue that, at most, the view that fitness is a statistical propensity is a terminological variant on our thesis that it is a primitive in evolutionary theory.

Most readers will agree with the starting assumptions of Klee (1984) that contemporary science and philosophy assume a primarily micro-deterministic view of nature–and that this has long been the case, or was at least until the 1970s. (As I will explain later, I think such an assumption has been open to question since the mid-1970s.) Defending a strict micro-determinism, Klee argues that concepts of emergence that seemingly are opposed to micro-determinist doctrine can be shown, on analysis, to be ultimately consistent with a thoroughgoing philosophy of micro-determinism. An exception is made, however, in the case of my own view, labeled “direct macro-determinism,” which he describes as “ultimately more troublesome” but then disposes of as being based on “simplistic analogies” and “metaphors” and “too weak to be conclusive.”

The preface by Parsons begins: “This book contains the most substantial philosophical papers I wrote for publication up to 1977, with one new essay added. … The collection is unified by a common point of view underlying the essays and by certain problems that are approached from different angles in different essays. Most are directly concerned with the philosophy of mathematics, and even in those that are not … the connection between the issues discussed and mathematics is never far from the surface … in the Introduction I articulate some elements of my general point of view and point out some connections between the essays.“ The nine previously published papers are unrevised except in some cases for added postscripts and footnotes. Of the essays written for publication before 1977, essay 7, “Quine on the Philosophy of Mathematics,” has not been, in fact, previously published. The eleventh, “Sets and modality,“ is the new essay. A general point of view does indeed show itself in these essays, but it is rigorously subordinated to careful and balanced analyses of the problems discussed. That is why, without sharing all elements of the point of view, I have profited so much from these essays and, seeing them collected together, am so impressed by them.

In their 1983 article, Popper and Miller present an argument against inductive probability. This argument is criticized by Redhead in his 1985 article. The aim of the present note is to state one form of the Popper-Miller argument, and defend it against Redhead's criticisms.

John Searle's provocative essay, “Minds, Brains, and Programs“ (1980), with its Chinese-room thought experiment (see the Appendix), has generated a great deal of interest and controversy among philosophers, computer scientists, and cognitive scientists.

Six recently discussed problems in discrete probabilistic sample space, which have been found puzzling and even paradoxical, are reexamined. The importance is stressed of a sharp distinction between the formalization of mathematical problems and their formal solution that, applied to probability theory, must lead through the explicit partitioning of a sample space. If this approach is consistently followed, such problems reveal themselves to be either inherently ambiguous, and therefore without solution, or quite straightforward. In both cases nothing remains of any sense of paradox.

Larry Laudan's primary aim in his latest book, Science and Values, is to account for the high degree of agreement and the ubiquity of disagreement in science. Arguing that earlier philosophers have either concentrated on agreement and ignored disagreement or highlighted disagreement at the expense of agreement, he sets out to provide “a single, unified theory of rationality which promises to be able to explain both these striking features of science” (p. 3). However, while recognizing that Laudan has done much to clarify this issue and to bring traditional thinking about science into line with scientific practice, I shall argue that the basic problem remains to be solved. To do justice to agreement and disagreement, we must pursue a more radical course than the one Laudan charts.

What has belief to do with perception? Some contemporary philosophers have suggested that one's perceiving an object entails one's having a particular perceptual belief, not just some belief or other, about that object. N. R. Hanson, for instance, has illustrated the present view, with respect to visual perception, as follows:

This is an interesting, well argued, and highly readable book; anyone interested in the central philosophical problems with which it deals will benefit from studying it.

Stalnaker defines inquiry as the process of forming, testing, and revising beliefs. His goal is to lay the groundwork for a theory of inquiry, by elaborating and defending a certain apparatus in terms of which the process of inquiry should be described.

In his paper, “Grand Unified Gauge Theories and the Number of Elementary Particles,“ Robert Weingard (1984) suggests what he calls the Extended Redhead's Principle (ERP) for elementary particles: “Two particles for which there are conceivable circumstances in which one can be ‘rotated’ or reoriented into the other are the same (species of) particles” (p. 154). The philosophical soundness of such a principle is questionable.

About twenty years ago, philosophers debated the verifiability of the statement “Last night everything doubled in size.” It seems that universal nocturnal expansion would double our rulers and tape measures making the size change indiscernible. I think that there is an internal analogue to the question “Did everything double in size last night?” The question “Did my preferences double in intensity last night?“ also raises problems of verification.

Douglas W. Hands's “What Economics Is Not: An Economist's Response to Rosenberg“ (Hands 1984a) is an unsympathetic criticism of the explanatory hypotheses of “If Economics Isn't Science, What Is It?” (Rosenberg 1983). Before replying to his objection, I summarize the claims of that paper.