Article contents
Quantum Logic and the Invariance Argument—A Reply to Bell and Hallett
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Extract
The aim of this paper is to show that the argument put forth by Bell and Hallett against Putnam's thesis regarding the invariance of meaning for quantum logical connectives is insufficient to establish their conclusion. By using an example from the causal theory of time, the paper shows how the condition they specify as relevant in cases of meaning variance in fact fails. As a result, the conclusion that negation undergoes a change of meaning in the quantum logical case is left in doubt. The paper proceeds in three stages. First, a summary of Putnam's argument for the invariance of meaning in the case of quantum logical connectives is provided; this is followed by a review of the criticisms advanced against it by Bell and Hallett. Finally, it is shown how the main claim upon which their major criticism rests is unfounded.
- Type
- Discussion
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986
Footnotes
I would like to thank William Demopoulos for drawing my attention to the point that constitutes the central argument of this paper as well as for many helpful discussions of the issues dealt with. I would also like to thank Michael Friedman for several valuable suggestions. Support of research by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada is gratefully acknowledged.
References
- 2
- Cited by