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In Defense of the Popper-Miller Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Donald Gillies*
Affiliation:
Department of History and Philosophy of Science, Chelsea College, University of London

Abstract

In their 1983 article, Popper and Miller present an argument against inductive probability. This argument is criticized by Redhead in his 1985 article. The aim of the present note is to state one form of the Popper-Miller argument, and defend it against Redhead's criticisms.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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Footnotes

I am most grateful for discussions with Sir Karl Popper and David Miller that convinced me of the correctness of their argument. The main point in the present note is based on a related argument which Popper communicated to me by letter. I would also like to thank Colin Howson, Frank Lad, and Michael Redhead for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

References

Good, I. J. (1984), “The Impossibility of Inductive Probability”, Nature 310: 434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jeffrey, R. C. (1984), “The Impossibility of Inductive Probability”, Nature 310: 433.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, I. (1984), “The Impossibility of Inductive Probability”, Nature 310: 433.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, K. R., and Miller, D. (1983), “A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability”, Nature 302: 687–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Popper, K. R., and Miller, D. (1984), “The Impossibility of Inductive Probability”, Nature 310: 434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Redhead, M. L. G. (1985), “On the Impossibility of Inductive Probability”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36: 185–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar