Much of the recent debate on the labor market issues of developing countries has revolved around the interaction of the labor market with stabilization and structural adjustment policies, introduced mostly in conjunction with the IMF and the World Bank. In particular, there is a growing body of literature on the interaction between structural adjustment policies and employment performance in these countries.

According to the dominant view in this literature, the favorable employment effects of these policies stem basically from the shift of industrial trade strategy from state-led import substitution towards market-based export orientation.

Since the rise of the ruling Justice and Development Party in the early 2000s, Turkey has invested in several mega transport and infrastructure projects for the purposes of economic transformation, growth, and development. This article explores the impact of a recently completed mega-project—the Osman Gazi Bridge—on material change and popular imagination about the future. It claims that, while the Bridge created a colossal material change that can be observed by everyone, it also animated an imagined post-industrial transition and inclusive development in the industrial town of Dilovası. Although the dream of a better future serves as a medium for the industrial town’s underprivileged inhabitants to connect and socialize, along with the current marginalizing conditions, it also has the potential to fuel future resistance, if imagination is unable to be transformed into reality.

This study applies the proactive/reactive state framework to the transformation of Spanish and Turkish finance capital in a comparative perspective. It concludes that the “proactive” policies pursued by the Spanish state and the strategic coalition established between political elites and the integrationist segments of finance capital resulted in the heterodox internationalization of Spanish firms, whereas the “reactive” state policies in Turkey, designed in line with orthodox neoliberal dictums, paved the way for an incomplete internationalization. The 2007/2008 crisis, however, demonstrates that the same state may be both proactive and reactive across various policy fields over time. The recent Spanish financial crisis and Turkey's regulatory success after 2001 illustrate this point.

Throughout the Ottoman Empire, land was always the major source of revenue and surplus and thus inevitably a major source of contention. Myriad property-rights disputes were recorded in the registers of the local kadı courts and archives of the various ministries in Istanbul. Conflicts over the agricultural surplus revealed in such documentation demonstrate, for instance, that peasants in the sixteenth century not only contested taxes imposed on them but also opposed the illegal transfer of land titles by the sipahis (İnalcık 1997, p. 72). By the middle of the sixteenth century, the practice of selling state-owned miri lands–which by legal definition could not be bought or sold–had become widespread, sometimes even confirmed by the rulings of the local kadı courts. The stamp of şeriyye implicit in the kadı's ruling meant in effect that the land subject to sale was taken out of the miri land regime and placed in the legal category of freehold mülk lands (İnalcık 1997, p. 112).

When introducing this survey, it is necessary to say a word of justification about the time limits adopted. The year 1500 has been selected as an approximate starting point, because only during the reign of Sultan Bayezid II (1481-1512) do Ottoman tax registers become frequent enough to allow even approximate conclusions with respect to agricultural production. However when dealing with certain regions of the Empire, we need to adopt an even later starting point. After all, part of this paper deals with ‘Syria’ in the broad sense of the word, that is, the region bordering the eastern Mediterranean between Anatolia and Egypt; and this area was only conquered by the Ottomans in 1516. As to Tunisia, to which the present paper will also refer, this country only became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1533 or 1570.

Considerable research has examined Turkey’s discursive governance of the Syrian refugee crisis, identifying the central themes and metaphors in top officials’ refugee-related messages. However, since they tend to rely on qualitative analyses based on convenience or purposive samples, prior studies have failed to assess the relative frequency of these themes and fall short of reliably gauging the shifts and continuities in the official discourse on refugees. Moreover, while several studies have noted the growing emphasis on the repatriation of Syrian refugees in recent years, no research has yet explored how the Turkish government has sought to reconcile this with its pro-refugee posturing. This paper addresses these limitations via a mixed methods analysis of 382 speeches President Erdoğan gave from September 2014 through December 2022. Quantitative findings show that Islamist and neo-Ottomanist themes have played a major role in Erdoğan’s refugee discourse throughout his presidency. However, since 2018, there has been a sharp increase in Erdoğan’s remarks about repatriating Syrian refugees. A critical discourse analysis of these remarks indicates that Erdoğan has appropriated the language of international law and standards on refugee returns so that he can continue to claim the moral high ground while simultaneously advocating mass repatriation of the Syrians.

This paper is about the process of constituting public memory and subjectivity in the context of post-colonial transformation. It hopes to raise a number of questions about the context in which memory is produced and how context affects the way such memory is then transmitted. It argues that the process of memory cannot be truly understood without including emotions in the analysis. I will attempt to show that, when memory is considered in conjunction with emotions, what gets told might often become destabilized by what gets transmitted. I will show, firstly, that memories recounted in life story interviews become part of the process of generational transmission and, secondly, that these memories are anchored to emotions which become the main content of transmission. And yet, because of the way emotions circulate in discourse, emotions get separated from the objects they were attached to in the original discourse and thus destabilize the process of transmission.

Europe of the interwar years witnessed the rise of agrarian populism in several countries. In a sense, something in the “spirit of the age” paved the way for the rise of agrarian ideologies throughout the world. The impact of the Great Depression also played a role in the rise of this phenomenon, since urbanization, industrialization, and liberalism increasingly were seen as responsible for this global economic catastrophe. Turkey of the 1930s and afterward witnessed the rise of such a populism, with an emphasis on the cult of the peasant as one of the most important intellectual motifs of cultural and political discourse. As a matter of fact, agrarian populism, or the so-called köycülük (peasantism), as it was referred to in Turkish, was one of the most important constituent elements of Kemalist populism from the early 1930s through the end of World War II. In this period, the state devised cultural and practical projects for an ideological campaign emphasizing the significance of improving the social and economic conditions of the peasantry. For this reason, in the Turkish press, many wrote about köycülük, and official and semiofficial state institutions such as People’s Houses organized peasantist (köycü) activities throughout the country. The impact of such an intellectual campaign could be seen in some of the most important undertakings of the single-party regime, such as the establishment of the Village Institutes and the land-reform attempts.

The Covid-19 crisis that led to the loss of thousands of lives and initiated one of the most complex social and economic upheavals has also a created a window of reflection for health systems researchers to revisit our major concepts, frameworks, and underlying assumptions. This commentary reviews two literatures that remain rather separate: comparative health policy and global health. First, I examine whether convergence in circumstances brought about by the spread of Covid-19 creates opportunities for learning “about” as well as unpacking the motivations of policy actors and how they use the cross-national information. However, given the emphasis on national policy actors and processes, this literature may overlook the importance of global actors, institutions and ideas. Second, global health differentiates itself with an emphasis on multilateralism as a political positioning and its multidisciplinary and multi-sectoral approach. However, the global health field is also challenged to consider its mission, political standing on multilateralism, changing relationships between North and South and its commitment to multidisciplinary approach. I argue that health systems scholars should use the window of opportunity created by Covid-19 pandemic to reexamine their methodologies and rearticulate their positioning by acknowledging the voice and agency of the Global South.

Focusing on queer-identified amateur football teams, this article investigates the potentials of the mobilities and alliances of gender non-conforming footballing people to disrupt the seemingly effortless structure of the football field. While football is arguably one of the sports with the strongest discriminatory attitudes toward gender non-conforming people, it has also become a site of resistance for queers in Turkey as of 2015. How political opposition groups relate to the football field, which is mostly considered as a male-dominant and heterosexualized space where social norms are reproduced, are classified into three groups in my research: resistance through, against, and for football. I give particular attention to the category “resistance for football” as a distinctive way for gender non-conforming people to inhabit the field. I discuss how the link between sexual and spatial orientations shapes the domain of what a body can do, both in terms of normativity and capacity, and I explore what these teams offer in order to exceed spatial and sexual boundaries. Lastly, I present recent queer interventions in the value system of the game through which I reflect upon the concept of “queer commons” and the processes of bonding, belonging, and border-making in queer communities.

This article analyzes the reemergence of the film industry in İstanbul since the mid-1990s. In exploring the industrial and spatial dynamics of this process of reemergence, we employ the perspective of path dependence, conducted with the aid of historical analysis and in-depth interviews with the key actors of the sector. By zooming in on the details of this industry’s reemergence, we uncover the specifics of the process of revival in terms of both the industry itself and of location. Analysis of the industry reveals the impact on the revival of İstanbul’s film sector of system-wide developments, the key roles played by the advertising and television sectors, and entrepreneurial initiatives. Analysis of location, on the other hand, reveals that, following the collapse of Yeşilçam—the historical center of İstanbul’s film industry—two new clusters have emerged, one located in the vicinity of the old center (Beyoğlu) and the other in a rising commercial district (Levent).

Ottoman poetry is an empty sign. It floats, unfettered by the correspondence between words and things conventional to the typically modern signification of historical realities. But the sign (under which many of the other written Ottoman humanities—philosophy, literary-critical writing, fine art literature, and thought in general—tend to be subsumed) is not exactly empty. It carries double, or overdetermined, meaning. Though empty of poetry the term Ottoman poetry does not, for most people, call Ottoman poetry to mind—it is full of other things in so far as the sign is “read” as a rhetorical figure, a symbol, an allegory of the national narrative. And since the middle of our century, at the latest, when the first generation born into the Turkish Republic had come of age, it has continued to be read this way. That is, the allegory continually displaces the reality. Either the poetry is not known and there is no poetry in mind to recall, or, if it is known, the experience of recall is overdetermined in ways that can be connected with the poetry only through an analysis of the history of its modern reception, probably beginning with Young Ottoman polemic c. 1860's-1880's.

This article is based on an ethnographic study in the Turkish hospitality sector and examines the employment of simple forms of labor control in hospitality service work from the perspective of labor process analysis. It introduces ethnographic data from two holiday villages on the southern coast of Turkey serving international customers. The two holiday villages were workplaces that employed mostly young workers for low-skill, routine tasks that demanded intense physical and emotional labor, but without due remuneration, career chances, and employment security. Data based on participant observation and in-depth interviews point to an increasing managerial reliance on simple forms of labor control. This happens as a result of intensifying competition among hospitality firms in a market with volatile demand and managerial perceptions regarding employees’ lack of customer service skills due to routinization and simplification of tasks after the introduction of the all-inclusive boarding system. Such market-related developments encourage employers to use simple control mechanisms that help in adjusting staffing levels, imposing loyalty, cutting costs, and ensuring efficiency.

This paper discusses the role played by the extensive, nation-wide network of sales agents organized by the leading Turkish manufacturer of consumer durables, Arçelik, in the formation of mass consumption markets in the post-Second World War era. The case study attempts to draw attention to a relatively less explored dimension of the industrialization experience of developing countries by shifting the usual emphasis on the structure of production toward the organization of consumption. This shift of emphasis serves to highlight certain society-specific mechanisms of market formation which compensate the limitations of the market-forming role of the state in the context of twentieth-century late industrialization.

In the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, British entrepreneurs were prominent in all the major sectors of the Izmir economy, forming one of the most important western communities in the city. They played an active role in the city's large commercial sector, not only in imports and exports, but also in complementary sectors such as insurance and maritime transportation. They also participated in money-lending and tax-farming. As the light-industrial sector of Izmir's economy grew, British entrepreneurs took advantage of the new opportunities offered there. They were particularly prominent in sectors that needed large capital resources and technological expertise, such as mining or infrastructure projects. Despite their strong economic presence, at no time did they monopolize any sector. Their dominance in various sectors was constantly challenged and at times checked by strong competition from other capital, both western and local. Nevertheless, the larger British houses attempted to dominate the sector in which they specialized, and constantly diversified their economic activities and patterns of investment. Despite intense competition, the British maintained a primary position in Izmir's economy throughout this period.

Two frequently discussed issues in Turkish electoral studies concern the instability and geographical cleavages in electoral preferences. Turkish voters are not strongly identified with political parties and frequently vote for different parties due primarily to patronage distribution. Their vote is also strongly influenced by parochial ties. Despite various regulations in electoral laws, such as a minimum 10 percent nationwide support for representation in the Parliament, which makes representation of smaller parties in the legislature difficult, fractionalization of electoral support continuously increased over the last two decades. Consequently, formation of stable governments became more and more difficult.

In a recent book detailing the massive war migration in the South-East of Turkey, Kemal Öztürk questions: “Has an Islamic position been made clear on the Kurdish problem, which for the last ten years has assumed the highest place on the national agenda?” and goes on to ask: “In the fifteen reports suggesting solutions to the Kurdish problem is there one representing muslims?” He concludes by saying, “Unfortunately the answer to both questions must be ‘no’” (Öztürk 1996, p. 104). Öztürk's comments are interesting for three reasons: first, is his assumption that a distinct Islamic stance is possible regarding the Kurdish problem. Second is his deploring of the fact that such a position has not been enunciated. And third is the rather disingenuous claim that the lack of a clear response in the name of Islam is synonymous with no position at all by the religious camia (community), as if the ‘de facto’ positions of muslims, i.e. their actual practice, could be dismissed quite so unproblematically.

Recent studies have shown that the media in developing countries recognizes the anthropogenic impact on climate change, while ignoring the mitigation and adaptation responsibilities of national political actors. This article addresses the discursive motives underlying the disconnect between the impact of climate change and the responsibility of those in positions of political power. This study analyzes Turkish news articles and columns on climate change published in three newspapers with different political orientations between June 2018 and January 2020, a period during which the school strike movement and other local uprisings and debates began. It claims that news related to national climate policy largely omits or obscures references to the anthropogenic causes of climate change, to the degree that the political responsibility of tackling it remains unaddressed and absolves readers and politicians from taking action. The article also aims to underline the impact of political parallelism in terms of the print media’s approach to the government’s neoliberal economic policy and its duty to tackle climate change. Finally, it argues that these approaches generate specific types of environmental discourses which are embodied in newspapers’ conceptions of nature, their solutions to climate change, and the actors of those solutions proposed by newspapers.