It is a great honour to have been invited by the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism to give this Ernest Gellner lecture. Ernest Gellner was for some years a colleague here at LSE, but he had been an intellectual hero of mine ever since, in the midst of an undergraduate philosophy course in the mid-1960s, I read Words and Things. His contribution, in substance as in style, was unique. He did not put up with cant, he was provocative in judgement, transgressive in regard to disciplinary boundaries. In so doing he inspired many younger writers. They do not, as they say, make people like that any more.

This article considers the normative and hypostatising functions of nationalist discourse, and the necessity of rhetoric to nations and nationalism. It does so on the basis of a case study of sententiousness in the thought of Alfredo Rocco. Rocco was one of the most important Nationalist and Fascist intellectuals and the legislative architect of the Fascist state. His political thought is analysed by taking as a starting point a quirk of the historiography on Rocco, which insistently attributes a dangerous ‘rigour’ to his texts, and in particular to the punchy, sententious quality of his style. A close reading of Rocco's nationalism, using Flaubert to understand the rhetoric of sententiousness, reveals a systematic pattern of contradictions between normative and hypostatised definitions of the nation. Aspects of these findings, it is argued, can potentially be extended to embrace all forms of nationalism.

This special issue aims to acquaint the readers of Nations and Nationalism with some of the central debates on gender and nationalism that have evolved over the last two decades. This field has moved from providing empirical footnotes to more general discussions of nationalism (featuring, in particular, studies of women's role in nationalist movements or national liberation struggles) to articulating a fundamental critique of mainstream theories. Critiques of gender-blind approaches to the treatment of national and ethnic phenomena are based on the premise that such approaches limit our understanding of the complex material, political and symbolic processes involved in the articulation of various national projects. The articles presented in this issue illustrate both the different positions in these debates and the varied ways in which a gender perspective illuminates our understanding of national and ethnic processes.

This article argues that the emergence and development of subaltern political process is a significant conflict dynamic found in the escalation of ethnic nationalist movements. These ethnie-defined modes of political participation are in turn an expression of the autonomous nature of ethnic nationalism, but occur ‘underneath’ and often antecedent to the organised violence and militancy which distracts most analyses of these conflicts. The article discusses this process of insurgent political mobilisation as a response to the structural paralysis of the post-colonial state, using the ethnic nationalist conflict in Indian Jammu and Kashmir as the central case study. In its discussion of this case, the article seeks to argue that the presence of such subaltern political process provides additional empirical evidence of the autonomous nature of ethnic nationalism, and its capacity to carve out alternative options for democratic action and popular participation.

The Roman–Jewish wars of 66–70, 115–17 and 132–35 CE destroyed the territorial, social and political bases of militant Jewish nationalism. Successive defeats brought a Roman ban on Jewish residence in Jerusalem and on proselytisation. Most of the Jewish population of Judaea, in southern Palestine, was annihilated or exiled. The creative heart of Judaism shifted to Galilee, where the study of rabbinic law and homiletics flourished, mostly in Hebrew, and the Mishna – the basis of the Talmud – was edited by the Tannaim (Mishna teachers). This culture was an implicit rejection of Graeco-Roman civilisation and values in favour of a more exclusivist religious-cultural nationalism. It is argued in this paper that this form of nationalism, though rare in the ancient world, anticipates more recent national movements of defeated peoples.

This article offers a gender re-reading of the international history of the post-First World War peace process, a period when nationalism is said to have reached its ‘apogee’, when national self-determination and mutual cooperation between nations in the form of a League of Nations defined liberal aspirations for a democratic new world order. It was also a period when international women's organisations emphasised female self-determination as both a national and international issue. Juxtaposed, these two aspects of the history of the peace of 1919 shed light on the importance of sex difference to the idea of national self-determination and to the overlapping constitution of the national and the international as spheres of political agency and influence in the early twentieth century.

One of the most challenging developments for students of international relations is the resurgence of ethnic strife, including secessionism and irredentism. Basic questions are only beginning to be addressed in the post-Cold War era. Why are some states more likely than others to intervene in ethnic conflicts? How can international norms about third-party intervention in ethnic conflicts be evaded or ignored by some states but respected by others? Why are some states inclined to use force rather than mediation to resolve ethnic strife? In short, what accounts for the emergence of adventurous and belligerent foreign policies with respect to internal ethnic conflicts? These questions are of increasing importance to students of international politics, yet the dynamics and internationalisation of ethnic conflict are far from fully understood.

This study focuses on the dynamics of third-party intervention in ethnic strife and implications for peaceful resolution. The first section presents a model that identifies the general conditions under which ethnic strife is most likely to lead to intervention by third-party states. The second uses four cases to illustrate, within the context of the model, different processes with respect to internationalisation of ethnic conflict. The third and final stage identifies implications for policy and theory, along with directions for future research.

It is inaccurate and misleading to apply the term ‘nationalism’ to Russia prior to the present day. Both Tsarist and Soviet leaders sought to maintain an empire and not a nation-state, and their national consciousness was imperial rather than national. The lack of Russian nationalism was crucial for Russian history since it explains the failure of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Modern societies cannot be successfully constructed upon the basis of imperial thinking. The absence of Russian nationalism also has significance for nationalism theory. Russia possessed the social, political and cultural characteristics that have been adduced as ‘causes’ of nationalism by a wide variety of scholars, yet Russia failed to develop a nationalist movement. This suggests that what is crucial to modern nationalism is the appearance of a particularist, secular ideology, since the most notable aspect in which Russia differed from Europe was Russia's universalistic, religious and imperialist discourse of national identity.

The formation of nation-states from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East after World War I, under colonial auspices, proceeded with negotiations in some instances and hostilities in others from previously autonomous communities, some of them formally designated as millets. Iraq comprised a diversity of religious and ethnic communities. The Assyrians, Christian mountain tribes, mostly refugees from Turkish Kurdistan under British protection, were one community which actively resisted integration into the new nation-state and, as a result, were subject to violent attacks by the nascent Iraqi army in 1933. This episode and the way it was perceived and interpreted by the different parties is an interesting illustration of the political psychology of communitarianism in interaction with nationalism, complicated by religious identifications, all in a colonial context. Subsequent histories and commentaries on the episode are also interesting in illuminating ideological readings.

In a survey of public opinion about the behaviour of officials in four postcommunist countries – Ukraine, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – we found pervasive suspicions of ethnic bias. Although ethnic minorities themselves were particularly suspicious of officials, there was a consensus across both ethnic majorities and minorities that officials favoured their own ethnic group and discriminated against others.

Suspicion may distort reality, however. Citizen' own reports of dealing with officials generally revealed much less ethnic discrimination in their personal experience than in their suspicions, presumptions and perceptions. Either suspicion exaggerated reality or general perceptions of bias focused on the most badly treated, rather than the most numerous, minorities.

Ethnic minorities themselves behaved in different ways towards officials. Amongst the ethnic minorities covered in this study, only Gypsies displayed the characteristics of hopelessness and ‘exclusion’. Some minorities behaved much like the titular nationality. But most compensated for their minority status by engaging more than the titular nationality in a wide range of strategies to influence officials – including the use of contacts, presents and bribes. Conversely, in areas where an ethnic minority was concentrated locally, members of the titular nationality displayed a measurably defensive reaction and a somewhat heightened degree of vigilance.

The paper is based on a total of 6,050 interviews made in the winter of 1997–8, including representative country-wide samples and special additional samples in areas where ethnic minorities were concentrated. It compares the four titular nationalities with eight ethnic minorities.

Nations and national projects are gendered in different ways. Feminist theory has raised important questions about the conceptualisation of ‘difference’. This article develops the conceptualisation of the different ways in which nations and national projects are gendered, arguing for a mid-level conceptualisation of gender relations. It argues against, on the one hand, the excessive fragmentation of gender, and on the other, too simple dichotomies of more/less unequal gender relations. This draws on a theorisation of gender relations which connects the different dimensions into specific kinds of gender regimes, either public or domestic gender regimes. This enables us to conceptualise different national projects as having a more or less public or domestic gender project. The conflicts between different national projects and with other polities, such as states, are then conflicts between differently gendered projects. The usefulness of this mid-level conceptualisation is demonstrated through examples of the competing relations between the UK, Ireland, the EU and the Catholic Church in a global era.

The politics of national identity in the Republic of Tatarstan are complex and often contradictory. Although sometimes posed in terms of an historical legacy, claims to nationhood are also strongly shaped by more pragmatic contemporary concerns. In addition to more conventional forms of political mobilisation, national identity is also contested in cultural arenas. Examining policies on language reform and media development, for example, sheds light on the processes through which a sense of national identity is currently being renegotiated in Tatarstan. The Republic's official multicultural policy is situated in the context of a range of distinct conceptions of Tatarstan's identity, from radical Islamic nationalism to a view of the republic as a Russian province.

I argue first that there are many different concepts of the nation, and advocate a certain conceptual pluralism. I also argue that a population as a whole cannot constitute a nation unless it has a certain national consciousness. I then show that we must adopt a fundamental principle of tolerance. I also try to attend to the complexities of the relations between Quebec and Canada, and argue that different populations represent themselves as nations in different ways and with different concepts. I show that Quebec constitutes a nation within a nation. I then wonder what it would mean for Canadians to accept a Quebec nation. Finally, I try to explain why a very large proportion of the population of Quebec has increasingly been favourable to sovereignty, and favourable to making a partnership proposal to Canada.

This article considers how nations are imagined and characterised in relation to the national roles allocated to women, with particular reference to the early Irish state. It examines two related dichotomies, that between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalisms, and the concept of the nation itself as ‘Janus-faced’, simultaneously looking ahead to the future and back to the past. It has been suggested that women bore the burden of the nation's ‘backward look’ towards a putative traditional rural past and an organic community, while men appropriated the nation's present and future. This thesis is examined with reference to Ireland and the representation of women in visual imagery and travel writing.

This paper examines the relationship between nationalist movements and minority languages, with particular emphasis on examples from Britain and Ireland. This relationship is less straightforward than often assumed, and the media's role in it is particularly complex. The varying political uses of minority language broadcasting are discussed, along with the implications of the separation between cultural and political nationalism. The notion of the routine banality of daily broadcasting is used to indicate how such broadcasting can work against nationalist mobilisation. Finally, Ireland is examined in the light of the previous discussion in order to offer an explanation of why it was so far behind many other areas in the provision of minority language broadcasting.

This paper is concerned with the fortunes of the pre-revolutionary, Pahlavi nationalist narrative in post-revolutionary Iran. The study analyses and compares pre- and post-revolutionary school textbooks with the aim of demonstrating that, for all its revolutionary and Islamic-universalist hyperbole, the Islamic Republic of Iran remained committed to the Pahlavi dynasty's conception of the ‘immemorial Iranian nation’ (or the ‘Aryan hypothesis’) as it was first articulated by European scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Post-revolutionary Iran clung to the European/Pahlavi master narrative of Iranian history, its very basic ‘story line’. It was, therefore, subject to the same evolution, the same dialectic of remembering and forgetting, the same successive deformations, and the vulnerability to the very same manipulation and appropriation. This study, then, attempts to establish that the Islamic Republic's apparent shift from ‘Iran Time’ to ‘Islam Time’, though it reaches far beyond Iranian borders, nevertheless remains wedded to, and embedded in, the dominant European, secular traditions of the Pahlavi era. Islamic consciousness in Iran does not in any way constitute the basis for an alternative myth to the national myth. Rather, it adds Islamic terminology to the very same myth. Political Islam thus remains within the confines of Iranian nationalism. It is articulated in the framework of the symbols of Iranian nationalism, endowing them with a meaning that is supposedly religious.

Military culture can play an important role in the rise of modern nationalism, as developments in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Spain demonstrate. Like many Europeans, Spanish army officers turned increasingly to nationalist ideology as they lost faith in the ability of liberal institutions to meet their needs. Because Spain, where army officers had much influence on politics and society, lacked other strong movements of modern, Castile-centred nationalism, military culture had a significant and long-lasting influence on the subsequent development of notions of Spanish national identity. The case of turn-of-the-century Spanish military nationalism lends credence to a general understanding of nationalism as a political phenomenon in which the state plays a central role.

The fundamental improvement between the Sunningdale and Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreements as conflict regulation processes is the recognition of opposing nationalisms as the core cause of conflict and, by extension, the development of a more symmetrical intergovernmental relationship between British and Irish governments which maximised the basis of consent for addressing conflicting claims to national self-determination. While the Agreement reflects a liberalisation of opposing nationalisms, it does not represent a ‘post-nationalist’ solution; the evolution of conflict regulation from 1985 to 1998 reflects a bi-national trend. The key to cultivating a ‘ripe moment’ for a constitutional settlement was based on the recognition that Northern Ireland's constitutional status needed to be redetermined and that the processes of self-determination needed to address and modify ‘constitutive’ aspects of sovereignty which preceded partition, as well as ‘regulative’ aspects which have evolved since the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.

This paper argues that examining the interweaving of ethnic and civic elements best explains current tensions in ethnic politics in New Zealand in elite state and nation-building and how these shape patterns of inclusion or exclusion of aboriginal and immigrant minorities. Theories of ethnic and civic nationalism are discussed briefly and the distinctiveness of settler societies is explored. Recent trends promoting biculturalism and multiculturalism are examined. A discussion of legal citizenship since 1840 reveals the linkages and persistence of three historical trajectories – the decolonising of aboriginal people (Maori), the de-colonial movement among Pakeha (‘white Europeans’), and the partial de-alienising of immigration. These trajectories, I conclude, reflect in-built tensions between different historical and current ethnic and civic representations of the New Zealand nation-state.

Accusations of Albanian rape of Serbs in Kosovo became a highly charged political factor in the development of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s. Discussions of rape were used to link perceptions of national victimisation and a crisis of masculinity and to legitimate a militant Serbian nationalism, ultimately contributing to the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. The article argues for attention to the ways that nationalist projects have been structured with reference to ideals of masculinity, the specific political and cultural contexts that have influenced these processes, and the consequent implications for gender relations as well as for nationalist politics. Such an approach helps explain the appeal of Milosević's nationalism; at the same time it highlights the divisions and conflicts that lie behind hegemonic gender and national identities constructed around difference.