Writers on nationalism have continued to use the distinction between civic and cultural nationalisms; and to suggest that the former has liberal connotations while the latter is intrinsically illiberal and authoritarian. This rests in part on the argument that the civic bond is rational and voluntaristic while the cultural bond is irrational and ascriptive; in part on the argument that the presence of the middle classes is conducive to liberal politics; and in part on the argument that cultural nationalism is illiberal because of its reactive origins. These arguments are critically examined, and then are reformulated to suggest that the liberalism or illiberalism of nationalism might not be related to its cultural or civic basis, but might depend both upon whether the class articulating the nationalism is marginalised or upwardly mobile; and upon whether the wider society becomes focused upon ressentiment in relation to threatening others, or on developing a self-generated identity.

Accusations of Albanian rape of Serbs in Kosovo became a highly charged political factor in the development of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s. Discussions of rape were used to link perceptions of national victimisation and a crisis of masculinity and to legitimate a militant Serbian nationalism, ultimately contributing to the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. The article argues for attention to the ways that nationalist projects have been structured with reference to ideals of masculinity, the specific political and cultural contexts that have influenced these processes, and the consequent implications for gender relations as well as for nationalist politics. Such an approach helps explain the appeal of Milosević's nationalism; at the same time it highlights the divisions and conflicts that lie behind hegemonic gender and national identities constructed around difference.

The collapse of the Soviet empire and subsequent rise and spread of ethnic and national conflict in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have sparked a wave of research on ethnicity and nationalism among scholars and policy makers alike (Brubaker 1996; Diamond and Plattner 1994; Greenfeld 1992; Horowitz 1985; Smith 1991). This recent surge of interest in ethnicity and nationalism particularly concerns the potential danger that ethnic nationalism poses to social stability and political developments such as democratisation. There is a strong tradition in the scholarship on nationalism, from Hans Kohn (1945) to Donald Horowitz (1985) which views political nationalism as civic, integrative and constructive while ethnic nationalism is dangerous, divisive and destructive. Ethnic cleavages are considered more fundamental and permanent than other forms of cleavage, and conflicts arising from them are therefore said to be the most difficult to deal with.

Central to assertions of national identity in the contemporary world is a sense of collective mission and destiny. This is clearly manifest in the recent spate of religious nationalisms, but it is also present as a component of secular nationalisms. In both cases, it is possible to trace the origins of the sense of collective destiny to much earlier beliefs in ethnic chosenness. In some cases a strict ‘covenantal’ form of the myth of ethnic election, such as was found in the Old Testament, has survived more or less intact into the modern era. In many other instances, a looser sense of ethnic election by the deity has continued to influence the outlook and purposes of secular nations. While there is no strict covariance between the earlier myths and modern national ideals, the ancient beliefs in divine election have given modern nationalisms a powerful impetus and model, particularly among peoples in the monotheistic traditions.

Globalisation, fragmentation and the emergence of identity politics challenge the myth of the homogeneous nation-state. They also lend increasing importance to processes of national boundary construction. This article argues that the dichotomy of ethnic and civic nations which traditionally informs much of social science discourse on nations and nationalism is inadequate to analyse how nations distribute membership. The same is true of the Meineckean distinction between cultural and political nations. Both typologies fail to account for some actually existing types of national boundary construction and they suggest that, in any instance, the process of boundary construction is homogeneous, universal and generic. As a consequence of these shortcomings, the ethnic/civic dichotomy needs to be revised, by disentangling different organising principles at work in defining the boundaries of ethnic and civic nations: ancestry, race, culture and territory.

The dominant ‘modernisation’ perspective on the nature of nations and national identities characterises these phenomena as purely modern artefacts which function as sociological cement for complex industrial societies. In opposition, Anthony D. Smith has elaborated an ‘ethno-symbolist’ framework which posits the possibility of pre-modern antecedents to modern national identities. According to Smith, modern states which have been able to establish their official cultures on the ethnicity of a demographically dominant and cohesive ethnic core are likely to be more stable than states that are divided by the rival histories and traditions of competing ethno-national communities. This paper evaluates Smith's ethno-symbolist thesis by applying his work on the relationship between states and ethnic cores to the historical example of Britain. What is Britishness? Is it just a transnational state patriotism, or is it a secondary form of national identity constructed largely in English terms?

The concomitants of nationalism and ethnic separation upon Greek-Cypriot consciousness are examined from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge and phenomenological analysis. The focus is upon the perception of Self and the social construction of Greek-Cypriot identity. The issue is examined in light of the ideological contest between Greek nationalism and Cypriotism. Whereas Greek nationalism sets the parameters of ideological orthodoxy and is the dominant force on the level of political consciousness, Cypriotism predominates on the level of everyday consciousness. One key consequence of the ideological class between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism is a structural ambivalence that characterises Greek-Cypriot perceptions of Self and Other. This ambivalence has been one of the main obstacles to the legitimation of an independent Cypriot polity and continues to impede the functional coexistence of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot people on the island.

The existing body of theory explaining how religion contributes to conflict is inadequate. This is because no existing theory is both sufficiently comprehensive, in that it describes most of the ways in which religion can become involved in conflict, and sufficiently dynamic, in that it takes into account the interrelationships between the various components of the theory. Also, few attempts are made to integrate such a theory into the general literature on conflict, and few such theories are tested, or even testable, in a large-n format (the use of statistical methodology to analyse a large number of cases in order to test theories and look for general trends). A more comprehensive and dynamic theory of religion and conflict is developed here based on the argument that religion has four basic functions in politics, society and conflict: to provide a value-laden belief system; to supply standards and criteria of behaviour based on that belief system; to organise adherents through its institutions; and to legitimate actors, actions and institutions. This theory is then integrated into Gurr's theory of ethnic conflict in a dynamic format that is testable in a large-n format.

This paper is concerned with the fortunes of the pre-revolutionary, Pahlavi nationalist narrative in post-revolutionary Iran. The study analyses and compares pre- and post-revolutionary school textbooks with the aim of demonstrating that, for all its revolutionary and Islamic-universalist hyperbole, the Islamic Republic of Iran remained committed to the Pahlavi dynasty's conception of the ‘immemorial Iranian nation’ (or the ‘Aryan hypothesis’) as it was first articulated by European scholars of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Post-revolutionary Iran clung to the European/Pahlavi master narrative of Iranian history, its very basic ‘story line’. It was, therefore, subject to the same evolution, the same dialectic of remembering and forgetting, the same successive deformations, and the vulnerability to the very same manipulation and appropriation. This study, then, attempts to establish that the Islamic Republic's apparent shift from ‘Iran Time’ to ‘Islam Time’, though it reaches far beyond Iranian borders, nevertheless remains wedded to, and embedded in, the dominant European, secular traditions of the Pahlavi era. Islamic consciousness in Iran does not in any way constitute the basis for an alternative myth to the national myth. Rather, it adds Islamic terminology to the very same myth. Political Islam thus remains within the confines of Iranian nationalism. It is articulated in the framework of the symbols of Iranian nationalism, endowing them with a meaning that is supposedly religious.

This paper argues that examining the interweaving of ethnic and civic elements best explains current tensions in ethnic politics in New Zealand in elite state and nation-building and how these shape patterns of inclusion or exclusion of aboriginal and immigrant minorities. Theories of ethnic and civic nationalism are discussed briefly and the distinctiveness of settler societies is explored. Recent trends promoting biculturalism and multiculturalism are examined. A discussion of legal citizenship since 1840 reveals the linkages and persistence of three historical trajectories – the decolonising of aboriginal people (Maori), the de-colonial movement among Pakeha (‘white Europeans’), and the partial de-alienising of immigration. These trajectories, I conclude, reflect in-built tensions between different historical and current ethnic and civic representations of the New Zealand nation-state.

This article explores the competing relations between ethnic, religious and racial identities in contemporary Tanzania at a time of rapid socioeconomic change and in the face of the declining authority and legitimacy of the state. During nearly four decades of one-party rule the state has pursued policies – educational, linguistic, developmental, etc. – aimed at constructing a secular national identity capable of uniting diverse social groups under the banner of African socialism. However, economic retrenchment in the 1980s and political liberalisation in the 1990s has contributed directly to a series of upheavals leading many Tanzanians to redefine the structures of common difference and to a fracturing of national identity. This article seeks to understand the reasons for the upsurge of conflict and cultural fragmentation in the 1990s.

One of the most challenging developments for students of international relations is the resurgence of ethnic strife, including secessionism and irredentism. Basic questions are only beginning to be addressed in the post-Cold War era. Why are some states more likely than others to intervene in ethnic conflicts? How can international norms about third-party intervention in ethnic conflicts be evaded or ignored by some states but respected by others? Why are some states inclined to use force rather than mediation to resolve ethnic strife? In short, what accounts for the emergence of adventurous and belligerent foreign policies with respect to internal ethnic conflicts? These questions are of increasing importance to students of international politics, yet the dynamics and internationalisation of ethnic conflict are far from fully understood.

This study focuses on the dynamics of third-party intervention in ethnic strife and implications for peaceful resolution. The first section presents a model that identifies the general conditions under which ethnic strife is most likely to lead to intervention by third-party states. The second uses four cases to illustrate, within the context of the model, different processes with respect to internationalisation of ethnic conflict. The third and final stage identifies implications for policy and theory, along with directions for future research.

It is inaccurate and misleading to apply the term ‘nationalism’ to Russia prior to the present day. Both Tsarist and Soviet leaders sought to maintain an empire and not a nation-state, and their national consciousness was imperial rather than national. The lack of Russian nationalism was crucial for Russian history since it explains the failure of both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. Modern societies cannot be successfully constructed upon the basis of imperial thinking. The absence of Russian nationalism also has significance for nationalism theory. Russia possessed the social, political and cultural characteristics that have been adduced as ‘causes’ of nationalism by a wide variety of scholars, yet Russia failed to develop a nationalist movement. This suggests that what is crucial to modern nationalism is the appearance of a particularist, secular ideology, since the most notable aspect in which Russia differed from Europe was Russia's universalistic, religious and imperialist discourse of national identity.

This article considers how nations are imagined and characterised in relation to the national roles allocated to women, with particular reference to the early Irish state. It examines two related dichotomies, that between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ nationalisms, and the concept of the nation itself as ‘Janus-faced’, simultaneously looking ahead to the future and back to the past. It has been suggested that women bore the burden of the nation's ‘backward look’ towards a putative traditional rural past and an organic community, while men appropriated the nation's present and future. This thesis is examined with reference to Ireland and the representation of women in visual imagery and travel writing.

The article examines a recent normative argument for ‘liberal nationalism’ that can be found in the work of a range of influential contemporary writers. That argument seeks to defend the view that the state has a responsibility to preserve and promote national cultures. It does so by arguing that the liberal ideal of an autonomous individual chooser presupposes a rich and healthy national culture which provides, and gives meaning to, the options which an individual faces. The claim of the present article is that the liberal nationalist argument is much less successful than these writers would like to think. Although the argument may be valid in certain restricted contexts, the article shows that it runs into severe difficulties for a wide range of central cases that nationalists have traditionally been concerned with.

This article advances the argument that national cohesion cannot meaningfully be pursued in multiethnic African states in the absence of democracy. But in order for democracy to facilitate cohesion, it must have the capacity to address issues of unequal power relations among the competing groups and regulate the conflicts which ensue therefrom. The article discusses four dimensions of pluralist democracy which address this capacity: democratisation of the state, strengthening of regulatory and oversight institutions, civil society and promotion of cross-sectional affiliations in party politics. The contrasting experiences of South Africa and Nigeria are then used to illustrate the formidable obstacles to democratic national cohesion in multiethnic African states, and the efforts that have been made to overcome them.

This paper examines the relationship between nationalist movements and minority languages, with particular emphasis on examples from Britain and Ireland. This relationship is less straightforward than often assumed, and the media's role in it is particularly complex. The varying political uses of minority language broadcasting are discussed, along with the implications of the separation between cultural and political nationalism. The notion of the routine banality of daily broadcasting is used to indicate how such broadcasting can work against nationalist mobilisation. Finally, Ireland is examined in the light of the previous discussion in order to offer an explanation of why it was so far behind many other areas in the provision of minority language broadcasting.

Nations and national projects are gendered in different ways. Feminist theory has raised important questions about the conceptualisation of ‘difference’. This article develops the conceptualisation of the different ways in which nations and national projects are gendered, arguing for a mid-level conceptualisation of gender relations. It argues against, on the one hand, the excessive fragmentation of gender, and on the other, too simple dichotomies of more/less unequal gender relations. This draws on a theorisation of gender relations which connects the different dimensions into specific kinds of gender regimes, either public or domestic gender regimes. This enables us to conceptualise different national projects as having a more or less public or domestic gender project. The conflicts between different national projects and with other polities, such as states, are then conflicts between differently gendered projects. The usefulness of this mid-level conceptualisation is demonstrated through examples of the competing relations between the UK, Ireland, the EU and the Catholic Church in a global era.

The politics of national identity in the Republic of Tatarstan are complex and often contradictory. Although sometimes posed in terms of an historical legacy, claims to nationhood are also strongly shaped by more pragmatic contemporary concerns. In addition to more conventional forms of political mobilisation, national identity is also contested in cultural arenas. Examining policies on language reform and media development, for example, sheds light on the processes through which a sense of national identity is currently being renegotiated in Tatarstan. The Republic's official multicultural policy is situated in the context of a range of distinct conceptions of Tatarstan's identity, from radical Islamic nationalism to a view of the republic as a Russian province.

Two cross-national women's organisations, one in Northern Ireland the other in Bosnia-Herzegovina, are observed here in interaction with each other. The article explores the connection between their ability to sustain such cross-community alliances and their choice to be women's projects. In so doing, it addresses the question ‘are feminism and nationalism compatible?’ Not all the women are ‘anti-nationalist’ in philosophy, but they draw distinctions between variants of nationalism, and may be described as ‘anti-essentialist’. The article distinguishes between variants of ‘feminism’, recognising it, too, as a plurality of movements. An anti-essentialist understanding of ethnicity and nation is partnered in both the Network and Medica by an anti-essentialist feminism, in which a woman's family role is minimised and value placed instead on her autonomy and agency. Certain forms of feminism and nationalism are thus compatible – but the configuration may be progressive or retrograde.