Since its first judgment on the merits in 2013, the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Court or ACtHPR) jurisprudence has bourgeoned. In building this jurisprudence, the African Court has borrowed significantly from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This article empirically maps judicial borrowing in the jurisprudence of the African Court and connects this practice to the theoretical framing of the semantic authority of interpretive actors in international law. The article argues that judicial borrowing allows the African Court to borrow the semantic authority of these more established actors in the field of international human rights law. The practice has allowed the Court to boost its interpretive claims. The article posits that the Court is simultaneously internalizing external references: it transforms them into an internal part of its jurisprudence. Therefore, the African Court is transforming what was initially the semantic authority of its homologues in Strasbourg and San José, into assertions of its own semantic authority. This transformation allows the Court to assert itself as the central authority for the interpretation of human rights in Africa. These findings shed new light onto wider scholarly debates on the characteristics of African human rights jurisprudence in the field of international human rights law.

Conferences of the Parties (COPs) are intergovernmental meetings established by treaties to review and promote the implementation of their provisions. The literature on COPs is limited and almost exclusively based on multilateral environmental agreements. The article departs from this scholarship to show that COPs are now present in different areas of international law and to discuss some of the ways in which these bodies influence the conventions that establish them. In particular, it considers how COPs affect the content and the implementation of their parent treaties. The article focuses on the bodies established by four treaties selected as case studies: the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; the Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions; the Convention on Cluster Munitions; and the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Based on the examination of the normative decisions adopted by these organs, the article argues that COPs’ activities (i) specify and develop the content of their parent treaties by setting procedural and substantive standards that states parties must meet to comply with their obligations; and (ii) support the implementation of their parent treaties by seeking to strengthen their social and political position, facilitating the adoption of measures by states parties. COPs pursue this second goal by building momentum in favour of the implementation of their treaties, stigmatizing their adversaries, and connecting their conventions with established international legal narratives.

The recent Covid-19 global health crisis not only brings into sharp relief the current problems afflicting the international intellectual property regime (IIPR) but also calls into question its legitimacy as an international authority. Against this backdrop, the article aims to launch an investigation into the legitimacy of the IIPR, as an international co-ordinative authority, designed to protect IP rights without prejudice to international trade norms. Drawing on Raz’s service conception of authority, it explores whether the IIPR lives up to its promises by enabling co-ordination between states over IP rights without undermining the initial balance on which it is founded, struck between developing and developed countries, as well as between international protection of IP- cum-trade rights and domestic regulatory autonomy. It does so by classifying the historical evolution of the IIPR under three different phases: (i) its foundation, (ii) before, and (iii) after the TRIPS-plus. Upon showing the legitimacy challenges inherent in its undemocratic foundation, the article points to the success of the regime in finding a balance between conflicting interests before the TRIPS-plus era. Later, it underlines the many challenges that come with linking the IIPR to the investment regime and argues that the FTAs and frequent regime-shifting activities put further pressure on the authority and legitimacy of the regime. Stressing the importance of democratic participation for the legitimacy of any co-ordinative authority, the article casts doubt on the IIPR’s legitimacy and concludes by raising some points to overcome the ongoing legitimacy challenges.

It is the task of the International Court of Justice to establish the operative facts from which to draw normative conclusions in all contentious cases that come before it. This task, however, is complicated where those facts necessitate engagement with specialized epistemic fields other than law such as science. Drawing on legal theory and epistemology I propose a coherence framework for the establishment of the facts in such cases. In essence, this means that the Court need not show that its factual determinations have been established beyond all doubt, nor even that they satisfy a certain standard of probability. Rather, what the Court must show is that a factual determination it has made has been arrived at through a rational process and that it is coherent. The coherence framework also has both descriptive and normative value as it both maps neatly on to the current (best) practice of the Court and provides a justification for why it should operate this way in the future.

International criminal proceedings are witnessing an increase in the use of digital sources of evidence at trial, and it is expected that digital evidence will shape the outcome of upcoming decisions of international criminal tribunals. Digital footage may arguably enhance the efficiency of international crimes investigations. However, the high expertise required to access, analyse, and assess digital materials may widen the gap between the prosecution and the defence, thus undermining fair trial rights. This article examines, in the context of proceedings before the International Criminal Court, the impact that the overreliance on digital evidence may have on the principle of equality of arms, and how such a situation might be alleviated.

Russia’s full-blown invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated the debate over international criminal law’s selectivity. While many have welcomed the renewed interest in accountability for international crimes in the wake of the ‘Ukraine moment’, others have emphasized double standards in the enforcement of international criminal law, including a lack of accountability for Western violations and disproportionate attention to European victims. This article interrogates the master narratives about international criminal law’s post-Ukraine selectivity and complicates accusations of bias by emphasizing Ukraine’s liminal status in the global order and the cross-border nature of aggression as an explanatory factor for differentiated responses from states. It suggests that concerns about an invidious ‘Ukraine effect’ on international criminal law enforcement are less persuasive after the International Criminal Court’s decade-long conflict with the African Union, and that a decentring of investigations to Eurasia should be construed not only as a moment of soul-searching but also as a welcome opportunity to rebalance the scales of justice. The article encourages international criminal law stakeholders to move beyond critique that unwittingly essentializes Eurocentric assumptions and to devise a more compelling vision of global criminal law enforcement that challenges crimes and inequalities both between and within states.

This article is one of very few attempts to empirically measure legal interpretation. It maps the application of eleven interpretation elements (good faith, ordinary meaning, object and purpose, etc.) in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) across ten International Criminal Court case studies. The elements were coded for identity and sequence of element, and amount of text used in applying each element. The mapping and analysis reveal, among other things, that the application of the VCLT across cases is markedly inconsistent and, in some instances, opaque and arguably unjustifiable. The results suggest, at least based on this small sample, that the ICC’s current practice of applying the accommodating, flexible methodology of the VCLT may be inconsistent with the requirement of strict construction in Article 22 of the Rome Statute, and that even when strict construction does not technically apply, a more systematic, transparent, and robust approach should nevertheless still be followed.

On its seventy-fifth anniversary last year, the Nuremberg war crime trials moved again into the spotlight of public attention. To the present day, Nuremberg is mainly portrayed as the birth of international criminal law being the first tribunal that held individuals accountable for war crimes committed during the Second World War. As we argue in this article, there is an often-overseen dark legacy of Nuremberg as it represents an unused opportunity to establish accountability for inhumane military practices, especially in air warfare, being of tragic influence for the postwar development of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as a whole. Going beyond the existing criticism already voiced on Nuremberg’s shortcomings, we hold that the Tribunal’s reluctance to prosecute bombing practices sowed the seeds for the decay of IHL by creating institutionalized silences, especially for massive violations of the principle of distinction. The tribunal thereby sidelined pre-war IHL and infected the development of post-war IHL by retroactively legitimating the bombing practices of the Axis powers and at least indirectly of the Allies. We argue that the failure to prosecute ‘total war’-practices and reestablish former restrictive legal structures regarding aerial bombardment has fundamentally eroded the pre-war meaning of the principle of distinction leading to its downfall in the First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1977. We describe these developments as a form of judicial desuetudo, meaning the abrogation of a rule through its subsequent non-enforcement by an international court during and after massive law violations because of perceived or real political constraints.