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Mapping interpretation by the International Criminal Court
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 May 2023
Abstract
This article is one of very few attempts to empirically measure legal interpretation. It maps the application of eleven interpretation elements (good faith, ordinary meaning, object and purpose, etc.) in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) across ten International Criminal Court case studies. The elements were coded for identity and sequence of element, and amount of text used in applying each element. The mapping and analysis reveal, among other things, that the application of the VCLT across cases is markedly inconsistent and, in some instances, opaque and arguably unjustifiable. The results suggest, at least based on this small sample, that the ICC’s current practice of applying the accommodating, flexible methodology of the VCLT may be inconsistent with the requirement of strict construction in Article 22 of the Rome Statute, and that even when strict construction does not technically apply, a more systematic, transparent, and robust approach should nevertheless still be followed.
Keywords
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- ORIGINAL ARTICLE
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- © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law in association with the Grotius Centre for International Law, Leiden University
Footnotes
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The research for this article was conducted with financial assistance from the University of Malaya Postgraduate Research Grant (PPP), Project # PG259-2016A.
The authors thank Professor Dr. Mary George, Faculty of Law, University of Malaya, and the academic staff at iCourts, the Danish National Research Foundation’s Centre of Excellence for International Courts, Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, for their helpful feedback on some of the concepts used in this article.
References
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2 M. Hulme, ‘Preambles in Treaty Interpretation’, (2016) 164 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1281; M. Waibel, ‘Demystifying the Art of Interpretation’, (2011) 22 EJIL 571, at 574; J. Powderly, ‘The Rome Statute and the Attempted Corseting of the Interpretative Judicial Function: Reflections on Sources of Law and Interpretative Technique’, in C. Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court (2015), 444, at 445 (observing that ‘subjective predilections and cultural assumptions of the bench’ lie in the background of the interpretative process).
3 L. Popa, ‘The Holistic Interpretation of Treaties at the International Court of Justice’, (2018) 87 Nordic Journal of International Law 249, at 340.
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6 W. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2017), at 201.
7 See Schabas, supra note 5, at 852.
8 J. Ohlin, E. van Sliedregt and T. Weigend, ‘Assessing the Control-Theory’, (2013) 26 LJIL 725, at 726–7.
9 C. Wheeler, ‘Human Rights Enforcement at the Borders: International Criminal Court Jurisdiction over the Rohingya Situation,’ (2019) 17 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) 609, at 631.
10 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17, P.T.Ch. II, 12 April 2019. In March 2020, the Appeals Chamber overturned the decision.
11 D. Jacobs, ‘ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Rejects OTP Request to Open an Investigation in Afghanistan: Some Preliminary Thoughts on an Ultra Vires Decision’, Spreading the Jam, 12 April 2019, available at www.dovjacobs.com/2019/04/12/icc-pre-trial-chamber-rejects-otp-request-to-open-an-investigation-in-afghanistan-some-preliminary-thoughts-on-an-ultra-vires-decision/.
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14 C. Stahn, ‘Justice Delivered or Justice Denied?’, (2014) 12 JICJ 809, at 818. The implication noted by Stahn is that, under Trial Chamber II’s reasoning, the policy element is superfluous because the determination of an ‘organizational policy’ is made by gauging the organization’s ability to carry out an attack rather than the existence of a policy to commit the attack.
15 See Ohlin, van Sliedregt and Weigend, supra note 8, at 745.
16 R. Poscher, ‘Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation’, in L. Solan and P. Tiersma (eds.), Oxford Handbook on Language and Law (2012), 128.
17 See Katanga Judgment, supra note 1, para. 43.
18 J. Powderly, ‘Judicial Interpretation at the Ad Hoc Tribunals: Method from Chaos?’, in S. Darcy and J. Powderly (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal Tribunals (2010), 17, at 34 (citing Prosecutor v. Kanbayashi, Dissenting Judgment, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on the Jurisdiction of Trial Chamber I, ICTR-96-15-A, 3 June 1999).
19 Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, ICC-01/04-16, A.Ch., 13 July 2006, para. 33.
20 See Powderly, supra note 18, at 34.
21 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Case No. IT-94-1-T, T.Ch. II, 10 August 1995; Prosecutor v. Bagasora and 28 Others, Appeal Chamber Decision on the Admissibility of the Prosecutor’s Appeal from the Decision of a Confirming Judge Dismissing an Indictment against Théoneste Bagasora and 28 Others, Case No. ICTR-98-37-A, A.Ch., 8 June 1998.
22 I. Van Damme, ‘Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body’, (2010) 21 EJIL 605, at 639.
23 See Katanga Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 38, 39.
24 Ibid., para. 39.
25 See Powderly, supra note 18, at 33.
26 C. Kreß, ‘The International Criminal Court as a Turning Point in the History of International Criminal Justice’, in A. Cassese (ed.), The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (2009), 143, at 145.
27 The general principles are: Art. 22 (nullum crimen sine lege – no crime without law); Art. 23 (nulla poena sine lege – no penalty without law); and Art. 24 (non-retroactivity ratione personae – no retroactive laws, and if there is a change in law prior to a final judgment, the law more favourable to the defendant applies).
28 W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2010), at 404.
29 D. Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’, (2008) 21 LJIL 925, at 926–7.
30 T. de Souza Dias, ‘Accessibility and Foreseeability in the Application of the Principle of Legality under General International Law: A Time for Revision?’, (2019) 19 Human Rights Law Review 649, at 653.
31 T. de Souza Dias, ‘Interests of Justice: Defining the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, (2017) 30 LJIL 731, at 734; C. Davidson, ‘How to Read International Criminal Law: Strict Construction and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, (2017) 91 St. John’s Law Review 37, at 47.
32 But see Schabas, supra note 6, at 216 (suggesting that ‘[t]he wording of Article 22(2) is precise enough to leave open the question of whether or not strict construction applies to provisions of the Statute other than those that define the offences themselves’).
33 Prosecutor v. Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Abd-Al-Rahman against the Pre-Trial Chamber II’s ‘Decision on the Defence “Exception d’incompétence” (ICC-02/02-01/20-302)’, ICC-02/05-01/20-503, A.Ch., 1 November 2021, para. 85.
34 Ibid., para. 87.
35 S. Darcy, ‘The Principle of Legality at the Crossroads of Human Rights and International Criminal Law’, in M. deGuzman and D. Amann (eds.), Arcs of Global Justice: Essays in Honor of William A. Schabas (2018), 203; A. Bufalini, ‘The Principle of Legality and the Role of Customary International Law in the Interpretation of the ICC Statute’, (2015) 14 The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 233.
36 See Davidson, supra note 31, at 75.
37 Ibid., at 44. See also D. Robinson, Justice in Extreme Cases: Criminal Law Theory Meets International Criminal Law (2020), at 131; C. Davidson, ‘Strict Construction, Deontics, and International Criminal Law’, (2021) 35 Temple International & Comparative Law Journal 69, at 75.
38 Ibid.
39 P. Merkouris, ‘Debating Interpretation: On the Road to Ithaca’, (2022) 35 LJIL 461, at 468.
40 See Davidson, supra note 37, at 75; Davidson, supra note 31, at 101.
41 See Merkouris, supra note 39, at 466.
42 F. Schauer, ‘Giving Reasons’, (1995) 47 Stanford Law Review 633, at 656. Schauer notes, however, the possible drawback that giving reasons commits a judge to those reasons when deciding future cases whose circumstances are at that time unforeseeable.
43 R. Burnett, ‘The Giving of Reasons’, (1983) 14 Federal Law Review 157, at 159; A. Samuels, ‘Giving Reasons in the Criminal Justice and Penal Process’, (1981) 45 Journal of Criminal Law 51, at 51; M. Shapiro, ‘The Giving Reasons Requirement’, (1992) University of Chicago Legal Forum 179, at 180.
44 See Samuels, ibid., at 52.
45 L. Grover, Interpreting Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2014), at 398–9.
46 D. Akande, ‘Sources of International Criminal Law’, in Cassese, supra note 26, at 45–6; D. Akande, ‘Treaty Interpretation, the VCLT and the ICC Statute: A Response to Kevin Jon Heller & Dov Jacobs’, EJIL:Talk!, 25 August 2013, available at www.ejiltalk.org/treaty-interpretation-the-vclt-and-the-icc-statute-a-response-to-kevin-jon-heller-dov-jacobs/. See also Robinson, supra note 37, at 131 (noting the sometimes-dispositive importance of the timing of when the ambiguity is dealt with – at the beginning or end of the inquiry).
47 A. Appazov, ‘“Judicial Activism” and the International Criminal Court’, (2015) iCourts Working Paper Series No. 17, at 17.
48 D. Jacobs, ‘Positivism and International Criminal Law: The Principle of Legality as a Rule of Conflict of Theories’, in J. Kammerhofer and J. D’Aspremont (eds.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (2014), at 37 (of SSRN version), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=2046311.
49 See Grover, supra note 45, at 401.
50 See De Souza Dias, supra note 31, at 747.
51 See Katanga Judgment, supra note 1, para. 45.
52 Ibid.
53 O. Dörr, ‘Article 31: General Rule of Interpretation’, in O. Dörr and K. Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2012), 521, at 522.
54 Ibid., at 522–3; see also R. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2015), at 161.
55 See, e.g., Dörr, supra note 53; Gardiner, ibid; U. Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2007).
56 See Dörr, ibid., at 542–3.
57 Y. Shereshevsky and T. Noah, ‘Does Exposure to Preparatory Work Affect Treaty Interpretation? An Experimental Study on International Law Students and Experts’, (2018) 28 EJIL 1287, at 1289.
58 See Dörr, supra note 53, at 522.
59 O. Dörr, ‘Article 32: Supplementary Means of Interpretation’, in Dörr and Schmalenbach, supra note 53, at 581.
60 L. Popa, Patterns of Treaty Interpretation as Anti-Fragmentation Tools: A Comparative Analysis with a Special Focus on the ECtHR, WTO and ICJ (2018), at 187, 191, 202, 212, 213.
61 See Gardiner, supra note 54, at 490.
62 See Popa, supra note 60, at 210.
63 O. Fauchald, ‘The Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis’, (2008) 19 EJIL 301.
64 Ibid., at 323–4.
65 Ibid., at 350.
66 See Swart, supra note 5, at 480; Schabas, in Vohrah et al., supra note 5, at 848.
67 See Swart, ibid., at 484.
68 A. Cassese, ‘International Criminal Justice’, in R. Badinter and S. Breyer (eds.), Judges in Contemporary Democracy: An International Conversation (2004), 175, at 214.
69 See Schabas, supra note 6, at 216.
70 B. Goy, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility before the International Criminal Court: A Comparison with the Ad Hoc Tribunals’, (2012) 12 International Criminal Law Review 1, at 7.
71 See Katanga Judgment, supra note 1, paras. 50–57.
72 A. Bryman, Social Research Methods (2008), at 692.
73 T. Hutchinson and N. Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’, (2021) 17 Deakin Law Review 83.
74 Two possible additional elements have been excluded from this study: special meanings if it is established that the parties so intended (Art. 31(4)) and the multiple meanings that could arise among the six authenticated language versions of the Rome Statute (Art. 33). These elements were not included because they were not raised in any of the case studies examined (and thus have no impact on the data other than an absence) and are not among the mandatory elements that must be examined in the VCLT methodology (indicated by ‘shall’ in Art. 31(1), (2), and (3)).
75 J. Li et al., ‘Rhythmic Brushstrokes Distinguish van Gogh from His Contemporaries: Findings via Automated Brushstroke Extraction’, (2012) 34 IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis & Machine Intelligence 1159; M. Geldof et al., ‘Reconstructing Van Gogh’s Palette to Determine the Optical Characteristics of His Paints’, (2018) 6 Heritage Science 17.
76 E. Igoua and H. Bless, ‘Inferring the Importance of Arguments: Order Effects and Conversational Rules’, (2003) 39 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 91, at 96; L. Rosenberg, ‘Aristotle’s Methods for Outstanding Oral Arguments’, (2007) 33 Litigation 33, at 37; G. Smith, ‘A Primer of Opinion Writing for Law Clerks’, (1973) 26 Vanderbilt Law Review 1203, at 1206.
77 A. Samaha, ‘Starting with the Text – On Sequencing Effects in Statutory Interpretation and Beyond’, (2016) 8 Journal of Legal Analysis 439, at 441.
78 Ibid., at 467–8.
79 R. Black and J. Spriggs II, ‘An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions’, (2008) 45 Houston Law Review 621, at 681.
80 Ibid., at 662, 665. Factors inapplicable to the ICC have been omitted.
81 See, e.g., E. Heit and C. Rotello, ‘The Pervasive Effects of Argument Length on Inductive Reasoning’, (2012) 18 Thinking & Reasoning 244, at 246.
82 D. O’Keefe, ‘How to Handle Opposing Arguments in Persuasive Messages: A Meta-analytic Review of the Effects of One-sided and Two-sided Messages’, (1999) 22 Annals of the International Communication Association 209.
83 See Heit and Rotello, supra note 81, at 272.
84 See, e.g., submissions by the International Commission of Jurists, Members of the Canadian Partnership for International Justice, Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice, European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Guernica 37 International Justice Chambers, and Bangladeshi Non-Governmental Representatives that were filed in connection with the 2018 Myanmar/Bangladesh Decision.
85 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against His Conviction, ICC-01/04-01/06, A.Ch., 1 December 2014 (Judge Sang-Hyun Song partly dissenting, Judge Anita Ušacka dissenting).
86 Studies have shown that judges try to avoid reversal on appeal and must consider the pressure of additional media attention in high profile cases. See, e.g., R. Posner, ‘Judicial Behavior and Performance an Economic Approach’, (2005) 32 Florida State University Law Review 1259, at 1271; G. Wetherington, H. Lawton and D. Pollock, ‘Preparing for the High Profile Case: An Omnibus Treatment for Judges and Lawyers’, (1999) 51 Florida Law Review 425, at 436, 451.
87 See Samaha, supra note 77.
88 See Fauchald, supra note 63, at 308.
89 C. Stahn and E. De Brabandere, ‘The Future of International Legal Scholarship: Some Thoughts on “Practice”, “Growth”, and “Dissemination”’, (2013) 27 LJIL 1, at 2, fn 11; R. Smyth, ‘What Do Judges Cite? An Empirical Study of the “Authority of Authority” in the Supreme Court of Victoria’, (1999) 25 Monash Law Review 29, at 42.
90 M. Zarni and A. Cowley, ‘The Slow-burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya’, (2014) 23 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 683, at 683–5.
91 P. McPherson, ‘Dozens Killed in Fighting between Myanmar Army and Rohingya Militants’, Guardian, 25 August 2017, available at www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/25/rohingya-militants-blamed-as-attack-on-myanmar-border-kills-12.
92 J. Head, ‘Rohingya Crisis: Villages Destroyed for Government Facilities’, BBC News, 10 September 2019, available at www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-49596113.
93 Request Under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute’, ICC-RoC46(3)-01-18, P.T.Ch. I, 6 September 2018.
94 Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 2019 Myanmar/Bangladesh Decision into the Situation in the People’s Republic of Bangladesh/Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ICC-01/19-27, P.T.Ch. III, 14 November 2019.
95 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-33, P.T.Ch. II, 12 April 2019, para. 25. The alleged crimes by the other forces were not part of the authorization request.
96 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, Art. 9, Art. 53(1)(c). This requirement is applicable to investigations proprio motu by way of Rule 48, ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
97 See Afghanistan Decision, supra note 95, paras. 91–96.
98 Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Judgment on the Appeal Against the Decision on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-OA4, A.Ch., 5 March 2020, para. 49.
99 See Afghanistan Decision, supra note 95, para. 89.
100 Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua, in a concurring and separate opinion, addressed the application of the VCLT more thoroughly by assessing ordinary meaning of the text, treaty text, good faith, object and purpose, and preparatory works.
101 See Rome Statute, supra note 96, Art. 7(1).
102 Ibid., Art. 2(a).
103 See Katanga Judgment, supra note 1, para. 1093.
104 Ibid., paras. 1113, 1119.
105 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04–01/06, T.Ch. I, 14 March 2012, para. 1358.
106 The ICTY, in contrast, had developed a different theory for joint liability – ‘joint criminal enterprise’ – that did not rely on this distinction and from which the drafters of the Rome Statute had knowingly departed. S. Ford, ‘The Impact of the Ad Hoc Tribunals on the International Criminal Court’, in M. Sterio and M. Scharf (eds.), The Legacy of Ad Hoc Tribunals in International Criminal Law (2019), 307, at 317.
107 M. Heikkilä, ‘Article 21: Applicable Law’, in M. Klamber (ed.), Commentary on the Law of the International Criminal Court (2017), 249.
108 See Gardiner, supra note 54, at 491.
109 K. Mechlem, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’, (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 905, at 946.
110 Industria Nacional de Alimentos, SA and Indalsa Peru, SA (formerly Empresas Lucchetti, SA and Lucchetti Peru, SA) v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, 5 September 2007, Decision on Annulment, Dissenting Opinion of Sir Franklin Berman (2007).
111 See Merkouris, supra note 39, at 463.
112 G. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (1998), at 207; O. Ammann, Domestic Courts and the Interpretation of International Law: Methods and Reasoning Based on the Swiss Example (2019), at 203.
113 E. Kassoti, ‘Between Sollen and Sein: The CJEU’s Reliance on International Law in the Interpretation of Economic Agreements Covering Occupied Territories’, (2020) 33 LJIL 371, at 379.
114 See Waibel, supra note 2, at 574.
115 See Katanga Judgment, supra note 1, para. 45.
116 See Fletcher, supra note 112, at 208; H. Kelsen, ‘On the Theory of Legal Interpretation’, (1990) 10 Legal Studies 127, at 129 (describing interpretation as discovering a ‘frame’ representing a norm to be implemented which can be filled with multiple correct possibilities).
117 G. Hernández, The International Court of Justice and the Judicial Function (2014), at 13.