Positivism’s Separability Thesis denies that the legality of a norm necessarily depends on its substantive moral merits; as H.L.A. Hart puts it, “[I]t is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.”H.L.A. Hart, The Concept Of Law 185–86 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter CL]. Accordingly, the Separability Thesis implies it is logically possible for something that constitutes a legal system to exclude moral norms from the criteria that determine whether a standard is legally valid. In such a legal system, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a norm N to be legally valid that N be consistent with a set of moral norms.

It is common to think that what theory of linguistic vagueness is correct has implications for debates in philosophy of law. I disagree. I argue that the implications of particular theories of vagueness on substantive issues of legal theory and practice are less far-reaching than often thought. I focus on four putative implications discussed in the literature concerning (i) the value of vagueness in the law, (ii) the possibility and value of legal indeterminacy, (iii) the possibility of the rule of law, and (iv) strong discretion. I conclude with some methodological remarks. Delineating questions about conventional meaning, legal content determination, and norms of legal interpretation and judicial practice can motivate clearer answers and a more refined understanding of the space of overall theories of vagueness, interpretation, and law.

This essay replies to the thoughtful commentaries, by Michael Bratman, David Brink, Larry Alexander, and Michael Moore, on my book Attempts.

Intentionalist theories of legal interpretation are often divided between objectivist and subjectivist variants. The former take an interpretation to be correct depending on what the reasonable/rational lawmaker intended or what the reasonable/rational audience thinks they intended. The latter take an interpretation to be correct where the interpretation is what the speaker actually intended. This paper argues that objectivism faces serious problems as it cannot deal with disagreement: reasonable and rational persons can often disagree as to what the interpretation of a text should be. It also defends subjectivism against criticisms by objectivists.

In 1990, in Department of Employment Services v. Smith,494 U.S. 872 (1990). the Supreme Court announced a new standard to govern Free Exercise claims. The Court held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens concurring)). Prior to Smith, the Court had applied a test drawn from Sherbert v. Verner.374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court had indicated that religiously motivated persons were constitutionally exempt from otherwise valid laws unless the imposition of those laws was necessary to secure “a compelling state interest.”Id. at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court rejected almost every Free Exercise claim raised under Sherbert, the Sherbert standard was—in theory if not in practice—remarkably generous to religiously motivated persons, granting them a presumptive right to disobey laws that thwarted their religious commitments.

Private law is generally formulated in terms of right–duty relations, and accordingly, private-law claims are understood to arise from breaches of duty, or wrongs. Some claims are not easy to explain on this basis because the claim arises from an act that the defendant was justified in doing. The violation/infringement distinction seems to offer an explanation of such claims, but it is argued that the explanation is illusory. Claims of this sort are best understood as based not on a primary right–duty relation at all but on a “primary liability” or “right–liability” relation. A primary-liability claim is not a claim arising from the breach of a strict-liability duty. The recognition of primary-liability claims does not involve skepticism about duties or rules or legal relations and it is consistent with the analysis of private law in terms of corrective justice.

In some cases, harming another gives rise to a duty to compensate for harm done. This paper argues that the influential explanations of such duties of compensation—that they are somehow derived from rights intrusions, or breaches of duties not to harm—fail. I offer and defend an alternative explanation for why certain harms and not others give rise to compensatory duties, an explanation that seeks to derive them from wide-scope duties not to harm or to compensate for harm done.

On November 27, 1905, the steamship Reynolds was moored to Vincent’s dock for the purposes of unloading its cargo, when a violent storm arose. The captain signalled for a tug to tow the ship from the dock after the cargo had been unloaded, but none could be obtained, because the waters had become too rough. It was too dangerous to cast off, and as the lines holding the ship to the dock became frayed, the crew replaced them. The Reynolds was repeatedly thrown against the dock, causing considerable damage to it. The ship’s owner, the Lake Erie Transportation Company, was held liable for the cost of the damage. Defendant’s appeal against an order denying a new trial was dismissed by a two to one majority of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in an opinion that has since enjoyed considerable and consistent attention.Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1910).

Conventionalism once seemed an attractive way to justify the viability of the positivistic social thesis. Subsequent criticism, however, has significantly lessened its attractiveness. This paper attempts to revive jurisprudential interest in conventionalism by claiming that positivists would profit more from the conventionalism of Ruth G. Millikan than that of David Lewis.

Three arguments are proffered to support this contention. First, Millikan's conventionalism is not vulnerable to the major criticism leveled at conventionalism, viz its compliance-dependence (i.e., the main reason to follow a convention is that other social actors do so), as this is not its defining feature. Second, Millikanian conventionalism retains conventionalism's ability to explain how law emerges from social practices while avoiding the main disadvantage of Lewisian conventionalism, viz its inability to explain the normativity and contestability of law. Third, Millikan's conventionalism can more effectively repel Dworkin's and Greenberg's assaults on legal positivism than its Lewisian counterpart.

In an article published in 2001, Charles W. Collier raises a number of objections to my article “Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First Amendment Jurisprudence,” beginning with an implicit objection embedded in the subtitle of his article: “Hate Speech and the Mind-Body Problem: A Critique of Postmodern Censorship Theory.” Since I advocate neither postmodernism nor censorship, and since I would have thought that “postmodern censorship” was an oxymoron, I found this characterization of my position surprising, to say the least. Collier does not define “postmodern censorship theory” or even “postmodernism,” but he helpfully includes a note citing Steven Gey's article, “The Case against Postmodern Censorship Theory.” Gey, in turn, claims to have picked up the terminology from an article by Kathleen Sullivan, “Free Speech Wars.” Curiously, though, Sullivan nowhere uses the phrase “postmodern censorship theory” in the article cited, although she does discuss a group of leftist legal theorists she dubs “the new speech regulators,” arguing that they: demand a response from those who would leave speech mostly deregulated; and they deserve a response that goes beyond the rote and reflexive invocation of free speech as an article of faith. The appeal to the First Amendment as self-evident truth may be no more effective, as Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. recently cautioned, than Samuel Johnson's attempt to refute Bishop Berkeley merely by kicking a stone.

There is no escaping the fact that law shapes identity. Laws tells us who we are and where we stand in society. While sometimes benign, such classification can also be a devastatingly powerful instrument of ostracism and subjugation. Legally enforced racial segregation sent a cold and harsh message about what the dominant society thought it meant to be black. The recent backlash against affirmative action resurrects degrading stereotypes and sends old messages wrapped in new code words about racial identity. “English-only” laws and attempts to restrict public support for immigrants define targeted groups as “outsiders,” people who do not belong in America. The acceptance of anti-sodomy laws brands homosexuals as deviant And the slow, grudging history of legal recognition of sexual harassment, the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment, and the persistence of the “reasonable man” standard effaces the distinctive experiences of women in society while subjecting all to measurement against a male norm.

It is commonly held that we wrong someone if we punish them without first determining whether they are guilty through the process of a sufficiently fair and reliable procedure. This wrong is best explained by pre-institutional moral procedural rights. Recently, Christopher Heath Wellman has argued for the skeptical conclusion that there are no such rights, challenging a widely held orthodoxy. I propose two novel grounds for pre-institutional moral procedural rights and so answer Wellman's skepticism. First, we have rights not to be subject to punitive systems that do not include specific sorts of reliable procedures because otherwise we are subject to unreasonable risks of undeserved punishment. Second, not only do we have rights that others not harm us or unreasonably risk harming us, we have rights that they control for avoiding wrongfully harming us across relevant close possible worlds.

One key premise in Shapiro's book Legality is that rationality requires those who have accepted the master plan for a system of law to obey the system's rules. In this paper, I question this premise, arguing instead that although it may be rational for agents to commit to follow the system's rule in all (or most) cases to which they apply, it is not rational for agents to follow the rules in fact when the rules appear to require the wrong outcomes in particular cases. My argument is based largely on epistemic responsibility, which I view as an element of rationality.

Massimo Renzo argues that, as long as it is acting in good faith, an authority can issue orders that require subjects to act in ways that are morally wrong and still be acting within the scope of its jurisdiction, so that the orders are binding. This, however, is incorrect. If the authority is permitted to issue an order, it is acting within the scope of its jurisdiction and so the order creates an obligation. But if the authority is not permitted to issue the order, it is not acting within the scope of its jurisdiction and so the order does not create any obligation whatsoever. I develop my position and provide a model of mistaken authority through engagement with Renzo's view.

The best test of whether an intellectual problem is genuinely worthwhile is whether there exists a Jewish joke on point. By that quite exacting standard, the problem of preemptive action is certainly an important one. To be sure, the joke that comes to mind is not especially funny, but that is not what counts. It is the existence of the joke, not its funniness, that matters.

The import and intentions of Ronald Dworkin's work are fairly grand. Dworkin does not propose a plain theory of law. Indeed, his theory of law is one part of a grand architectonic that also encompasses a theory of liberal equality and an important discussion of community. Though it is the last component that this essay is most interested in, it is impossible to consider one part in isolation from the others. Dworkin believes that community can serve as a go-between for authority and autonomy; or, to use a different rubric, community can explain and justify obligation. The authority must present a legal system that is true to the value of integrity. If a legal system displays integrity, the political community becomes amenable to personification. Personification of the community allows for the formation of feelings of veneration and attachment towards it. These feelings are critical to the well-being of the individual. Hence if authority abides by the demands of community, it deserves allegiance from the individual. The tension between authority and autonomy is in this manner resolved.

An influential view in recent philosophy of punishment is that the apparatus of criminal justice should be geared at least in part to state censure of wrongdoing. I argue that if it were to be so geared, such an apparatus would make ambitious claims to authority, and that the legitimacy of the relevant state would then depend on whether those claims can be vindicated. This paper looks first at what kind of authority is being claimed by this apparatus. The criminal law, I argue, cannot merely be thought of as claiming a right to rule and to be obeyed. Rather, its authority is better understood as the authority of moral oversight: a power to alter, at will (though within certain limits), citizens’ liability to answer for their compliance with—and to be officially censured for their failure to comply with—a designated set of pre-existing moral 7reasons. The paper then looks at whether a state could realistically be expected to possess such authority—that is, whether a state that claims to have such a power could ever be legitimate.