I offer in this paper an argument in support of the orthodox view that resultant luck should not affect judgments of blameworthiness—and so, for example, that we should not blame the successful assassin more than the attempted assassin who equally tries but fails. This view, though widely held among moral philosophers and legal scholars, has been severely challenged as implying either the implausible rejection of moral luck or an equally implausible theory of wrongness according to which actual consequences may play no wrong-making role. The argument I offer, however, assumes both challenges to be true and shows that the orthodox view is consistent with holding them. Indeed, I argue that all other things being equal, successful offenders are no more to blame than their unsuccessful counterparts, even though agents are responsible for what they actually do (and therefore are subject to moral luck), and successful offenders do more wrong than their unsuccessful counterparts do (and therefore consequences do play a wrong-making role). The reason is that the difference in the amount of wrong done by one and the other offender, I show, is counterbalanced by a difference in the degree to which the successful offense and the unsuccessful one are attributable to their respective agents—blameworthiness being a function of both amount of wrong done and degree of attributability.

This article elaborates upon and defends the distinction between “primary duty” claims and “primary liability” claims in private law introduced in a previous article. In particular, I discuss the relevance of the distinction to the debates over fault and strict liability and “duty skepticism” and to the relationship between primary and remedial rights. I argue that the tendency to assume that all claims in private law arise from a breach of duty is a source of error and confusion. As a prelude to the discussion, I set out an analysis of a claim or remedial right in private law as a Hohfeldian power correlated with a remedial liability. I also consider whether primary-liability claims can be formulated in terms of the legal relations found in Wesley Hohfeld's scheme, and I make some general comments about Hohfeldian analysis.

This article is about decision making by juries in capital cases. A jury is a collection of individuals who may possess differing views about factors relevant to the task before them, but who must, nonetheless, arrive collectively at a decision. As such, the members of the jury face a classic social choice problem. We investigate how this problem is likely to be resolved under various institutional regimes, differentiated by the set of individuals who are allowed to participate and the decision rule controlling their activities. As in our previous paper analyzing decision making by juries, we focus here on an aspect of the process that has been neglected in judicial opinions and academic scholarship: namely to what extent, and how, persistent disagreement among jurors can and will be resolved.

Liberalism is a wonderful theory, but its adherents have a difficult time explaining why. In his Tanner Lecture entitled Foundations of Liberal Equality, Ronald Dworkin proposes to defend liberalism in a new way. Dworkin is not content to view liberalism as a political compromise in which people set aside their personal convictions in the interest of social peace. Instead, he undertakes to make liberal political theory “continuous” with personal ethics, by describing an ethical position that endorses liberalism as a matter of conviction.

A rational defense of the criminal law must provide a comprehensive theory of culpability. A comprehensive theory of culpability must resolve several difficult issues; in this article I will focus on only one. The general problem arises from the lack of a systematic account of relative culpability. An account of relative culpability would identify and defend a set of considerations to assess whether, why, under what circumstances, and to what extent persons who perform a criminal act with a given culpable state are more or less blameworthy than persons who perform that act with a different culpable state.

How do legal texts determine legal content? A standard answer to this question—sometimes called “the standard picture”—is that legal texts communicate something and what they communicate is identical to legal content. Mark Greenberg criticizes the standard picture and offers in its place his own “moral impact theory.” My goal here is to respond to Greenberg by showing how the standard picture better explains legal practice than the moral impact theory does. To that end, I first clarify certain aspects of the moral impact theory. I then critique the theory, focusing on its inability to explain (i) why practitioners reason about legal content as they do and (ii) why they agree on legal content as often as they do. Finally, I refine the standard picture and demonstrate how it explains what the moral impact theory cannot.

It is often claimed that John Finnis's natural law theory is detachable from the ultimate theistic explanation that he offers in the final chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights. My aim in this paper is to think through the question of the detachability of Finnis's theistic explanation of the natural law from the remainder of his natural law view, both in Natural Law and Natural Rights and beyond. I argue that Finnis's theistic explanation of the natural law as actually presented can be, without too much strain, treated as largely detachable in the way that his readers have by and large supposed it to be; indeed, Finnis's account as actually presented really amounts to no explanation of the natural law at all, theistic or otherwise, and that fact accounts in part for the ease with which Finnis's natural law view can be detached from theism of that final chapter. Nevertheless, the considerations raised in that chapter militate in favor of a much more thoroughgoing, largely nondetachable theistic account. And it is just such an account that we find Finnis affirming in the development of his views after Natural Law and Natural Rights.

The idea that human beings are intellectually self-governing plays two roles in free-speech theory. First, this idea is frequently called upon as part of the justification for free speech. Second, it plays a role in guiding the translation of free-speech principles into legal policy by underwriting the ascriptive framework through which responsibility for certain kinds of speech harms can be ascribed. After mapping out these relations, I ask what becomes of them once we acknowledge certain very general and profound limitations in people's capacity for intellectual self-governance. I argue that acknowledging these limitations drastically undermines the putative justifications for free speech of the type that I identify in the first part of the paper. I then show how we can reformulate an “ascriptive” account of intellectual and doxastic responsibility on which we may still be held responsible for what we think or believe even though we lack agent-causal capacities in our thinking and believing. Then, in light of this ascriptive account of intellectual responsibility, I show how the key idea—that people “have minds of their own”—can (and should) still play a significant role in guiding the legislative outworkings of free speech.

Take “legal reality” to be the part of reality that actual legal thought and talk is distinctively about, such as legal institutions, legal obligations, and legal norms. Our goal is to explore whether legal reality is disunified. To illustrate the issue, consider the possibility that an important metaphysical thesis such as positivism is true of one part of legal reality (legal institutions), but not another (legal norms). We offer two arguments that suggest that legal reality is disunified: one concerns the heterogeneity of different entities that are part of legal reality; the other concerns variation within legal thought and talk. We then show that taking the possibility of the disunity of legal reality seriously has important upshots for how we think about the positivist and antipositivist traditions, the debate between them, and their relation to other parts of legal theory, such as critical legal theory and legal realism.

The question addressed here is whether evidence concerning defendants' past criminal records should be introduced at their trials because such evidence reveals their character and thus reveals whether they are the kinds of persons likely to have committed the crimes with which they are currently charged. I strongly caution against the introduction of such evidence for a number of reasons. First, the link between defendants' past criminal records and claims about their standing dispositions to think and act is tenuous, at best. Second, noncharacter, or trace, evidence should have primacy in determining the guilt or innocence of defendants. Third, character evidence will vary in its freshness and specificity. Other things being equal, only relatively fresh and specific character evidence has probative value. Moreover, such evidence will have greater probative value in criminal cases where the issue before the court is whether a crime has been committed than in cases where the issue is whether it was the defendant who committed the crime. Finally, we might be more sanguine about the introduction of fresh and specific character evidence under conditions likely to work against its misuse or misinterpretation. However, the relevant conditions may not often be satisfied in the real world of criminal trials and defendants.

Thucydides is the author of the most harrowing account of societal breakdown in antiquity. Brian Leiter has recently made the provocative claim that Thucydides’ analysis of such breakdowns indicates that morality is of little import in guiding behavior, including legal behavior. Yet Thucydides also narrates events, particularly in Athens, that indicate that something resembling morality can continue to guide action, including legal action, even at the worst of times. Thucydides provides tantalizing clues as to why he narrates events that only sometimes follow the path predicted by Leiter. In particular, Thucydides (accurately) portrays the law that suffuses Athenian life and saves Athens itself as, for the most part, informal and infused with moral concerns. Leiter's reading of Thucydides therefore not only is limited but misses implicit arguments that challenge Leiter's broader argument for a particular form of legal realism.

In 1990, in Department of Employment Services v. Smith,494 U.S. 872 (1990). the Supreme Court announced a new standard to govern Free Exercise claims. The Court held that “the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens concurring)). Prior to Smith, the Court had applied a test drawn from Sherbert v. Verner.374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court had indicated that religiously motivated persons were constitutionally exempt from otherwise valid laws unless the imposition of those laws was necessary to secure “a compelling state interest.”Id. at 403 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court rejected almost every Free Exercise claim raised under Sherbert, the Sherbert standard was—in theory if not in practice—remarkably generous to religiously motivated persons, granting them a presumptive right to disobey laws that thwarted their religious commitments.

This essay replies to the thoughtful commentaries, by Michael Bratman, David Brink, Larry Alexander, and Michael Moore, on my book Attempts.

Private law is generally formulated in terms of right–duty relations, and accordingly, private-law claims are understood to arise from breaches of duty, or wrongs. Some claims are not easy to explain on this basis because the claim arises from an act that the defendant was justified in doing. The violation/infringement distinction seems to offer an explanation of such claims, but it is argued that the explanation is illusory. Claims of this sort are best understood as based not on a primary right–duty relation at all but on a “primary liability” or “right–liability” relation. A primary-liability claim is not a claim arising from the breach of a strict-liability duty. The recognition of primary-liability claims does not involve skepticism about duties or rules or legal relations and it is consistent with the analysis of private law in terms of corrective justice.

Intentionalist theories of legal interpretation are often divided between objectivist and subjectivist variants. The former take an interpretation to be correct depending on what the reasonable/rational lawmaker intended or what the reasonable/rational audience thinks they intended. The latter take an interpretation to be correct where the interpretation is what the speaker actually intended. This paper argues that objectivism faces serious problems as it cannot deal with disagreement: reasonable and rational persons can often disagree as to what the interpretation of a text should be. It also defends subjectivism against criticisms by objectivists.

This article introduces a significant yet largely overlooked problem in the law of torts: causal underdetermination. This problem occurs when the causal inquiry of a but-for test produces not one but two results, which are contradictory. According to the first, the negligent defendant is the likely cause of the plaintiff's injury, whereas according to the second, she is not. The article explains why causal underdetermination has escaped the radar of tort scholars and is perceived by courts as lack of causation. It demonstrates that the current practice in cases of causal underdetermination might lead to erroneous decisions, absolving negligent defendants of tort liability even when the evidence suggests that they are in fact the likely cause of the plaintiff's injury. This, in turn, the article asserts, may not only lead to underdeterrence among potential defendants, but also encourage manipulative litigation strategy to escape liability in retrospect. The article then proposes solutions that contend with causal underdetermination and resolve the difficulties that the current practice entails.

INTRODUCTION

It’s apples and oranges, we say. Chalk and cheese.Apples and oranges is the North American term, implying incommensurability. Chalk and cheese is the British term, implying both incommensurability and incompatibility. Or, somewhat more equivocally, six of one and half a dozen of the other.This may imply either the equality of the options before us (if emphasis is placed on the identity of six and half a dozen) or the incommensurability of options that are insignificant in our lives (if emphasis is placed on the difference between one option and the other). What do we mean?

Positivism’s Separability Thesis denies that the legality of a norm necessarily depends on its substantive moral merits; as H.L.A. Hart puts it, “[I]t is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.”H.L.A. Hart, The Concept Of Law 185–86 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter CL]. Accordingly, the Separability Thesis implies it is logically possible for something that constitutes a legal system to exclude moral norms from the criteria that determine whether a standard is legally valid. In such a legal system, it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a norm N to be legally valid that N be consistent with a set of moral norms.

In some cases, harming another gives rise to a duty to compensate for harm done. This paper argues that the influential explanations of such duties of compensation—that they are somehow derived from rights intrusions, or breaches of duties not to harm—fail. I offer and defend an alternative explanation for why certain harms and not others give rise to compensatory duties, an explanation that seeks to derive them from wide-scope duties not to harm or to compensate for harm done.

There is a close but largely unexplored connection between law and economics and cognitive psychology. Law and economics applies economic models, modes of analysis, and argument to legal problems. Economic theory can be applied to legal problems for predictive, explanatory, or evaluative purposes. In explaining or assessing human action, economic theory presupposes a largely unarticulated account of rational, intentional action. Philosophers typically analyze intentional action in terms of desires and beliefs. I intend to perform some action because I believe that it will (is likely to) produce an outcome that I desire. This standard “belief-desire” model of action invokes what philosophers of psychology and action theorists aptly refer to as a “folk psychology.”