In this paper I argue that economic theories have never been able to provide a coherent explanation of the causation requirement in tort law. The economic characterization of this requirement faces insurmountable difficulties, because discourse on tort liability cannot be reduced to a cost-benefit analysis without a loss of meaning. More seriously, I try to show that by describing causation in economic terms, economic theories offer an image of the practice in which the participants incur in logical contradictions and develop patterns of inference that are far from intuitive. For this reason, efficiency cannot be the fundamental principle underlying tort law. Finally, I suggest that economic analysis of law can provide a genuine explanation of certain aspects of legal practice if it relinquishes its reductionist claims.

The idea of “church autonomy” has risen to prominence in law and religion discourse in recent years. Defenders argue that church autonomy is essential to protecting religious freedom, while critics argue that it permits great harm. This heated dispute often obscures the fact that religious group autonomy is not all-or-nothing. Religious organizations can enjoy some autonomy without being free from all legal oversight. This article thus seeks to make progress in the debate by providing a taxonomy of kinds of judicial examination of religious organizations’ decisions—focusing on employment decisions—and normatively assessing each kind. I argue that religious groups should enjoy protection from certain kinds of examination, but other kinds are justifiable, and even required. My argument supports an approach similar to that seen in some recent European Court of Human Rights decisions, rather than the less discriminating approach of U.S. courts.

John Finnis's powerfully and deservedly influential modern classic, Natural Law and Natural Rights, expounds a theory of law and morality that is based on a picture of “persons” using practical reason to pursue certain “basic goods.” While devoting much attention to practical reason and to the goods, however, Finnis says little about the nature of personhood. This relative inattention to what “persons” are creates a risk—one that Finnis himself notices—of assuming or importing an inadequate anthropology. This essay suggests that the “new natural law” developed by Finnis suffers in places from the inadvertent adoption of (or, more likely, acquiescence in) a flawed anthropology—an anthropology under the thrall of modern individualistic commitments. To explain this suspicion, this article discusses three difficulties (or so they seem to me) in his natural law theory: difficulties in accounting for the basic good of friendship, for obligations we owe to others, and for legal authority. These difficulties may seem disconnected, but this article suggests that they may all reflect an inadequate anthropology—one that Finnis does not exactly embrace (in fact, I suspect that he would reject it) but that is pervasive today and that in places may affect his theorizing.

The wishes of the dead seem to have normative significance. We not only respect last wills and testaments, but we take seriously what the dead loved, what they valued, even after they have long escaped this mortal coil. But this presents a philosophical puzzle. Is this a normatively justified practice? Why should the fact that some dead person preferred state of affairs x to state of affairs y be a reason to bring about x rather than y—especially if there is otherwise reason to promote y rather than x? In this paper, I argue that extant solutions to this problem are inadequate and propose an alternative. I argue that the normative significance of the wishes of the dead is to be found not in the dead's well-being or interests, but instead in the relations of friendship we bear to the dead.

Numerous legal theorists argue that corrective justice is distinct both conceptually and normatively from distributive justice. In particular, they contend that it is an error to view corrective justice as ancillary to distributive justice, necessary only to maintain or restore a preferred allocation of benefits and burdens. The specific arguments of these legal theorists are addressed and shown to be inconclusive in relation to what I term the Dependence Thesis. The Dependence Thesis holds that a normative account of the occasions of corrective justice is dependent on a larger theory of distributive justice. The nature of this dependence relation varies from theory to theory. The role of tort compensation schemes within libertarian, liberal egalitarian, and utilitarian theories of distributive justice is discussed. It is argued that such theories provide comprehensive and critical perspectives on historical corrective practices, neither simply endorsing nor invalidating them. An alternative normative account of the occasions of corrective justice, offered by legal theorists who support the autonomy of corrective justice from distributive justice, is also discussed.

The possibility of collective action is essential to human freedom; yet, as Rousseau famously argued, individuals acting together allow themselves to depend on one another's choices and thereby jeopardize one another's freedom. These two facts jointly constitute what I call the normative problem of collective action. I argue that solving this problem is harder than it looks: it cannot be done merely in terms of moral obligations; indeed, it ultimately requires putting in place a full-fledged system of contract rights. The point has important ramifications for contract theory: the role that contract rights play in reconciling collective action and freedom turns out to be crucial to understanding how—and by whom—these rights can legitimately be enforced. It also explains why expectation damages should be the standard remedy for breach of contract.

This article argues that the disjunctive obligation in contract law can be justified on moral grounds. It argues that from a perspective that regards human beings as free agents capable of choice and therefore independent of material objects, the contracting parties must be understood as agreeing to mutually guarantee one another's ownership of a certain value. This guarantee can be fulfilled either by handing over what was promised or by making up the difference between the market value and the contract value of what was promised. The plaintiff's contractual right is therefore a right that the defendant perform or pay. This makes expectation damages intelligible as a vindication of the plaintiff's contractual right. Moreover, the disjunctive obligation can be reconciled with all the doctrines that others take to be decisive arguments against it—with the doctrines of specific performance, inducing breach, impossibility, preexisting duty consideration, and nominal damages.

One of the most difficult challenges of mature legal systems is the need to balance the conflicting demands of stability and flexibility. The demand for flexibility is at odds with the principle of impartiality, which is considered a cornerstone of the rule of law. In the present article, I explore the way in which the law copes with this dilemma by developing the idea of tolerance of incoherence. I argue that tolerance of incoherence emerges from the interplay between the inferential and lexical-semantic rules that determine the meaning of legal speech acts. I base this argument on an inferential model of speech acts, which I develop through a discussion of graded speech acts, and on the idea that the use of speech acts is governed by multiple and potentially conflicting conventions. I show how this tolerance allows the law to resolve the tension between dynamism and traditionality, and discuss its sociological and moral implications.

Global political organization in recent centuries has been dominated by the juridical model of the international states system. Originating in early modern Europe, this distinctive way of structuring political authority has progressively extended its reach to the point where, today, the inhabitable land surfaces of the world are entirely divided up among sovereign states. I will argue that we have both practical and moral reasons to move away from this form of political organization. While my immediate target will be the ideal states system that John Rawls proposes in The Law of Peoples,J. Rawls, THE LAWOF PEOPLES (1999); hereafter “LP.” the main conclusions defended here are applicable to a range of possible models that can be characterized as states-system models. Theories in this range may depart in various ways from current international law but all are marked by the claim that legal-political authority should be concentrated in exclusive or nearly exclusive territorial jurisdictions regarded as equal and independent political units.

This article focuses primarily on the emotion of guilt as providing a justification for retributive legal punishment. In particular, I challenge the claim according to which guilt can function as part of our epistemic justification of positive retributivism, that is, the view that wrongdoing is both necessary and sufficient to justify punishment. I show that the argument to this conclusion rests on two premises: (1) to feel guilty typically involves the judgment that one deserves punishment; and (2) those who feel guilty after wrongdoing are more virtuous (or less vicious) than those who do not. I shall argue that premise (1) is false on both empirical and conceptual grounds and that there are no particularly good grounds supporting this premise (2). Finally, I consider and reject the claim that anger, as opposed to guilt, can afford the type of epistemic justification needed by positive retributivism.

This is the second of two closely related articlesThe first is Warren F. Schwartz, Long-Shot Class Actions: Toward a Normative Theory of Legal Uncertainty, 8 LEGAL THEORY 297 (2002). challenging the widely held belief that plaintiffs, through the settlement process, are realizing “too much” from “unmeritorious” claims. No one has offered a systematic justification for this belief. It appears, however, to be based upon the effects produced by three characteristics of the settlement process: (1) the outcome of litigation is uncertain; (2) when, as in a class action, the stakes are very high for a defendant, the defendant will be very risk-averse and will consequently be prepared to pay in settlement much more than the expected value of its liability; and (3) litigation is costly.

Think of the color spectrum, spread out before you. You can identify the different colors with ease. But if you are asked to indicate the point at which one color ends and the next begins, you are at a loss. “There is no such point,” is a natural thought: One color just shades gradually into the next.

We consider the implications of the definition of juror bias offered in Schwartz and SchwartzEdward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, The Challenge of Peremptory Challenges. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, Long Beach, California, March 24–26, 1995. for optimal use of juror challenges to improve the accuracy of the jury process. For them, bias consists of a juror assinging more/less weight to the evidence for guilt than would be assigned by the median juror in a fully representative pool of jurors. When juror assessments of the evidence have a probabilistic component to them, we show that this notion of bias does not imply that we necessarily would wish to use challenges to eliminate the most biased jurors. We also explain how understanding juror verdict accuracy requires an analysis of the interaction between the threshold rule that the juror uses to determine what level of belief in the guilt of the defendant is sufficient for “guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” and the probative force of the evidence in the cases that the prosecution chooses to bring to trial. Whether we use the Schwartz and Schwartz definition or other more standard legal approaches to defining juror bias (and grounds for challenge for cause) we come away highly skeptical of the expanded voir dire and extended use of peremptories that, in a number of recent highly publicized criminal trials, have had the consequences of eliminating from the jury pool the most highly educated and the most knowledgeable jurors.

Sometimes it is morally permissible to prevent someone from performing a wrongful act by harming him before he has a chance to act. It is permissible, for example, to kill someone you reasonably fear is about to kill you. Under other circumstances, however, it may only be permissible to threaten to harm someone to discourage him from performing a wrongful act. It is not always permissible straightaway to harm him. A military commander, for example, may threaten an enemy with disproportionate retaliation, even though it would not ordinarily be permissible to carry it out.

I aspire to answer two questions regarding the concept of a corrective duty. The first concerns what it means to wrong others, thus triggering a demand for corrections (the ground question). The second relates to the proper content of corrective duties. I first illustrate how three prominent accounts of corrective duties—the Aristotelian model of correlativity, the Kantian idea that wronging corresponds to the violation of others’ right to freedom, and the more recent continuity view—have failed to answer the two questions satisfactorily. I then introduce my proposal, which holds that we wrong others when we fail to treat their status as moral agents as a source of stringent constraints on our action. I call it the moral neglect account. Once we have identified a common aim of corrective duties (counterbalancing moral neglect), we can fill their content in the various contexts in which wronging has occurred. I conclude by observing that it is not the primary role of corrective justice to assign responsibilities for damage reparations; in fact, requests for compensation make more sense if framed in distributive rather than corrective terms.

Legal reasoning is commonly thought of as being based on either rules or analogies. More specifically, there is ongoing debate regarding whether precedential reasoning is best characterized as rule-based or analogical. This article continues that work by comparing recent and representative approaches from each camp, namely, Stevens's analogical model and the “rule-based” model of Horty and Rigoni. In the course of the comparison improvements on each approach are suggested and the improved models serve as the basis for the ultimate evaluation. The evaluation demonstrates that the “best” approach depends on the goals one has in theorizing legal reasoning as well as the jurisprudential assumptions one is willing to make.

In an impressive and important article, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, Matthew Adler maintains that constitutional rights are “rights against rules: they protect citizens against the legislative enactment and judicial application of particular rules (rules with wrong act-type predicates); they do not provide guarantees that citizens can perform any particular sorts of actions free of governmental interference.”Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1998). As Adler writes:

Richard Arneson finds that Joel Feinberg's “principled arguments against hard paternalism are defective and merit rejection.” Furthermore, Arneson concludes with a tone of finality, “there is no successful case against hard paternalism to be made.” This diagnosis seems especially dire coming from Arneson, who formerly defended hard antipaternalism against Feinberg's revisionistic “soft” antipaternalism. On Feinberg's behalf I will try to show how Arneson's critique downplays certain costs of hard paternalism. These costs may be worth paying, but (I think Feinberg believed) their magnitude itself constitutes a powerful case against paternalism.

Several theorists argue that blackmail is morally wrong because the blackmail proposal is coercive. These coercion-based views are promising but incomplete. A full explanation of blackmail's immorality must address both the blackmail proposal and the blackmail agreement. I defend what I call the complex account, on which blackmail is morally wrong because blackmail proposals are coercive and blackmail agreements are fraudulent. The complex account avoids difficulties that beset other coercion-based views and provides a stronger case for why blackmail should be criminalized.

Philosophers have long debated whether there is a morally significant difference between acting with the intention of bringing about some state of affairs and acting with the mere awareness that that state of affairs will occur as an unintended side effect of what one is trying to achieve. This controversy is mirrored in the criminal law in a number of places, most notably with respect to the question of whether the mens rea for the crime of murder should require the intent to cause death or only the knowledge that it will occur. In this paper I propose what I believe is a satisfactory way of drawing the intended/foreseen distinction and then argue, contrary to what Duff and others have supposed, that such a distinction does not underwrite a difference in moral or legal culpability. I leave open the possibility, however, that there may be consequentialist reasons for sometimes imposing greater liability in the case of intended harms than in the case of those that are merely foreseen.