This article provides a normative appraisal of the law of military occupation by looking into occupation courts and their legitimacy. It focuses on two cornerstones of the current regulation of war: the principle of equality of belligerents, that is, the potential relevance of jus ad bellum considerations on the in bello rights of occupants, and the normative force of the traditional distinction between states and non-state armed groups, specially in conflicts not of an international character. Against the currently predominant neoclassical position in just war theory, it argues in favor of the moral equality of just and unjust occupants. Against the orthodox position in international law, it advocates the symmetrical treatment of states and non-state actors fighting internal armed conflicts, at least in terms of the rights they may claim on the territories under their control. It concludes by appraising the way in which this moral landscape should be translated into legal norms.

I. INTRODUCTION

Having developed his own complex and subtle theory of vagueness, Stephen Schiffer, in “A Little Help from Your Friends?” asks if philosophical theories of vagueness have anything to offer to jurisprudential concerns about vagueness. His answer is “no.”

To whom is a duty owed? Contractualism answers with an interest theory of direction. As such, it faces three challenges. The Conceptual Challenge requires acknowledgment that a duty is conceptually distinct from an interest. The Extensional Challenge requires an account of cases in which one who is owed a duty does not take an interest in the duty, or does not take as much of an interest as someone who is not owed the duty. The Positivist Challenge requires explanation of the great flexibility of law and other social practices in positing duties that do not reflect the landscape of moral interests. Contractualism can be shown to meet these challenges once we acknowledge the centrality of the idea of a generic interest. Focusing on generic interests also illuminates the distinctive form of respect involved in directedness.

Many scholars have offered theories that purport to explain the whole of the law of torts. At least some of these theories do not seem to be specific to a single jurisdiction. Several appear to endeavor to account for tort law in at least the major common law jurisdictions or even throughout the common law world. These include Ernest Weinrib's corrective justice theory, Robert Stevens's rights theory, and Richard Posner's economic theory. This article begins by explaining why it is appropriate to understand these three theories as universal theories of tort law and why it is important that they be so understood. This explanation draws upon various overt claims (or other strong intimations) made by the theorists themselves to the effect that this is how their respective accounts should be understood. The article then proceeds to test these theories, all of which are leading accounts of tort law, against the evidence in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The parts of tort law on which we focus are (1) the breach element of the action in negligence, (2) the law that determines when a duty of care will be owed in respect of pure economic loss, (3) the law that governs the availability of punitive damages, (4) the defense of illegality, and (5) the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and its descendants. The article concludes that none of the theories is a satisfactory universal account of tort law. All of them suffer from significant problems of fit in that they cannot accommodate (often even approximately) the areas of law that we discuss. Although each of the theories contains a great many valuable insights, they all nonetheless fall well short of accomplishing that which they are held out as providing. In the course of this analysis, the article explains why this is an appropriate line of criticism and identifies the degree of lack of fit that we regard as being “significant.”

The obligation of a court to follow the law of a superior court is commonly taken to be stronger than the obligation of the higher court to respect its own precedent. The Supreme Court has recently asserted this stronger obligation in the most forceful terms. What follows is an attempt to demonstrate that this is wrong as a matter of policy and as a matter of law.

Two rival approaches to property rights dominate contemporary political philosophy: Lockean natural rights and egalitarian theories of distributive justice. This article defends a third approach, which can be traced to the work of David Hume. Unlike Lockean rights, Humean property rights are not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. In contrast to the egalitarian approach, which begins with highly abstract principles of distributive justice, Humean theory starts with simple property conventions and shows how more complex institutions can be justified against a background of settled property rights. Property rights allow people to coordinate their use of scarce resources. For property rules to serve this function effectively, certain questions must be considered settled. Treating existing property entitlements as having prima facie validity facilitates cooperation between people who disagree about distributive justice. Lockean and egalitarian theories endorse moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions and undermine social cooperation.

According to interest theorists of rights, rights function to protect the right-holder's interests. True. But this leaves a lot unsaid. Most saliently here, it is certainly not the case that every agent who stands to benefit from performance of a duty gets to be a right-holder. For a theory to allow this to be the case—to allow for an explosion of right-holders—would be tantamount to a reductio thereof. So the challenge for interest theorists is to respect the core of the interest theory while delimiting the set of right-holders in a principled manner. The foremost explicit attempt to do this has invoked Bentham's test. Predictably, invocation of this test has come under attack, with the ultimate aim of challenging the interest theory itself. My purpose in this paper is to render Bentham's test as clearly and accurately as possible. Doing so will raise issues of modality—ultimately in rendering Bentham's test's logical form. Ultimately a core attack on Bentham's test falls away, and, to that extent, the interest theory remains standing as a promising theory of rights.

According to a recent wave of work by legal anti-positivists, legal norms are a subset of moral norms. This striking “one-system” view of law has rapidly become the dominant form of anti-positivism, but its implications have so far been little tested. This article argues that the one-system view leads systematically to untenable conclusions about what legal rights and obligations we have. For many clear legal norms, the view lacks the resources to explain the existence of corresponding moral norms. And its criteria for distinguishing legal norms within morality imply an under- or over-inclusive set of legal norms. I stress the special difficulties that apply beyond obligations, in the case of privileges and powers, and I show that the view's problems do not only—or mainly—concern egregiously unjust law, or indeed morally defective law at all. I close with reflections on legal normativity and the prospects for different forms of anti-positivism.

In two recent papers, Mark McBride has attacked the interest theory of rights, both introducing new arguments and claiming that interest theorists have not successfully deflected Gopal Sreenivasan's earlier arguments. This essay replies to all of McBride's criticisms, showing them to be mistaken.

In “The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof,” I argue that epistemic conditions that undermine knowledge in Gettier-type cases also potentially undermine legal verdicts. For this reason, I argue, there is a deeper connection between knowledge and legal proof than is typically presupposed or argued for in the scholarly legal literature. To support these claims, I present several examples illustrating how conditions that render epistemically justified beliefs merely accidentally true (and thus disqualify them as cases of genuine knowledge) may also render evidentially well-supported verdicts merely accidentally true for similar reasons. Such “Gettierized” verdicts, I contend, fail to realize the epistemic goal or aim of legal proof. Thus I conclude there, legal proof includes something like a knowledge requirement—in the sense that legal verdicts aim not only at truth and sufficient evidential support but also, as with knowledge, at an appropriate connection between their truth and justifying evidential support.

Is the act/omission distinction relevant to assessments of responsibility, and if so, why? The traditional view is that the distinction is relevant in that ceteris paribus acts are more blameworthy than omissions. Until about the 1960s that position tended to be assumed rather than justified, but since then there has been considerable debate over the issue. Some philosophers have challenged the validity of the moral position upon which the distinction rests, and some have questioned its conceptual grounding.See, e.g., J. Bennett, Whatever the Consequences Analysis, 26 (1966); P. Unger, LIVING HIGHAND LETTING DIE (1996) on the moral relevance of the AOD. See, e.g., J. Bennett, THE ACT ITSELF (1995); B. Vermazen, Negative Acts, in ESSAYS ON DAVIDSON: ACTIONSAND EVENTS 95 (Vermazen and Hintikka, eds., 1985) on the concept of omission. But others have come to its defense.See, e.g., A.M. Honore, Are Omissions Less Culpable? in ESSAYS FOR PATRICK ATIYAH 31 (Cane and Stapleton, eds., 1991); M. Moore, ACTAND CRIME 23 (1993). So the question remains. Exactly what (if anything) does the act/omission distinction (henceforth AOD) tell us about responsibility in general or legal responsibility?

In his interesting comment on my recent article, “The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction,” Edward Schwartz makes two criticisms of my analysis. The criticisms have essentially to do with my assumption that an appeals court judge will base his or her decisions only on what happened at trial, and not on any inference that can be drawn from the fact that an appeal was brought. Before explaining why I do not find Schwartz's criticisms problematic, it will be helpful for me to restate the main features of the model that I examined in the article.

Elaborating first upon H. L. A. Hart's distinction between imposing duties and imposing disabilities, this article explores the two senses mentioned (but not fully explained) by Hart in which power-holders may be legally disabled. Legal invalidation (nullification) of norms that have been generated by vulnerable power-holders is seen to reduce diversity or pluralism in every normative sphere, from the supranational to the intrafamilial. By contrast, mere legal nonvalidation (noncognizance) of such norms tends to preserve the autonomy of the power-holders that created the norms, thus enhancing legal pluralism. Punishment for creating forbidden norms amounts in principle to an in-between sort of control, less restrictive than completely invalidating them but more restrictive than just not validating them, that is, just ignoring them. Illustrative examples include the European Court of Justice's early use of invalidation to convert an international treaty into a supranational constitution, and the subtle effects of legal nonvalidation of same-sex marriage.

There are two distinct types of legal wrongdoing: civil and criminal. This article demonstrates in three ways that Immanuel Kant's Universal Principle of Right, properly interpreted, offers a plausible and resilient account of this important distinction. First, Kant's principle correctly identifies attempted crimes as crimes themselves even when they do not violate the rights of any individual. Second, it justifies our treatment of reckless endangerment as a crime by distinguishing it from ordinary negligence, traditionally thought to be only civilly wrong. Third, it explains and justifies differences between the features of traditional criminal punishments and the features of civil remedies. Moreover, the Universal Principle of Right yields a Kantian standard for criminal wrongdoing that is compelling enough to inform future philosophical inquiries into the nature and limits of the state's criminal lawmaking authority.

Among Joel Feinberg's almost innumerable achievements are his development and defense of the sovereign-right conception of autonomy and its corresponding rejection of hard legal paternalism. According to Feinberg, a competent individual's voluntary, self-regarding conduct falls within the protected realm of sovereign self-rule and is therefore immune from coercive, paternalistic interference by the state. It does not matter whether the self-harm the state wants to prevent is big or the coercion needed to prevent it is small. The coercive interference would be illegitimate because “sovereignty is an all or nothing concept; one is entitled to absolute control of whatever is within one's domain however trivial it may be.”

Whereas the Restatement of Torts and leading economic and justice-based approaches to explaining the standard of reasonable care advocate symmetric measurement of reasonable care across the defendant/plaintiff distinction, this article demonstrates that, in fact, the law applies this standard asymmetrically. Defendants are expected to discharge an objectively fixed amount of care, whereas plaintiffs are generally assessed using a subjective measurement of reasonable care. Normatively, I argue that an asymmetric assessment of care, because it combines an unfavorable assessment of defendant's negligence with a favorable assessment of plaintiff's negligence, means that the victim gets to fix the terms of the interaction. This argument resonates with the powerful egalitarian idea of accommodating, rather than overlooking, relevant differences; different treatment is necessary for the duty of reasonable care to give effect to the qualitative difference between the plaintiff's life and limb and the defendant's autonomy. Asymmetric assessment of due care, I argue, is the doctrinal metric by which the law determines what it is for the plaintiff and the defendant to relate as equals given that difference, or to relate as substantive equals.

Patricia Smith provides an analysis of the concept of omission that builds upon the work of Joel Feinberg. Her account succeeds in bringing together more systematically than did Feinberg several key elements of his analysis. She also usefully extends the analysis to include unintentional omissions. Nonetheless, I argue that she mistakenly presupposes that there is a unique and logically fundamental concept of omission. Rather, I contend, there are multiple omission concepts, each mapping the conceptual terrain of inaction in a somewhat different way. These different concepts, each useful for a distinct purpose, will emerge from an examination of the flaws that Smith's account shares with Feinberg's analysis.

The following two theses seem both plausible and consistent: in cases where it is indeterminate whether the relevant legal language applies to the relevant set of facts, officials are not bound to decide the case one way rather than the other, but may reason either way; all reasons for action are—in some relevant sense—knowable. In this paper, I point out what I take to be a robust but unacknowledged tension between these two claims. The tension requires some careful teasing out, but the basic idea is that given certain further plausible assumptions concerning law, language, and normativity, the two claims turn out to be inconsistent. In addition to examining the sources of the tension in some detail, I also address several possible objections to my argument and discuss which of the many theses should be rejected.

This article develops a theory of just contractual relationships for a liberal society. As a liberal theory, our account is premised on liberalism's canonical commitments to self-determination and substantive equality. As a theory of contract law, it focuses on the parties’ interpersonal interactions rather than on the justice (or welfare) of the social order as a whole.

Normatively, the article claims that the rules governing cases where one party experiences harsh circumstances or vulnerability during the bargaining process or operates under significant informational disadvantage must be guided by the commitment to relational justice, that is, to reciprocal respect for self-determination and substantive equality. Jurisprudentially, the article studies the systemic difficulties hindering the translation of these normative prescriptions into legal language and analyzes how they affect the form assumed by the law of precontractual justice and its institutional pedigree.