Two methodological claims in Hart's The Concept of Law have produced perplexity: that it is a book on “analytic jurisprudence”H.L.A Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994). and that it may also be regarded as an essay in “descriptive sociology.”Id. Are these two ideas reconcilable? We know that mere analysis of our legal concepts cannot tell us much about their properties, that is, about the empirical aspect of law. We have learned this from philosophical criticisms of conceptual analysis; yet Hart informs us that analytic jurisprudence can be reconciled with descriptive sociology. The answer to this puzzle lies in the notion of nonambitious conceptual analysis. The theorist analyzes concepts but accepts the limitations of conceptual analysis and therefore uses empirical knowledge and substantive arguments to explain, refine, or perhaps refute initial insights provided by intuitions. This is the conclusion that this paper arrives at as an argumentative strategy to defend Hart's legal theory from the criticisms of Stavropoulos and Dworkin. The latter argues that Hart's legal theory cannot explain theoretical disagreements in law because he relies on a shared criterial semantics. Stavropoulos aims to show that Hart's semantics is committed to ambitious conceptual analysis and relies on the usage of our words as a standard of correctness. Both attacks aim to show that the semantic sting stings Hart's legal theory. This essay refines both challenges and concludes that not even in the light of the most charitable interpretation of these criticisms is Hart's legal theory stung by the semantic sting. This study defends the view that Hart's methodological claims were modest and that he was aware of the limits of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method. He was, this study claims, far ahead of his time.

This article develops and advances a liberal ideal of equality for evaluating the lawful scope of employer control over employees. It argues that, in addition to attending to discrimination and bargaining power asymmetries, we should ensure that our laws treat workers as the moral equals of their bosses more broadly—as people with equally weighty claims to exercising agency over their own values and lives. To illustrate, the article explains that employer control over workplace expression can preclude colleagues from communicating with each other as moral equals and can compromise employees’ abilities to exercise agency over their own characters. It then discusses how our agential interests in workplace expression can guide legal reform.

This paper is about the remedy of disgorgement for breach of contract. In it I argue for two conclusions. I first argue that, prima facie at least, disgorgement damages for breach of contract present something of a puzzle. But second, I argue that if we pay close attention to the notion of contractual performance, this puzzle can be resolved in a way that is consistent with principles of corrective justice. In particular, I suggest that even if a contract gives the promisee a right to only the promisor's performance of the contract, such a right can sometimes entail the acquisition by the promisee of certain rights of ownership. And in situations in which such rights are acquired, the disappointed promisee is entitled to the gains realized by the promisor in breach of contract by reason of the fact that such gains are something to which the promisee has an antecedent right.

In Chapter 4 of his famous work, Harm to Others, Joel Feinberg, with characteristic clarity and insight, outlined the major problems associated with analyzing the foundations of responsibility for the failure to act. In that chapter he made a number of controversial claims supported by arguments that have generated debate ever since he made them in 1984. His analysis led him to conclude that liability (or responsibility) for the failure to act falls within the moral limits of the criminal law in cases in which a random bystander could easily rescue a seriously imperiled stranger.

This paper argues that neither a general right to exclude migrants nor a general right to migrate freely exists. The extent of the right to exclude or the right to migrate freely must instead, in the majority of cases, be determined indirectly by examining whether a given immigration law or policy would result in the violation of migrants’ basic rights. Therefore states’ right to exclude migrants is constrained by what the author calls the indirect principle of freedom of migration. Under this principle, if an immigration law or policy cannot be imposed without violating a migrant's basic rights, then the law or policy cannot be legitimately implemented. The argument for this principle is undertaken both conceptually and substantively. It is then defended against the objections that on the one hand, it may not have enough critical force, and on the other, it may be overly restrictive of states’ power to exclude migrants.

This article discusses the place of integrity in Ronald Dworkin's legal and political philosophy. It presents integrity as a response to certain problems that arise in any society in which more than one contestant view about justice is allowed to determine public policy and legal principle. It also analyzes the relation between integrity and justice, arguing that although integrity requires citizens and officials sometimes to uphold policies or positions they take to be unjust, Dworkin is nevertheless wrong to present them as competing political virtues. Instead, integrity operates as a second-level concept, addressing situations that arise in a society where there is disagreement about justice (and where, therefore, there is no uncontroversial account of what justice requires to set against the requirements of integrity). The article concludes with some reflections on the role of individual convictions about justice in context of law and social action.

Sometimes there are reasons for us to think or act in certain ways. We pay our taxes, we show up on time for our classes, we refuse to assent to claims that we recognize to be inconsistent, and we refrain from wanton violence, and we do each of these things because—we assume—there are reasons for us to do them. I will express the general point by saying that there are norms that apply to us, and to our thought and action. For a norm to apply to a person is for there to be a reason for that person to think or act in a particular way—the way indicated by the norm. Perhaps this reason is one that the person herself does not in any way recognize or acknowledge. But the reason itself—whether or not it is recognized or acknowledged by the person for whom it purports to be a reason—is what I call a “norm.” For instance, I might not recognize or acknowledge various norms concerning theft. But those norms still exist, and they still apply to me; there is a reason for me not to steal, whether or not I recognize or acknowledge that reason. My failure to recognize or acknowledge such reasons does not make them any less real or any less applicable to me.

Despite the bad press that retributivism often receives, the basic assumptions on which this theory of punishment rests are generally regarded as being attractive and compelling. First of these is the assumption that persons are morally responsible agents and that social practices, such as criminal punishment, must acknowledge that fact. Additionally, retributivism is committed to the claim that punishment must be proportionate to the crime, and not determined by such utilitarian concerns as the welfare of society, or the hope of deterring other criminals.Jeffrie Murphy writes, “Even many people who do not like the name ‘retributivist’ are persuaded by considerations that are clearly retributive in nature. Suppose it was suggested that we punish negligent vehicular homicide with life imprisonment and first degree murder with a couple of years in jail, and suppose this suggestion was justified with the following utilitarian reason: Conduct of the first sort is much more common and dangerous than conduct of the latter sort (we are much more likely to be killed by a negligent driver than by someone who kills us with the primary object of killing us), and thus we should use the most severe deterrents against those who are genuinely dangerous. If we object to this suggestion, as most of us would want to, that this would be unjust or unfair because it would not be apportioning punishment to fault or desert, we should be making a retributive argument. Thus even if the label ‘retributivist’ repels most people, many of the actual doctrines of the theory do not.” Jeffrie Murphy, Retribution, Justice, And Therapy 230 (1979). Because the most commonly discussed version of retributivism is developed from Kant’s moral and legal theory, I will refer to it as Kantian Retributivism.This interpretation of Kant’s theory of punishment has been developed by Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Monist 475 (1968), and Murphy, supra note 1. Despite its appeal, Kantian Retributivism cannot provide a satisfactory response to a kind of case that is receiving increasingly serious consideration in philosophical literature. The case is this: Many crimes are committed by individuals profoundly disadvantaged by unjust social institutions, such as racism, classism, and/or sexism. If such individuals commit crimes, the retributivist is placed in a very difficult position: Either she must claim that the individual has willfully committed a crime and for that reason deserves punishment, seeming to ignore entirely the social background of the individual, or she can claim that the individual—in virtue of being disadvantaged by social injustices(s)—does not deserve punishment because such punishment would be unfair.Murphy comes to the conclusion that the punishment of such individuals is unfair and, therefore, unwarranted. See Jeffrie Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, in Murphy, supra note 1, at 93–114. I have argued elsewhere that neither strategy is tenable.See Jami L. Anderson, Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism, 16 Crim. Just. Ethics 13–25(1997).

According to the standard or traditional account, those who hold political authority legitimately have a right to rule that entails an obligation of obedience on the part of those who are subject to their authority. In recent decades, however, and in part in response to philosophical anarchism, a number of philosophers have challenged the standard account by reconceiving authority in ways that break or weaken the connection between political authority and obligation. This paper argues against these revisionist accounts in two ways: first, by pointing to defects in their conceptions of authority; and second, by sketching a fair-play approach to authority and political obligation that vindicates the standard account.

Courts commonly allow willful ignorance to satisfy the knowledge element of a crime. The traditional rationale for this doctrine is that willfully ignorant misconduct is just as culpable as knowing misconduct. But it is not obvious that this “equal culpability thesis” holds across the board. Is it true in all cases of willful ignorance or only some? This is the question I investigate here.

Specifically, I argue against several common versions of the equal culpability thesis before defending my own restricted version. First, I argue that the broadest version of the thesis, adopted by many courts, is overinclusive. Then I argue against several restricted versions of the thesis offered by legal theorists including Doug Husak, David Luban, and Deborah Hellman. My own account, by contrast, is premised on a duty of reasonable investigation. If my account is on the right track, the widely employed willful ignorance doctrine stands in need of reform.

In this reply, I seek to summarize fairly the criticisms advanced by each of my four critics, Jonathan Schaffer, Gideon Yaffe, John Gardner, and Carolina Sartorio. That there is so little overlap either in the aspects of the book on which they focus or in the arguments they advance about those issues has forced me to reply to each of them separately. Schaffer focuses much of his criticisms on my view that absences cannot serve as causal relata and argues that this commits me to the view that double preventions (such as beheadings) cannot be causal of events such as deaths. I deny that double preventions such as beheadings are not causal, while admitting that other double preventions are not causal but denying that this latter conclusion is unwelcome in its implications. Yaffe criticizes my view that a person substantially causing some harm H is sufficient for that person having performed the activity of H-ing, whereas I affirm that causing H is sufficient for doing the action of H-ing even if it is not sufficient for intentionally H-ing (Yaffe's definition of “activity”). Gardner takes issue with my “experiential argument” for the relevance of causation to moral blame; he urges that we cannot infer that we are more guilty (when we cause a harm than when we don't) from either the psychological fact that we feel more guilty or from the moral fact that it is virtuous to feel such heightened guilt, because it is viciously circular: we feel such guilt only because we have already judged that we are more guilty, and it is virtuous to feel such guilt only because we in fact are more guilty. I deny such circularity exists. Sartorio takes issue with my thesis that in omissive overdetermination cases (where each omission is sufficient to fail to prevent some harm, meaning neither is necessary) neither omitter is morally responsible for the harm. I trade intuitions with Sartorio about a range of related cases that we each think bears on the issue.

In H.L.A. Hart’s now famous Postscript to The Concept of Law,H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185–86 (2nd ed., 1994). Hereinafter referred to as CL. he embraced the Incorporation Thesis, according to which it is possible for a legal system to have a rule of recognition that incorporates moral criteria of validity.Nevertheless, Hart had some reservations about the Incorporation Thesis. Hart, a skeptic about moral objectivism, believed that the Incorporation Thesis presupposes that moral norms have an objective status and hence conditioned his acceptance of the Incorporation Thesis on the truth of moral objectivism. See Kenneth Einar Himma, Incorporationism and the Objectivity of Moral Norms, 5 LEGAL THEORY 415 (1999), for a discussion of Hart’s worries on this count. In such legal systems, a norm must satisfy certain moral conditions as either a necessary or a sufficient condition for it to be legally valid. According to the Incorporation Thesis, then, the criteria of validity need not consist exclusively of standards that define validity in terms of a norm’s source or pedigree.

I. INTRODUCTION

The notion that the current descendants of slaves are owed compensation for slavery is one that receives widespread discussion and support. For example, in 1989, Representative John Conyers of Michigan proposed legislation that would create a commission to explore the effects of slavery on both African-Americans and the United States. More recently, Randall Robinson, in The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks, argued that an important step toward healing racial division and helping poor African-Americans is to compensate blacks for slavery.Randall Robinson, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWESTO BLACKS (2001). Also, a well-known group of civil-rights and class-action attorneys, including Harvard law professor Charles Ogletree and Johnnie Cochran, is putting together a lawsuit seeking reparations for the descendants of slaves.Reparations for Slavery, 1 (CBS News television broadcast, 2000), available from www.cbsnews. com/stories/2000/11/04/national/main246998.shtml. The debt on some estimates involves trillions of dollars.Larry Neal and James Marketti estimate that the value of unpaid income to slaves amounts to $1.4 trillion and $3.4 trillion respectively. Dinesh D’Souza, THE ENDOF RACISM 69 n.18 (1995) citing Richard F. America, ed., THE WEALTHOF RACES: THE PRESENT VALUEOF BENEFITSFROM PAST INJUSTICES (1990). In this paper, I argue that the descendants of slaves were not harmed by slavery since they owe their existence to slavery. I then recognize that they may have a claim to compensation based on their having inherited their ancestors’ (i.e., the slaves’) claim to compensation. I argue that the inheritance-based claim is defeated by a number of concerns, particularly doubt surrounding the existence and amount of this inheritance-based claim, concerns about offsets (sums that must be subtracted from compensation), and problems concerning the identity of any contemporary public or private entity that owes compensation. Note that in this essay I will not discuss harms that were not the result of enslavement and hence I set aside some of the claims put forth on behalf of current African-Americans.

This article engages with Jaffey's recent contribution on the nature of no-prior-duty remedial obligations. Jaffey's use of a right-liability relation and his challenge to Hohfeld's analytical scheme are rejected as unsound. An alternative model distinguishing three pathways to account for remedial obligations and other legal consequences is proposed. This draws on the Hohfeldian scheme but extends it to permit the full expression of reflexive liabilities, mutually correlative liabilities, and the operation of nonhuman conditions. The proposed approach also recognizes a weaker form of a Hohfeldian power, which is required in considering the way that the law deals with the allocation and realization of risk.

Christopher Wellman is the strongest proponent of the natural-duty theory of political obligations and argues that his version of the theory can satisfy the key requirement of “particularity”; namely, justifying to members of a state the system of political obligations they share in. Critics argue that natural-duty theories like Wellman's actually require well-ordered states and/or their members to dedicate resources to providing the goods associated with political order to needy outsiders. The implication is that natural-duty approaches weaken the particularity requirement and cannot justify to citizens the systems of political obligation they share in. I argue that the critics’ diagnosis of natural-duty approaches is correct, whereas the proposed implication is false. I maintain that 1) only natural-duty approaches can justify political obligations, and that 2) weakening the particularity requirement contributes to the theory's ability to justify a range-limited system of political obligations among compatriots.

Every theory of justice requires a first-order theory specifying principles of justice, and a second-order view explaining why those principles constitute the correct principles of justice. According to John Rawls, political liberalism is committed to the two principles of justice specified in its first-order theory, “justice as fairness.” Justice as fairness, according to Rawls, in turn presupposes the second-order view that justice is a political conception. A political conception of justice treats the principles derived from the fundamental ideas in the public political culture as the correct principles of justice. Political liberalism, however, nowhere offers a defense of the view that justice is a political conception. Indeed, it even strives to avoid the admission that it presupposes that justice is a political conception by stating only that it uses a political conception of justice, while allowing that justice might not actually be a political conception. As to the truth of its second-order presupposition, political liberalism chooses to remain agnostic. Rawls claims that political liberalism has no choice at all. To do otherwise, he argues, would lead to an internal contradiction.

How do legal texts determine legal content? A standard answer to this question—sometimes called “the standard picture”—is that legal texts communicate something and what they communicate is identical to legal content. Mark Greenberg criticizes the standard picture and offers in its place his own “moral impact theory.” My goal here is to respond to Greenberg by showing how the standard picture better explains legal practice than the moral impact theory does. To that end, I first clarify certain aspects of the moral impact theory. I then critique the theory, focusing on its inability to explain (i) why practitioners reason about legal content as they do and (ii) why they agree on legal content as often as they do. Finally, I refine the standard picture and demonstrate how it explains what the moral impact theory cannot.

In “Professional Detachment: The Executioner of Paris,” I concluded with the cheap and some would say libelous suggestion that lawyers might accurately be described as serial liars, because they repeatedly try to induce others to believe in the truth of propositions or in the validity of arguments that they believe to be false. Good lawyers have responded with some indignation that, in calling zealous advocacy “lying,” I have misdescribed the practice of law. I wish to explain why I believe that it is the practice of lawyering that engages in misdescription.

This article argues that there is a fundamental tension between Joel Feinberg's theory of the nature of rights and his account of what types of beings are potential right-holders. In explaining this tension, I argue that Feinberg actually adopts two competing concepts of rights. Clearly, Feinberg must choose between these two theories, but I suggest that both are attractive and that neither view can be selected as either “correct” or “incorrect” on the grounds of either logical consistency or even straightforward conceptual analysis. In the end, one's preference between these two concepts of rights depends upon competing values, values about which reasonable people can disagree.

David McCarthy has recently suggested that our compensation and liability practices may be interpreted as reflecting a fundamental norm to hold people liable for imposing risk of harm on others. Independently, closely related ideas have been criticized by Stephen R. Perry and Arthur Ripstein as incompatible with central features of negligence law. We aim to show that these objections are unsuccessful against McCarthy's risk–liability theory and that such an approach is a promising means both for understanding the moral basis of liability for negligence and for reasoning about possible reforms of the institution of negligence law.