Choice Blindness is an experimental paradigm that examines the interplay between individuals’ preferences, decisions, and expectations by manipulating the relationship between intention and choice. This paper expands upon the existing Choice Blindness framework by investigating the presence of the effect in an economically significant decision context, specifically that of pension choice. In addition, it investigates a number of secondary factors hypothesized to modulate Choice Blindness, including reaction time, risk preference, and decision complexity, as well as analysing the verbal reports of non-detecting participants. The experiment was administered to 100 participants of mixed age and educational attainment. The principal finding was that no more than 37.2% of manipulated trials were detected over all conditions, a result consistent with previous Choice Blindness research. Analysis of secondary factors found that reaction time, financial sophistication and decision complexity were significant predictors of Choice Blindness detection, while content analysis of non-detecting participant responses found that 20% implied significant preference changes and 62% adhered to initial preferences. Implications of the Choice Blindness effect in the context of behavioural economics are discussed, and an agenda for further investigation of the paradigm in this context is outlined.

Biases in people’s judgments of time saved by increasing the speed of an activity have been studied mainly with hypothetical scenarios (Svenson, 2008). The present study asked whether the classic time-saving bias persists as a perceptual bias when we control the speed of an activity and assess the perceived time elapsed at different speeds. Specifically, we investigated the time-saving bias in a driving simulator. Each participant was asked to first drive a distance at a given speed and then drive the same distance again at the speed she or he judged necessary to gain exactly three minutes in travel time compared to the first trip. We found that that the time-saving bias applies to active driving and that it affects the choice of driving speed. The drivers’ time-saving judgements show that the perception of the time elapsed while driving does not eliminate the time-saving bias.

Individuals differ in their ability to deal with unpredictable environments. Could impaired performances on learning an unpredictable cue-criteria relationship in a laboratory task be associated with impaired learning of complex skills in a natural setting? We focused on a multiple-cue probability learning (MCPL) laboratory task and on the natural setting of pilot training. We used data from three selection sessions and from the three corresponding selected pilot student classes of a national airline pilot selection and training system. First, applicants took an MCPL task at the selection stage (N = 556; N = 701; N = 412). Then, pilot trainees selected from the applicant pools (N = 44; N = 60; N = 28) followed the training for 2.5 to 3 yrs. Differences in final MCPL performance were associated with pilot training difficulties. Indeed, poor MCPL performers experienced almost twice as many pilot training difficulties as better MCPL performers (44.0% and 25.0%, respectively).

Individuals have been shown to adaptively select decision strategies depending on the environment structure. Two experiments extended this research to the group level. Subjects (N = 240) worked either individually or in two-person groups, or dyads, on a multi-attribute paired-comparison task. They were randomly assigned to two different environments that favored one of two prototypical decision strategies—weighted additive or take-the-best (between-subjects design in Experiment 1 and within-subject design in Experiment 2). Performance measures revealed that both individuals and dyads learned to adapt over time. A higher starting and overall performance rate in the environment in which weighted additive performed best led to the conclusion that weighted additive served as a default strategy. When this default strategy had to be replaced, because the environment structure favored take-the-best, the superior adaptive capacity of dyads became observable in the form of a steeper learning rate. Analyses of nominal dyads indicate that real dyads performed at the level of the best individuals. Fine-grained analyses of information-search data are presented. Results thus point to the strong moderating role of the environment structure when comparing individual with group performance and are discussed within the framework of adaptive strategy selection.

Earlier frameworks have indicated that older adults tend to experience decline intheir deliberative decisional capacity, while their affective abilities tend toremain intact (Peters, Hess, Västfjäll, & Auman, 2007). Thepresent study applied this framework to the study of risky decision-makingacross the lifespan. Two versions of the Columbia Card Task (CCT) were used totrigger either affective decision-making (i.e., the “warm” CCT) ordeliberative decision-making (i.e., the “cold” CCT) in a sample of158 individuals across the lifespan. Overall there were no age differences inrisk seeking. However, there was a significant interaction between age andcondition, such that older adults were relatively more risk seeking in the coldcondition only. In terms of everyday decision-making, context matters and riskpropensity may shift within older adults depending upon the context.

Birnbaum (2011, 2012) questioned the iid (independent and identicallydistributed) sampling assumptions used by state-of-the-art statistical tests inRegenwetter, Dana and Davis-Stober’s (2010, 2011) analysis of the“linear order model”. Birnbaum (2012) cited, but did not use, atest of iid by Smith and Batchelder (2008) with analytically known properties.Instead, he created two new test statistics with unknown samplingdistributions.

Our rebuttal has five components: 1) We demonstrate that the Regenwetter et al.data pass Smith and Batchelder’s test of iid with flying colors. 2) Weprovide evidence from Monte Carlo simulations that Birnbaum’s (2012)proposed tests have unknown Type-I error rates, which depend on the actualchoice probabilities and on how data are coded as well as on the null hypothesisof iid sampling. 3) Birnbaum analyzed only a third of Regenwetter etal.’s data. We show that his two new tests fail to replicate on the othertwo-thirds of the data, within participants. 4) Birnbaum selectively picked dataof one respondent to suggest that choice probabilities may have changed partwayinto the experiment. Such nonstationarity could potentially cause a seeminglygood fit to be a Type-II error. We show that the linear order model fits equallywell if we allow for warm-up effects. 5) Using hypothetical data, Birnbaum(2012) claimed to show that “true-and-error” models for binarypattern probabilities overcome the alleged short-comings of Regenwetter etal.’s approach. We disprove this claim on the same data.

The illusion of control refers to the inference of action-outcome contingency in situations where outcomes are in fact random. The strength of this illusion has been found to be affected by whether the frequency of successes increases or decreases over repeated trials, in what can be termed a “success-slope” effect. Previous studies have generated inconsistent findings regarding the nature of this effect. In this paper we present an experiment (N = 334) that overcomes several methodological limitations within this literature, employing a wider range of dependent measures (measures of two different types of illusory control, primary (by self) and secondary (by luck), as well as measures of remembered success-frequency). Results indicate that different dependent measures lead to different effects. On measures of (primary, but not secondary) control over the task, scores were highest when the rate of success increased over time. Meanwhile, estimates of success-frequency in the task did not vary across conditions and showed trends consistent with the broader literature on human memory.

Interval estimates are commonly used to descriptively communicate the degree of uncertainty in numerical values. Conventionally, low alpha levels (e.g., .05) ensure a high probability of capturing the target value between interval endpoints. Here, we test whether alpha levels and individual differences in numeracy influence distributional inferences. In the reported experiment, participants received prediction intervals for fictitious towns’ annual rainfall totals (assuming approximately normal distributions). Then, participants estimated probabilities that future totals would be captured within varying margins about the mean, indicating the approximate shapes of their inferred probability distributions. Results showed that low alpha levels (vs. moderate levels; e.g., .25) more frequently led to inferences of over-dispersed approximately normal distributions or approximately uniform distributions, reducing estimate accuracy. Highly numerate participants made more accurate estimates overall, but were more prone to inferring approximately uniform distributions. These findings have important implications for presenting interval estimates to various audiences.

Studies of happiness have examined the impact of demographics, personality and emotions accompanying daily activities on life satisfaction. We suggest that how people feel while contemplating aspects of their lives, including their weight, children and future prospects, is a promising yet uncharted territory within the internal landscape of life satisfaction. In a sample of 811 American women, we assessed women’s feelings when thinking about major life domains and frequency of thoughts about each domain. Regression and dominance analyses showed that emotional valence of thoughts about major life domains was an important predictor of current and prior life satisfaction, surpassing, in descending order, demographics, participants’ feelings during recent activities, and their neuroticism and extraversion scores. Domains thought about more frequently were often associated with greater emotional valence. These results suggest that life satisfaction may be improved by modifying emotional valence and frequency of thoughts about life domains. Moreover, these thoughts appear to be an important and relatively stable component of well-being worthy of further study.

Prior studies have found that subjects prefer an improving sequence of incomeover a constant sequence, even if the constant sequence offers a largerpresent-discounted value. However, little is known about how these preferencesvary with the size of the wage payments. In each of four studies, we find apositive relationship between the preference for increasing payments and thesize of the payments. We find no evidence that our measure of the decreasingmarginal utility of money is associated with this relationship. Additionally, wefind weak evidence in support of a theoretical prediction that the differencebetween the preference for increasing wage payments and the preference forincreasing nonwage payments will be largest for intermediate amounts. We do notfind a relationship between the preference for increasing payments and thepreference for improving nonmonetary sequences. Finally, the relationshipbetween the preference for increasing payments and the size of the payments doesnot appear to be sensitive to the precise specification of the increases.

In most previous studies of verbal probabilities, participants are asked to translate expressions such as possible and not certain into numeric probability values. This probabilistic translation approach can be contrasted with a novel which-outcome (WO) approach that focuses on the outcomes that people naturally associate with probability terms. The WO approach has revealed that, when given bell-shaped distributions of quantitative outcomes, people tend to associate certainty with minimum (unlikely) outcome magnitudes and possibility with (unlikely) maximal ones. The purpose of the present paper is to test the factors that foster these effects and the conditions in which they apply. Experiment 1 showed that the association of probability term and outcome was related to the association of scalar modifiers (i.e., it is certain that the battery will last at least…, it is possible that the battery will last up to…). Further, we tested whether this pattern was dependent on the frequency (e.g., increasing vs. decreasing distribution) or the nature of the outcomes presented (i.e., categorical vs. continuous). Results showed that despite being slightly affected by the shape of the distribution, participants continue to prefer to associate possible with maximum outcomes and certain with minimum outcomes. The final experiment provided a boundary condition to the effect, showing that it applies to verbal but not numerical probabilities.

This paper presents two studies on narrow bracketing and myopic loss aversion. The first study shows that the tendency to segregate multiple gambles is eliminated if subjects face a certainty equivalent or a probability equivalent task instead of a binary choice. The second study argues that the behavioral differences previously attributed entirely to myopic loss aversion are partly because long-term return properties are simply easier to grasp if the return information is already provided in the form of long-term returns rather than one-year returns. Both results may be related to recent failures to replicate myopic loss aversion. When the choice situation is structured in such a way that it draws respondents’ attention to the final outcome distribution and/or if severe misestimations of long-term returns based on short-term return information are unlikely, behavioral differences consistent with myopic loss aversion are less likely to be observed.

Doyle’s (2013) theoretical survey of discount functions criticizes two parametric families abbreviated as CRDI and CADI families. We show that Doyle’s criticisms are based on a mathematical mistake and are incorrect.

Numerical performance information is increasingly important to political decision-making in the public sector. Some have suggested that biases in citizens’ processing of numerical information can be exploited by politicians to skew citizens’ perception of performance. I report on an experiment on how citizens evaluate numerical performance information from a public school context. The experiment is conducted with a large and diverse sample of the Danish population (N=1156). The analysis shows a strong leftmost-digit-bias in citizens’ evaluation of school grading information. Thus, very small changes in reported average grades, which happen to shift the leftmost grade digit, can lead to very large shifts in citizens’ evaluation of performance. The rightmost digit on the grade is almost fully ignored.

Social networking sites (SNSs) provide users with an efficient interface for distributing information, such as photos or wall posts, to many others simultaneously. We demonstrated experimentally that this type of indiscriminate one-to-many (i.e., monologue) communication may induce self-focused attention and thereby impair perspective taking. The present study used multiple paradigms to explore the link between engaging in online one-to-many communication and a decrease in perspective taking. Experiment 1 revealed that Facebookers who published a personal photo to the public or their friends were less likely to adopt another person’s visual perspective than were those in the control group. Experiment 2 showed that Facebookers who engaged in indiscriminate one-to-many wall posting were more likely than those in the control group to rely heavily on their own perspectives. A state of self-focus, as measured by greater Stroop interference in naming the color of self-relevant versus neutral words, mediated the detrimental effect of indiscriminate one-to-many communication on cognitive perspective taking. These findings suggest that indiscriminate one-to-many communication on SNSs may promote public self-focus, leading to self-referential processing when making social judgments. Online monologue communication may be more harmful to perspective taking than previously understood.

Studies using the Ultimatum Game have shown that participants reject unfair offers extended by another person although this incurs a financial cost. Previous research suggests that one possible explanation for this apparently self-defeating response is that unfair offers involve strong negative responses that decrease the chances of responders accepting offers that would objectively constitute a net profit. We tested the hypothesis that one way of reducing responders’ rejections of unfair offers is through increased psychological distance, so that participants move away from the concrete feeling of being unfairly treated. Social distance was manipulated by having participants play the Ultimatum Game either for themselves, or for another person. Compared to deciding for one’s self or a close social contact, participants showed less sensitivity to fairness when deciding for a stranger, as indicated by fewer rejected unfair offers. We suggest that social distance helps people move beyond immediate fairness concerns in the Ultimatum Game.

In social interaction, the facial expression of an opponent contains information that may influence the interaction. We asked whether facial expression affects decision-making in the ultimatum game. In this two-person game, the proposer divides a sum of money into two parts, one for each player, and then the responder decides whether to accept the offer or reject it. Rejection means that neither player gets any money. Results of a large-sample study support our hypothesis that offers from proposers with a smiling facial expression are more often accepted, compared to a neutral facial expression. Moreover, we found lower acceptance rates for offers from proposers with an angry facial expression.

A study using a high school and college sample (age 18–26) was conducted to validate the Slovak version of the Adult Decision-Making Competence. The results were similar to findings reported by Bruine de Bruin, Parker, and Fischhoff (2007) on the adult population in America. The internal consistency of component subscales and whole measure was confirmed as well as the factor structure. Gender differences in two of the six subscales were found. The results highlight the usefulness of A-DMC in assessing decision-making competence in Slovak language, but non-student samples are needed to enhance the generalisability of findings.

A large body of survey research offers evidence that citizens are not always fully aware of the economic and political realities in their respective countries. Norton and Ariely (2011) extended this research to the domain of wealth inequality, showing that Americans were surprisingly unaware of the shape of the wealth distribution in America. Using an alternative methodology, Eriksson and Simpson (2012) found that asking Americans to estimate the average wealth of quintiles, rather than the percent of wealth owned by each quintile, led to relatively more accurate estimates. We note, however, that the Eriksson and Simpson (2012) results do not challenge Norton and Ariely’s (2011) conclusion that Americans desire a much more equal distribution of wealth.