We argue that we should see a negative relationship between the share of risky assets in the default fund of a defined contribution (DC) pension plan and the average plan member age if trustees design the default fund in line with predictions from the life-cycle portfolio choice theory. Adoption of the default fund should be low in DC plans with high member age dispersion if default funds are indeed designed for the average plan member and members become aware of this. From analyzing a panel dataset of Australian DC pension plans, we obtain results that are consistent with both hypotheses.

The low demand for immediate annuities at retirement has been a long-standing puzzle. We show that a hyperbolic discount model can explain this behaviour and results in the attractiveness of long-term deferred annuities. With a set of benchmark assumptions, we find that retirees would be willing to pay a much higher price than the actuarial fair price for annuities with longer deferred periods. Moreover, if governments were to introduce a pre-commitment device which requires pensioners to make annuitisation decisions around 10 years before retirement, the take up rate of annuities could become higher.

This paper presents the results of a choice experiment that is designed to examine whether changing how plan information is presented affects planned retirement-savings behavior. The main hypothesis is that providing plan information in a more concise format with helpful recommendations, rather than providing lengthy and detailed information, will alter retirement-planning choices. The specific choices examined include: whether to enroll, how much to contribute, and how to structure (broadly) the asset allocation. The choice experiment is conducted on three different samples: (i) a Qualtrics panel of new employees, (ii) a Qualtrics panel of job seekers, and (iii) a sample of business-school students. Our results suggest that, controlling for demographic and other factors, our main hypothesis was not supported by the data in any of the samples. Thus, the data cast some doubt on the notion that simplifying and condensing the retirement-plan information presented to employees will result in vastly different retirement-planning choices.

We examine pension-cost crowd out of salary expenditures in the public sector using a 15-year data panel of state teacher pension plans spanning the Great Recession. While there is no evidence of salary crowd out prior to the Great Recession, there is a shift in the post-recession years such that a 1% (of salaries) increase in the annual required pension contribution corresponds to a decrease in total teacher salary expenditures of 0.24%. The effect operates through changes to the size of the teaching workforce, not changes to teacher wages. An explanation for the effect heterogeneity pre- and post-recession is that public employers are less able to shield the workforce from pension costs during times of fiscal stress. This problem is exacerbated because unlike other benefit costs, such as for health care, pension costs are countercyclical.

The Multiemployer Pension Reform Act (MPRA) allows multiemployer plans facing insolvency to apply for approval from the Treasury to cut accrued benefits of plan members to prolong plan solvency—a departure from the benefit protections of Employee Retirement Income Security Act. To assess the law's impact, this paper models Central States Teamsters – by far the largest – plan to have applied under the new law to reduce benefits. Using a stochastic model of future investment returns, the probability of insolvency within 10 years drops from 50% (without cuts) to 6% (with cuts). While benefit cuts increase the overall welfare of participants by extending the plan's life, the welfare of younger retirees (under age 75) worsens and welfare of workers improves.

Based on two decades of Danish register data at the individual level, this paper finds that a 1-dollar increase in pension wealth leads to a 42-cent rise in total debt for a group of low-wage earners. Collective bargaining in the labor market provides time-sector variation in mandatory pension contribution rates, which we exploit in two empirical research designs; an event study and a cross-sectional instrumental variable regression model. Both methods demonstrate that the debt rise is accompanied by increased housing wealth and homeownership rates. Together, the empirical evidence indicates that mandatory pension contributions lead to a significant increase in net wealth, as well as in gross debt.

According to optimal portfolio theories, investors should reduce their exposure to stock market risk as they grow old. Indeed, older workers, with only a few years left before retirement, are particularly vulnerable to unexpected falls in stock prices. Despite the theoretical and – as shown by the recent financial crisis – policy relevance of the issue, empirical evidence on this topic has been scant and inconclusive. The aim of the present paper is to assess the effect of age on portfolio choices, using a new panel dataset from an Italian defined-contribution pension plan. We find that on average holdings of risky assets do indeed significantly decrease with age. However, the effect is non-linear, being much stronger in the last part of one's career. Moreover, we also document that inertial behaviour is quite widespread, and can be very costly. Results are confirmed when we control for individual fixed effects and cohort effects.

The foreign property rule (FPR) requires that no more than 30% of the assets held in tax-deferred retirement savings accounts be foreign property. The FPR is supposed to increase the value of the dollar and reduce its volatility and decrease the cost of capital and promote investment in Canada as well as decrease the extent of inequality inherent in these plans. On the basis of evidence from the easing of this regulation from 20% to 30% over the period 2001/02 we find that it accomplishes none of these objectives. There was no measurable impact on the exchange rate predicted from the Bank of Canada's forecasting equation; the capital outflow from the change amounted to no more than two days trade in the foreign exchange market over the period 2000/01; Canada's equity markets did significantly better internationally when the FPR was eased than in the prior two-year period. Finally, closer inspection reveals that the rule exacerbates income inequality by imposing the largest costs on lower middle-income groups. We estimate that the increase in the FPR from 20% to 30% increased Canadians expected income by between 500 million and one billion dollars annually by permitting greater portfolio diversification. The complete removal of the FPR would increase income by an estimated additional 1.5 billion to 3 billion dollars annually.

Explaining cross-country differences in current accounts is difficult. While pay-as-you-go pensions reduce the need to save for retirement, contributions to capital-funded pensions are saved for future consumption. An overlapping-generations analysis shows that capital-funded pensions increase net foreign assets holdings. With a multi-pillar system whose capital-funded part accounts for 18% of pensions, the Austrian current account balance would be 1 percentage point of gross domestic product (GDP) higher than with pure pay-as-you-go pensions in 20 years. By comparison, the Austrian current account surplus averages 1.8% of GDP. Empirically, I find that the current account of high-income countries increases with the coverage and replacement rates of capital-funded pensions.

This contribution aims at enriching the debate on the priority of unfunded pension rights in the case of a sponsoring firm's bankruptcy. Starting from the idea that pension promises in DB schemes are part of a financial contract between a sponsor and participants to a sponsored pension plan, we argue that plan participants are not ordinary creditors and should be given the same priority as other claimants in the event of underfunding and a sponsoring firm's bankruptcy. We build up a model consistent with this view, which gives room for more participants' involvement in pension fund management. We assume that the sponsoring firm chooses the optimal share of a pension fund deficit that it commits to cover in case of underfunding, while participants choose the contribution rates that maximize their expected utility. We show that two regimes govern the pattern of the relationship between the optimal level of funding chosen by the sponsor and the optimal contribution rates chosen by the plan participants. Allowing plan participants to determine their desired contribution rates gives the entrepreneur the proper incentive for funding the pension plan. In a certain way, our pension contract resembles a cash-balance contract and our model suggests that more security can be given to plan participants in their pension savings by offering them a cash-balance plan which states a priority of unfunded pension rights in case of a firm's bankruptcy.

Many nations incentivize retirement saving by letting workers defer taxes on pension contributions, imposing them when retirees withdraw their funds. Using a dynamic life-cycle model, we show how ‘Rothification’ – that is, taxing 401(k) contributions rather than payouts – alters saving, investment, consumption, and Social Security claiming patterns. We find that taxing pension contributions instead of withdrawals leads to delayed retirement, somewhat lower lifetime tax payments, and relatively small reductions in consumption. Indeed, the two tax regimes generate quite similar relative inequality metrics: the relative consumption inequality ratio under taxed-exempt-exempt (TEE) is only 4% higher than that in the exempt-exempt-taxed (EET) case. Moreover, results indicate that the Gini measures are also strikingly similar under the EET and the TEE regimes for lifetime consumption, cash on hand, and 401(k) assets, differing by only 1–4%. While tax payments are higher early in life under the TEE regime, they are slightly lower in the long run. Moreover, higher EET tax payments are also accompanied by higher volatility. We therefore find few reasons for policymakers to favor either tax approach on egalitarian or revenue-enhancing grounds.

The objective of the paper is to identify the determinants of the market share of each AFJP and the matrix of direct and cross price elasticities, by using a discrete choice model of product differentiation, based on the random utility theory. The results obtained from the estimation of a simple logit model using a panel of quarterly data between December of 1995 and June of 2006 shows the existence of two competitive mechanisms used by firms: prices and a vector of variables explaining horizontal differentiation, such as quantity of branches and salesman. The estimation of the nested-logit model supports the hypothesis of sequential election, where firms are chosen by their price setting strategies, defining two groups of competitors. Finally, the regulatory change that eliminates fixed commissions provides additional importance to prices signals in consumers' utility.

In recent years, a growing number of capital market professionals have projected a low-return environment in US investment portfolios – where returns in most asset classes are expected to drop below historical rates. While these specific forecasts may not fully materialize, it is natural for cyclical investment markets to go through extended periods of lower returns, creating significant risks for public pension systems which rely on investment returns to sustain their long-term solvency and offset budgetary contributions. This paper uses a simulation method to examine the long-term effect of a low-return environment on the unfunded liabilities and contribution costs of US public pension systems while considering the moderating effects of asset allocation strategies, amortization approaches, and contribution policies.

This paper introduces an integrated asset-liability management model that allows for the joint quantitative analysis of capital structure choices, pension fund allocation decisions and rational pricing of liabilities. We confirm that capital structure decisions have a substantial impact on the value of pension claims, and we provide a quantitative assessment of the mispricing induced by the use of an arbitrary regulatory discount rate. We also present a quantitative assessment of the asset substitution effect implied by a change in the pension fund allocation to risky assets taking place after the corporate and pension obligation claims have been issued.

We study retirement incentives with an augmented reduced form option value model à la Stock and Wise (1990). We propose methodological extensions to better reflect the respective incentives faced by singles and couples. Our results show that a more comprehensive modeling of couples’ incentives leads to very different patterns of retirement incentives – particularly for women. We apply the new indicators to data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and retirement in Europe in Belgium and find two key results. First, contrary to several previous studies, we obtain a positive signed income effects. Second, we find very different retirement incentives for men and women, with little flexibility in the retirement decision for men and substantially more flexibility for women as a function of financial incentive and household composition.

When a private pension plan sponsor with an underfunded plan becomes insolvent, the difference between the value of the plan's assets and its termination liabilities represents a liability for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Hence, accurately modeling the joint statistical distribution over time of defined benefit pension underfunding and sponsor terminations is critical for estimating PBGC's prospective cash flows and evaluating its financial position. It appears that the current Pension Insurance Modeling System (PIMS) approach to modeling risk does a reasonable job of capturing its statistical properties effects on PBGC cash flows, although some of the aspects might be improved, and metrics expanded. The present paper outlines, how an option-based approach to modeling the joint distribution of defaults and underfunding in PIMS might be implemented, while preserving the strengths of the current model. Moving to an option-based approach would allow PIMS to be used to estimate the fair values of future liabilities. Such an approach could have a significant effect on the perceived financial position of PBGC.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's (PBGC) Pension Insurance Modeling System (PIMS) is used to evaluate the financial security and resilience of the national program backstopping private defined benefit plans. The Pension Research Council of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania recently convened a Technical Review Panel of experts to review key inputs, outputs, and model assumptions. Our review was intended to provide a formal evaluation of the technical adequacy of the model by outside experts. The papers herein summarize views of each expert on this project. Key findings are as follows:

• • The PIMS models are an important and valuable tool in modeling the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation's liability risk. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other model that can do a comparable job.

• • Nevertheless, some improvements could be integrated in the Agency's approach to modeling. Those deserving highest priority attention, in the experts’ view, include incorporating systematic mortality risk (i.e., treat mortality and longevity as stochastic variables); including new asset classes increasingly found in defined benefit plan portfolios (e.g., commercial real estate, private equity funds, infrastructure, hedge funds, and others); developing a more complex model for the term structure of interest rates; and incorporating an option value approach to pricing the insurance provided.

• • The Agency could also do more to communicate the range of uncertainty and potential for problems associated with the PBGC's financial status. This could include additional information including the conditional value-at-risk, and perhaps an ‘intermediate,’ ‘optimistic’, and ‘pessimistic’ set of projected outcomes, as well as the expected ‘date of exhaustion’ for assets backing pension benefits insured by the PBGC.

We examine whether an individual's inability to save in the last 12 months affects the extent to which they are concerned about their future financial security and their propensity to plan for retirement. We use an original survey based upon representative samples of working individuals in 16 countries. We show that individuals who were unable to save over the 12-month period prior to the survey are less likely to consider well-being in retirement as their major financial concern. They are also less likely to invest in supplementary pension funds than those who were able to accumulate savings. We provide evidence that these findings are robust under several specifications and are mediated by respondents' perceived income prospects and assessment of their current financial situations.