Using longitudinal Survey of Income and Program Participation data linked to Social Security Administration administrative records from 2009 and 2012, we find negative economic shocks cause 401(k) contribution behavior to react in ways consistent with reactions to fear and past trauma. If employees participating in 401(k) plans did not experience real earnings declines or unemployment spells between 2009 and 2012, then their contribution rates would have been 5% higher and each person would have contributed US $193 more toward their defined contribution plan accounts. We conclude that previous studies may have swung too far in emphasizing inertia as a primary behavior trait explaining workers’ 401(k) plan engagement. Reactive behavior to protect living standards by reducing retirement savings is also important.

A quirk in the Social Security benefit formula interacting with the sharp economic downturn due to the COVID-19 pandemic could cause certain groups of near-retirees to suffer significant and permanent reductions to their Social Security retirement benefits. A sudden decline in the Social Security Administration (SSA)'s measure of economywide average wages in the year a worker turns 60 causes the Social Security benefit formula to devalue all the worker's earnings prior to age 60, resulting in a lower measure of career-average earnings and a lower benefit in retirement. A middle-income worker aged 60 in 2020 could receive an annual Social Security benefit reduction of around 9%, with losses through retirement approaching $46,000. Individuals becoming eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits would be subject to similar reductions in percentage terms. Several methods are discussed to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of similar benefit ‘notches’ occurring in the future.

Over five million state and local government employees have lifetime earnings that are divided between employment that is covered by the Social Security system and employment that is not covered. As Social Security benefits are a nonlinear function of covered lifetime earnings, the simple application of the standard benefit formula to covered earnings only would provide a higher replacement rate on those earnings than is appropriate given the individuals' total (covered plus uncovered) lifetime earnings. The Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP), established in 1983, is intended to correct this situation by applying a modified benefit formula to earnings of individuals with non-covered employment. This paper analyzes the distributional implications of the WEP and finds that it reduces benefits disproportionately for individuals with lower lifetime covered earnings. It discusses an alternative method of calculating the WEP that comes closer to preserving the intended redistribution of the system. In recognition of historical data limitations that prevent the Social Security Administration (SSA) from being able to implement this alternative method at present, the paper also analyzes two alternative ways of calculating the WEP that use the same information as the current WEP, are budget neutral, and come closer to maintaining the individual-level, cross-sectional progressivity of Social Security than does the existing WEP formula.

Hedging against tail events in equity markets has been forcefully advocated in the aftermath of recent global financial crisis. Whether this is beneficial to long horizon investors like employees enrolled in defined contribution (DC) plans, however, has been subject to criticism. We conduct historical simulation since 1928 to examine the effectiveness of active and passive tail risk hedging using out of money put options for hypothetical equity portfolios of DC plan participants with 20 years to retirement. Our findings show that the cost of tail hedging exceeds the benefits for a majority of the plan participants during the sample period. However, for a significant number of simulations, hedging result in superior outcomes relative to an unhedged position. Active tail hedging is more effective when employees confront several panic-driven periods characterized by short and sharp market swings in the equity markets over the investment horizon. Passive hedging, on the other hand, proves beneficial when they encounter an extremely rare event like the Great Depression as equity markets go into deep and prolonged decline.

Since 1990s, substantial changes in the role of the state in the social security schemes can be observed in the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). While the general framework of social benefits in the CEE countries is still defined by the state, more and more often the task of provision of social security is transferred to the private entities. Such privatization of social policy makes the need for protection mechanism and some state guarantees even stronger. It is still the state that is responsible for the final outcome of social security systems so that is why governments are directly providing or indirectly creating safety mechanisms built-in the private market mechanism used for social purposes. The paper surveys various types of the protection mechanisms in selected CEE countries that exist in the important and already most privatized element of the social security system – the pension system. While describing the safety measures and possible guarantees, special attention is paid to the new forms that have been built up recently. The paper covers both mandatory and voluntary pension markets and identifies present and possible threats in the existing frameworks that can harm the social security. The paper concludes with general assessment and policy recommendations.

This paper investigates whether exposure to explanatory diagrams can affect a major financial decision. In a controlled experiment, participants were given Pension Benefit Statements with or without one or two diagrams, before answering incentivised questions that measured recall, comprehension and choice of contribution rate. The diagrams had at best a marginal influence on recall or comprehension. Nevertheless, a diagram relating contributions to income projections prompted more participants to advocate higher contributions, while both diagrams influenced the rationale participants gave for decisions. The implication is that although pension products remain hard to understand, diagrams may alter decisions by reinforcing relevant causal thinking.

This study quantifies the possible consequences to stakeholders of reforms to the excise tax on reversions of excess pension assets. Under the US Pension Protection Act (PPA) of 2006, funding in defined benefit (DB) plans is likely to improve significantly. Many plans may become overfunded over time, owing to the shortfall amortizations mandated by the PPA, as well as to precautionary contributions by sponsors and to plan investment returns. This analysis shows that a more moderate excise tax rate together with a reasonable funding threshold for asset reversions would not only enable sponsors to spend the excess funds on other corporate needs, thereby lowering the cost of sponsorship of DB plans, but also would open a considerable revenue source for the government, with only a small increase in bankruptcy cost for the PBGC. Plan participants could also gain in an alternative reform, which would require a partial transfer of excess assets to them along with a still-lower reversion tax rate. These findings also hold for plan sponsors with various degrees of risk tolerance or only making the PPA-required minimum contributions.

This paper uses the Current Population Survey to study older workers' transitions out of employment and into retirement during the first year of the pandemic. We find that, among workers ages 55 to 79, the likelihood of leaving employment over the course of a year rose by 6.7 percentage points, a 43-percent increase over baseline. Workers without a college degree, Asian–Americans, those whose jobs were not amenable to social distancing, and part-time workers saw disproportionate impacts. In contrast, the likelihood of retiring increased by 1 percentage point, and there was no immediate retirement boom for full-time workers under 70.

In this paper, we derive the optimal cyclical design of a target benefit (TB) pension plan that balances the sustainability and the benefit stability using the optimal control approach. The optimal design possesses a linear risk sharing structure with cyclical parameters. We observe that the optimal design should be pro-cyclical in the usual circumstances, but counter-cyclical when the pension plan is severely in deficit. We compare the TB plans with the defined benefit plans and conclude that a more aggressive investment strategy should be adopted for the TB plans. In the end, we provide a cautionary note on the optimal control approach in the study of the TB plans.

To improve the design of the pay-out phase of DC plans, this paper proposes a new approach to structure pension products: the Personal Pension with Risk sharing (PPR). By unbundling and valuing the investment, (dis)saving, insurance and risk-sharing functions of pensions, PPRs allow risk management and (dis)saving to be customized to the specific features of heterogeneous individuals. Unlike variable annuities, PPRs allow investment risks to be combined with longevity insurance without giving rise to high year-on-year volatility in consumption streams or opaque and rigid valuation and smoothing rules. The synthesis of a PPR structure provides new opportunities for product innovation and for the comparison of retirement products.

We study the fiscal and welfare consequences of three options for increasing pension generosity in Spain: (i) disability and minimum pensions are fully indexed with the Consumer Price Index (CPI); (ii) minimum and lower value pensions are fully indexed with the CPI; and (iii) returning to full price indexation of all Spanish pensions. While these reforms increase pension adequacy, the tax increases needed to finance the higher pension expenditure differ significantly. Moreover, most current cohorts prefer returning to the full price indexation of all Spanish pensions, but future cohorts prefer that only disability and minimum pensions be indexed with the CPI.

The legitimacy of a pension system or any social security program depends on its credibility and perceived fairness. In order to gauge this legitimacy, we need to understand the relation between people's knowledge and attitudes. This experimental survey into the role of knowledge and perceptions divided respondents into two groups: the ‘treatment’ group received an information letter about a forthcoming pension reform before they were interviewed, while the control group was interviewed without receiving this ‘treatment’. Comparisons of the responses from the two groups allow us to assess how the level of knowledge and the provision of information affect people's opinions on policy reform. We also consider the patterns of covariation between background factors, people's concerns, and attitudes toward pension reform. The results show that the information letter had a significant impact on subjective but not on the objective level of knowledge. Receiving the information letter improved acceptance and perceptions of the fairness of the reform.

Labour supply responses among older people are estimated on 1996 cross-section register data covering all Norwegians aged 55–68, with an inter-temporal structural model of retirement decisions. Simulations illustrate the impact of introducing flexible pension take-up with actuarial adjustment. With the option of perfect consumption smoothing via the credit market, the reform which comes into effect in Norway from 2011 will reduce the share of retired persons in the age bracket 60–67 (in the base year 15–16%) by around 3 percentage points. With no consumption smoothing, the reduction will be 0.75 percentage points.

This paper reports the results from a large telephone survey of 1,000 retiring white-collar workers in Sweden. Shortly before the interview, the participants at age 65 had a choice of receiving a life annuity by default or opting for a fixed-term payout, with a minimum payout length of 5 years. Large monetary amounts were at stake in the payout decision of the survey participants; the average monthly pension payment under the life annuity amounted to US $280. Comparing the survey responses with administrative records on actual payout choices, I find that a majority of retiring white-collar workers fail to recall their payout decision. The recollection rate is much lower among annuitants (those who chose the default option); only 40% of the annuitants accurately recalled their payout decision compared to 77% of those who opted for a fixed-term payout. Beyond payout choice, few individual characteristics predict successful recollection.

Gollier proposed in 2008 a model for the analysis of pension schemes that is helpful to focus attention on the impact of intergenerational risk sharing and on the role of the participation constraint. He uses the model to analyze the relative attractiveness of a collective scheme with respect to schemes that may be implemented by individuals for themselves. The analysis makes use of an assumption concerning the ownership rights of investment returns realized by generations that are between career start and retirement at the time of the transition from an individual to a collective system. The present paper investigates the consequences of adopting an alternative assumption. In a calibration exercise, the increase of the effective rate of return obtained by switching from an existing ‘autarky’ scheme to an infinite-horizon ‘collective’ scheme is found to be 8 basis points, as opposed to 72 basis points as reported by Gollier. Additionally, the effects are considered of changes in the specification of agents' preferences, aiming to express the specific nature of retirement income provision in the second pillar. The Black–Scholes assumptions are used to model the economic environment, so that many results can be obtained in closed form.

The question how to optimize consumption and portfolio choice over the life cycle has been widely discussed in the literature so far. In this paper we concentrate on a retiree's optimal consumption and portfolio selection over his remaining years of life. We apply the logistic model of mortality thus modeling the empirically observed increase of mortality during the retirement period. The optimal consumption strategy and portfolio choice are established by reducing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmann equation to the explicit solution of an ordinary differential function (ODF) that includes the mortality rate. A general finding is that the Merton-Samuelson result of constant portfolio choice for a constant mortality is confirmed for arbitrary mortality. The portfolio choice is only influenced by risk and return of assets and the retirees’ risk aversion. To get the specific optimal consumption strategy in a realistic situation the logistic model of mortality has been fitted to the data of the Statistical Yearbook for the Federal Republic of Germany 2006/2008. The optimal initial value for the ODF is obtained by numerical methods. The solution provides a large increase in the ratio of optimal consumption to wealth up to about 92 years followed by a sharp decrease. A bequest motive dampens the magnitudes of the ups and downs of the consumption ratio but does not change the basic shape.

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures private sector defined benefit (DB) pension plans, when an employer becomes insolvent and is unable to pay the pension liabilities. In principle, the insurance premiums collected by PBGC should be sufficient to cover potential losses; this would ensure that PBGC could pay the insured benefits of terminated pension plan without additional external funding (e.g., from taxpayers). Therefore, the risk exposure of the PBGC from insuring DB pension plans arises from the probability of the employer insolvencies; and the terminating plans’ funding status (the excess of the value of the insured plan liabilities over the plan assets). Here we explore only the second component, namely the impact of plan underfunding for the operation of the PBGC. When a DB plan is fully funded, the PBGC's risk exposure for an ongoing plan is low even if the plan sponsor becomes insolvent. Thus the questions most pertinent to the PBGC are: what key risk factors can produce underfunding in a DB plan, and how can these risk factors be quantified? We discuss the key risk factors that produce DB pension underfunding, namely, investment risk and liability risk. These are interrelated and must be considered simultaneously in order to quantify the risk exposure of a DB pension plan. We propose that an integrated risk management model (an Integrated Asset/Liability Model) can help better understand DB pension plan funding risk. We also examine the Pension Insurance Modeling System developed by the PBGC in terms of its own use of some of the building blocks of an integrated risk management model.

We argue that we should see a negative relationship between the share of risky assets in the default fund of a defined contribution (DC) pension plan and the average plan member age if trustees design the default fund in line with predictions from the life-cycle portfolio choice theory. Adoption of the default fund should be low in DC plans with high member age dispersion if default funds are indeed designed for the average plan member and members become aware of this. From analyzing a panel dataset of Australian DC pension plans, we obtain results that are consistent with both hypotheses.