Collective pension schemes are the dominant form of saving for retirement in the Netherlands. We investigate the introduction of individual choices into a collective pension system without affecting the generally accepted advantages of a collective agreement. Increasing individual choices can be beneficial, as it prevents pension plans from making decisions for the average plan participant that may not be optimal for individual participants. We argue for a system in which individuals choose from a set of low-cost balanced index funds, together with a level of intergenerational guarantees that are exchange-traded. This system maintains the two primary advantages of collective agreements: risk sharing and low implementation costs, while facilitating different risk taking behavior at the individual level. To facilitate individual choices within collective pension schemes, it is important to enhance the transparency associated with intergenerational guarantees to all participants in the scheme, both in terms of their price and quantity. We argue that the current system, in which long-term guarantees are given by the young to the old within a specific fund but not across pension funds, is not transparent and we argue that it can be suboptimal. We propose a system of Pension Guarantee Exchanges (PGEs) that increase transparency and allow pension funds with different age distributions to trade with each other. Knowing the price of such guarantees facilitates the introduction of individual portfolio choices within collective pension schemes.

Some retirement plans allow the participant to choose how funds are invested. Having to direct investments may provide the participant with financial education. This paper finds that U.S. households covered by pension plans in which the employee chooses investments are significantly more apt to hold stock outside of their retirement plan than are households with pension plans offering no such choice. The effect of investment choice upon non-pension asset allocation is not explained by portfolio rebalancing or observable differences in income and saving preferences across households. This provides some evidence that the design of a pension plan may influence an employee's financial decisions outside of the pension plan, although unobserved heterogeneity in worker's preferences could also explain the result.

Defined benefit pension funds invest in illiquid asset classes for return, diversification or liability hedging reasons. So far, little is known about factors influencing how much they invest in illiquid assets. We conjecture that liquidity and capital requirements are pivotal in this decision. Short-term pension payments and margining on derivative contracts generate liquidity requirements, while regulations impose capital requirements. Consistent with our model we empirically find that these requirements create a hump-shaped impact of liability duration on the fraction of risky assets invested in illiquid assets. Further, we report that pension fund size, type, and funding ratio impact illiquid assets allocations.

The standard model of intertemporal choice assumes risk neutrality towards the length of life: under additivity of lifetime utility and expected utility assumptions, agents are not sensitive to a mean preserving spread in the length of life. Using a survey fielded in the RAND American Life Panel, this paper provides empirical evidence on possible deviation from risk neutrality with respect to longevity in the US population. The questions we ask allow to find the distribution as well as to quantify the degree of risk aversion with respect to the length of life in the population. We find evidence that roughly 75% of respondents were not neutral with respect to longevity risk. Hence, there is a little empirical support for the joint use of the expected utility and additive lifetime utility assumptions in life-cycle models. Higher income households are more likely to be risk averse towards the length of life. We do not find evidence that the degree of risk aversion varies with age or education.

We provide the first analysis of annuity rates in the Netherlands for the period 2001–2012. During this period, the number of annuity providers was high and stable, and we find that falls in annuity rates can be explained entirely by changes in yields and life expectancy. We show that annuitants could have increased their annuity income by about 5%, by shopping around and purchasing their annuities from alternative providers. Money's worth calculations show that the market is efficient by international standards, with a money's worth above 0.9 for the whole period and close to unity by the end of the period. We present conflicting evidence on the existence of adverse selection because although we find money's worths are inversely related to age of purchase, we find that they are positively related to size of purchase.

Redistribution is an inevitable feature of collective pension schemes and economic experiments have revealed that most people have a preference for redistribution that is not merely inspired by self-interest. However, little is known on how these preferences interact with preferences for different pension schemes. In this paper, we review the experimental evidence on preferences for redistribution and suggest some links to redistribution through pensions. For that purpose we distinguish between three types of situations. The first deals with distributional preferences behind a veil of ignorance. In the second type of situation, individuals make choices in front of the veil of ignorance and know their position. Finally, we discuss situations in which income is determined by interdependent rather than individual choices. In the closing sections of the paper, we discuss whether and how these experimental results speak to the redistribution issues of pensions. For example, do they argue for or against mandatory participation? Should we have less redistribution and more actuarial fairness? How does this depend on the type of redistribution involved?

We compare two contracts for managing systematic longevity risk in retirement: a collective arrangement that distributes the risk among participants, and a market-provided annuity contract. We evaluate the contracts’ appeal with respect to the retiree's welfare, and the viability of the market solution through the financial reward to the annuity provider's equityholders. We find that individuals prefer to bear the risk under a collective arrangement than to insure it with a life insurers' annuity contract subject to insolvency risk (albeit small). Under realistic capital provision hypotheses, the annuity provider is incapable of adequately compensating its equityholders for bearing systematic longevity risk.

It has been long suggested that public pension wealth may crowd out household savings. However, there remains controversy about the extent of this displacement effect. In this paper we use an original microsimulation model based on retrospective survey data collected through the third wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to estimate the displacement effect of public pension wealth on other wealth in Belgium. Combining this rich dataset with an accurate estimation of the individual pension entitlements allows us to circumvent some of the main measurement error problems faced by previous studies. We estimate that an extra euro of public pension wealth is associated with about 14–25 cent decline in households’ non-pension wealth.

In many countries, governmental support for funded old-age programmes comes at the cost of at least partial mandatory annuitisation of accumulated assets in retirement. We survey regulatory frameworks for the payout phase of funded pension systems in seven European countries and the US and study the influence of mandatory annuitisation on the welfare of both rational and behaviourally influenced individuals using a dynamic life-cycle model. We show that mandatory immediate full annuitisation of retirement assets will reduce rational individuals’ certainty equivalent pension wealth by up to 54%. Softening the strict immediate annuitisation requirements along the line of regulatory realities in some of the surveyed countries reduces utility losses considerably. Behaviourally restricted individuals can benefit from full annuitisation at retirement, but generally they will also prefer more flexible regulation.

In this paper, I show that traditional earnings related pay-as-you-go pension systems as we see them in many OECD countries subsidize human capital formation. The reason is that these systems come along with an implicit tax structure that features high tax rates at the beginning of working life and low tax rates toward the end. When the costs of human capital investment are mainly time costs, such an implicit tax structure lowers the costs of human capital investments and simultaneously increases the payoff. The fact that higher skilled workers tend to have steeper wage profiles over the working phase than the unskilled enforces this mechanism. I first show this result in a simple analytical model and then quantify the macroeconomic and welfare effects of making the implicit tax structure age independent in a large-scale overlapping generation model, in which households can invest in human capital both by going to college and through on-the-job training. In terms of welfare, such a reform comes along with a lot of intergenerational redistribution. Although the welfare of current retirees may increase by about 4.5% of their remaining life-time resources, current older workers will lose due to an increase in their implicit tax rates. The welfare of future generations slightly declines by 0.1%.

Many believe that global capital markets will generate lower returns in the future versus the past. We examine how persistently lower real returns will reshape work, retirement, saving, and investment behavior of older persons using a calibrated dynamic life cycle model. In a low return regime, workers build up less wealth in their tax-qualified 401(k) accounts versus the past, claim social security benefits later, and work more. Moreover, the better-educated are more sensitive to real interest rate changes, while the least-educated alter their behavior less. Interestingly, the distribution of wealth is more uniform in periods of persistent low expected returns.

Retirement savings in defined contribution plans vary as a result of the timing and frequency of unemployment spells. We hypothesize that unemployment is coincident with negative shocks to equities prices, implying workers may systematically miss investment opportunities. First we match historic stock returns to unemployment hazards by gender, and earnings quartile. Next we test the relationship between unemployment, equity returns, and pension savings, by repeated simulation. Finally, we find that the timing of unemployment spells amplifies retirement savings losses on average for all worker-types in our analysis. Timing impacts are observed to be largest for high earnings workers and to increase with unemployment losses disproportionately.

Within a model featuring demographic uncertainty, this paper studies a pension reform where public pension benefits are indexed to the total wage bill rather than to the average wage level. This implies a decline in the variability of contribution rates and an increase in the variability of replacement rates. While thus shifting some of the adjustment burden following demographic shocks to pensioners, the trade-off in risks is found to be fairly moderate.

This paper applies the method of mechanism design to find optimal linear pension rules (contribution rate and monthly benefit function) for flexible retirement: First the government announces a rule, making the benefit dependent on employment length. Each individual, having private information on his own expected lifespan and utility function, optimizes his employment length, conditional on that rule. The government chooses the optimal Bayesian linear rule, which maximizes the social welfare (e.g. the aggregate individual maxima) under a social constraint (e.g. the aggregate net lifetime contribution equals zero). Under this rule there is a better compromise between incentives and insurance than under so-called actuarially fair benefits.

We present a new database of social security indicators for 11 Latin-American countries designed to show how much they promise to pay in return to contributions. These are based on micro-simulations according to existing norms. We use response-surface analysis to characterize simulation results. Our results indicate that most programs are progressive. The length of service (LOS) has a strong impact on the expected returns to contributions. In several programs, the expected rates of return exhibit striking discontinuities in the LOS, mostly due to vesting period conditions. This implies these programs may be exacerbating income risk.

Over the last 25 years, the United States has seen a dramatic shift in the private sector away from defined benefit plans and towards defined contribution plans. While commentators constantly cite an increase in labor mobility as a major reason for the shift in the private sector from defined benefit to defined contribution plans, researchers to date have not been able to document any difference in mobility by pension type. This study argues that the inability to find such a relationship stems from ignoring the important role of job tenure. Using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), the results of duration analyses that include the interaction of job tenure and pension type reveal that workers with between five and ten years of tenure at a firm are 23% more likely to leave a job with a defined contribution plan than with a defined benefit plan. This difference is consistent with differences in the timing of benefit level entitlement between the two types of plans.

We investigate the pension choices made by over 700 firms between 1981 and 1998 when DC plans expanded and overtook DB plans. Their average pension contribution per employee dropped in real terms from $2,140 in 1981 to $1,404 in 1998. At the same time, the share of their pension contributions attributed to defined contribution plans was 23% in 1981 and increased to 68% in 1998. By analyzing pension plan data from the IRS Form 5500 and finances of the plan's sponsoring employer from COMPUSTAT with a fixed-effects ordinary least squares model and a simultaneous model, we find that a 10% increase in the use of defined contribution plans (including 401(k) plans) reduces employer pension costs per worker by 1.7–3.5%. This suggests firms use DCs and 401(k)s to lower pension costs. Lower administrative expenses may also explain the popularity of DC plans. Although measuring a firm's pension cost per worker may be a crude way to judge a firm's commitment to pensions, this study suggests that firms that provide both a traditional defined benefit and a defined contribution plan are the most committed because they spend the most on pensions. Further research, especially case studies, is vital to understand employers' commitment to employment-based pension plans.

The expectations of economic agents play a crucial role in almost any inter-temporal economic model. Using 2009–12 panel data for a representative sample of the Dutch population, we analyze consumers’ income and pension expectations. We focus on heterogeneity across socioeconomic groups and associations with how consumers perceive the economic and financial crisis. We find that pension expectations become more pessimistic over the 4 years, in line with pension reforms and the crisis. We find substantial differences across groups that are generally plausible and in line with financial theory.

This paper deals with two issues concerning the effects of population aging on education decisions in the presence of a PAYG pension system: We first analyze the effects of an aging population per se on individual skill choices and continuous education and the production structure. Second, we study the implications of postponed retirement, which is often proposed as a measure to cope with the economic challenges of increased longevity. Our study uses a dynamic general equilibrium framework with overlapping generations and probabilistic aging. The model allows for capital–skill complementarity in the production of final output.

As a response to population aging, in a small open economy with a fixed interest rate, our first simulation shows that GDP is depressed due to an adverse effect on skill choice and labor supply. We then introduce postponed retirement as a potentially dampening policy measure due to its encouragement of human capital formation. However, since there is less private saving in this scenario, the overall effect on GDP is even worse than in the pure aging scenario.

The paper shows the impact of changes in multi-pillar pension systems in six Central and Eastern European countries for individual pension wealth. It demonstrates that the post-crisis changes in pension system reduced pension wealth of workers in Poland and increased in Lithuania and Slovakia. The change did not have significant impact on pension wealth in Estonia and Romania. The magnitude of this effect is highest in those countries where the reduction of the fully-funded pension contribution was permanent. Loss or gain in pension wealth varies with age of participants – it is higher for younger people, who will accumulate their pension wealth to a larger extent after the change. The level of the change in pension wealth depends also on the wage level – higher earners lose more relative to the average wage level. The difference in pension wealth depends also on the difference between rates of return in fully funded and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) components of the pension system. The net outcome of post-crisis pension system modifications depends both on the magnitude of fully-funded contribution reduction, but also on the design of PAYG component and the way individual pension rights are accrued. These results indicate the rise in implicit liability of pension system in Slovakia to be higher than the reduction of the explicit liability caused by the pension system change and the lower rise of implicit liability in Poland and Latvia.