This article offers a critical analysis of scholarship produced about Brazil's Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (BNDES) since its founding, in 1952, to 2013. BNDES has performed an important, if changing and sometimes controversial, role in Brazil's economic development over the past 60 years, especially as provider of long-term finance. This analysis of almost 1,000 texts highlights discussions about its initial organisation and mission and how the role and activities of the bank changed over time, guided by turbulent national political and economic contexts. In spite of the bank's institutional importance, however, the literature is more narrative than analytical and of limited scholarly impact, dominated as it is by the bank's authorship. We argue for independent, evidence-driven, critical analyses of the effectiveness of this important institution in promoting Brazil's economic and social development.

Recent thinking and practice in transitional justice suggest that victims and societies hold indivisible, perhaps even simultaneous, rights to truth, justice and reparations after gross human rights violations. This article analyses the advantages and drawbacks of such holistic approaches to transitional justice, through a case study of Chile's second official truth commission, the ‘Valech Commission’. The article illustrates the politics of ongoing contestation about authoritarian era crimes in Latin America, showing how and why the commission was designed to deliver on certain truth-and-reparations obligations towards survivors of past state repression, while attempting to explicitly decouple truth revelations from judicial consequences. It also discusses the implications of associating truth-telling and reparations in a single instance, and in doing so contributes to debates about the potentially contradictory or counterproductive outcomes that may arise from the yoking together of truth, justice and reparations functions in transitional justice policy design.

Between 1900 and 1914, Argentina experienced the period of greatest growth of its railway network (see Fig. 1). During this time its total length was increased by about 12,000 miles, thus improving on the increase achieved during the railway boom of the 1880s. As before, the new peak was associated with a massive inflow of foreign capital which reached record levels: about 2,000 million gold pesos, against 800 millions during the 1880s. Furthermore, the new railway constructions were mainly made after 1907 and located in the pampas (see Tables 1 and 2). This rapid growth has been explained by many authors mainly as a global consequence of the so-called Mitre law (national law 5315), sanctioned in 1907, which standardised railway legislation in a way that favoured foreign investors, giving rise to an investment boom, especially among the British groups settled in the pampas.1

By mid-1940, the Argentine economy seemed to be heading for a major crisis because many of her traditional export markets had suddenly become inaccessible. In response, Finance Minister Federico Pinedo and his team developed a wide range of initiatives. These aimed to overcome the crisis and restructure the Argentine economy in order to accommodate it to a changing and difficult international environment.

This article analyses the nature, successes and failures of these policies. It argues that while Pinedo's initiatives certainly entailed visionary elements which anticipated major problems of the Argentine and Latin American development of the post-war era, they should not be regarded as some ‘golden opportunity’ for sound economic modernisation that was missed only because Pinedo and his fellow conservatives failed to win political approval and were later pushed aside by the rising force of populism.

What are the characteristics of pre-democratic elections? This article seeks to answer this question by analysing the Brazilian First Republic. Through an original assessment of formal complaints filed by defeated candidates in federal elections, we show that (1) political conflicts were intense and electoral fraud was a consequence of parties’ inability to monopolise the administrative machine in charge of conducting elections; (2) elections were organised by state-level parties, but voting practices were confined to local environments; and (3) voters were mobilised collectively, not individually. These three factors should be taken into account in future research on elections before democracy.

This article demonstrates that Bolivian tariff policy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not as passive as previously assumed and that the average tariff ratio remained high. However, high average tariffs coexisted for a long time with free-entry rights for different products which represented the main economic activity of certain Bolivian regions. Furthermore, the competitiveness of products was sometimes mostly determined by the geographic fragmentation of the country and the uneven pattern of railway construction rather by than tariffs. Therefore, beyond its high average level, the protectionist effect of tariffs was sometimes constrained by institutional and geographical restrictions.

Lately we have become accustomed to look for change in Latin American Catholicism. Indeed, expectations of innovation and change have largely replaced the norms of continuity which once governed both scholarly and popular outlooks on the Catholic Church in the region. Constant change is now commonly anticipated in the ideas and structures of the churches, in their relation to social movements, and in the form and content of the churches' projections into society and politics as a whole.

Research into the economic structures established by Spain in the Indies, based on sources which allow at least an approximate reconstruction of reality, dates only from the last thirty or forty years. The advances made, despite the uncertainty still surrounding certain aspects of the processes of production, appropriation and distribution, enable us to abandon traditional conceptions of this economy as isolated, closed, rustic in its technology, archaic or ‘feudal’.

The dominant profile of the economic structures imposed on New Spain and Peru, especially during a fifty-year cycle the nature and timing of which will be discussed below, was shaped by the transfer of the European system of mercantile production, in terms of both its technological bases and the legal structure and methods of calculation which governed its reproduction. Thus, we retain the adjective ‘colonial’ for this modern economy, in as much as its development was conditioned by the need to maximise shipments of silver to the metropolis and, in pursuit of this aim, the indigenous population was subjected to severe oppression. Likewise, the metropolis maintained a high level of control over the internal economic dynamic of these regions and a monopoly of their foreign trade.

Towards the mid-sixteenth century the expression ‘conquista y población’ was frequently invoked to characterise Spain's dominion in the New World. ‘Conquista’ referred to the initial feat of arms, by which the papal right to grant lands to the Catholic monarchs (hitherto only valid within the order of European nations) was imposed on the indigenous kingdoms and domains of the Indies.

In the 1990s, Colombia decentralised politics and passed multicultural reforms as part of wider strategies to strengthen the state. Multiculturalism produced a complex institutional environment marked by jurisdictional overlap and legal plurality. The literature on Colombia's multiculturalism confirms that violence, indigenous rights abuses and the lack of enabling legislation on indigenous territorial entities limited ethno-political autonomy and instead enhanced the capacity of the state to transform indigenous identity and bureaucratise local decision-making practices. However, some indigenous authorities used the new institutions to take control of communal matters, changing local governments along the way. The better-known case of indigenous self-government is that of the Nasa people in Cauca, characterised by the capture of local institutions to advance ethnic rights. In my study of the Embera Chamí of Karmata Rúa (Antioquia) I argue that they represent an alternative approach centred on institutional embeddedness, or the repetition of ethnic autonomy rules by multiple layers of government.

Since the trade liberalisation of the mid 1980s the trade regime facing Mexican manufacturers has changed dramatically. The economy has moved from one where import substitution behind tariffs and some licensing restrictions was the norm to a highly open trading environment with virtual free trade between Mexico and its largest trade partner the USA and modest tariffs of around 10 per cent with other countries. Since the late 1980s manufactured exports have grown dramatically at one of the fastest rates of any economy, although financed by large capital inflows the net trade balance in manufactures remains negative. This paper surveys the recent evidence on the impact of this liberalisation process on manufacturing performance. Various performance indicators can be used to assess the impact on manufacturing. Here four are discussed: (1) revealed comparative advantage measures of net trade balance; (2) efficiency wage estimates of unit labour costs; (3) total factor growth; (4) export growth. The performance of different branches of manufacturing is examined using these indicators and tests are conducted to establish links between movements in these indicators and the degree of exposure to foreign competition experienced by the various branches. The general conclusion is that the evidence is ambiguous with only some studies supporting the view that the greater the trade liberalisation in a branch the greater will be the subsequent improvement in performance.

The reform approved in Peru in 2009 during a right-wing government deviates from similar attempts in the region to expand access to healthcare. Left-wing parties in Peru were extremely weak during the policy-making process and the political parties were non-programmatic. Based on original field research, this article demonstrates how parties that lacked core values uniting their leaders and had no commitment to the health reform did not care for the definition of specifications regarding funding and implementation. Instead, technocrats dominated the process of policy formation, which, accompanied by the lack of commitment from key political actors, led to poorly specified policy and deficient implementation.

The 1750 Treaty of Madrid prompted Portuguese civil and ecclesiastical authorities under Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (later the Marquis of Pombal) to strengthen crown control of the Brazilian Amazon. Pombal's brother, Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado, governor and captain-general of the State of Grão-Pará and Maranhão, and Bishop Fr. Miguel de Bulhões e Sousa sought to supplant the missionaries, especially the Jesuits, and rein in autonomous backwoods Indian traders, called cunhamenas (Tupi for male in-law). The Lisbon Inquisition collaborated by prosecuting the infamous mameluco Pedro de Braga, a powerful interethnic intermediary on the Rio Negro, who was condemned for practicing indigenous rites and accepting multiple wives from tribal chiefs.

This article attempts to analyse the nature of Cuban policymaking during the period of economic ‘adjustment’ since the collapse of the Soviet bloc by focusing on one aspect: the opening to foreign capital. It outlines the widely-accepted characterisation of policy as a cyclical process and identifies the assumptions about the policy-making process that underlie it. Citing data on the changes in economic conditions and the sequencing of policy towards foreign capital in the post-1990 period, it suggests that policy-making can be better understood as an evolutionary process. This conclusion has implications for the way in which we understand the renewed wave of reforms launched in March 2008.

The cry for land is, without any doubt, the loudest, the most dramatic and the most desperate sound in Guatemala.’ So wrote the Guatemalan bishops in 1988. In their country's long history, the bishops stated, only one president – Jacobo Arbenz – had addressed the issue of land reform.1 Inaugurated in 1951, Arbenz presided over the most successful agrarian reform in the history of Central America. The reports of the US embassy bear testimony to the fact that within eighteen months land was distributed to 100,000 peasant families, amid little violence and without adversely affecting production.2 Praise for initiating the reform does not belong, however, solely to Arbenz. As his wife observed, ‘Alone, he could not have done it’. Praise should also be given to the Communist party of Guatemala, whose leaders were Arbenz's closest personal and political friends.3

This study explores the ideological response of Argentina's Generación del Ochenta to the ‘modernisation’ over which they presided. It begins with a brief analysis of the political role of the Generación, the urban reform of Buenos Aires, and the socio-economic developments associated with both. It goes on to discuss the nature of the elite, the socialisation of its members, and the informal networks central to its role. It concludes by discussing the role of ideology in elite domination, particularly in response to perceived threats associated with the nation's dramatic changes, focussing upon the writing of the Generación's exemplar, Miguel Cané.

At the end of its first year, the revolutionary process in Nicaragua must be considered a success from several different perspectives. The war-torn economy has been stabilized, a progressive agrarian reform program initiated, a large state sector formed on the basis of expropriated Somocista property, an independent foreign policy adopted, and a massive literacy campaign launched throughout the country. Most important, however, has been the imposition of a high degree of political stability coupled with, and partially growing out of, the consolidation of power in the hands of a cohesive revolutionary vanguard. The ability of the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) to establish its hegemony in post-Somoza Nicaragua has permitted the government to move decisively on a number of critical fronts and to escape power-sharing formulas that could have turned the policymaking process into a protracted struggle against entrenched interests. The foundation of Sandinista control over the government is simple: as Comandante Humberto Ortega explained, ‘We took power by arms, and it should be clear who has power in Nicaragua today.’

On 11 January 1986, the Sandinista government announced the modification of the 1981 Agrarian Reform Law. The new law institutionalizes significant changes in Sandinista agrarian policy which have yet to be analyzed. The changes introduced suggest that the Nicaraguan agrarian reform was reaching its limits during 1985, after successfully distributing 2,523,388 manzanas of land to 83,322 families. Further, six years into the institutionalization of the Nicaraguan revolution the balance of forces which had emerged required a re-evaluation of policies designed to achieve one of the central goals of the revolution – to radically change the socio-economic conditions of the Nicaraguan peasantry through the implementation of an agrarian reform.

There is currently a renewed interest in the relationship between economic fluctations and strike movements which refers back to an article by Eric Hobsbawm1 and an even earlier polemical piece by Leon Trotsky.2 This article offers a contribution to the growing literature, focusing, unlike most other studies, on a Third.World country. It also reflects the increasing influence of social history in Latin American research on the making of the working class.

As the developing world modernises and traditionally excluded groups seek to take part in their societies, the political activity of the peasantry assumes an ever-increasing importance. Yet most scholarship has focused on the more spectacular forms of political action such as rebellion. In recent years some scholars have turned their attention to the other extreme of everyday resistance,1 but such contributions are still limited in number. This paper utilises an inclusive view of peasant politics and takes the position that all kinds of peasant political action are different parts of one whole, such that a similarity of motivation lies behind them all. It concentrates upon a category of political action that falls between rebellion and everyday resistance: organised, non-violent peasant protest. It studies these alternative forms of political action within a political system which is relatively open to such tactics. The story which emerges reveals that by resorting to non-violent protest, peasants can make a positive contribution to their societies and improve their own welfare. In developing this argument the paper links the study of non-violent protest to existing theories and research on peasant violence and everyday resistance. In doing so it argues that the explanations for riot and rebellion given in the moral economy theory, and which underlie acts of everyday resistance, also help to account for collective, non-violent peasant political activity.