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Power and Consolidation in the Nicaraguan Revolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2009

Stephen M. Gorman
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Extract

At the end of its first year, the revolutionary process in Nicaragua must be considered a success from several different perspectives. The war-torn economy has been stabilized, a progressive agrarian reform program initiated, a large state sector formed on the basis of expropriated Somocista property, an independent foreign policy adopted, and a massive literacy campaign launched throughout the country. Most important, however, has been the imposition of a high degree of political stability coupled with, and partially growing out of, the consolidation of power in the hands of a cohesive revolutionary vanguard. The ability of the Sandinista Front of National Liberation (FSLN) to establish its hegemony in post-Somoza Nicaragua has permitted the government to move decisively on a number of critical fronts and to escape power-sharing formulas that could have turned the policymaking process into a protracted struggle against entrenched interests. The foundation of Sandinista control over the government is simple: as Comandante Humberto Ortega explained, ‘We took power by arms, and it should be clear who has power in Nicaragua today.’

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 13 , Issue 1 , May 1981 , pp. 133 - 149
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1981

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References

1 El Nuevo Diario (Managua), Año 1, No. 19 (6 06 1980), p. 5.Google Scholar

2 James, Petras, ‘Whither the Nicaraguan Revolution?’, Monthly Review, Vol. 31, No. 5. (10, 1979), p. 14.Google Scholar

3 See Malloy, James M., Bolivia: The Uncompleted Revolution (Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970);Google Scholar and René, Antonio Mayorga, ‘National-Popular State, State Capitalism and Military Dictatorship in Bolivia: 1952–1975,’ Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2 (spring 1978), pp. 89–119.Google Scholar

4 See Humberto, Ortega Saavedra, 50 años de lucha sandinista (Managua, Ministerio del Interior, 1979), pp. 77–110;Google Scholar and Eduardo, Crawley, Dictators Never Die: A Portrait of Nicaragua and the Somoza Dynasty (New York, St Martin's Press, 1979), Chapter 20.Google Scholar

5 See Jaime, Wheelock, Diciembre victorioso (Managua, Secretaría Nacional de Propaganda y Educación Política, 1979).Google Scholar

6 See ‘Sandinista Perspectives: Three Differing Views,’ Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 1 (winter 1979), pp. 114–27.Google Scholar

7 For an account of the Battle for Managua, see Roger, Mendieta Alfaro, El últimomarine: la caida de Somoza (Managua, Editorial Unión, 1980).Google Scholar

8 Petras, ‘Whither the Revolution?’ devotes considerable attention to the composition of the post insurrectionary government and the distribution of power between ‘left’ and ‘right.’ His primary error, however, was in evaluating Los Doce and the Terceristas as essentially social democratic reformists. In practice, both became supporters of radical programs.

9 For a clearer exposition of Ortega's position see his interview in ‘Sandinista Perspectives.’

10 The two new members of the JGRN were Arturo Cruz and Rafael Córdova Rivas, appointed on 18 May 1980.

11 Pedro, Camejo and Fred, Murphy (eds.), The Nicaraguan Revolution (New York, Pathfinder Press, 1979), p. 38.Google Scholar

12 The portfolios of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform were combined under the direction of Jaime Wheelock.

13 Programma de gobierno (Managua, Dirección de Divulgación y Prensa de la Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional, 1979), p. 2.Google Scholar

14 Latin America Political Report, Vol. XIII, No. 32 (17 08 1979), p. 251.Google Scholar

15 Interview with Roberto Sánchez of the Dirección de Divulgación y Prensa del Ejército Popular Sandinista, de Managua, June 2, 1980.

16 Interview with Tomás, Borge, ‘El poder lo tienen las clases tradicionalmente explotadas,’ Cuadernos de Marcha, Vol. 1, No. 5 (01-02 1980), p. 87.Google Scholar

17 Interview with Roberto Sánchez.

18 See Barricada (Managua), 31 12 1979, p. 9.Google Scholar