¹ This article is based on extensive field research conducted by the author in Nicaragua during the academic year of 1984–5 and from January to February of 1986.

² 1 manzana = 0.7 hectares = 1.75 acres.

³ For example, an accepted view on the agrarian reform states that the implementation of the agrarian reform law was slow in the first year. See Deere, Carmen Diana, Marchetti, Peter, Reinhardt, Nola, ‘The Peasantry and the Development of Sandinista Agrarian Policy, 1979–1984,’ Latin American Research Review, vol. xx, no. 3 (1985), p. 94Google Scholar. The implementation of the agrarian reform was indeed slow in the sense that only 131,857 manzanas were distributed to cooperatives and individual farmers during 1981–2. The state sector, however, received 322,920 manzanas from the pool of land acquired for the agrarian reform the same year. Thus the implementation was slow from a distribution perspective, but not from the perspective of expropriation. Out of a total of 523,403 manzanas expropriated under the agrarian reform law from 1981 to 1985, 407,945 manzanas were expropriated during the first year. This fact had serious consequences for the future development of the agrarian reform and will be analyzed below.

⁴ See Table 3.

⁵ New land is land which has been expropriated under the agrarian reform law, bought by the government, or expropriated by presidential decree. The amount of new land distributed under the agrarian reform is actually less than 838,454 manzanas, since most of the 101,408 manzanas distributed to indigenous communities consisted of secure titles to land, traditionally claimed by these indigenous communities.

⁶ Ministry of Agricultural Development and Agrarian Reform (MIDINRA), Avance v Perspectivas de la Reforma Agraria (Managua; D.G.R.A., 1986), p. 2.Google Scholar

⁷ Several comprehensive studies provide accounts of the development of the cooperative movement, see footnote. Also, the latest data can be found in Tables 3 and 7. Thus the discussion of this phase will focus on the special titles program.

⁸ Thome, Joseph and Kaimowitz, David, ‘Agrarian Reform’, in Walker, Thomas (ed.), Nicaragua – The First Five Years (New York, Praeger, 1985), p. 300.Google Scholar

⁹ Weeks, John, The Economies of Central America (New York, Holmes and Meier, 1985)Google Scholar, table 18.

¹⁰ Thome, and Kaimowitz, in Walker, , (ed.), Nicaragua– The First Five Years, p. 301.Google Scholar

¹¹ For excellent discussions of Sandinista agrarian reform policy during the first two phases, see Deere et al. (1985); Thome and Kaimowitz in Walker (1985); Baumeister, E., ‘Estructuras Productivas y Reforma Agraria en Nicaragua,’ in Harris, Richard and Vilas, Carlos, (eds.), La Rèvolucion En Nicaragua-Liberacion Nacional, Democracia Popular y Transformación Económica (Mexico, ERA, 1985)Google Scholar, and Vilas, Carlos, The Sandinista Revolution – National Liberation and Social Transformation in Central America (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1986).Google Scholar

¹² See Table 3.

¹³ See Deere et al., p. 94.

¹⁴ This perception was frequently pointed out to the author in interviews conducted with representatives of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP) in Managua during the academic year of 1984–5. COSEP represents the private-sector opposition to the Sandinista government.

¹⁵ See Deere, et al., for a discussion of policy disputes within MIDINRA, p. 84.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁷ See Table 2.

¹⁸ Wheelock, Jaime, Entre la Crisis y la Agresión – La Reforma Agraria Sandinista (Managua, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1985), p. 37.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Based on interviews with COSEP and UPANIC representatives during 1984–5.

²⁰ Wheelock, Jaime, Nicaragua: The Great Challenge (Managua, Alternative Views, 1984), p. 36.Google Scholar

²¹ See Table 2.

²² See Table 5.

²³ Thome and Kaimowitz in Walker, op. cit. p. 308.

²⁴ See Table 1.

²⁵ See Table 3.

²⁶ See Table 4.

²⁷ Instituto Histórico Centroamericano, Envío, Managua año 4, número 46, (1985).

²⁸ Instituto Histórico Centroamericano, Envío, Managua, año 4, número 51 (1985), p. 14 c.

²⁹ Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos (UNAG), Main Report, presented at the First National Congress of UNAG, in celebration of the organization's fifth anniversary, Managua, April 25–7, 1986, pp. 9, 11.

³⁰ Barricada, official party newspaper of the FSLN, 3, 7, 14 June 1985.

³¹ Press conference with Enrique Bolaños, Club de Prensa Internacional, Managua, 25 June 1985.

³² Barricada, 18 June 1985.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Envío, número 51, p. 17c.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 16 c.

³⁶ A thorough evaluation of the agrarian reform up to 1985 led MIDINRA to give future priority to the demands of poor peasants with little or no land. The same priority was awarded to peasants displaced by the war. Further, this policy was to be implemented using ‘the organizational form most appropriate to the region in question’ [emphasis mine]. See Midinra, , Avance y Perspectivas, p. 8.Google Scholar

³⁷ Table 5 indicates the difficulties the government experienced in 1985 in obtaining land for purposes of the agrarian reform.

³⁸ La Gaceta – Diario Oficial, Managua, no. 8, 13 January 1986.

³⁹ This provision, however, does not apply to landowners who possess less than 50 manzanas in the Pacific regions and less than 100 manzanas for the rest of the country.

⁴⁰ Barricada, 28 January 1986.

⁴¹ According to article 4, land is considered ‘idle’ if it is suitable for farming and/or cattle-raising, and has been left uncultivated during a period of two consecutive years.

⁴² Barricada, 28 January 1986.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ See article 12 of ‘Reglamiento a la Ley de Reforma Agraria’, Barricada, 10 February 1986.

⁴⁵ Barricada, 12 January 1986.

⁴⁶ Barricada, 13 January 1986.

⁴⁷ To give an idea of what the war has meant in terms of human and material losses, we would like to point out to what extent the main organization of the agricultural producers (UNAG) has been affected in region vi alone. As of April 1986, 861 of UNAG's members, who were heads of households have been assassinated; 54 cooperatives, 17 private homes and 26 state production units have been destroyed. Some 3,000 farmers have been kidnapped and 20,000 have been forced to leave their homes and resettle in safer areas as a result of the counter-revolutionary activity. UNAG, Main Report, p. 23.

⁴⁸ Barricada, 13 January 1986.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Midinra, , Avance y Perspectives, p. 2.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Barricada, 13 January 1986.

⁵² See Table 5. Further, producers in the agricultural frontier received titles to 133,616 manzanas in 1985.

⁵³ The problematic of this measure was evident during the events surrounding the expropriations in Masaya in 1985.

⁵⁴ Barricada, 12 January 1986.

⁵⁵ This analysis was offered by senior officials of MIDINRA and UNAG in talks and interviews conducted by the author during January and February 1986 in Nicaragua. See also the interview with Comandante Jaime Wheelock in Barricada, 13 January 1986.

⁵⁶ Barricada, 13 January 1986.

⁵⁷ By ‘strategical defeat’ we mean that the counter-revolution ceased to pose a military threat to the Nicaraguan government in 1985, though terrorist attacks, carried out by counter-revolutionary task forces, continue.

⁵⁸ Harris, Richard and Vilas, Carlos, Nicaragua – A Revolution Under Siege (London, Zed Press, 1985), p. 232.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Carrion, Luis, El Patriotismo, Base de la Unidad Nacional (Managua: DEPEP, 1981), p. 15.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Vilas, Carlos, The Sandinista Revolution (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1986), p. 153.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 159.

⁶² MIDINRA, , Informaciones Agropecuarias (Managua, MIDINRA, 1984), p. 15.Google Scholar

⁶³ MIDINRA, , Revolutión y Desarrollo (Managua, MIDINRA, 1985), p. 34.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ MIDINRA, , Informaciones Agropecuarias (Managua, MIDINRA, 1985).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Author’s interview with Ali Romero, vice-director of the Direccion General de la Reforma Agraria (D.G.R.A.), Managua, 10 February 1986.

⁶⁶ Barricada, 28 January 1986.

⁶⁷ Vilas, , The Sandinista Revolution, p. 175.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For a discussion of the Sandinista hegemonic project, see Luciak, Ilja, ‘Popular Democracy in the New Nicaragua – The National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG)’, Occasional Papers Series, no. 28 (University of Iowa, 1986).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Vilas, , The Sandinista Revolution, p. 145.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Coraggio, José Luís, Nicaragua – Revolución y Democracia (Mexico, Editorial Linea, 1985), p. 86.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Author's interview with Juan Tijerino, third secretary of the National Assembly and senior UNAG official, Managua, 27 January 1986. The certificates, though supported by the FSLN and UNAG, are highly controversial. Many senior officials of the FSLN and UNAG are against them, because they often protect producers who are not efficient. The certificates are now in the process of being phased out.

⁷² Luciak, , ‘Popular Democracy in the New Nicaragua’, p. 18.Google Scholar

⁷³ FSLN, , Programa Histórico del FSLN (Managua, Depep, 1984) p. 21.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Author's interview with Ramiro Gurdián, president of UPANIC, Managua, 28 June 1985. According to the president of UPANIC, the organization consists of three big and five small associations of producers, organized according to their productive activity. The smaller organizations are the banana growers with 16 members, followed by 62 rice growers and 74 sorghum planters. Only the Association of Cattleman (FAGANIC) has a significant membership), ranging from 100 to 300 members for each of its 2; local organizations.

⁷⁵ Author's interview with Rosendo Díaz, secretary general of UPANIC, Managua, 17 February 1986. Díaz bases his unique interpretation of the reformed law on the fact that land received under the agrarian reform cannot be sold. Therefore he considers the title not one of property but of usufructus.

⁷⁶ Author's interview with José María Briones, President of the Association of Ranchers of Estelí (ASOGAES), Estelí, 31 January 1986.

⁷⁷ The moderate view of the president leadership of ASOGAES is representative of several organizations affiliated with UPANIC. Briones points out that the confrontational politics of UPANIC hurt its members. In the case of ASOGAES it has resulted in a membership loss of 200, leaving the organization with 130 members. Felipe Espinoza, member of the National Assembly for the Conservative Party (PCD) and former president of ASOGAES, was said to represent the confrontational style of UPANIC leaders. His political positions were identified with the position of ASOGAES and as a result farmers left the organization. Author's interview with Briones.

⁷⁸ According to Rosendo Díaz, the development of UPANIC during the year of 1985 has been completely negative and the organization is constantly loosing members. Many of those farmers who leave the organization join UNAG. Author's interview with Rosendo Díaz.

⁷⁹ For a comprehensive analysis of UNAG's role in Nicaragua's democracy model see the article by Luciak (1986).

⁸⁰ Unag, , Main Report, p. 14.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Luciak, , ‘Popular Democracy in the New Nicaragua,’ p. 24.Google Scholar

⁸² Author's interview with Daniel Núñez, President of UNAG, Managua, 17 January 1986.

⁸³ Luciak, , ‘Popular Democracy in the New Nicaragua,’ p. 18.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Author's interview with Juan Tijerino. See also UNAG, Main Report.

⁸⁵ Author's interview with Ali Romero.

⁸⁶ UNAG, , ‘Discurso Oficial de la Delegación de los Empleadores de Nicaragua ante la 71a Conferencia de la Organizatión International del Trabajo’ (Managua, Unag, 1985)Google Scholar, mimeo.