Yes. We show that aggregate stock returns predict aggregate U.S. employment, despite the industrial composition of publicly traded firms differing markedly from that of all firms, and the representativeness of public firms declining over time. We also show that appropriately reweighted stock returns predict industry and local labor market outcomes. We find the strongest evidence of an alignment of interests between shareholders and workers in the manufacturing sector, despite its declining labor share of output. Our findings suggest that at quarterly frequencies, product demand shocks are more important drivers of industry- and city-level stock returns than technology shocks.

We identify Industry-Neutral Self-Financed Informed Trading (INSFIT) as stock trades financed by offsetting, equivalent dollar-denominated stock trades in the same industry. Approximately 37% of short-term mutual fund trading profits can be attributed to these trade pairs. Consistent with informed trading, INSFIT precedes unusually high media coverage for the underlying stocks. The trades underlying INSFIT are also larger as the release of stock-level news becomes more imminent. Both relative valuation and the hedging of industry exposure motivate INSFIT’s industry neutrality. While INSFIT positively impacts fund performance, active fund managers who execute INSFIT more aggressively obtain smaller trading profits per execution.

We use the 2015 Chinese stock market crash to study the effects of government stock purchases. The Chinese government purchased stocks to stabilize the markets through state-owned financial institutions known as the “National Team.” We find that the intervention led to reduced volatility and price informativeness. These impacts are driven by the disclosure of government portfolios. Consistent with investors having a stronger incentive to acquire government intervention information instead of fundamental news, we find reduced information production and information asymmetry following intervention disclosure. The article suggests that government stock purchases involve a trade-off between stability and informational efficiency.

A eurozone exit or breakup exposes bondholders to currency redenomination risk. I quantify redenomination risk since the sovereign debt crisis: It contributes substantially to credit spreads around changes in government in France and Italy. Bond prices suggest that markets have priced a potential Italian exit as isolated, and a French one as a breakup. Unlike conventional default risk, redenomination risk can be negative depending on the strength of the national “shadow” currency. Countries with strong shadow currencies earn breakup-insurance premia from the eurozone analog of “exorbitant privilege.” Yield effects are quantitatively large for implied exit probabilities as low as 1%.

This article proposes a new method for examining the impact on a firm’s investment of uncertainty reflected in its stock-return volatility. We simultaneously address the endogeneity of uncertainty and mismeasurement in Tobin’s Q, but earlier empirical work often neglects one of the two issues. Our nonparametric estimates further suggest that the relation between investment and uncertainty is significantly decreasing and strongly concave. This result contrasts with the existing literature that widely adopts linear regressions. Ignoring nonlinearity or measurement error in Q can lead to a substantial estimation bias. However, the bias due to the endogeneity of uncertainty is small.

This article investigates the impact of exchange-traded fund (ETF) ownership on seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We find that increases to firms’ ETF ownership is positively related to their propensity to conduct an SEO. ETF ownership is also associated with less negative SEO announcement returns, smaller discounts, and better long-run stock returns. Our evidence is consistent with equity issuance following investor demand for stocks driven by greater participation in ETFs, suggesting a possible alternative source of market timing opportunity.

Adverse market events can affect credit supply not only by hurting financial fundamentals but also by changing the risk-taking behaviors of individual decision-makers. We provide micro-level evidence of this individual decision-making channel in the U.S. mortgage market. We find that mortgage application rejection rates are more sensitive to foreclosure intensity when loan officers are more exposed to foreclosure news, despite the same housing market and bank fundamentals. Loans originated from the affected branches have lower ex post default rates, consistent with higher lending standards being applied. In the aggregate, this effect results in tighter credit supply during housing market downturns.

We study how banks use “regulatory adjustments” to inflate their regulatory capital ratios and whether this depends on forbearance on the part of national authorities. Using the 2011 EBA capital exercise as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that banks substantially inflated their levels of regulatory capital via a reduction in regulatory adjustments (without a commensurate increase in book equity and without a reduction in bank risk). We document substantial heterogeneity in regulatory capital inflation across countries, suggesting that national authorities forbear their domestic banks to meet supranational requirements, with a focus on short-term economic considerations.

Do asset managers engage in friendly investing to obtain privileged investment information? We test this hypothesis in the context of mutual fund connections to financial groups. Using brokers as the source of connections, we find that funds overweight the stock of connected financial groups and side with management in contested votes. We also find that fund performance improves with the extent of friendly investing. The improvement stems from trading the stock of companies that borrow from connected financial groups. Brokerage commissions do not drive the results. Our findings suggest that funds can obtain valuable information by acting as friendly shareholders.

Exploiting demand shocks from changes in federal government spending, we examine how the organizational structure of a firm affects its investment behavior. Government spending shocks affect the investment of government-dependent conglomerate segments less than matched stand-alone firms. Investment also increases in lower government-dependent segments when other segments within the same firm experience positive demand shocks, indicating cross-subsidization between segments. We further show that this cross-subsidization leads to worse operating performance and increases the diversification discount. Our findings are robust after addressing the endogeneity of government spending.

This article studies how industry peers’ stock prices respond when another firm in the industry is acquired by a foreign firm. The average stock price reactions of industry peers in horizontal foreign acquisitions around deal announcements are significantly negative. Peers’ returns are more negative in growing, less specialized, and competitive industries. Moreover, the negative stock price reactions of industry peers are related to future decreases in their operating performance. Overall, these results suggest that foreign acquisitions have strong competitive effects for the industry peers of U.S. target companies.

Combining experimental data sets from seven individual studies, including 255 asset markets with 2,031 participants, and 36,326 short-term price forecasts, we analyze the role of heterogeneity of beliefs in the organization of trading behavior by reproducing and reconsidering earlier experimental findings. Our results confirm prior evidence that price expectations affect trading behavior. However, heterogeneity in beliefs does not seem to drive overpricing and asset market bubbles, as suggested by earlier studies, and we find no indication of short-term beliefs being better determinants of trading behavior than longer-term beliefs.

Recent Delaware Chancery Court decisions that boards are self-interested in setting director compensation have focused scrutiny on the pay-setting process used by corporations. We examine the effect of peer benchmarking on director compensation decisions. Director pay relates positively to peer director pay, and firms paying their directors highly are selected as peers. Moreover, firm performance and board advising performance are positively related to the talent component and are generally unrelated to the self-serving component of the peer pay effect. The evidence indicates that firms use peer benchmarking to justify high compensation mainly to attract talented directors to enhance board quality.

In this study, we investigate whether and how trust between board members and the CEO (board–CEO trust) affects the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that firms with higher levels of board–CEO trust exhibit poor M&A performance. High trust is associated with low acquisition announcement returns, long-term stock return performance, and post-deal operating performance. This negative effect of board–CEO trust is more pronounced among acquiring companies prone to agency problems. Our results suggest that, in the institutional setting of corporate boards, high trust can be too much of a good thing.

It is well documented that since at least the 1970s investment-cash flow (I-CF) sensitivity has been decreasing over time to disappear almost completely by the late 2000s. Based on a neoclassical investment model with costly external financing, we show that this pattern can be explained by the gradual increase of capital adjustment costs, attributable to the accumulation of knowledge capital. The result is robust to a variety of approaches, including Euler equation estimation and the simulated method of moments. More generally, our findings demonstrate that I-CF sensitivity should only be interpreted as a joint measure of financial and real frictions.

We argue that syndicates associate venture capitalists (VCs) with uneven skill levels in order to lower their expected gains from threatening to stop financing: Non-continued participation would send a milder negative signal to alternative financiers. This can explain the empirical observations that i) early-round syndicates regularly associate VCs with different levels of experience and ii) follow-on syndicates often involve none of the early-round VCs. Consistent with the theory, we find empirically that the heterogeneity of VC experience levels in a syndicate is i) negatively related to the extent to which the founders of the VC-backed firm are professionally well connected and ii) positively related to the likelihood of syndicate switching in a later round.

We confirm prior evidence that bonds on average are offered at prices below their immediate post-offer secondary market prices. However, in cases where banks lead–manage their own bond offerings the underpricing is significantly less as compared with other non-self-marketed offerings. These findings are robust across various matched samples and selection models. Our results suggest that the bond offering process is characterized by substantive agency conflicts between shareholders of corporations (issuers) and underwriters.

We exploit the information content of option prices to construct a novel measure of bank tail risk. We document a persistent increase in tail risk for the U.S. banking industry following the global financial crisis, except for banks designated as systemically important by the Dodd–Frank Act. We show that this post-crisis difference in tail risk for large and small banks is consistent with the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) status of large banks being reinforced by the Dodd–Frank designation: Naming the banks whose failure could threaten the financial stability of the U.S. gave investors a list of banks the government deemed as TBTF.

We study how patenting enhances customer capital and creates financial value in a product market characterized by information asymmetry between firm insiders and customers. We find that firms with more and higher quality patents develop greater customer capital, as measured by more positive customer perceptions of product novelty and quality. To establish causality, we exploit the exogenous variation in the random assignment of patent examiners to review applications and use the average examiner leniency as an instrument for patent grants. Our mediation analysis documents a positive impact of patenting on firm performance and financial market valuation through enhanced customer capital.

Consolidation in the U.S. banking industry has led to larger banks. I find that low-income households face reduced access to credit when local banks are large. This result appears to stem from large banks’ comparative disadvantage using soft information, which is particularly important for lending to low-income households. In contrast, the size of local banks has little or no effect on high-income households. Consistent with low-income parents’ credit constraints limiting investment in their children’s human capital, areas with larger banks exhibit a greater sensitivity of educational attainment to parental income, and less intergenerational economic mobility.