A transnational community of disarmament proponents achieved considerable success in influencing Soviet security policy in the 1980s on several issues, including two examined here: nuclear testing and strategic defenses. Fundamental changes in the Soviet domestic structure after 1989, however, had the paradoxical effect of making transnational actors simultaneously less constrained in promoting their favored policies and less effective in getting them implemented. Transnational relations and domestic structures in combination affect security policy. This interaction likewise has implications for theories of ideas, learning, and epistemic communities.

Realist and other scholars commonly hold that rationally led states can and sometimes do fight when no peaceful bargains exist that both would prefer to war. Against this view, I show that under very broad conditions there will exist negotiated settlements that genuinely rational states would mutually prefer to a risky and costly fight. Popular rationalist and realist explanations for war fail either to address or to explain adequately what would prevent leaders from locating a less costly bargain. Essentially just two mechanisms can resolve this puzzle on strictly rationalist terms. The first turns on the fact that states have both private information about capabilities and resolve and the incentive to misrepresent it. The second turns on the fact that in specific strategic contexts states may be unable credibly to commit to uphold a mutually preferable bargain. Historical examples suggest that both mechanisms are empirically plausible.

Globalization transforms collective action in domestic and international politics. As the scale of markets widens and as economic organization becomes more complex, the institutional scale of political structures can become insufficient for the provision of an appropriate range of public goods. A process of this sort occurred prior to the emergence of the modern nation-state, which itself constituted a paradigmatic response to this predicament. Today, however, a complex process of globalization of goods and assets is undermining the effectiveness of state-based collective action. Overlapping “playing fields” are developing, made up of increasingly heterogeneous—transnational, local, and intermediate—arenas. The residual state retains great cultural force, and innovative projects for reinventing government are being tried. Nevertheless, the state's effectiveness as a civil association has eroded significantly, and this may lead to a crisis of legitimacy.

A rediscovery of the long-forgotten republican version of liberal political theory has arresting implications for the theory and practice of international relations. Republican liberalism has a theory of security that is superior to realism, because it addresses not only threats of war from other states but also the threat of despotism at home. In this view, a Hobson's choice between anarchy and hierarchy is not necessary because an intermediary structure, here dubbed “negarchy,” is also available. The American Union from 1787 until 1861 is a historical example. This Philadelphian system was not a real state since, for example, the union did not enjoy a monopoly of legitimate violence. Yet neither was it a state system, since the American states lacked sufficient autonomy. While it shared some features with the Westphalian system such as balance of power, it differed fundamentally. Its origins owed something to particular conditions of time and place, and the American Civil War ended this system. Yet close analysis indicates that it may have surprising relevance for the future of contemporary issues such as the European Union and nuclear governance.

Is there escape from a self-help system? Realists say no. They assume states are egoistic actors in anarchy; this means states must either look out for themselves or risk destruction: structure generates a self-help system. Constructivists think escape is possible. Because identities are made, not given, we should not make a priori assumptions of state egoism: process generates self-help. Process could also generate an other-help security system. This article introduces a third approach that uses social identity theory to argue that interstate relations are inherently competitive. Thus, for cognitive and motivated—rather than structural or social—reasons, competition, which can be coercive or cooperative, characterizes international politics.

The collective goods theory of alliances and neorealist theory yield conflicting expectations about the security policies of states. The former emphasizes the temptation to “ride free” on the efforts of others, while the latter emphasizes the incentives for self-help. In the cases of Britain, China, and France during the early cold war, the constraints identified by neorealist theory, reinforced by the advent of nuclear weapons, prevailed. Each discounted the value of the security benefits superpower partners could provide. The second-ranking powers' decisions to shoulder the burden of developing independent nuclear forces are at odds with collective goods arguments that portray especially strong temptations to ride free in the circumstances that prevailed at that time—an international system dominated by two superpowers, each possessing large nuclear deterrent arsenals that could easily be employed on behalf of allies. This analysis suggests that present efforts to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons by offering them international security guarantees are unlikely to succeed.

Many analysts associate internationalization of markets with wide-ranging changes in domestic politics. An “open polity” approach shows how extant domestic institutions mediate in this relationship between internationally induced changes in domestic actors' policy preferences, on the one hand, and national policy and institutional outcomes on the other. The nature of labor unions and formal political institutions often results in political outcomes that differ significantly from those that would ensue if outcomes simply mirrored preference changes. In addition, while existing institutions may sometimes constrain governments from pursuing policies that would improve long-term economic performance, governments will often fail to change these institutions because of short-term political considerations.

Systemic theories of international politics are inadequate for explaining particular states' policies, and some neorealists reach for supplementary foreign-policy-level concepts. Yet these studies almost never provide the empirical evidence required by their motivational constructs. Available psychological studies rely too heavily on notions peculiar to the cold war—such as the image of the enemy. A new theory proposes four additional ideal-type images. Each image is likely to lead to a specified set of strategic behaviors. An application to dyadic relations across the Persian Gulf from 1977 through 1990 suggests that this theory can help account for otherwise puzzling behavior, and it illustrates a promising route toward a more sensitive interactionist international relations theory suited both to the former superpower relationship and to diverse others.

The conventional wisdom about the domestic political effects of economic internationalization in recent decades is overdrawn and too simple. Increasing exposure to trade and capital mobility has not led all countries to pursue the same types of economic policies. The political power of the left and the strength of organized labor still have a marked bearing on macroeconomic policy. Rather than being constrained by internationalization, the relationship between left-labor power and fiscal expansions has increased with greater trade and capital mobility. However, the political left and organized labor have had to pay a price for these expansions. With greater exposure to world market forces, left-labor power has been increasingly associated with lower levels of corporate taxation and with higher interest rates. Nonetheless, common assertions about the demise of partisan politics must be reconsidered.

The extraordinary success of transnational anti-apartheid activists in generating great power sanctions against South Africa offers ample evidence that norms, independent of strategic and economic considerations, are an important factor in determining states' policies. The crucial role of a strengthened global norm of racial equality in motivating U.S. anti-apartheid sanctions illustrates the limitations of conventional international relations theories, which rely primarily on structural and material interest explanations, and supports theoretically derived constructivist claims. In particular, this case suggests that analysts should examine the role of global norms in defining states' interests, rather than viewing norms solely as external constraints on state behavior.

Theories of integration fail to explain the stop-and-go nature of European integration. This failures stems from their one-sided attention to either the member states or the institutions of the European Union (EU). The process of integration is best described as one of action and reaction, involving the institutions of the EU, member states, and interest groups. Governments respond to European integration in one policy area by intervening more in adjacent areas, thus inducing policy competition between national states. When their rivalry becomes counterproductive, member states will be motivated to take new steps toward further integration. This interpretation explains the stop-and-go rhythm of European integration and results in a new theoretical framework termed ‘dialectical functionalism.’

How is it, that among the countless technological innovations in weaponry, chemical weapons stand out as weapons that carry the stigma of moral illegitimacy. To provide an adequate account of the prohibitionary norm against chemical weapons use, one must understand the meanings that have served to constitute and delegitimize this category of weapons. Such an account is provided by genealogy, a method that examines the interpretive practices around which moral orders are constructed and behaviors are defined as normal or unacceptable. The genealogical method yields insights that illuminate neglected dimensions of the chemical weapons taboo: namely, the roles that contingency, domination, and resistance have played in the operation of this norm as a symbol of “uncivilized” conduct in international relations.

One of the lessons drawn by many scholars from the 1982 U.S. sanctions against the Soviet-European gas pipeline was that the decline of American hegemony and the global spread of American business placed the overseas networks of U.S. multinational corporations beyond the control of the U.S. government for the purposes of economic sanctions. Through systematically examining three subsequent sanctions efforts (Nicaragua, Libya, and South Africa), this study qualifies the generalizability of this “lesson.” In none of the cases was the United States willing to incur alliance costs through applying extraterritorial controls, nor was it able to persuade American firms to substitute public preferences for private ones. Nonetheless, in each case, the U.S. government influenced corporate decision making by augmenting corporate perceptions of risk so that prudent business stategies reinforced diplomatic preferences.

Contemporary international politics embody a tension between formal equality and de facto inequality. States recognize each other as sovereign equals, yet the strong still push around the weak. Among the structures that reflect this tension are informal empires. The dominant assumptions in mainstream international relations theory, materialism and rationalism, privilege the formal equality of states in informal empires a priori: materialism by assuming that authority relations cannot exist between sovereign states; rationalism by assuming that states are sovereign over their own interests. A constructivist approach allows one to explore the hypothesis that transnational authority structures construct state identities and interests. An empirical analysis of the Soviet-East German relationship supports this hypothesis, which raises questions about the emerging study of international governance.

The United States resisted restrictionist immigration legislation in the late twentieth century, providing an anomaly for those who would expect restrictionism in times of economic recession. According to some expectations, labor unions would be part of a coalition that in such times would restrict migration to reduce job competition. This reasoning draws on a state-centric approach and assumes that effective barriers to entrance exist. If one alternatively assumes that states cannot fully regulate the socioeconomic forces driving migration flows, then one may expect labor unions to abandon their supposed preference for restrictionism and instead organize immigrant workers. In that case, unions would prefer migration law that accommodates the transnational migrants' interests. The data provide some support for this argument. The perspective of complex interdependence, which emphasizes transnational relations and the blurring of foreign and domestic politics, can enhance understanding of immigration policymaking.

What accounts for the development of the Arab states system from the explosive mix of Arab nationalism and sovereignty to their simultaneous existence? To understand this development, one must first examine how institutions can shape the very interests and roles of states in such a manner as to encourage the development of relatively stable expectations and shared norms; that is, regional order. This approach illuminates how inter-Arab interactions and state formation processes led to the consolidation of sovereignty and a meaning of Arab nationalism that is consistent with sovereignty. Consequently, this region highlights how sovereignty—and its lack thereof—is consequential for understanding interstate dynamics, and how different meanings of the nation have different implications for security.

Measured against institutionalism and modified structural realism, realism provides the most coherent explanation of the international arrangements pertaining to the issue-area of civil aviation. Although institutionalized international organizations govern technical and safety issues, no single regime has emerged to govern the important commercial matters that bear on states' relative gains and losses. Instead, since World War I states have entered into a multiplicity of denounceable bilateral agreements that in turn reflect the balance of bargaining power between them. States that have attempted to reorganize the system have been driven by their own interests and capabilities, with the stronger aviation powers professing a preference for liberalism.

A growing literature in international relations concludes that democratic states pursue distinctive foreign policies. Specifically, democracies do not engage each other in war and only rarely engage each other in serious disputes short of war. Scholars have offered three basic explanations to support these findings. Each of the three invokes a different explanatory variable: norms, checks and balances, and trade. None of the three, however, provides a convincing explanation of the peace that is said to prevail between democratic polities: the distinction between norms and interests is unclear; substitutes for checks and balances exists in nondemocracies; and trade can deter conflict only under restrictive conditions.

After the economic crisis of the early 1980s, developing countries adopted new policies regarding intellectual property protection only as a result of a coercive U.S. strategy, consistent with a neorealist explanation based on power. Targeted countries have complied only on paper, not in practice, however. In contrast, hegemonic powers have not employed overt coercion in the area of antitrust policy, consistent with interpretivist neoliberalism, which emphasizes learning and voluntarism. A nuanced analysis of power and ideas is necessary to account for the differences between the cases. The different mechanisms through which the new policies have been adopted suggest different prospects for these new policies.

Nontariff barriers to trade are most pervasive when deteriorating macroeconomic conditions give rise to demands for protection by pressure groups, when countries are sufficiently large to give policymakers incentives to impose protection, and when domestic institutions enhance the ability of public officials to act on these incentives. Statistical results based on a sample of advanced industrial countries during the 1980s support the argument that the incidence of nontariff barriers tends to be greatest when the preferences of pressure groups and policymakers converge. More attention should be devoted to the interaction between societal and statist factors in cross-national studies of trade policy.