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International Inspection: From Proposals to Realization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

Robert H. Cory Jr
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Extract

A proposal for an international inspectorate lies at the heart of every contemporary plan for armament control. Alternatives to the increasing perils of the unprecedented arms race of our era are made dependent on the development of a reasonably effective method of monitoring treaty compliance. Reduction of tension through control of weapons can be attempted only by the creation of a type of political instrument with which the world has had little previous experience. The achievement of a system of inspection, when viewed in the perspective of the history of international organization, is a task of political and administrative architecture on an unprecedented scale. Even the more modest proposals envisage staff and budgetary resources comparable, if not greater, in size than those of the present UN. More significantly, these plans imply an extension of international authority within national borders. Therefore, if arms control should become a viable instrument of international diplomacy, a rapid development of international political, judicial, and administrative techniques will be required.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 13 , Issue 4 , Autumn 1959 , pp. 495 - 504
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1959

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References

1 “The Nth Country Problem, A World-wide Survey of Nuclear Weapons Capabilities, Devalues, June 1959.

2 For the most recent information on radiation hazards, made public through the May 5–8, 1959, hearings of the Holifield Committee of the United States House of Representatives, see Walter Schnier's, “A Primer on Fall-out”, Reporter, 07 9, 1959Google Scholar.

3 At present the inspection staff of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can administer safeguards only in those nations with which it has contracts or in those nations which voluntarily request its services.

4 Document EXP/NUC/28, August 20, 1958.

5 Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 1959.

6 The need for continuing research to prevent obsolescence of inspection techniques is emphasized by the Panel on Seismic Improvement, a committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Lloyd Berkner, which investigated the implications for the Geneva Experts’ plan of the new data on underground explosions released by the President's Science Advisory Committee on January 5, 1959. According to the panel, this data indicates: a. The capability of the Geneva Experts’ plan for detecting explosions above 5 kilotons is actually valid only for events above 20 kilotons. b. Improvement of instruments and techniques could restore capability for events above 10 kilotons. c. A three-year program of research would probably restore the capability to the originally estimated level. d. The addition of unmanned control stations in seismic areas of the world would increase capability to cover 98 percent of events as small as one kiloton. See: United States Department of State, Press Release, June 12, 1959.

7 In discussing the legal implications of inspection for the United States, Louis Henkin concludes that, while there are no major constitutional barriers, “… the most striking aspect of arms control is the projected effect on secrecy and security. There is an air of unreality, redolent of Utopia, in a discussion which assumes freedom of access, even to foreigners, to United States installations and offices, which may even entail the virtual abolition of security classification and with them security checks and investigations, and prosecutions for espionage or related crime”. Arms Control and Inspection in American Law, New York, Columbia University Press, 1958, p. 155Google Scholar.

8 Inspection for Disarmament (Melman, Seymour, ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1958)Google Scholar further suggests that an international agency could be more effective if it offered rewards to national citizens for information on treaty violation (p. 39). This conflicts with national definitions of loyalty and of treason.

9 Stoessinger, John G., “The International Atomic Energy Agency: The First Phase”, International Organization, Summer 1959 (Vol. 13, No. 3), p. 406CrossRefGoogle Scholar .The policies under which the inspectorate will operate have taken the Board of Governors more than two years to forge and will be submitted to the Agency's General Conference in 1960. The New York Times, September 27, 1959, p. 41.

10 For treaty provisions, see Senate Subcommittee on Disarmament, 84th Cong., 2d. Sess., Disarmament and Security, A Collection of Documents, 1919–55, p. 396–413.

11 UN Truce supervision is analyzed by Mohn, Paul in “Problems of Truce Supervision”, International Conciliation, 02 1952 (No. 478)Google Scholar; and by Frye, William in A United Nations Peace Force, New York, Oceana Publications, 1957Google Scholar.

12 Inspection for Disarmament, op. cit., reports a poll of Columbia University professors and instructors in Pure Science, Engineering, and Political Science, indicating that 68 percent would be willing to serve a two-year term and 16 percent would consider permanent employment in an international inspectorate (see p. 48).

13 John G. Stoessinger, Atoms for Peace, The International Atomic Energy Agency, manuscript for the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace.

14 The plan is contained in annexes 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 13 of the Report of the Conference of Experts for the Study of Possible Measures Which Might Be Helpful in Preventing Surprise Attack and for the Preparation of a Report Thereon for Governments, Document A/4078 (8/4145), January 5, 1959. The Soviets refused to use the plan as a basis for negotiations.

15 Document A/4078 (S/4145), op. cit., Annex II, p. 14.

16 Inspection for Disarmament, op. cit., p. 49.