The Hartian tradition of jurisprudence utilises linguistic philosophy to examine legal communications, most particularly those made by judges, and seeks to reach conclusions about the commitment of legal actors towards legal systems, the part played by morality, and what aspects of law involve the exercise of discretion. But this approach fails to take account of the nature of communication within modern society. If one approaches these issues through the application of communication theory, applying Niklas Luhmann’s concept of redundancy, our understanding alters radically. Systems theory explains how and why the communication resources available to legal actors are both limited and system specific. Whilst one can accept that actors use communications to achieve particular legal operations, one cannot attribute the meaning of these communications to their intentions, motivations or commitments. This conclusion and reasons for it change our understanding of long-standing and unresolved jurisprudential debates about the nature of judicial discourse.

Non-conviction-based (NCB) asset forfeiture is a relatively recent addition to law enforcement's armoury in the fight against organised crime in the UK. It allows for criminal assets to be forfeited to the State even in the absence of criminal conviction, the stated objective being to undermine the profit incentive of criminal activity. Until now, NCB asset forfeiture has principally been critiqued from a criminological point of view, specifically concerning the Packer models and the civil/criminal dichotomy – aside from this, however, it remains rather underdeveloped theoretically. This paper addresses this lack of legal theoretical engagement with NCB asset forfeiture by providing an initial contribution from a systems-theoretical perspective. This contribution makes use of systems theory's unique insights to critique the perceived ‘failure of law’ that gave rise to the NCB approach, and challenges the legitimacy of that approach in terms of procedural rights.

Women's domestic work is largely deemed to be a ‘labour of love’ and lacking any value outside the private family. This reflects an ‘ideology of domesticity’, whereby women's natural place is deemed to be in an imagined private sphere. In this paper, I examine the status of housework in the context of asserting property rights in the home upon relationship breakdown. Using Valverde's legal chronotope as a lens, I argue that the ideology of domesticity is not merely present in legal discourse, but also takes on material form through the spatiotemporal ordering of the home. Housework is spatially and temporally concealed behind the powerful veneer of the imagined ideal family home, with corresponding invisibility in the law. For domestic work to be acknowledged, the individual often has to demonstrate that her work transgresses boundaries between private and public. However, as I argue, this transgression is particularly difficult for women, who remain spatiotemporally anchored in the home.

Ever since Evo Morales Ayma became Bolivia's first indigenous president in 2006 and the promulgation of a human-rights-enhancing Constitution (2009) thereafter, indigenous peoples’ rights were gradually recognised. Yet, with the increasing demand for natural resources, indigenous communities have been adversely affected by the state's neo-extractivist policies. While global indigenous rights norms protect their fundamental rights, legal-implementation processes in the country's lowlands reveal dilemmas in terms of the value of laws in practice as well as its reinterpretation on the ground. Namely, in the communities, different positions and camps have emerged in terms of the role and functions of participatory rights. Despite the potential of the latter in strengthening collective-rights regimes and self-determination, community leaders, advisers and other members report how such processes fracture and weaken decision-making mechanisms and human rights claims.

From its foundation in 1948 and until the 1990s, the State of Israel lacked a formal Bill of Rights. Although the Declaration of Independence had promised a constitution, a series of obstacles prevented its adoption. In the intervening years, several attempts to anchor a Bill of Rights in a Basic Law met with failure.

In 1992, the Knesset adopted two Basic Laws dealing with human rights. The Supreme Court used these laws as a platform for creating a full-fledged Bill of Rights, and Israeli scholars helped to expedite this process. And yet, despite extensive academic discussion of these developments, the dearth of legal literature remains conspicuous on one question: How did it happen? How is it that after forty-four years of failures and parliamentary paralysis, the Knesset suddenly voted in favour of anchoring a Bill of Rights in Basic Laws?

In this article, I examine four possible explanations. The first attributes these developments to the successful exploitation of a constitutional moment that reflected a severe erosion of public trust in politics. The second pins success on the tactics adopted by the proponents of the law. Instead of insisting on the adoption of a complete Bill of Rights, they split it into small sections and worked to enact only the consensual ones. According to the third thesis, the adoption of these laws was enabled by their proponents’ failure to expose the full import of this move, thereby lulling their traditional opponents into a false sense of security. According to the fourth explanation, success resulted from two major shifts in Israeli politics. The first was the Labor Party’s loss of hegemony and the ensuing uncertainty regarding the identity of future coalitions, and the second was the strengthening of sectorial elements that threatened the dominance of the secular bourgeoisie. The first shift weakened the coalition’s inherent resistance to the constitutionalization of the political system, and the second neutralized the institutional interest of Knesset members representing the old elites against the constitutional project.

Finally, my conclusion points out that these explanations are not mutually exclusive, and all the elements they consider joined together to bring about the ‘constitutional revolution’, as it came to be known.

This paper draws from the wrongful convictions of women to interrogate the limits of dominant conceptions of wrongful conviction. Most North American innocence projects turn on a conception of demonstrable factual innocence. The paper argues that this focus is problematic as a matter of criminal law principle and presents particular difficulties for women. The paper identifies that family violence forms the primary context for both the conviction of women for violent crimes, and for women's wrongful convictions. Taking two key examples of family violence – child homicide and intimate partner violence – we illustrate that the prevailing focus on demonstrable factual innocence fits awkwardly with identified wrongful convictions in these areas, and argue that this focus may deflect attention from unidentified miscarriages of justice. We suggest that focusing on factual innocence undermines the criminal justice system's proper focus on state responsibilities, including the responsibility to protect women and children from harm, and the asymmetric burden of proof that applies in criminal cases.

This paper explores the role played by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the consultations and stocktaking during 2017 and the negotiations during 2018 leading up to the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). It examines selected parts of the text of the GCM, with particular reference to the ILO's mandate of securing social justice and decent work, as well as the protection of migrant workers and governance of labour migration. The final part of the paper looks ahead to the ILO's role in the implementation of the GCM, with specific reference to the Arab states region, where migration for employment is significant and the governance challenges, particularly in relation to the protection of low-wage and low-skilled workers, are especially acute.

My title ‘The Struggle for Law’ is that of a book by the nineteenth-century German jurist Rudolf von Jhering (1915). In fact a better translation of Jhering’s original German title (Der Kampf ums Recht) might be ‘the struggle around law’ or ‘the battle for rights’. He argued that citizens owe a moral duty to themselves and their society to assert legal rights vigorously. But law itself is above the fray, not subservient to their conflicting interests. So the struggle for law is not to control it but to invigorate it – to be involved in the legal order, an active citizen living under law. Jhering presupposed a cultural unity – ‘our whole culture’ (Jhering, 1913, pp. 59, 62). Given this unity, law can respond not only to citizens’ claims but to their feelings – feelings that are understandable in the shared culture law inhabits.

This paper identifies and engages with the social bodies emerging by virtue of the social turn in the life sciences and recent embodied approaches to social justice. Across these diverse domains, bodies are being narrated as shaped by and dependent on their environments. To explore this potentially important and productive convergence, we bring Martha Fineman's vulnerability theory into conversation with neuroscience and environmental epigenetics. We foreground significant intersecting concerns and argue that vulnerability theory – and other embodied models of social justice – is strengthened by taking embodiment seriously, including attending to the social turn in the life sciences. This can enhance the potential traction of these progressive theories. These in turn provide an alternative theoretical framework to the neoliberal lens through which neuroscience and epigenetics have hitherto been translated into policy and practice. We nevertheless acknowledge the potential limitations and dangers of the current biopolitical landscape.

This paper uses legal consciousness to discuss the influence of Portuguese culture on women's perceptions of and reactions to domestic violence. It is based on an in-depth small-scale study of Portuguese women living in England, and proposes that culture is central in shaping their behaviour, regardless of whether they experienced violence or not. The cultural characteristics that influence women the most are analysed here under the themes of ‘familism’, ‘shame and community pressure’ and ‘acculturation’. These do not operate all at the same level and their influence can change according to structural and individual circumstances. As such, the paper suggests that immigrant women's perceptions of and reactions to domestic violence can only be fully understood by articulating national culture with other structural and individual variables; this will enable a multilayered and situated understanding of women's legality that avoids a simplistic attribution of their behaviour to national or ethnic provenance.

This paper introduces a symposium on socio-legal studies and the humanities, justifying the originality of a dedicated special issue on this topic. The paper identifies and critically examines themes and problems in the literature before introducing the articles in the symposium and, finally, discussing areas for future research.

Drawing on ethnographic research across two street-level bureaucratic institutions in Istanbul, Turkey in the late 2010s, this paper traces the causes and implications of the politicisation of bureaucrats in the context of authoritarianisation. It argues that politicisation of bureaucrats cannot solely be taken as a reflection of the erosion of bureaucratic autonomy and capacity but must be explored further to reveal how bureaucrats cope with authoritarian pressure as well socio-legal destabilisations to preserve their institutional ethos. To this aim, I demonstrate how bureaucrats get politicised in response to authoritarian policies and, in turn, labour to uphold the rule of law despite politico-legal risks. The paper particularly focuses on how bureaucrats weave political solidarity and circulate anti-government discourses and how they use their knowledge of the legal-regulatory repertoire and archives to deter and ‘correct’ unlawful practices through their everyday work. The paper generates insights into the fashionings of political subjectivities and agency by bureaucrats through their labouring in the face of authoritarian interventions, legal disruptions and the increasing interactions with the citizenry. In doing this, my objective is to shed light on the everyday workings of authoritarian state and to get a better picture of the way the law is ‘made real’ (Latour, 2002) across mundane encounters between bureaucrats and the citizenry.

This essay seeks to shed some light on the portrayal of law and lawyers on television. Whilst it focuses principally on the British experience, it is written in the wake of American television’s extensive output and comments on these products. It indicates where the impetus for this work has come from and examines the changes in the portrayal of small screen lawyers. It notes the scholarship carried out in the United States and seeks to build on this pioneering work. It assesses the schemes used by the analysts of American TV law and notes their limited applicability to the British context. It constructs a typology of TV law programmes based on the development of distinctive styles of programming. This typology covers legal procedurals, legal dramas, legal comedies and legal reality shows. It notes the potential for analysis of the development of TV law programmes to shed light on areas such as the globalisation of culture and debates on legal education as well as on the nature and image of the legal profession and its socio-political function. It suggests that this process of mapping out the domain of small screen legal justice requires to be supplemented by detailed readings of the wealth of material which is revealed in the overview of the British experience and complemented by studies in other jurisdictions. It concludes that there seems to be a paradox at the heart of lawyer programmes. The dominant ethos of the vast majority of the material has been essentially reflective rather than refractive. The protagonists have been anti-establishment whilst the underlying trope has been the attainment of justice through the vehicle of the heroic lawyer.

This article sets out a sociological reconstruction of the constitution of the European Union (EU). Utilising a methodology derived from historical-functionalist sociology, it explains the distinctive court-led, judicial form of this constitution within a wide comparative-sociological framework, and it cites earlier examples of judicialised constitutions to elucidate the adaptive functions performed by judicial actors in the EU constitution. The article proposes a new method for analysing constitutions in general and that of the EU in particular, and it offers an encompassing sociological perspective for addressing the increasing preponderance of judicial institutions in contemporary democratic polity building.

The study of law and emotion is now established as a distinct field of study in its own right. In this respect, legal studies has shared in a wider ‘affective turn’ that has involved twenty-first-century social science in a new concern to explain the contribution of emotional feelings to human thought, motivation and behaviour. This development has been accompanied by a pronounced debate over how emotion should be rendered accountable within a rational frame of analysis. On the one hand, it is possible to portray this as being sustained by a movement to make us more emotionally literate and more sensitive to the ways people act and think through feeling. On the other hand, it might be interpreted as being rooted in a concern to make matters of emotion more amenable to rational discipline and the sanction of reason. In this paper, I contend that, where a focus is brought to the experience of ‘compassion’, the volume is raised on these conflicts of interpretation. I further argue that opposing and contested points of view on the experience and value of ‘compassion’ provide us with valuable insights into the wider dynamics of social and cultural change that have inspired the ‘affective turn’. These arguments are developed with reference to the social theories of Max Weber and Norbert Elias. Moreover, in taking note of Hannah Arendt's thinking on the cultural politics of compassion, I attend not so much to how the controversy of compassion might be resolved, but rather to its potential to awaken critical humanitarian concern. Compassion is hereby celebrated as an inherently ‘unstable emotion’ that brings debate to the condition and bounds of human care and social justice.

The spread of COVID-19 has seen a contest over health governance and sovereignty in Global South states, with a focus on two radically distinct modes: (1) indicators and metrics and (2) securitisation. Indicators have been a vehicle for the government of states through the external imposition and internal self-application of standards and benchmarks. Securitisation refers to the calling-into-being of emergencies in the face of existential threats to the nation. This paper contextualises both historically with reference to the trajectory of Global South states in the decades after decolonisation, which saw the rise and decline of Third-World solidarity and its replacement by neoliberalism and global governance mechanisms in health, as in other sectors. The interaction between these modes and their relative prominence during COVID-19 is studied through a brief case-study of developments in Kenya during the early months of the pandemic. The paper closes with suggestions for further research and a reflection on parallel trends within Global North states.

This paper examines the potential use and limits of Zweigert and Kötz's classical functional approach in comparative law for an empirical socio-legal research project. The project involves a comparison of the formal labour laws and informal norms and institutions which regulate restaurant work in the cities of Melbourne, Australia, and Yogyakarta, Indonesia. The paper argues that the functional approach is a necessary but incomplete method for overcoming the many issues of comparability between the two research sites; the method requires both extension of its analytical steps and explicit explanation of its limitations.

Kanaks are the indigenous Melanesian population in New Caledonia. This article explores the experiences unique to Kanak women after colonisation, including the impact of French colonial laws and policies on gender relations in the indigenous community. Kanak women have assumed largely concealed roles in the colonial period. Little literature deals specifically with the impact of French colonisation on Kanak women, possibly reflecting the dominant colonial tendency to discount the historical, cultural, socio-economic and political significance of Kanak women in the colonial era. The French colonisers fortified their control by sharpening and maintaining hierarchical differences based on race, class, gender, sexuality and space between the indigenous peoples and the colonisers. The emphasis on discrete boundaries was reinforced by repressive colonial laws, such as the indigenat, an emblem of colonial control exemplifying collusion between an indigenous patriarchy and the colonial administrators.

The development of an integrated critical psychological jurisprudence (PJ) continues to elude researchers in theoretical and applied contexts. Indeed, the radical potential of a synthetic PJ that furthers the political aims of social change, collective good and citizen justice has yet to be sufficiently problematised or systematically reviewed in the extant literature. This article begins to address this deficiency. First, the social philosophy that informs and underscores radicalised PJ is described. This includes commentary on its underlying symbolic, linguistic, material and cultural footing. Second, several well-rehearsed theoretical strains of critical PJ are summarily presented. These strains consist of anarchism, critical legal studies, feminist jurisprudence and complex systems science. Third, a conceptual integration is undertaken that links radicalised PJ’s grounding in social philosophy with its established theoretical variants. This synthesis demonstrates the probing political project of critical PJ, especially as a humanising strategy of resistance and an evolving struggle for justice. This is a political project that seeks to de/reconstruct the images (aesthetic), narratives (epistemology), embodiments (ethic) and reproductions (ontology) at the core of its nascent critique.

This paper distinguishes three ideal-type contexts in which comparisons are used: comparison as a contribution to disciplinary enquiry, as part of deliberately trying to learn lessons and as an essential element of a new form of governmentality concerned with ranking places in terms of social indicators. After offering examples of the way comparisons are employed (and criticised) in each of these exercises, the paper ends by discussing the overlap and feedback between them.