Is there a stable set of practices or assumptions surrounding dignity, and would these necessarily denote a single foundation sustaining that stability? Two contemporary debates offer contrasting approaches to these questions. In the first, two jurists, who share agreement over the appearances of dignity in post-1945 jurisprudence, disagree as to whether these appearances form an emerging ius commune or a contingent set of conceptions. The second, comparative, debate explores the functional consequences of dignity’s aristocratic resonances. One position posits a continuing relationship between dignity and aristocratic nobility; the other, a functional division between dignity-within-aristocracy and dignity-within-democracy. This article insists that clarification of these debates depends upon a distinction between the epistemology and ontology of dignity, and, further, a distinction between dignity’s genealogy and its grammar. It concludes that a complex genealogical inheritance is at the heart of much disagreement, and that attention to dignity’s use clarifies its deficiencies and its continuing appeal.

In a bid to promote consensus, this response article parses the subtle difference of meaning and emphasis that subsists between the various proponents of the new paradigm of legal capacity by closely reading four articles included in this issue of the Journal.

This paper reframes debates about gender equality in the legal professions by interrogating the practices of men and interconnections between fatherhood, gender and parenting within the specific context of large corporate law firms. Drawing on interviews with male lawyer-fathers, it argues that closer exploration of fatherhood reveals much about the gendered dynamics of identity formation as a legal professional in this sector. A set of ideas about fatherhood, the paper suggests, shape how men's work can define a distinctive gender identity as a ‘family man’ and good lawyer. Political-economic and cultural shifts around fatherhood, however, are reconfiguring and adapting gender relations in law in a number of contradictory ways with implications for understanding the place of men in relation to gender-equality agendas. Ideas about fatherhood, family, work and career, I argue, are mobilised and enmeshed within the reproduction of distinctive law-firm cultures and gendered ideas of organisational commitment. What, in short, might it mean to be both a ‘good father’ and a ‘good lawyer’?

This paper surveys recent trends in the development of the sociology of law in Denmark. The overall argument of the paper is that, currently, the sociology of law in Denmark is marked by a striking sociological and more specifically institutional and empirical turn. This new direction in scholarship suggests not only a renewed research focus on the institutional dimensions of law but it also – and very differently from work from the 1980s and 1990s – suggests a re-orientation towards sociology more generally. A clear consequence of this return to the sociological core of the sociology of law has been an empirical orientation towards how law is practised, how legal institutions work and, as part of that, how the legal profession takes part in both legal change and transformations of state and society. This new research relies not only on general sociological theory and method but also on the more specific elite sociology, sociology of professions and sociology of knowledge.

As the many pages of law journals, monographs and textbooks demonstrate, the complex interface between law and visual culture continues to be a marginal aspect of legal study, research and scholarship. To paraphrase sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1965/1990, p. 1) there exists a hierarchy of legitimate objects of study. The orthodoxy continues to be preoccupied with the ways in which the written texts of law make the world. The multifarious gatekeepers of legal studies have responded in a variety of ways to scholarly and pedagogic projects that turn away from law's written text and its operationalisation. In my experience from giving papers and talking to lawyers and judges, these range from bewilderment, disbelief and passive aggressive indifference to more open attacks and withering denunciations that dismiss work that touches on the visual aspects of law as esoteric, trivial, ‘not law’. The publication of these three books exploring various dimensions of the interface between law and visual culture does not herald the death of the written text of law, but they do point to the long history and contemporary significance of visual culture for law. Their publication provides an opportunity to examine a body of work that takes this interface seriously. Each of these studies demonstrates the need to qualify the legal obsession with the word and for legal scholars to pay due regard to a wider range of visual cultural forms and practices that shape and represent law and legal practice. They also provide an opportunity to reflect on apparent resistance to taking the visual dimensions of law more seriously. In combination, these three monographs illustrate the substantive, jurisdictional, disciplinary and methodological diversity of current research on the visual dimensions of law and its historical range.

Historically, sex services premises in New South Wales, Australia were regarded and regulated as illegal and disorderly entities; they were policed as outlaws. The Disorderly Houses Amendment Act 1995 [NSW] bestowed legal status, providing an opportunity to regulate sex services premises as legal subjects. Despite these reforms, in many areas brothels continue to be regulated more restrictively than other businesses. I argue that this is because, for many, brothels continue to be perceived as outlaws. They are regarded as inherently unlawful, disorderly, and hence warranting and requiring exclusion from the community. I argue that this conception of brothels as outlaws is constructed and reinforced through regulation. In contrast, some local councils and Land and Environment Court decisions have taken up the opportunity to regard and regulate sex services premises as legal subjects or citizens. The conception of sex services premises as citizen imports an existing legal framework, with associated accountabilities, rights and responsibilities. This shift in conception results in people viewing sex services premises differently, experiencing them differently and regulating them differently.

The increasing mobility of athletes prompts a reconsideration of the presumed connection between allegiance, identity and nationality. Olympic citizenship challenges traditional understandings of community membership by calling into question the privileged status of birthright citizenship and by bringing forth a different, more fluid and changeable notion of belonging. By juxtaposing the ‘old’ world of nations competing via ‘their’ athletes, as momentary representatives of the nation, for glory, medals, dominance and prestige, to the increasing mobility of sportspersons engaging in the pursuit of athletic excellence and creative self-expression, we argue that neither the enactment of tighter rules to prevent ‘citizenship shopping’ nor the transformation of the Olympic Games into athletes' Olympics are desirable reforms. Instead, we propose a participatory growth model which would allow athletes to choose the country they intend to represent following their enmeshment into a localised web of socio-economic interactions and a flexible framework of citizenship. This cannot but have wider implications for the Olympic Charter and for politics in general.

Law has to be able to respond to new or changing circumstances. This ‘legal adaptability’ may be more important than details in the ‘law as such’. However, its meaning and its significance have not yet been analysed in detail. Thus, legal adaptability will be examined in this article. It looks at the worst case scenario by discussing a fictional country (Elbonia) where legal adaptability is poor, and identifies the main adaptability criteria. By using empirical data from the three Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), it also provides an example of how to ascertain the degree of legal adaptability of particular countries.

In the last four decades, there has been a significant increase in the number and variety of appropriate dispute-resolution (ADR) institutions and processes in Australia as a critical aspect of improved access to justice. Although more people can get assistance to resolve their disputes, the issues of whether this access is shared equally within the community, how the disadvantaged fare in these processes and what type of justice is provided by the various ADR processes are explored. The relevance of legislative objectives of ADR fora and processes to justice outcomes is highlighted. It is argued that ADR processes need to be designed and implemented bearing in mind the type/nature of the dispute, parties involved and availability of resources, and to have an overarching objective of promoting access to justice for users. Additionally, improved access to justice requires ongoing and rigorous evaluation of ADR processes to ascertain whether justice objectives are being achieved.

This paper examines the role of coroners in investigating and reporting on cases of death after police contact (DAPC) in England and Wales. It considers how Article 2 (the right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has affected coronial processes and practices. It argues that the effects of Article 2 represent an evolutionary shift in accountability processes surrounding cases of DAPC in England and Wales, but that this shift has in turn been mediated by aspects of institutional structure in the coronial system. It discusses how this shift demonstrates the dynamic relationship between the coronial system, state and society and how this has continued to evolve as a result of external demands.

What conditions are necessary for juries to work effectively? Legal scholars and social scientists have debated this question, and research in psychology and law demonstrates that jurors are easily confused by scientific evidence and readily swayed by the slick framing of argument. Rather than condemn juries as unworkable, however, I demonstrate experimentally that jurors need not possess legal or scientific sophistication to make reasoned choices during trials. Specifically, I demonstrate that various institutions embedded in our legal system (such as penalties for lying and the threat of verification) can substitute for sophistication and enable even unsophisticated individuals to learn what they need to know. Based on these findings, I argue that rather than advocate blue ribbon juries and bench trials as replacements for citizen juries, scholars should instead seek substitutes for jurors’ lack of sophistication in the institutions of our legal system.

This paper develops the concept of peripheral governance as a kind of legal transnationalism that is being generated by responses to outward travel for health care. I argue for a recuperation of the ‘peripheral’ in order to think through the ways in which marginal actors and marginal objects contribute to transnationalism. The paper draws on the idea of networked governance, nodal governance in particular, to capture governance mechanisms that have emerged in response to outward flows for health care. Peripheral governance comes into being through the cultivation of dependency on core provision of health care in other jurisdictions and by focusing domestic provision on those services (information, counselling, check-ups), which lie on the margins of health care. Peripheral governance has four key technologies: non-development, exit, use and return. These technologies illustrate how state agencies may actively mobilise the peripheral as they claim to address local needs through participation in the regulation of cross-border health care. In so doing they configure a conception of the peripheral that does not want to become core, participates in transnational networks on its own terms, and focuses on marginal objects of health care. I develop this account of peripheral governance through a critical reading of the strategies that the Irish Crisis Pregnancy Agency has adopted in response to women's practices of travelling for abortion care.

This paper offers a definition of legal fictions and an evaluation of the role of legal fictions in legal practice, especially insofar as they enable legal change. The first part of the paper defines legal fictions as any suspension of one or more of the required operative facts leading to the imposition of an associated normative consequence, whether this suspension is introduced because of (1) the absence of proof of some previously required fact; or (2) the presence of proof to the contrary. The second part argues that legal fictions have an unjustifiably bad reputation as enablers of legal change. This paper makes a plea for seeing legal fictions as forms of tentative cognition that enable courts to communicate with each other, exploring whether a certain change in the law (i.e. precisely a suspension of a required operative fact in the imposition of a certain normative consequence) ought to be introduced at a more explicit level. Under the guise of this relational reading of legal reasoning, legal fictions become an instrument of careful experimentation – a way of testing the extent to which the potential introduction of a rule will be beneficial. Seen in this light, legal fictions are by no means signs of the immaturity of the system; they are, instead, dynamic resources that allow courts, over time, to balance flexibility and responsiveness with stability and predictability.

Precarious work is a crucial impediment to substantive equality. This paper examines the regulation of precariousness in the light of two recent trends: the casualisation of employment in the wake of the crisis, and global efforts to regulate domestic work (e.g. ILO Domestic Workers Convention (No 189)). It takes these developments as an opportunity to explore the effective regulation of contemporary labour markets, and in particular the role of the Standard Employment Relationship (SER). The paper returns to two prominent accounts of the SER: Vosko's critique of SER-centrism in non-standard work regulation and Bosch's notion of the flexible-SER. It argues that the domestic work debates confirm the value of a modernised SER in its temporal dimensions. Yet the literature on precarious work tends to focus on regulatory settings in which the standard model remains dominant. The key contemporary challenge is to identify strategies that will embed this model in settings in which it is in decline or was never deep-rooted. Drawing on the notion of ‘reconstructive labour law’, the paper argues for innovative legal mechanisms that prompt the construction of flexibilised SER-type relationships. It concludes, however, that for these strategies to be effective, casualisation must be identified not only in contractual arrangements but also in working-time practices.

The idea of ‘human dignity’ is, notoriously, as ambiguous as it is compelling. Notwithstanding the absence of any clear or settled definition of human dignity, either in the abstract or in terms of what it means in practice, it is an idea which takes pride of place in international legal documents, in judicial reasoning, and in scholarship across a range of disciplines, where it seems, particularly in recent years, to have become the focus for an explosion of academic interest and an accompanying proliferation of literature. Much of the existing literature attempts to uncover the meaning, or multiple meanings, of ‘human dignity’, focusing on the uncertainty surrounding the substance or content of the idea and trying to compose a catalogue of use-types. In this paper, my primary aim will be to address another type of uncertainty, namely uncertainty about the role, function or status within legal frameworks of the ‘dignity norm’ – the norm requiring respect for human dignity. I want to explore several possibilities: first, that the dignity norm is simply a proxy for respect for autonomy; second, that it is a right in the sense that we can speak of a specific ‘right to have dignity respected’; and third, that it is a legal principle. Having problematised each of these in turn, I will contend that the function of the dignity norm is best captured by describing it as the ‘substantive basic norm’ of the legal systems wherein it appears.

Images of oil-covered seabirds or radioactive fallout from nuclear disasters easily evoke concerns over the risks to personal integrity and environmental degradation. The energy-extraction industry, like others, is profit-driven – a competitive enterprise, with little regard for the social impact of its activities beyond corporate social responsibility (CSR) rhetoric. CSR is neither a precautionary measure nor a remedial framework. Outsider stakeholder influence from government is limited and CSR is written on companies’ terms. What emerges is a distortion between companies’ responsibility and accountability for breaches. We propose a hybrid form of accountability that incorporates public international law to ensure the state, as a guardian of society, plays a more definitive role. This will require more binding obligations on states and companies beyond the current soft-law principles, to curtail jurisdictional constraints and forum shopping of large corporations, through an international court of reparations to guarantee effective remedies for victims.

This article aims to assess the work of the courts as navigators when law meets culture in Turkey, where the culture of the official legal system and the culture of the people do not always accord. First the conceptual framework used is analysed, then readers are introduced to the peculiarities of Turkish law and socioculture, and finally, the work of the judge is considered. Selected cases are in three groups: cases where courts face culture contrary to the vision embodied in the official legal framework; then, where courts face culture which can be catered for within the legal framework, though not in keeping with it, and now need revision because of the aspired European Union membership; and finally, where courts face demands of further Europeanisation and human rights law from the outside, which may or may not fit in the framework or the traditional values of the people.

Since the mid-1990s there has been intense activity in terms of anti-corruption initiatives. Section 1 of this paper (Regulatory measures: the conventions) focuses on the frameworks of these conventions and in the course of their assessment argues (a) that the lack of a unified approach is unlikely to further the fight against corruption in any meaningful way, (b) that regulation is unlikely to be effective in terms of results unless there are robust enforcement mechanisms in place, and (c) that anti-corruption legislation provides only a partial answer and that we need to engage in what I call a process of re-socialisation. Section 2 (Enforcement and informers) highlights the difficulties associated with enforcing the conventions and explores whether the antiquated qui tam action might serve a useful purpose in addressing the problem of enforcement deficit. Section 3 (Fighting corruption through re-socialisation) asks whether greater social awareness through education provides a possible solution. Guided by a humanistic philosophy of society the view is put forward that part of the answer for effectively tackling corruption lies in making people aware of its long-term effects.

Pensions constitute an important link, in many welfare regimes, between processes of social categorisation and labour market segmentation over the life-course. Pensions also reveal how socio-economic rights are defined in relation to normative and ideological categories (such as gender, class and race), how (and for whom) the state prioritises their distribution, and what these processes reveal about notions of equality and their political and legal institutionalisation. In this paper, I argue that pensions, especially but not only occupational pensions, therefore fall within the ambit of a broad conception of labour law; they should be of interest to feminist legal scholars not solely because of their linkages to paid employment, however, but because of their relationship with the organisation of both production and social reproduction – and the evolution of norms of equality across these domains.

This paper contributes to the debate on the role of anthropological expertise in the legal sphere by broadening the analytical field of vision. Rather than focusing on the anthropologist, his or her positionality, the epistemic status of anthropological knowledge or the ensuing ethical questions – as the other contributions to this themed section do – we turn the question around. Based on empirical data from a survey conducted among European judges on judiciary practice and sociocultural diversity, our focus here is on the question of how judges perceive, assess and accommodate sociocultural diversity in their daily decision-making. We furthermore investigate the conditions under which external expertise is called upon in specific legal settings and situations. We develop a conceptual argument for rethinking the role of anthropological knowledge and research in legal practice and argue for the need to pursue new forms of collaborative ethnography with judges that go beyond participant observation of their courtroom interactions. Working together with the judges who give decisions on cases, we claim, can provide scope for both critical reflection and applied problem-solving.