Police powers of discretion to discontinue criminal proceedings are rather exceptional in Europe, where most Criminal Justice Systems are based on some kind of principle of legality. Germany and England may be regarded as contrasting examples for different decision-making-models on the question whether or not to prosecute an offender. Germany, with a principle of compulsory prosecution theoretically guiding the work of public prosecutors—compared to England, where already the police have significant powers of discretion when deciding about a case. In recent years, however, the differences between the practice of these principles seem to have vanished: Whereas some German federal states have started to involve police in prosecution decisions, policy makers in England try to restrain the traditionally wide discretion of police in dealing with cases of minor crimes. Interesting lessons that might be useful for future harmonization of European criminal justice systems can be drawn from the experiences in both countries.

The following essay was the keynote delivered at the International Conference of the German Law & Society Association in Bremen, Germany, in March 2010. In seeking to understand the formation of the Association of the Sociology of Law it is important to be mindful of the context of the spirit of the 1960s and 1970s in which it arose. Sociology of law's beginnings can be traced to the start of the 20th century with especially Eugen Ehrlich, Max Weber, Hermann Kantorowicz, Arthur Nußbaum and Theodor Geiger. However, after nearly being wiped out under German National Socialism, it began to re-emerge slightly in the 1960s.

With respect to space at least, philosophy is almost unanimous. A space comes into being as soon as a border is established and an observer looks at both sides of the border including at the border separating the sides. Without the border, no space, and the space has none. Without the observer, the same applies, even if there are only observers where distinctions are being drawn. Jacques Derrida was conscious of this. One of his questions is the perennial question of philosophy: what is space if, for a space to reveal itself, there is a boundary to be drawn, such that an observer may emerge looking at the space the boundary is brought forward in.

I don't usually open my commentary by citing great words spoken by old men. But in this case I will make an exception. Ferdinand Lassalle is not only the grandfather of German social democracy; he is also the author of these words: “Constitutional issues are power issues.”

The following reflections, that will focus exclusively on the European primacy clause in the light of the Statement by the Constitutional Court no. 1/2004 of 13 December, in particular with regard to its scope as regards the Spanish Constitution itself, may take as a starting point the conclusion contained at the last paragraph of FJ 4 of the Statement, which states as follows:

“In the scarcely-conceivable event that in the ultimate functioning of European Union Law this Law were to result irreconcilable with the Spanish Constitution, and without the hypothetical excesses of European Law with regard to the European Constitution itself being remedied by the ordinary channels provided for in the latter, ultimately the preservation of the sovereignty of the Spanish people and of the supremacy of the Constitution as it provides for itself could lead this Court to tackle the problems that would arise in such a case, and which from the current point of view are considered to be non-existent, by way of the relevant constitutional procedures”.

Since May 2004 Polish administrative courts have passed a great deal of judgments in which the law of the European Union (formerly European Community law) has played either the main role or a subsidiary role in the proceedings. This article seeks to examine how the above-mentioned courts comply with the expectations which are put on them by EU law and how they participate in the process of legal integration within the EU. In this context, the author scrutinizes how the national judiciary adjudicating in the administrative law area understands, interprets, employs and applies the systemic principles of EU law such as: supremacy, and (in) direct effect and effectiveness. In addition, the participation of national courts in the process of a dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union through the preliminary ruling procedure is captured. The analysis is not aimed at being exhaustive and focuses solely on the total impact of EU law on the national judiciary and the general trends in the judicial application of EU law, that is to say the overall reception of EU law and the dimension of the EU-friendliness displayed by Polish administrative courts.

This year is designated the “European Year of Citizens”. It marks the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the European Union citizenship under the Treaty of Maastricht. It is important to ask what exactly will be celebrated on this occasion. Specifically, which rights did the European peoples gain by virtue of their so-called fundamental status of EU citizenship, and were the guarantees embedded in those rights satisfactory? This article will address these questions by focusing on the social rights field, a field which has been dramatically affected by the development of the European Union citizenship concept.

The relationship between immigration and constitutional identity is simultaneously obvious and evasive. This Article explores that relationship through a comparative case study of Italy and Canada. It begins with a conceptual analysis of the role of immigration against the backdrop of collective identity, constitutional identity, and constitutional subjectivity. The metaphor of immigration as a mirror of constitutional identity orients this analysis. Then, an empirical comparison of the role of immigration in Italy and Canada demonstrates the very different place of immigration in national and constitutional narratives of “self” and “other.” Yet, when the lens is widened to include their recent startup visa programs, their narratives start to converge as the new metonymy of innovation makes an appearance. This convergence marks a conceptual shift in constitutional identity: From immigration as mirror to immigration as display. As a tool of attraction for innovators, immigration law has both internal and external dimensions, which reverberate with implications for constitutional identity. Ultimately, the startup visa programs enlarge the constitutional “us” and make constitutional subjectivity more fluid.

In Viking and Laval, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) adjudicated the rights of labor and capital mobility under E.U. law. Both cases strengthen the single European market through economic liberalization to generate greater prosperity for all Europeans as part of the process of European economic and political integration. Labor and capital mobility create greater prosperity for all through more rational market exchanges. Free trade is good for goods and is even better for labor. A liberalized and fully mobilized labor market results in more productivity and greater wealth in the European polity, as well as interdependence, and thereby deeper integration resulting in greater understanding and less conflict. The decisions, wrongly criticized by some as “bad for workers” are justified by the fact that they will benefit workers in Eastern Europe, consumers in Western Europe, and the Community as a whole by deepening integration. A key challenge for the European Union is to economically anchor and deepen the political restructuring of Eastern Europe by enabling the natural labor and capital movements which an open marketplace generates. Europe does this not with the failed neo-liberal model which has ravaged the wealth of the United States and squandered it in illusory booms based on consumer borrowing and deficit spending to fund war for oil. Rather, Europe is developing a neo-corporatist social model. This article uses the Viking and Laval cases as examples of this development.

It has been a long journey from the noble declaration in the Federal Republic's new constitution (Grundgesetz [Basic Law]) that women and men have equal rights, to the establishment of concrete laws and jurisprudence that now assure that women and men actually receive equal treatment and that women are no longer disadvantaged in society (and even more, laws and jurisprudence that assure that women receive support if they encounter structural disadvantages). This article, in looking back on its first fifty years of service, surveys the decisive role that the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) played in that journey.

Criminal law is different, it is often said, from other areas of law in that it is rooted in and thus depends on national heritage to a great extent. This uniqueness is recognized by European institutions, as expressed by General Advocat Mazák in a case concerning the protection of the environment by means of criminal law:

“In many respects, criminal law stands out from other areas of law. Availing itself of the most severe and most dissuasive tool of social control – punishments – it delineates the outer limits of acceptable behaviour and in that way protects the values held dearest by the community at large. As an expression essentially of the common will, criminal penalties reflect particular social disapproval and are in that respect of a qualitatively different nature as compared with other punishments such as administrative sanctions.

In three high-profile cases the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG — Federal Constitutional Court) was recently called upon to exercise its authority to issue a temporary injunction in proccedings referred to as einstweilige Anordnungen (provisional measures). Article 32 of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtgesetz (BVerfGG — Federal Constitutional Court Act) provides: In a dispute the Federal Consitutional Court may deal with a matter provisionally by means of a temporary injunction if this is urgently needed to avert serious detriment, ward off imminent force or for any other important reason for the common good.

Modern federations are faced with the challenge of cross-state as well as cross-nation economic activities and with the ever-increasing mobility of society. This has not only promoted international law, but has also created the need for harmonized laws throughout federations within the competence areas of the states. Diverse laws within federal systems may increase transaction costs, cause delays, and lead to jurisdictional conflicts for nationwide or cross-state transactions. In order to preserve federalism, and therefore prevent an ever-advancing process of centralization, interfederal legal harmonization promoted by the states themselves is crucial. There are two distinct methods of legal harmonization of state laws: (1) harmonization by “Uniform Law Conferences,” which are in principle run by lawyers and thus independent, to a certain extent, from the influence of policy makers; and (2) harmonization by executive intergovernmental conferences. These two distinct models of interfederal legal harmonization will be analyzed and evaluated with regard to efficiency, compatibility with democratic principles, transparency, and accountability in a comparative legal study of the harmonization processes. This Article will scrutinize the federal systems of the United States and Canada, on the one hand, as well as those of Germany and Austria, on the other hand. The study will reveal that the efficiency of interfederal legal harmonization increases with the level of intergovernmental integration through the participation of government officials and their staff.

On February 26, 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) declared—for the first time in its history—a criminal prohibitory law (strafrechtliche Verbotsnorm) from the German Criminal Code null and void.1 The provision in question—Section 217 of the German Criminal Code—dealt with the controversial issue of assisted suicide. This case study will briefly examine the previous regulation pertaining to assisted suicide in Germany under Section 217, before scrutinizing its subsequent unconstitutionality as a consequence of the BVerfG’s landmark decision. In order to do so, this article will explore the legal background of the decision, the fundamental rights which were held to have been infringed by Section 217, and propose potential ways of regulating assisted suicide in Germany in the future.

The case of Carles Puigdemont underlines that European criminal law is in a crisis of confidence. The Higher Regional Court of Schleswig-Holstein has rejected a Spanish European arrest warrant for the criminal offence of rebellion because it lacks double criminality. It applied German law de lege artis without, however, questioning the European legal framework. The case would have provided an opportunity to refer the matter to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling in order to further specify the European law criteria of double criminality. This would have been the adequate legal response to a politically explosive case. In the end, the Spanish judiciary sees itself disavowed and the system of the European arrest warrant called into question.

This article focuses on the strategy to replace the UK Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) with a home-grown Bill of Rights to lessen the influence of the European Court of Human Rights' case law. Without attempting to disregard the national-specific elements, the discussion of these questions is very relevant for all States confronted with the influence of Strasbourg. The tension between coherence, efficiency and autonomy is overarching. The article therefore approaches the issue not only from an outsider's perspective but also, where relevant, from a comparative constitutional law perspective. Both perspectives seem to be largely absent from the current (academic) debate. Firstly, this article analyzes the current relationship between the UK Supreme Court and the Strasbourg Court, which reveals that the judicial arguments in support of a mirror principle are not so much based on section 2(1) HRA, as they are, in the domestic courts' relationship with Strasbourg, on concerns about international obligations, hierarchy, effectiveness of the Strasbourg Court, coherence and efficiency. Internally, judicial arguments are founded on concerns about separation of powers, limited jurisdiction, and accustomedness to the precedent system. In the second part, this article focuses on the potential impact of a home-grown Bill of Rights on the current relationship between both courts; concluding that a home-grown Bill of Rights will most likely cause domestic courts to receive less latitude by Strasbourg and will not absolve domestic judges from the duty of taking into account the Strasbourg case law.

Although the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is a technical intergovernmental organization with a limited mandate, it has been entrusted with a panoply of tasks. These include, inter alia, the international harmonization of intellectual property law, the administration of fee-based global intellectual property protection services, and the delivery of dispute resolution services to individuals. While the central role of WIPO in the continuous development of substantive intellectual property law has been questioned by developing countries, the administrative activities of WIPO have remained largely unscathed by critique and, therefore, have not attracted much attention. They revolve around the international filing, registration or recognition of industrial property rights, such as patents, industrial designs and trademarks, and provide an interesting perspective on the law of international institutions.