Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-17T03:24:33.806Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Federal Constitutional Court's Emergency Power to Intervene: Provisional Measures Pursuant to Article 32 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Andreas Maurer

Extract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

In three high-profile cases the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG — Federal Constitutional Court) was recently called upon to exercise its authority to issue a temporary injunction in proccedings referred to as einstweilige Anordnungen (provisional measures). Article 32 of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtgesetz (BVerfGG — Federal Constitutional Court Act) provides: In a dispute the Federal Consitutional Court may deal with a matter provisionally by means of a temporary injunction if this is urgently needed to avert serious detriment, ward off imminent force or for any other important reason for the common good.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 2 , Issue 13 , 2001 , E6
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

(1) Those proceedings that are permissible to the FCC are enumerated in § 13 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (Federal Constitutional Court Act). The most common proceedings are: Verfassungsbeschwerde (constitutional complaint – 126,962 proceedings until 2000), Normenkontrollverfahren (judicial proceedings on the constitutionality of laws – 3,288 proceedings until 2000) and Einstweilige Anordnungen (temporary injunctions – 1,157 proceedings until 2000).Google Scholar

(3) Berkemann, Jörg, Einstweilige Anordnung (oldarticle 32) (Umbach/Clemens, eds., Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz Kommentar (1992)) p. 571.Google Scholar

(2) Lechner/Zuck, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, 4th ed., 1996, § 32 no. (4) Id. at 571–572.Google Scholar

(5) Id. at 572. “Eine eAnO setzt voraus, dass ohne ihren Erlass die ernsthafte Gefahr besteht, dass das Verfahren der Hauptsache angesichts vollendeter Tatsachen sinnlos, ja sinnwidrig wird.“Google Scholar

(6) Id. at 594 (citing BVerfGE 33, 232 [234]).Google Scholar

(7) The Court grants only about 20% of requested provisional measures. Id. at 570.Google Scholar

(8) Id. at 578–579.Google Scholar

(9) Id. at 592.Google Scholar

(10) Id. at 592–593 (citing BVerfGE 14, 11).Google Scholar

(11) Id. at 594 (citing BVerfGE 63, 332 and BVerfGE 82, 306).Google Scholar

(12) Id. at 596 (citing, inter alia, BVerfGE 6, 1 [4]).Google Scholar

(13) Decision FCC, 91, 320, 326.Google Scholar

(14) This principle only finds an exception in very special cases, e.g. when the injunction would voilate basic rights and this violation would cause very grave damages. In fact, aspects of constitutionality are most probably regularly taken into consideration, even if the FCC denies that (see: Berkemann, Das verdeckte summarische Verfahren des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, JURISTENZEITUNG 1993, p. 161 seq.).Google Scholar

(15) Pursuant to Articles 93a and 93c of the Federal Constitutional Court Act, the Court may summarily dismiss a constitutional complaint, if it lacks “constitutional significance“ or if “the issue determining the judgement of the complaint has already been decided upon by the Federal Constitutional Court, …” Regarding the role of these rules in Article 32 proceedings, see Robbers, JURISTISCHE SCHULUNG 1994, p. 1031, 1032; Decision FCC, 1 BvQ 23/01, 18 July 2001.Google Scholar

(16) Jörg Berkemann, Einstweilige Anordnung (oldarticle 32) (Umbach/Clemens, eds., Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz Kommentar (1992)) pp. 571 and 601–602.Google Scholar