¹ Cf. Graves, W. Brooke, Uniform State Action: A Possible Substitute for Centralization 9–10 (1934); William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance 15 (1964); Jacob S. Ziegel, Harmonization of Private Laws in Federal Systems of Government: Canada, the USA, and Australia, in Making Commercial Law: Essays in Honor of Roy Goode 131, 132 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997).Google Scholar

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⁸ Halberstam & Reimann, supra note 5, at 15–17.Google Scholar

⁹ We will see that the legal reality of federalism in the analyzed systems is often very different from the constitutional outset.Google Scholar

¹⁰ For the history of the Uniform Law Commission, see Vaughn C. Ball, The Organized Movement for Uniform State Legislation, 9 Ohio St. L.J. 551 et seq. (1948); Walter P. Armstrong, A Century of Service: A Centennial History of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 11 et seq. (1991); Robert A. Stein, Strengthening Federalism: The Uniform State Law Movement in the United States, 99 Minn. L. Rev. 2253 et seq. (2015).Google Scholar

¹¹ For a short overview of the Centre's activities, see Close, supra note 6, at 546.Google Scholar

¹² For a good overview of the effects of presidential and parliamentary systems in constitutional reality, see generally Aalt Willem Heringa & Philipp Küver, Constitutions Compared: An Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law 20 et seq. (3d ed. 2012).Google Scholar

¹³ The Federalist No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 51 (James Madison). See also Riker, supra note 1, at 16 et seq.; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 Yale L.J. 1425, 1446 et seq. (1987); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1988).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See 1 De Tocqueville, Alexis, Chapter 8, in Democracy in America 114, 116 (New York 1948). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 410 (1819) (“In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the Government of the Union and those of the States. They are each sovereign with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other.”).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Maxeiner, James R., United States Federalism: Harmony Without Unity, in Federalism and Legal Unification: A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Twenty Systems 491, 500 (Daniel Halberstam & Mathias Reimann eds., 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Grenon, Aline, Unification of Laws in Federal Systems: The Canadian Model, in Federalism and Legal Unification: A Comparative Empirical Investigation of Twenty Systems 169, 171 (Daniel Halberstam & Mathias Reimann eds., 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Cf. Burgess, Michael, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice 120–23 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Grenon, supra note 16, at 170.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Hogg, Peter W., Constitutional Law of Canada 196 et seq. (2d ed. 1985).Google Scholar

²⁰ There are only four concurrent powers in Sections 92A and 94A of the Constitution Act of 1867 for the export of non-renewable natural resources, forestry resources, electrical energy, and pensions. For details, see Grenon, supra note 16, at 171.Google Scholar

²¹ Constitution Act, 1867, § 91, no. 13 (Can.).Google Scholar

²² Id. § 94.Google Scholar

²³ Id. § 91.Google Scholar

²⁴ For more details, see Hogg, supra note 19, at 88 et seq.; Patrick Monahan & Byron Shaw, Constitutional Law 11, 109 et seq. (4th ed. 2013).Google Scholar

²⁵ McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406. See 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5.3 (3d ed. 2000).Google Scholar

²⁶ Corwin, Edward S., The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (1950); Rudolf H. Heimanson, Federalism and the Uniform Law Movement, 6 N.Y.L.F. 161, 163 (1960); Maxeiner, supra note 15, at 496 et seq.; Gordon Tullock, The New Federalist 127 et seq. (1994); A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 Temp. L. Rev. 297, 302 et seq. (2003); Carlyle Conwell Ring, Jr., A New Era: Cooperative Federalism—Through the Uniform State Laws Process, 33 Hamline L. Rev. 375, 378 (2010). For the centralization process in commerce law, see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551–56 (1985); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). For a summary of the development of the judicature of the Supreme Court, see Robert Schütze, From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law 84 et seq. (2009).Google Scholar

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²⁹ For a critical analysis of this development, see Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Rel., The Federal Role in the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth S. 4 et seq. (1981); Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 Miss. L.J. 557, 577 (2000).Google Scholar

³⁰ The Canadian Supreme Court sees its role as the guardian of federalism. See Greg Taylor, Characterisation in Federations: Six Countries Compared 27 et seq. (2006); Close, supra note 6, at 536 et seq. Google Scholar

³¹ See Monahan & Shaw, supra note 24, at 241 et seq.; Ziegel, supra note 1, at 137; Taylor, supra note 30, at 29 et seq.; Grenon, supra note 16, at 175.Google Scholar

³² Taylor, supra note 30, at 29 et seq.; Monahan & Shaw, supra note 24, at 11 f., 241 et seq.; Grenon, supra note 16, at 175.Google Scholar

³³ For a comparative political science perspective, see Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited, 44 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 845, 847 f. (2006).Google Scholar

³⁴ U.S. Const. amend. XVII, § 3(1).Google Scholar

³⁵ Constitution Act, 1867, §§ 24, 26, 27, 32 (Can.).Google Scholar

³⁶ For the history of the Uniform Law Commission see Ball, supra note 10, at 551 et seq.; Armstrong, supra note 10, at 11 et seq.; Stein, supra note 10, at 2253 et seq. Google Scholar

³⁷ Constitution art. 1, § 1.2 (Unif. Law Comm'n 2018).Google Scholar

³⁸ Ziegel, supra note 1, at 141.Google Scholar

³⁹ Constitution and Bylaws pmbl. § D (Unif. Law Conf. Can. 1996). Initially, it was only comprised of the provincial delegations, but it was enlarged through the addition of the federal delegation and delegations of the territories. See Close, supra note 6, at 547.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Constitution and Bylaws, supra note 39, pt. 11, § 22, VII. Yet, the modest funding policy of the different jurisdictions has caused major problems for the ULCC. See Grenon, supra note 16, at 184. See also Hurlburt, supra note 6, at 248.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Constitution, supra note 37.Google Scholar

⁴² Most states issued special laws concerning the nomination of the commissioners. But, if there is no state regulation, the bar may appoint the commissioners. Id. art 2, § 2.2.Google Scholar

⁴³ See, e.g., D.C. Code § 3-1432 (2012); Idaho Code § 67-1701 (2018); Or. Rev. Stat. § 172.010 (2017); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 2, § 201 (2016); Wash. Rev. Code § 43.56.010 (2009).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Constitution, supra note 37, art. 2, § 2.3. Furthermore, life-members who rendered a special service to the Uniform Law Commission in the past may be appointed. Id. art. 2, § 2.4. For a good summary of the appointment and working procedures, see James W. Day, The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 8 Univ. Fla. L. Rev. 276, 278 et seq. (1955).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Constitution, supra note 37, art. 2, § 2.5.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Ziegel, supra note 1, at 137 f.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Constitution and Bylaws, supra note 39.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Hurlburt, supra note 6, at 247 f.; Close, supra note 6, at 546.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Constitution and Bylaws supra note 39, pmbl. § C.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Id. pmbl. See also Grenon, supra note 16, at 184 f.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Hurlburt, supra note 6, at 248; Close, supra note 6, at 547.Google Scholar

⁵² Hurlburt, supra note 6, at 250; Francis C. Muldoon, Law Reform in Canada: Diversity or Uniformity?, 12 Manitoba L.J. 257, 266 (1982-1983); Close, supra note 6, at 548.Google Scholar

⁵³ See Constitution and Bylaws, supra note 39, pt. 11, § 22.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Close, supra note 6, at 551.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See Constitution, supra note 37, art. 5, § 5.1(1); id. art. 6, § 6.1(1). See also Ring, supra note 266, at 386.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Constitution and Bylaws, supra note 39, pt. 11, § 22, VIII.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See Observer's Manual 2–3 (Unif. L. Comm'n. 2013), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Publications/observer%20manual%202013.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Constituion, suprea note 37, art. 5, § 5.2.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Observer's Manual, supra note 57, at 3–4. Many critics stress that the integration of lobby groups in the drafting process can lead to regulatory capture. See Janger, Edward J., Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture and the Race to the Bottom, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 569, 578 et seq. (1998); Vermeulen, Erik P.M., The Evolution of Legal Business Forms in Europe and the United States: Venture Capital, Joint Venture and Partnership Structures 168 (2003).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Constitution, supra note 37, art. 8, § 8.1.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Id. art. 8, §§ 8.1, 8.3.Google Scholar

⁶² Id. art. 6, § 6.1(6).Google Scholar

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⁶⁵ In the past, the proceedings of the Conference have been printed and published by the Canadian Bar Association. Hurlburt, supra note 6, at 250.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Grenon, supra note 16, at 184.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Appendix D: ULCC Tables 131 tbl. 3 (Unif. Law Conf. Can. 2013), http://www.ulcc.ca/images/stories/2013_pdfs_en/2013ulcc0045.pdf.Google Scholar

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⁷² See, e.g., U.C.C. (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm'n 1977); Uniform Partnership Act (Unif. Law Comm'n 2013). Cf. Stein, supra note 10, at 2258 et seq. Google Scholar

⁷³ See, e.g., Uniform Parentage Act (Unif. Law Comm'n 2017); Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (Unif. Law Comm'n 1997); Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Unif. Law Comm'n 2008).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Namely the Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, Hague Conference on Private International Law, Nov. 23, 2007, https://assets.hcch.net/docs/14e71887-0090-47a3-9c49-d438eb601b47.pdf.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Furthermore, this encourages non-self-executing international agreements to preserve as much legislative autonomy of the states as possible. Instead, the ULC encourages cooperative legal harmonization to implement international law. See William H. Henning, The Uniform Law Commission and Cooperative Federalism: Implementing Private International Law Conventions Through Uniform State Laws, 2 Elon L. Rev. 39, 41 et seq. (2011). See also Ring, supra note 26, at 394 et seq. Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Some Uniform and Model Acts are very successful whilst others receive no or very little attention in the states. For a description of the success rates in the different decades, see Graves, supra note 1, at 292; Overby, supra note 26, at 346; Mary Whisner, There Oughta Be A Law—A Model Law, 106 L. Libr. J. 125, 127 (2014).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ White, James J., Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 2096, 2103 et seq. (1991); Maxeiner, supra note 15, at 509.Google Scholar

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⁷⁹ The American Law Institute, https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2018) (noting that the ALI was founded in 1923). See Graves, supra note 1, at 52–67.Google Scholar

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⁸¹ Whisner, supra note 76, at 128; Maxeiner, supra note 15, at 508 f.Google Scholar

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⁸⁵ For the Austrian Federal President, see Gamper, Anna, Legislative and Executive Governance in Austria 9 (2004). For an elaborative comparison of the role and the functions of the German and the Austrian presidents, see Lutz Mehlhorn, Der Bundespräsident der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Republik Österreich 468 et seq. (2010).Google Scholar

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⁸⁷ Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 51, para. 1 (Ger.).Google Scholar

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⁹⁵ Scharpf, supra note 94, at 244 et seq. See also Fritz W. Scharpf, Theorie der Politikverflechtung, in Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik 13, 19 (Fritz W. Scharpf, Bernd Reissert & Fritz Schnabel eds., 1976).Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁰ Waldhoff, supra note 94, at 117 et seq.; Scharpf, supra note 94, at 247; Konrad Hesse, Der unitarische Bundesstaat 19 (1962); Gyde Maria Bullinger, Die Zuständigkeit der Länder zur Gesetzgebung, 1970 DÖV 761, 762; Gerhard Lehmbruch, Der unitarische Bundesstaat in Deutschland, in Föderalismus: Analysen in entwicklungsgeschichtlicher und vergleichender Perspektive 53, 103 (Arthur Benz & Gerhard Lehmbruch eds., 2002); Anne Hohler, Kompetition statt Kooperation—Ein Modell zur Erneuerung des deutschen Bundesstaates? 80 et seq. (2009).Google Scholar

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¹⁰³ Gamper, supra note 85, at 20 et seq.; Öhlinger, surpa note 88, at 19 et seq. For a brief characterization of the federal system in Austria, see Taylor, supra note 30, at 95 et seq. Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁵ Gamper, supra note 85, at 22; Bußjäger, supra note 104, at 121 et seq. Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Gamper & Koch, supra note 88, at 112.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ The Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz is a more informal body. All the same, Section 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government provides that: The presiding members of the states’ governments are to be invited several times a year for joint discussions with the federal government by the Federal Chancellor in order to discuss important political, economic, social and financial questions and to contribute in a personal way to an understandable uniform policy in the federal and state governments. See Hans-Thomas Knoke, Die Kultusministerkonferenz und die Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz 109 et seq. (1966).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ The Austrian Landeshauptleutekonferenz is even mentioned in the constitution. Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution], art. 59b(1) (Austria). Several other laws make a similar reference. See Andreas Rosner & Robert Gmeiner, Die Länderkonferenzen als Instrumente der Selbstkoordination der Länder und des kooperativen Bundesstaats, in Kooperativer Föderalismus in Österreich 49, 52 (Peter Bußjäger ed., 2010).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Rules of Procedure, Bauministerkonferenz [ARGEBAU], https://www.bauministerkonferenz.de/dokumente/Geschaeftsordnung.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (providing the Rules of Procedures for the German Construction Minister's Conference (Bauministerkonferenz)); Rules of Procedure, German Conference of the Ministers of Educ. and Cultural Affairs, Kultusministerkonferenz [KMK], https://www.kmk.org/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2018) (providing the preamble for the Rules of Procedure for the German Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (Kultusministerkonferenz)). For the Austrian conferences, see Gamper, supra note 85, at 22.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ In Germany the following 19 ministerial conferences exist: Conference of the Agriculture Ministers (Agrarministerkonferenz, AMK); Conference of the Social and Employment Ministers (Arbeits- und Sozialministerkonferenz, ASMK); Conference of the Building Ministers (Bauministerkonferenz, ARGEBAU); Conference of the Ministers of Europe (Europaministerkonferenz, EMK); Conference of the Finance Ministers (Finanzministerkonferenz, FMK); Conference of the Ministers of Science (Gemeinsame Wissenschaftskonferenz, GWK); Conference of the Ministers of Health (Gesundheitsministerkonferenz, GMK); Conference of the Ministers for Gender Equality (Konferenz der Gleichstellungs- und Frauenminister der Länder, GFMK); Conference of the Ministers of the Interior (Innenministerkonferenz, IMK); Conference of the Ministers of Integration (Integrationsministerkonferenz, IntMK); Conference of the Ministers for Youth and Family (Jugend- und Familienministerkonferenz, JFMK); Conference of the Ministers of Justice (Justizministerkonferenz, JuMiKo); Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (Kultusministerkonferenz, KMK); Conference of the Ministers for Spatial Planning (Ministerkonferenz für Raumordnung, MKRO); Conference of the Ministers of Sports (Sportministerkonferenz, SMK); Conference of the Environment Ministers (Umweltministerkonferenz, UMK); Conference of the Ministers for Consumer Protection (Verbraucherschutzministerkonferenz, VSMK); Conference of the Ministers of Transport (Verkehrsministerkonferenz, VMK); Conference of the Ministers of Economy (Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz, WMK). Of course, not all states have 19 ministries, and thus often the state ministers take part in two or more ministerial conferences. In Austria, the names of the Conferences vary according to the competencies of the states’ ministers. In the past, there have been the following conferences: Conference of the Speakers of Agricultural Matters (Landesagrarreferentenkonferenz); Conference of the Speakers of Family Matters (Landesfamilienreferentenkonferenz); Conference of the Speakers of Finance (Landesfinanzreferentenkonferenz); Conference of the Speakers for Health (Landesgesundheitsreferentenkonferenz); Conference of the Speakers of Youth Matters (Landesjugendreferentenkonferenz); Conference of the Speakers of Cultural Matters (Landeskulturrefrentenkonferenz); Conference of the Experts on Social Matters (Landessozialreferentenkonferenz); Conference of the Speakers of Sports (Landessportreferentenkonferenz); Conference of the Speakers of Environmental Matters (Landesumweltreferentenkonferenz); Conference of the Speakers of Traffic (Landesverkehrsreferentenkonferenz). For the functions of the Austrian conferences see, Rosner & Gmeiner, supra note 108, at 51.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ For the German ministerial conferences, see Schneider, Paul Georg, Beteiligung der Landeparlamente beim Zustandekommen von Staatsverträgen und Verwaltungsabkommen der Bundesländer 11 (1978). For the Austrian ministerial conferences, see Rosner & Gmeiner, supra note 108, at 56 f.Google Scholar

¹¹² For an example of the resolutions of the German ministerial conferences, see Detailed Specifications for the Final School Exams (Abitur) of the Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (Kultusministerkonferenz), Kultusministerkonferenz https://www.kmk.org/dokumentation-statistik/beschluesse-und-veroeffentlichungen/bildung-schule/allgemeine-bildung.html#c1284 (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).Google Scholar

¹¹³ See Klatt, Interföderale Beziehungen im kooperativen Bundesstaat, supra note 101, at 189; Walter Rudolf, Kooperation im Bundesstaat, in VI Handbuch des Staatsrechts § 141, para. 41 et seq. (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 3d ed. 2008).Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ The Rules of Procedure of the Joint Interfederal Bureau (Geschäftsordnung der Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer, GO-VSt) can be found as an annex in Gernot Meirer, Die Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer oder die gewerkschaftliche Organisierung der Länder (2003).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Rules of Procedure of the Joint Interfederal Bureau § 7, supra note 114.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ For a critical analysis of the unanimous decision making with regard to efficiency, see Scharpf, supra note 33, at 848 et seq. Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ According to Section A.I.6 of the Rules of Procedure of the German Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (Kultusministerkonferenz) (KMK), a unanimous vote is only necessary for certain issues of significant importance. Other than that, a majority of 13 out of 16 votes is sufficient. See Geschäftsordnung der KMK, https://www.kmk.org/fileadmin/Dateien/pdf/KMK/GO-GR-Fassung-29-08-2014.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). In the Conference of the Ministers for Consumer Protection (VSMK), a majority of 13 votes is always sufficient. See Geschäftsordnung der VSMK, https://www.verbraucherschutzministerkonferenz.de/VSMK-Dokumente-Geschaeftsordnung.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Rosner & Gmeiner, supra note 108, at 61.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ In the Ministerial Conference of Education and Arts (KMK) and the Conference of the Ministers of Sports (SMK), however, only the state ministers are invited.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ This is true for the Ministerial Conference of Agriculture (Agrarministerkonferenz, AMK) — specifically, Section 1.4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Ministerial Conference of Agriculture—and for the Conference of the Ministers of the Interior (Innenministerkonferenz, IMK). See Geschäftsordnung AMK, https://www.agrarministerkonferenz.de/documents/go-amk-stand-28092018_1539351169.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). See also the Website of the IMK, https://www.innenministerkonferenz.de/IMK/DE/aufgaben/aufgaben-node.html;jsessionid=441D336BEC08BAA6A096E04B74890820.1_cid349 (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). In other ministerial conferences such as the Conference of the Ministers for Consumer Protection (VSMK), for example, the federal minister has the right to vote but resolutions may also be passed in his absence. See Geschäftsordnung der VSMK, https://www.verbraucherschutzministerkonferenz.de/VSMK-Dokumente-Geschaeftsordnung.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2018).Google Scholar

¹²¹ For an example, see Rules of procedure for the German Ministerial Conference of Agriculture arts. 9–10, supra note 120; Rules of Procedure for the German Conference of the Minster of Sports art. 2, Geschäftsordnung SMK, http://www.sportministerkonferenz.de/sites/default/files/dokumente/Beschluss%20der%2039.%20SMK_Gesch%C3%A4ftsordnung%20der%20SMK.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2018); Rules of Procedure for the German Conference of the Minister of the Environment §§ 9, 10, Geschäftsordnung UMK https://www.umweltministerkonferenz.de/documents/umk-go-2017_1518084108.pdf. (last visited Nov. 20, 2018). See also Klatt, Interföderale Beziehungen im kooperativen Bundesstaat, supra note 101, at 189.Google Scholar

¹²² See Rosner, Andreas, Koordinationsinstrumente der österreichischen Länder 128 et seq. (2000); Rosner & Gmeiner, supra note 108, at 56 f.Google Scholar

¹²³ For Austria, see id. at 49, 56. The same is true for the German ministerial conferences. See Hans Schneider, Verträge zwischen Gliedstaaten im Bundesstaat, 19 VVDStRL 1, 12 (1961).Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], June 22, 1977, 45 BVerfGE 400, 421 [hereinafter Judgment of June 22, 1977]. See also Hirschmüller, Martin, Die Konferenzen der Ministerpräsidenten und Ressortminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 112 et seq. (1967); Knoke, supra note 107, at 49–90; Hermann Eicher, Der Machtverlust der Landesparlamente 96 (1988).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ For the ministerial conferences in Germany, see Schneider, supra note 123, at 12. For the efficiency of the ministerial conferences in Austria, see Rosner, supra note 122, at 32.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Even though the Prime Minister and his cabinet are not mentioned in the Canadian Constitutional Acts, he governs the country on the basis of a long-established legal tradition. As in all semi-parliamentary systems, he is de facto dependent upon the confidence of Parliament. Moreover, the Canadian Prime Minister is usually also a member of Parliament. For details, see Hogg, supra note 19, at 196 f.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Cf. Ziegel, supra note 1, at 149.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Kisker, Gunter, Kooperation im Bundesstaat 118 f., 143 (1971) (arguing that that the principle of unanimous vote should be binding for the ministerial conferences). See also Hirschmüller, Martin, Die Konferenzen der Ministerpräsidenten und Ressortminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 79 (1976).Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Kisker, supra note 128, at 143.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Id. (providing the German perspective). From the US-American perspective, see Greve, supra note 29, at 562.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Maxeiner, supra note 15, at 509.Google Scholar

¹³² Hesse, supra note 100, at 20; Lambrecht, supra note 92, at 246; Schneider, supra note 111, at 125, 138; Schnabel, supra note 966, at 62; Eicher, supra note 124, at 96. Less concerned about the effects of intergovernmental cooperation on parliaments, see Benz, Arthur, Föderalismus als dynamisches System 37 (1985).Google Scholar

¹³³ Cf. Leisner, Walter, Schwächung der Landesparlamente durch grundgesetzlichen Föderalismus, 1968 DÖV 389, 392 (1968); Schneider, supra note 111, at 118 et seq.; Martin Morlock, Informalisierung und Entparlamentarisierung politischer Entscheidungen als Gefährdungen der Verfassung?, 62 VVDStRL 39, 44 f. (2003); Kisker, supra note 128, at 123 et seq., 143.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ For the North American perspective, see Graves, supra note 1, at 29, 289, 304; Heimanson, supra note 26, at 165 et seq.; David W. Leebron, Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27 Can. Bus. L.J. 63, 104 (1996); Erwin Chemerinski et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 74, 116 (2015). For the German and Austrian perspective, see Wolfgang Abendroth, Das Grundgesetz 915 (5th ed. 1975); Öhlinger, supra note 88, at 22; Oldopp, supra note 102, at 17 et seq. Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Hesse, supra note 100, at 29 et seq.; Abendroth, supra note 134, at 91 f.; Arthur Benz, Neue Formen der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Ländern, 1993 DÖV 85, 87 (1993); Hohler, supra note 100, at 57.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ For the North American perspective, see Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforecement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1692, 1698 et seq. (2001). For the German perspective, see Eicher, supra note 124, at 97. For a different opinion, see Hirschmüller, supra note 124, at 93 (arguing that federalism becomes meaningless through increasing interfederal harmonization).Google Scholar

¹³⁷ For a broader participation of the parliaments in Germany, see von Lewinski, Kai, Gesetzesverfasser und Gesetzgeber 67 (2015). For the opposing opinion, see Hohler, supra note 100, at 64.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ For the system in the United States, cf. Janger, supra note 59, at 591 et seq. (expressing criticism that the unification process institutionalizes a race to the bottom because of the need to implement the proposed legislation in the states). For the German system, see Judgment of June 22, 1977, supra note 124.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ Kisker, supra note 128, at 145.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ For a good overview of the differences between presidential and parliamentary systems, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, The Separation of Legislative and Executive Powers, in Comparative Constitutional Law 234 et seq. (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011); Jenny S. Martinez, Horizontal Structuring, in The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law 547, 553 et seq. (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2013).Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], art. 63(1), 67 (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁴² See Cheibub, José Antonio & Limongi, Fernando, Legislative-Executive Relations, in Comparative Constitutional Law 211, 215 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).Google Scholar

¹⁴³ Even in the presidential system of the United States, the executive has effective means to introduce bills, even though formally only the parliament has this right. A good example of the presidential influence on legislation is the “New Deal” legislation by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. For an in depth analysis, see Heringa & Küver, supra note 12, at 95; Ralph Alexander Lorz, Interorganrespekt im Verfassungsrecht 143 (2001). For criticism of the executive prejudice of legislation in Germany, see Matthias Herdegen, Informalisierung und Entparlamentisierung politischer Entscheidungen, 62 VVDStRL 7, 15 et seq. (2003); Martin Morlok, Informalisierung und Entparlamentisierung politischer Entscheidungen, 62 VVDStRL 39, 44 et seq. (2003). For a critique with regard to the lack of transparency in the drafting process, see Herrmann Pünder, Wahlrecht und Parlamentsrecht als Gelingensbedingungen repräsentativer Demokratie, 72 VVDStRL 191, 241 et seq. (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ See also Benz, supra note 135, at 94 (pleading for an extended involvement of the states’ parliaments). In Germany, the states increasingly implement rules obliging the state government to inform on the results of the ministerial conferences. See – for example – Constitution of North Rhine Westphalia, art. 40 and Constitution of Rheinland-Pfalz, art. 89b.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Graves, supra note 1, at 50 et seq.; Maxeiner, supra note 15, at 509. See also Nicole Bolleyer, Paradoxes of Self-Coordination in Federal Systems, in Federal Dynamics 321, 328 (Arthur Benz & Jörg Broschek eds., 2013).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ From a U.S. American perspective, see Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Rel., The Federal Role in the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth 25 f. (1980); Greve, supra note 29, at 559, 567, 575. From a German perspective, see Klatt, Parlamentarisches System und bundesstaatliche Ordnung, supra note 101, at 9; Abromeit, supra note 102, at 52; Edzard Schmidt-Jortzig, Herausforderungen an den Föderalismus, 1998 DÖV 746, 748 (1998); Reinhold Zippelius & Thomas Würtenberger, Deutsches Staatsrecht § 14, para. 69 (32d ed. 2008).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Schnabel, supra note 96, at 49 et seq.; Klatt, Parlamentarisches System und bundesstaatliche Ordnung, supra note 101, at 8; Zippelius & Würtenberger, supra note 146, § 14 Rn. 71; Greve, supra note 29, at 576.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Gerhard Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat 162 et seq. (3d ed., 2000).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Id. at 162; Scharpf, supra note 94, at 247 et seq.; Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Study of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. of Legal Stud. 131, 141 (1996); Greve, supra note 29, at 562.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ See Lehmbruch, supra note 148, at 29 et seq.; Hartmut Klatt, Interföderale Beziehungen im kooperativen Bundesstaat: Kooperation und Koordination auf der politischen Leitungsebene, 78 Verwaltungsarchiv 186, 194 (1987).Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ Klatt, supra note 150, at 199.Google Scholar

¹⁵² Id. at 194; Smith, Stephan, Konfliktlösung im demokratischen Bundesstaat 270 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁵³ For majority votes in the German ministerial conferences, see Meinhard Ade, Der Länderrat: Zur Zweckmäßigkeit und Zulässigkeit einer verfassten Ländergemeinschaft 136 et seq. (1976). For the opposing view, see Hirschmüller, supra note 124, at 87 f.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ See also Ade, supra note 153, at 36 et seq. Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Abromeit, supra note 102, at 49; Klatt, Parlamentarisches System und bundesstaatliche Ordnung, supra note 101, at 7.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ See Klafki, Anika, Risiko und Recht 125 et seq. (2016).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ An example of just how dysfunctional nations can become if there is no interfederal cooperation can be seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For more details on this topic, see Venice Commission, Preliminary Opinion on the Draft Amendments to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, CDL(2006)027; Anika Klafki, Friedenssicherung durch Verfassungsrecht, 2015 DÖV 637, 640 et seq. Google Scholar