In the ongoing debate about preliminary references raised by constitutional courts, the Italian Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, hereafter, ICC) is apparently a latecomer. Despite its pivotal role in the founding era in which the relationships between Community law and national legal orders were assessed, its reluctance towards preliminary references to the ECJ (since 2009: Court of Justice of the European Union, CJEU) has repeatedly been invoked as a standard in legal scholarship. Whereas from the early 1960s onwards it engaged dialectically with the CJEU, and contributed to some basic tenets of EC law vis-à-vis national law (direct effect, primacy, limits concerning basic constitutional principles, so-called counter-limits), it appeared for a long time to be almost silent on the crucial aspect concerning its ability to enter into a direct dialogue with the CJEU via the preliminary reference procedure. Although this ambivalence may appear contradictory, one should not forget that behind the scenes, dialogue took place along indirect or “hidden” channels. Either in response to claims raised by the judiciary in incidenter proceedings, or in adjudicating disputes between State and Regions in principaliter ones, the ICC often sent messages and alerts to the CJEU. In so doing, it indirectly contributed to shaping the relationships between EU law and domestic law. In the long run, the absence of the ICC's direct involvement in the relationships with the CJEU has, however, estranged its action from the core of EU law in favor of the partnership between the CJEU and the common judges (both ordinary and administrative).

At the Nice summit in December 2000, we witnessed the solemn proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which can be seen as the remarkable product of a revolutionary process. The Convention that drafted the Charter had adopted the approach ‘as if’ it were to be incorporated into the European Treaties. However, the question as to the final status of the Charter had not yet been decided when it was proclaimed. Instead, the issue was placed on the post-Nice and post-Laeken agenda and is currently being discussed in the Convention on the future of Europe.

[Editors’ Note: This is the fourth consecutive article published in German Law Journal since July 2004 that is dedicated to the ongoing debate over the fate and prospects of the German model of Capitalism, welfare policy and corporate governance. The 22 July 2004 acquittals of all six defendants in the criminal proceedings against former Mannesmann CEO, Klaus Esser; Deutsche Bank's CEO (Vorstandssprecher) and then Member of Mannesmann's supervisory board, Josef Ackermann, and other members of Mannesmann's Supervisory Board have, once more, highlighted to German, European and International observers the particular features of law and politics in “Germany Inc.”, “Rhenish Capitalism”, or “Rhineland Capitalism”. As begun in the aftermath of Josef Ackermann's inthronization at the head of Deutsche Bank in May 2002 (exactly two years and two months before his acquittal before the Landgericht Düsseldorf) and Ackermann's subsequent transformation of the Board's control structure, German Law Journal has published several contributions to the ongoing changes in German corporate governance and its embeddedness within the specific German economic and legal system (see http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=156). In the Journals July issue, Peter Kolla, a law student of Osgoode Hall Law School of York University in Toronto, meticulously traced the background debates to the closely observed criminal proceedings in the Mannesmann aftermath (http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=460), and in our August issue, Jürgen Hoffmann, Professor of Sociology in Hamburg, surveyed the current interdisciplinary debate over the future fate of so-called Rhineland Capitalism and reconstructed Germany's recent history in an international context of globalization and privatisation (http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=485). Also in the August issue, Max Rolshoven, writing his Ph.D. in law at the University of Münster, offered a first assessment of the acquittals in the Mannesmann case (http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=480). In the article, published here, Professor Christopher Allen of the University of Georgia further deepens this inquiry from an economic point of view, while placing the contemporary debate over the possible end of Rhineland capitalism in the historical context of Germany's development in the 20th Century. The Editors of German Law Journal are very pleased and honored to be able to provide for a further forum for this important debate, bringing together lawyers, economists, political scientists and sociologists, for a much needed exploration of the historical and political origins as well as of the legal framework of Germany's much critizised and, at the same time, ardently praised system of corporate governance and industrial relations. We invite our readers to contribute to this debate, which has so far found too little resonance in Germany itself. The Editors.]

In Europe, issues concerning religious freedom are hotly debated. Many courts had to consider cases concerning infringement of religious freedom. This Article will focus on three examples: Headscarves, burqas, and crucifixes. Often, the interests of members of minority religions have lost in European courts and European constitutional courts. This is particularly true considering the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights upheld bans on headscarves for students in universities and public secondary schools, as well as for teachers in public schools. The Court also accepted bans on full-body veils worn in public areas. Finally, mandatory crucifixes in public schools have been deemed to conform to the standards set by the European Convention on Human Rights. In all of these cases, the European Court of Human Rights has not adequately construed religious freedom as a strong right.

This is where the work of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde comes in. Böckenförde has thoroughly discussed the proper role of religion in a democratic society. Coming from a theoretical starting point, he developed an understanding of religious freedom as a strong right. He also explained why State neutrality should be understood in terms of open neutrality. Both perspectives help to more fully explain the scope of religious freedom.

Within the Council of Europe, the relationship between the ECtHR and the member states is crucial for the survival and effective functioning of the Court. The ECtHR is currently overwhelmed by applications, the bulk of which emanate from a relatively small number of states, notably Russia, Rumania, Turkey, and the Ukraine. The backlog of cases will soon be toppling the vertiginous mark of 160,000, the adjudication of which alone would take the Court more than six years. The sheer number of cases exemplifies the system's urgent need for reform. Lately, discussions have been heavily influenced by considerations of subsidiarity, which the earlier Interlaken Declaration-as well as the recent Brighton Conference-emphasized as the key for the future relationship between the ECtHR and member states. Discussions about the principle's proper role in the relationship between member states and the ECHR, however, are far from over. This is due to questions regarding the principle itself, as well as to the factual realities dominating in the ECtHR-national court relationship. The principle often focuses on a strict separation of competences at two different levels, the national and the international, and many understandings of that principle require that the two levels stand in a more or less hierarchical relationship. This is difficult to assume in the Council of Europe context, where, compared to the EU, neither the doctrine of direct effect nor the principle of primacy in application reigns. Moreover, Strasbourg's emphasis on subsidiarity appears to focus on the responsibility of the member states to remedy human rights violations. In line with that argument, scholars have opined that the ECHR system should focus on an approach in which the ECtHR would be involved only if there are good reasons to depart from interpretation at the national level. Nonetheless, others recently doubted the overall usefulness of such an understanding of subsidiarity, since those member states responsible for the lion's share of new applications to the ECHR often neither possess a functioning judiciary nor functioning judicial or executive institutions, in general.

During the past decade many American law schools have identified and responded to the opportunity and necessity of training law students and lawyers for the challenges created by globalization. Opportunities are certainly available to schools with strong business, international trade and human rights programs. Opportunities are, however, also available to schools with interests and strengths in the newer disciplines such as conflict resolution, intellectual property and environment protection. Law schools which have ventured into global oriented training have recognized that the market is not simply a one-way-street for domestic students but also includes training of foreign law students and lawyers. Private foundations in the United States and abroad, foreign governments and our national government have helped finance foreign lawyer visits and training events throughout America. When international lawyers visit the United States, domestic law schools are involved as hosts, training sites, and sources of professional expertise. There has also been a simultaneous movement of domestic lawyers and law students through foreign law school programs and other study abroad opportunities. When all these international experiences are taken together one realizes the need for law schools to become more involved in the development and implementation of training and development of globally oriented legal education.

Critiques of Robert Kagan's recent, inflamatory work on the nature and state of transatlanticisim seem to come in three forms: material, analytical and emotional. By “material” I mean critiques of the fundamental and more or less obvious facts and structures out of which he has spun his claims. These facts amount to little more than the less than revelatory reminder that the U.S. devotes considerably more resources to security and defense spending than do Europeans. Critiques of Kagan's work at this level are pointless. At least on this much, Kagan has it right: we are now all too familiar with the staggering statistic that reveals that American security and defense spending is equal to the total of the expenditures of the next twenty countries.

In the last fifteen years, the legal fight against bribery and corruption has evolved from the solitary effort of the United States with its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 et seq., to a global legal endeavor. During the same period of time, corporations have become increasingly engaged in transnational deals that require them to understand their obligations under a web of anti-corruption regulations. The stakes for businesses are high: fines can range in the tens of millions of dollars and individuals found guilty of corruption may be imprisoned for life.

European Union (EU) regulation of the free circulation of goods may be considered an eminent jurisprudential achievement; in fact, it has emerged from and been strengthened by the judgments of the European Court of Justice (hereinafter “the Court”).

In particular, the Court's engagement with the prohibition on quantitative import restrictions and other measures having an equivalent effect established by Article 28 European Convention (EC), has paved the road towards integration. This was especially true of the Court's “milestone” decisions in Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon.

The judicial parameter established by those judgments was built upon the interpretation of “quantitative restrictions” as encompassing any “measures hindering trade.” Although this has proven to be, for a limited period of time, an efficient instrument in pursuing Treaty goals, like the creation of a single European market, it has also produced a few side effects, including: (a) an excessive broadening of the field of Article 28 EC's application; and, consequently, (b) an increase in the number of claims the Court has had to examine. This has placed the Court in the position of having to weigh, more and more frequently, the content of national policies in order to determine whether the restrictions they impose can be justified.

For some time, there has been something paradoxical about Martti Koskenniemi's From Apology to Utopia (hereinafter FATU). FATU might very well have been the single most influential book of the last 15 years in the field of international legal theory. Virtually all of my colleagues have, at one point or another, engaged with it and used it to sustain their arguments in diverse areas of the law (including, amusingly enough, even in commercial arbitration). Yet, as is well known to most law library users, FATU has long been out of print, making it extremely difficult to find a copy, even more so when, as is periodically the case at my home university, the available copy goes missing. FATU, in other words, seemed to be everywhere, but nowhere to be found. The prophet had believers. His tables of the Law, however, seemed to have disappeared. The splendid republication of FATU comes as great news to all of us who have struggled to access, let alone to possess, this seminal book.

There are a few premises underlying this discourse on the relationship between constitutional law and European human-rights law which I should reveal before we explore the relationship itself. I start with a functionalistic designation of the general legal process as being no more (and no less!) than a conflict-resolution process. From this perspective, the most important of my starting premises is what I consider to be an empirical fact, that is to say that the constitutional courts now produce jurisprudence(2) overtly and explicitly transcending the Enlightenment's illusion of complete separation between the competencies of the legislative and judicial branches of power.

Environmental standards should not be a hindrance for economically relevant projects — especially in the fields of sustainability and green energy. Therefore, the Dutch legislature implemented experimental instruments in the Crisis and Recovery Act to improve the flexible application of environmental standards. They did this by allowing competent authorities to deviate from these standards. This article analyzes this Dutch approach, which can be characterized as “bending the rules.” Are these instruments legally sound and how are the relevant provisions applied in practice? Dutch government is currently working on a fundamental change of the system of environmental law with a new Environment and Planning Act. Should this new system of environmental law include a general permanent provision to deviate from environmental standards? This article provides environmental scholars with some lessons that can be learned from the Dutch Approach.

This Article reads the work of Martti Koskenniemi—arguably the most significant international legal thinker of the post-Cold War era—as an exercise in (Lacanian) psychoanalysis. Excavating the links between Koskenniemi and French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, and analyzing the origins of those links in Koskenniemi's debt to the Harvard branch of the American Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, it argues that over almost thirty years Koskenniemi has employed psychoanalytic techniques to rebuild the self-confidence of international law(yers). The success of this confidence-building project explains the acclaim Koskenniemi's work enjoys. As international law's psychoanalyst he has defined the identity of the international lawyer and mapped the structure of international legal argument, stabilizing international law's present reality by synchronizing it with narratives of its past. Any attempt to destabilize that reality or depart from present structures into an alternative future must start from an analysis of Koskenniemi's methods and it is in this sense, and not out of a more pure interest in Koskenniemi's work, that this Article deconstructs Koskenniemi's oeuvre. It situates his method, reveals his choices, and explores their limits in an effort to develop (tentative) proposals for a “new” international law(yer) and an international legal future outside the structure that Koskenniemi has mapped so effectively and affectively.

Victor Kattan's “From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891–1949” is an archival excavation of the Israeli-Palestinian (Arab-Israeli) conflict and its origins. This review will examine the contours of Kattan's book followed by a brief examination of objectivity in academic scholarship often enunciated through the concept of ‘balance’ as it relates to those scholars (like Kattan) working on the conflict. Finally, this review will explore some of the weakness of the arguments that Kattan advances.

Ever closer gets the net of networks, and so it does in law and legal scholarship. Finally in the law, one feels tempted to remark. But there is a reason for the lawyer's patient scepticism, for her professional habit to await a certain academic consolidation of a concept before setting out on a transdisciplinary transfer. There is a reason – and it lies in the law's “necessity to decide” (Entscheidungsnotwendigkeit). There is no shortage of fuzziness and uncertainty. But have life and law ever been less paradoxical? Arguably, the problem is not new, yet it has only recently been made explicit.

On 14 February 2008, German prosecutors and investigative authorities made a sensational catch. That day, it became public that they had initiated criminal investigations against Klaus Zumwinkel, then head of the DAX-listed corporation Deutsche Post. Additionally, the top manager's villa in Cologne was searched in a dawn raid and, as the media apparently had been tipped off, TV cameras could film the corporate executive while accompanied out of his home by prosecutor Margit Lichtinghagen. About one year later, Zumwinkel, no longer head of Deutsche Post, was convicted of tax evasion to two years of prison placed on probation. Although hailed by many as a triumph for the prosecution of white-collar crimes and the fight against corporate executives' recklessness, some already questioned the approach of prosecutors and investigators in the early stages. This criticism first and foremost referred to the fact that important information used as evidence in the investigations as well as the subsequent criminal court proceedings stemmed from banking data “stolen” by a Liechtenstein banker from his (former) employer Liechtenstein Global Trust, a bank based in Liechtenstein, and subsequently purchased by German authorities. This phenomenon, the purchase of “stolen banking data by German authorities, was not unprecedented as the so called “Liechtenstein tax affair” (“Liechtensteinische Steueraffäre”) had already been going on for some time. Zumwinkel, however, was the first widely known defendant in that context.

Some years back, Philip Alston argued that processes of globalization, such as the privatization of state functions and the deregulation of private power, while purportedly value-neutral, have “acquired the status of values in and of themselves.” The market is increasingly seen as “the most efficient and appropriate value-allocating mechanism.” As a consequence, human rights become subjected to a litmus test of their “market-friendliness.” As Alston puts it:

The European Community is also a community of Law. Nevertheless the European Community is not focused on the creation of one European Law in contrast to the Laws of its Member States. Instead the European Community focuses on the harmonization of the national legal system only to the extent that is required for the functioning of the common market (art. 3 I h EC). The harmonization of Corporate Law (art. 44 EC) was regarded as a key factor of this process. As a consequence Corporate Law is one of the most harmonized legal fields in the European Community.

The Russian government is accused of hacking emails circulating among senior members of Hilary Clinton's campaign team to support President Trump's election in 2016. This was not the first time the United States was the target of massive cyber espionage: The Chinese government is believed to have gained sensitive information on 22.1 million US government employees through “cyber intrusions” in 2014. This Article will examine whether cyber espionage of this kind is unlawful under public international law and will conclude that it is. Specifically, such espionage can result in a violation of territorial sovereignty and will likely violate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Yet, based on the controversial “clean-hands-doctrine,” past US actions in the realms of cyber espionage and intervention may well invalidate any claims it asserts against Russia or China.