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² See Office of the Director of Nat'l Intelligence, Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in recent US Elections:” The Analytical Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3254229-ICA-2017-01.html#document/p1; Luke Harding, Top Democrat's Emails Hacked By Russia After Aide Made Typo, Investigation Finds, The Guardian (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/14/dnc-hillary-clinton-emails-hacked-russia-aide-typo-investigation-finds; Sanger, David E., Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking, New York Times (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/russia-election-hacking-sanctions.html?_r=1.Google Scholar

³ See Sanger, David E., Cyberthreat Posed by China and Iran Confounds Whitehouse, New York Times (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/world/asia/cyberthreat-posed-by-china-and-iran-confounds-white-house.html; Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People, Federal Authorities Say, The Washington Post (July 9, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-system-affected-21-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/?utm_term=.319beab5403b.Google Scholar

⁴ See Sanger, supra note 3.Google Scholar

⁵ The principle of sovereign equality will not be discussed here, as its application does currently not seem relevant to the allegations made against Russia and China; for more details on this issue, see Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), General List No. 156, Order (March 3, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/156/18078.pdf (focusing especially on para. 27).Google Scholar

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¹¹ The Case of the S. S. “Lotus” (Fr. V. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7).Google Scholar

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¹³ Patrick Beuth, NSA Kann Drei Von Vier E-Mails Mitlesen, Die Zeit (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.zeit.de/digital/datenschutz/2013-08/nsa-ueberwacht-75-prozent-internet; Charles Arthur, NSA-Scandal: What Data Is Being Monitored and How Does It Work?, The Guardian (June 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/nsa-prism-records-surveillance-questions.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tools Collect “Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet”, The Guardian (July 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data; NSA Sucks Realtime Data from Fifty Companies, Daily Mail (June 9, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2338367/NSA-sucks-realtime-data-FIFTY-companies.html.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19.Google Scholar

¹⁶ U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.Google Scholar

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¹⁸ G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (Dec. 21, 1965).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Id. Google Scholar

²⁰ G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).Google Scholar

²¹ Craig Forcese, Spies Without Borders: International Law and Intelligence Collection, 5 J. Nat'l Security L. & Pol'y 179, 198 (2011); Aaron Shull, Cyberespionage and International Law, in GigaNet 8th Annual Symposium 1, 3–4 (2013).Google Scholar

²² Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, para. 162 (Dec. 19).Google Scholar

²³ U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. at 34–5.Google Scholar

²⁴ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgement, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 202 (June 27); see also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgement, 2005 I.C.J. 168, at paras. 161–65 (Dec. 19).Google Scholar

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²⁶ Kirstin Schmalenbach, Casebook Internationales Recht, 29–30 (2nd ed. 2014); Aust, Helmut P., Stellungnahme zur Sachverständigenanhörung am 5. Juni 2014, HU Berlin 16 (2014), https://www.bundestag.de/blob/282870/fc52462f2ffd254849bce19d25f72fa2/mat_a_sv-4-1_aust-pdf-data.pdf; Anne Peters, Surveillance Without Borders? The Unlawfulness of the NSA-Panopticon, Part I, EJIL: Talk! (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/surveillance-without-borders-the-unlawfulness-of-the-nsa-panopticon-part-i/; Shoshan, supra note 1, at 43–5; Stefan Talmon, Sachverständigengutachten gemäß Beweisbeschluss SV-4 des 1. Untersuchungsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages der 18. Wahlperiode, Universität Bonn 20–21 (2014), https://www.bundestag.de/blob/282872/2b7b605da4c13cc2bc512c9c899953c1/mat_a_sv-4-2_talmon-pdf-data.pdf. Talmon also bases his view on the ICJ's reasoning in the Nicaragua Case. When dealing with unauthorized fly overs by US planes over Nicaraguan territory, the court concluded that such conduct violated Nicaragua's sovereignty but did not deal with the question of whether these flights also amounted to an unlawful intervention. This argument is unconvincing. The ICJ had no reason to examine whether these reconnaissance flights constituted an unlawful intervention or not. Nicaragua claimed that its sovereignty had been violated by the flights and the court concurred. Therefore, there was no need for the court to further examine US conduct. See Nicar. v U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at paras. 87–91, 251; Stefan Talmon, Das Abhören des Kanzlerhandys und das Völkerrecht, 1 Bonner Rechtsjournal 6, 10 (2014). See also Torsten Stein&; Thilo Marauhn, Völkerrechtliche Aspekte von Informationsoperationen, 60 ZaöRV 1, 22–5 (2000) (providing a more general discussion of the difficulty of distinguishing between acceptable “persuasion” of another State and “coercion”).Google Scholar

²⁷ Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at para. 205; see also Shull, supra note 21, at 4.Google Scholar

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³⁵ See, e.g., Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy & Peter Beaumont, Revealed: US Dirty Tricks to Win Vote on Iraq, The Guardian (Mar. 2, 2003), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq. The authors refer to a memo describing the US spying on UN diplomats that represent then-sitting States of the Security Council. The authors further explain that:Google Scholar

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³⁸ A definition was provided by Judge Hudson in his Individual Opinion in the River Meuse Case before the PCIJ: “It would seem …that where two parties have assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one party which is engaged in a continuing non-performance of that obligation should not be permitted to take advantage of a similar non-performance of that obligation by the other party.” See Diversion of Water from the River Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), Judgement, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70, at para. 323 (June 28).Google Scholar

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