In the era before state regulation of insurance rates, the American fire insurance industry succeeded in regulating itself. The final quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed a sustained movement towards organisation in the fire insurance industry. Through the establishment of local rate-setting boards fire insurers were able to manage the risks that had plagued their industry since its inception. The local insurance ‘cartels’ of the late nineteenth century differed from their mid-century predecessors in their longevity. As the organisations became stronger, they were able to stabilise prices throughout the industry and enhance diversification. As a result, economic downturns no longer routinely resulted in destructive competition, and major fires no longer led to waves of bankruptcies.

This article examines the investment practices of life assurance firms within the United Kingdom, through an analysis of the asset holdings of the sector over the period 1900 to 1965. The data are drawn from the detailed annual returns to the Board of Trade. Aggregate, sectional and individual company data are used in the study. Major trends in investment practice are identified and analysed; and cross-sectional comparisons are made. The main emphasis is on the contribution of the life assurance sector towards provision of financial support to the British industrial sector. From the beginning of the period a significant proportion of life firms' investments was held in corporate securities, although over time the composition moved away from fixed-interest stock towards share holdings. The study highlights the great variation in investment practice across individual life assurance firms, with no strong evidence of convergence over time excepting investments in equity holdings.

Insurance for damage caused by public unrest became popular in post-1918 Central Europe and proved to be a profitable business, but one that became increasingly problematic because of the role of fascist regimes in promoting civil commotion. This article addresses some of the experiences of insurance companies, especially the Munich Reinsurance Company, when trying to manage policies covering political unrest and riot in Italy, Germany and Spain between 1922 and 1941. In the case of Italy in 1922, the new fascist regime forced the insurers to pay for damages caused by the Squadri. In Germany, the insurers were forced to assume a fictitious liability for damages done to the Jews in the Pogrom of November 1938. In Spain, Franco forced the insurance companies to treat Civil War damages as a civil commotion and make payouts despite their strenuous objections. These experiences demonstrated that civil commotion insurance was most safely marketed in democracies that provided enough unrest but also law and order to make it worthwhile.

This article considers the changing regulatory environment in which French insurance operated between the ancien régime and the post-war years. At first treated with suspicion, the state came to recognise the social benefits of insurance during the industrial revolution. The extension of regulation over different products and companies – life, marine, general – needs to be understood as a historical process in which first the benefits and then the possibilities for access to substantial financial resources came to be understood. A dual tradition of mistrust and fascination has prevailed in the French attitudes towards insurance, and this paper explores this relationship in a variety of contexts. It is suggested that the eventual nationalisation of much of the industry in 1946 was a signal of both increasing respectability and of the state's desire to offer universal coverage. The opportunity to mobilise and direct investment flows was also attractive.