This article contributes to the literature analysing the role of public banks in crises. Taking the case of Spain, it analyses the behaviour of the public bank (ICO) between 1971 and 2015, specifically during two crises: the crisis of the 1970s, when Spain was an economically backward country coming out of a dictatorship; and that of 2008–13, by which time it had integrated into the international economy. Public credit underwent sweeping privatization in 1991, which translated into major downsizing. From then on, a gradual process of modernization began, mainly characterized by institutional changes in governance and access to resources. Our results indicate that public and private credit behave differently during recessions. Private credit always remains closely synchronized with the business cycle, but public credit less so.

Since the global financial crisis in 2008, there has been an elevated interest in private debt and as a macroeconomic variable. In light of the lack of high-frequency data, this study presents a unique monthly time series dataset on credit from and deposits in Swedish commercial banks from 1875 to 2020, covering 1,752 monthly observations and most of Swedish commercial banking history. In a first application, the study examines to what extent money in Sweden has been exogenous, created independently of demand by the central bank, or endogenous, created in response to demand by commercial banks, during different institutional settings. The results, derived via cointegration and impulse-response functions, show that though the relationship between deposits and credit has changed over time, both theories often hold validity simultaneously. While changes in deposits often have had significant impact on credit, the opposite has also been true. There are, however, differences between different regulatory regimes, as well as for different groups of banks.

This article reconstructs the history of direct interventions in exchange rate markets performed by the leading Italian banks of issue: the Banca Nazionale until 1893, then the Banca d'Italia between 1894 and 1913. The article shows that this type of operation represented a constant and relevant commitment for both institutions; interventions were made in the bills and/or the bonds market, sometimes also in conjunction with increases in the discount rate. Although often successful in the initial stages, until 1904 institutional provisions severely constrained the accumulation of foreign assets in the banks’ portfolios therefore reducing the viability, and hence the overall effectiveness, of these interventions.

Mutual benefit societies evolved as the major provider for sickness, accident and life insurance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries on both sides of the Atlantic. One of the major problems facing insurers was the risk of adverse selection, i.e. that unhealthy individuals had more incentives than healthy individuals to insure when priced for the average risk. By empirically examining whether longevity among insured individuals in a nationwide mutual health society was different from a matched sample of uninsured individuals, we seek to identify the presence of adverse selection. We find no compelling evidence showing that unhealthy individuals were more likely to insure, or reasons to believe that problems related to adverse selection would have been a major reason for government intervention in the health insurance market in Sweden.

How was Romania able to borrow cheaply on the international capital markets before World War I? We explore this within the context of its three southeast European neighbours, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, using a novel dataset of monthly bond prices from the Berlin and London stock exchanges. A comparison of country characteristics and panel data analysis suggests that Romania was able to borrow under more favourable conditions due to its abundant natural resources and desirable exports.