The scaling of urban climate action and its governance is rapidly becoming a central focus in the urban climate governance literature and policy debates. Building on the broader scaling literature and inspired by related initiatives in other fields, this article calls for the development of a systematic “science of scaling” for urban climate governance. Such a science of scaling may help to give a better understanding of how well-performing urban climate action and its governance can be multiplied, accelerated and broadened (ie horizontal and vertical scaling and scaling out, up and down), and it may help to uncover scaling trajectories towards systemic change in cities (ie deep scaling).

At the end of August 2014, scientists and policymakers from forty-eight countries gathered at the Heritage Hotel in Auckland, New Zealand to debate the science and art of scientific advice. Jointly hosted by Sir Peter Gluckman, chief scientific advisor to the PrimeMinister of NewZealand, and the International Council for Science (ICSU), the Auckland summit was the largest ever meeting of its kind, attracting science advisors, advisory bodies and academic experts fromAlbania to Zimbabwe, and a host of countries in between.

Over two days of intense discussion, participants debated structures and methods for the provision of scientific advice in emergency situations, across national and disciplinary boundaries, and on contested topics,where science, values and politics collide. The meeting ended with a call to strengthen collaboration between advisory systems, an agreement to formalize the network, and a commitment tomeet again in 2016. As Sir Peter Gluckman said afterwards: “Our goal was to start a global conversation on the practices and challenges of conveying science advice to governments…The meeting has highlighted a real thirst among practitioners to share models and lessons.”

While nudging has garnered plenty of interdisciplinary attention, the ethics of applying it to climate policy has been little discussed. However, not all ethical considerations surrounding nudging are straightforward to apply to climate nudges. In this article, we overview the state of the debate on the ethics of nudging and highlight themes that are either specific to or particularly important for climate nudges. These include: the justification of nudges that are not self-regarding; how to account for climate change denialists; transparency; knowing the right or best behaviours; justice concerns; and whether the efficacy of nudges is sufficient for nudges to be justified as a response to the climate crisis. We conclude that climate nudges raise distinct ethical questions that ought to be considered in developing climate nudges.

Food producers and consumers are confronted with ever-growing choices and increasing competition within the EU and around the world. This has already led to various cases of food fraud and a call for political and legal action. Food fraud can be defined as ‘‘the deliberate and intentional substitution, addition tampering or misrepresentation of food, food ingredients or food packaging, labelling, product information, or false or misleading statements made about a food product’’. Meanwhile, the issue of “food fraud”, by means of employing names, symbols and images of third countries and thereby inducing a false impression on the consumer, appears to have been neglected despite its increasing economic impact. While the EU recently approved two new Geographical Indications (hereinafter, GIs) from third countries, the issue of the protection of Italian products against “rip–off Italian products” with Italian sounding names has taken centre–stage again.

The adoption of the REACH regulation, setting out to reformchemicals policy of the European Union (EU), was accompanied by intense controversy over the role of the precautionary principle. Analysing decision making on so called Substances of Very High Concern (SVHCs), this article demonstrates that despite legal underpinning, precaution plays a limited role in the implementation of the REACH authorisation procedure. Due to ambiguous legislative provisions, the controversiesof the legislativeprocessare carriedover tothe implementationprocess.

“After a reform is before another reform.” This paraphrasing of a famous saying from the world of football seems to be a very fitting way to describe the status quo of the European policy on genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

The title of our new section inevitably evokes a most basic question: What are lifestyle risks? While it is not that simple to define this broad term, in this editorial we aim at introducing the EJRR readership to this fascinating emerging area of risk studies. We shall attempt to describe the nature of lifestyle risks by identifying their main features and by raising some of the fundamental questions that are inherent to any discussion on this topic.

The Commission has proposed to legitimise the renationalization of the cultivation of GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms) accepting the request of a group of Member States who raised concerns at the Environment Council of June 2009 regarding the EU-wide decisions on GMO2 cultivation.

There is much to be welcomed concerning the role blockchain technology can play in modernising and enhancing international trade, creating a more level playing field and reducing costs. However, it goes without say that the technology also brings with it the risk of abuse leading to trade-based money laundering. This article explores how anti-money-laundering legislation should respond to the use of blockchain technology in shipping and trade. Maritime trade poses unique challenges because of several significant factors: the fact that it concerns large sums but many linked trading transactions over the same goods; its use of documents and involvement of numerous faceless entities; and its cross-border setting. Drawing on tried and tested forms of blockchain technology-based trade transactions, this work examines the fault lines in the current regulatory system and questions how best these gaps should be remedied. It also stresses that even states that have banned the issue and trade of cryptoassets might not be immune to these new challenges.

A multitude of medical products are being developed and produced as part of efforts to tackle COVID-19. They are varied in nature and range from test kits to tracing apps, protective equipment, ventilators, medicines and, of course, vaccines. The design, testing and manufacture of many of these products differs from production in normal times due to the urgency of the situation and the rapid increase in demand created by the pandemic. This article considers the legal issues arising as a result of the production of emergency products, particularly from a products liability perspective. To what extent do existing concepts under the European Product Liability Directive, such as defect, causation and the various defences, permit the pandemic to be taken into account when a Court is considering issues of liability? What is the impact on liability of the modified regulatory regime? In light of that discussion, the case for alternative responses is examined from a comparative and European perspective, including the issue of Government indemnities for the manufacturers of products, legal exemptions from liability and alternative no-fault compensation schemes.

The digital health ecosystem is rife with opportunities to improve healthcare through data-driven services in the European Union (EU). The value of health data, in the multiple forms in which they come (from health records to lifestyle data collected by smartphones or wearables), can truly emerge when they are allowed to flow in the ecosystem within a governance framework supported by all relevant stakeholders, with trust as the common and clear thread underpinning it. The coronavirus pandemic has provided an additional impetus for change, showing the importance of coordination and adequate communication between Member States and quality data to inform decision-making. Significant challenges remain, however, in order to achieve a fully integrated European digital health ecosystem, including: (1) the potentially diverging rules set by Member States at the national level and the need for an EU framework for the secondary use of health data; (2) the need for transparency and accountability for sustaining a data-sharing framework involving public authorities, research organisations, industry and citizens; and (3) the need for interoperable data and processes. Taking stock of these challenges, this article puts forward policy recommendations to enable the provision of pan-European data-driven healthcare services and to build a transparent and trustworthy framework for citizens.

The world is currently facing the worst pandemic in a century and we were caught unprepared. COVID-19 has proven highly contagious and with severe consequences that are still unfolding. As of 16 April 2020, there were over 2 million confirmed cases and over 136,000 related deaths reported worldwide.1 Over 1 million of those confirmed cases were in the preceding 14 days, with the USA accounting for nearly half of those. Furthermore, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is now warning that the world is about to suffer the worst economic recession since the Great Depression in the 1920s.2

Designing a framework for evaluating laws, rules and policies within any given legal system is a daunting task. Comprehensive schemes risk ending up as mere paper realities because of the demands they place on evaluatorsas well as on the addressees of evaluations. More realistic evaluation frameworks on the other hand may not yield many results. The OECD has a long track record of encouraging member countries to deal with ‘regulation’ in the wider sense of the word in a rationalistic and systematic way. These encouragements tend to involve recommendations, peer reviews,and the use of country surveys in order to establish progress in what the OECD usually calls ‘regulatory policy’ or ‘regulatory management’ (‘better regulation’ in EU parlance and sometimes referred to as ‘meta-regulation’ in the literature). Recently a new tool has been added. In a move parallel to the EU's efforts to ‘complete the regulatory cycle’, the OECD has developed a new Framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation (hereafter referred to as ‘Framework’).

On 17 March 2021, the European Commission put forward its Proposal for a Regulation on Digital Green Certificates, which would facilitate European Union (EU) cross-border movement during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Regulation on the EU Digital COVID Certificate was adopted on 14 June 2021 and it will start to apply from 1 July 2021. This article examines the main declared goals of the new Regulation – the first being that Digital COVID Certificates facilitate safe cross-border movement, the second being that they preclude more restrictive national measures, the third being that they prevent discrimination and the fourth being that they coordinate Member States’ actions. In so doing, it highlights the main benefits and weaknesses of the Regulation, but it also goes beyond the Regulation by tackling broader questions of EU law that will be of relevance even once the pandemic is over. In this respect, the paper highlights the importance of science in assessing the proportionality of pandemic-related measures and of choosing the least restrictive and the most individualised options when restricting free movement due to public health reasons. It also identifies the effects EU certificates will have on Member States’ regulation of national COVID-19 certificates, notably those designed for other purposes than cross-border travel, and it shows that there is a thin line between the EU’s and national competences in this area.

What could a European Union (EU) response mechanism to health emergencies look like in the context of a more integrated Health Union? Despite an increased EU role in the preparedness, monitoring and coordination of health emergencies over the past two decades, Member States’ responses to the first wave of COVID-19 were surprisingly uncoordinated. In light of calls to improve cooperation regarding future health emergencies, this article discusses the creation of EU surveillance, preparedness and response mechanisms for health emergencies. Using insights from previous research and secondary literature, we highlight gaps in the existing serious cross-border health threats regulatory framework and discuss opportunities for further EU action. Based on a comparison with other EU crisis management mechanisms (the Banking Union, risk preparedness in the electricity sector and food safety), we discuss different crisis decision-making and coordination models and their potential applicability to the health sector. We then formulate several propositions to strengthen Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border health threats to streamline ex ante pandemic preparedness and organise emergency responses.

In modern Western societies the societal emphasis on risk and the minimization of it frequently leads to a call for increasing risk regulation. This mechanism is referred to as the vicious circle of risk regulation, and might cause a variety of problems such as overregulation and breaches of individual privacy. Different solutions have been put forward to break the vicious circle: a greater emphasis on individual citizens’ responsibility, a more rational approach in which governments calculate the greatest safety yield for a given budget and greater democracy: citizen participation in risk and safety related decision making processes. As each approach involves serious disadvantages the authors argue that a well-considered, unhurried approach might be the best way forward. Leadership is largely about timing and with regard to risk management after critical events taking one's time seems crucial indeed.

Drones represent a rapidly developing industry. Devices initially designed for military purposes have evolved into a new area with a plethora of commercial applications. One of the biggest hindrances in the commercial developments of drones is legal uncertainty concerning the legal regimes applicable to the multitude of issues that arises with this new technology. This is especially prevalent in situations concerning autonomous drones (ie drones operating without a pilot). This article provides an overview of some of these uncertainties. A scenario based on the fictitious but plausible event of an autonomous drone falling from the sky and injuring people on the ground is analysed from the perspectives of both German and English private law. This working scenario is used to illustrate the problem of legal uncertainty facing developers, and the article provides valuable knowledge by mapping real uncertainties that impede the development of autonomous drone technology alongside providing multidisciplinary insights from law as well as software electronic and computer engineering.