The right to vote and participate in the political process is a quintessential feature of any democratic society. Systematic risks to the integrity of US elections and passive civic participation in the EU political process present fundamental threats to the constitutional aspirations and the democratic ideals connected to “We the People” in the US and “United in Diversity” in the EU. The existence of power imbalances, social inequalities and information asymmetries in electoral and political processes illustrate that both jurisdictions are in peril and in risk of democratic backsliding. Blockchain-based voting can transform existing electoral and political processes in the digital age. This raises the question whether blockchain-based voting can be utilised as a digital tool to enhance the democratic legitimacy of US and EU electoral and political systems. Accordingly, this article aims to examine the prospects and limits of blockchain technology to secure foundational democratic norms connected to the right to vote and civic participation at the heart of contemporary constitutionalism. It contends that the decentralised, immutable, accessible, transparent, and secure processes of blockchain technology have the potential to enhance the legitimacy of the US and EU constitutional orders, since blockchain-based voting can act as a forum for enhanced civic participation, public deliberation, and democratic contestation. Nevertheless, the article concludes that a number of important steps must be taken to fully realise the potential of blockchain-based voting in a manner that combats the risks associated with the technology, strengthens public confidence in electoral and political processes and secures a balanced system of governance in the US and the EU constitutional orders.

This article examines the convergence of myriad forms of information on people who come to be targets of state and public control due to the perceived risk they present through having been alleged to have not disclosed their HIV-positive status to sex partners. Attending to the material, violent impacts of criminalisation – violence, both legal and extralegal – this article outlines how punishment is enhanced and amplified through the flow of information. Focusing on the material impacts of flows of information about the daily lives of people who face criminalisation moves analysis beyond solely a theoretical object of inquiry and helps to frame an understand that the effects of big data operate not just “within” big data surveillance, but also “beyond” big data surveillance.

Under the phrase “code is law” and based on its “trustless trust”, blockchain has emerged as a disrupting technology considered by some as an alternative to the law. Based on a study of real-life blockchain-based decentralised applications (Dapps), this article takes blockchain developers at their word and adopts the point of view of users: can blockchain live up to its promise and enable them to transact with each other without the need for the trust granted by the law? The article particularly highlights that users need to be able to ascertain that a self-advertised Dapp indeed qualifies as one. Blockchain technology may make it possible to do away with trust in third parties, but this is not enough. Users also need to trust that an alleged Dapp genuinely is one, and blockchain alone cannot provide this. Beyond Dapps, it is argued that blockchain needs the complementary role of the law to deliver its promises and especially to authenticate blockchain “virtues”. The EU certification mark is identified as a promising form of co-regulation for that purpose.

Roundup, and other glyphosate-based herbicides, are the most heavily used pesticides in the history of the USA and globally. In March 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified glyphosate as a “probable human carcinogen”. A portion of the 695,000 Americans then living in 2015 with non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NHL) became aware of IARC’s decision. Several thousand Roundup–NHL lawsuits had been filed by the end of 2017, rising to 18,400 by July 2019 and 42,000 by November 2019. Three cases have gone to trial, each won by the plaintiffs. The author has served as an expert witness for the plaintiffs in this litigation and has been compensated for his time spent. The impact of the litigation on the independent assessment of the science useful in determining whether glyphosate and glyphosate-based herbicide exposures are linked to NHL is reviewed, as is why the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and IARC reached such different judgements regarding glyphosate human cancer hazard and risk. Two important “lessons learned” regarding the EPA versus IARC assessment of glyphosate cancer hazard and risk are highlighted. The first arises from differences in the magnitude of applicator risks from mostly dermal exposures to formulated glyphosate-based herbicides compared to just dietary exposures to technical glyphosate. The second relates to missed opportunities to markedly lower applicator exposures and risks with little or no impact on sales via reformulation, added warnings and worker safety provisions, company-driven stewardship programmes and greater determination by the EPA in the 1980s to compel Monsanto to add common-sense worker protection provisions onto Roundup labels (eg “wear gloves when applying this product”). Policy reforms designed to alleviate systemic problems with how pesticide hazards, exposures and risks are analysed, regulated and mitigated are described.

The “sharing economy” represents a growing challenge to regulatory policy. In this article, I argue that these debates about the sharing economy are better understood as a broader normative and policy problem of updating our regulatory tools for the new dynamics of 21st century capitalism. The new “on-demand” economy reflects more widespread trends in the structure of business organization, driven by new developments in finance and technology. I argue that we should analyze these changes through the normative lens of the balance of economic power: what is especially troubling about the on-demand economy is the way in which it outstrips the modes of accountability and countervailing power enabled by 20th century labor, safety net, and economic regulations. The article then suggests key frontiers for regulatory innovation, in particular: (1) expanding regulatory oversight of concentrated market and economic power among on-demand platforms; (2) expanding the relative power of workers to counteract the concentrated power of platforms in the on-demand economy (for example by expanding safety net protections and the ability to organize collectively); and (3) by reinventing systems of collective urban planning processes in the face of the on-demand economy. All three of these focus areas for regulation would entail a variety of specific interventions, but share a common premise of rebalancing economic power in this new economy. The payoffs of these shifts would be more than an expansion of welfare or efficiency, but rather the creation of a policy regime that enables a richer form of economic freedom that achieves more genuine economic independence from domination of various kinds.

Nonhuman autonomous systems are not legal persons under current law. The history of organizational law, however, demonstrates that agreements can, with increasing degrees of autonomy, direct the actions of legal persons. Agreements are isomorphic with algorithms; that is, a legally enforceable agreement can give legal effect to the arbitrary discernible states of an algorithm or other process. As a result, autonomous systems may end up being able, at least, to emulate many of the private–law rights of legal persons. This essay demonstrates a technique by which this is possible by means of limited liability companies (LLCs), a very flexible modern type of business organization. The techniques that this essay describes are not just futuristic possibilities; as this essay argues, they are already possible under current law.

This article investigates the L'Aquila decision. It aims to present a theoretical framework from contemporary disaster research and political philosophy to better understand why blame and responsibility has come to play such a prominent role in the aftermath of disasters. Furthermore, it presents a number of examples from criminal law around the world to provide context to the decision. The central claim in tthis piece is that the decision is not an extraordinary, isolated decision on responsibility following disasters; rather the decision is emblematic to an on-going development of disaster responsibility. Thus, after disaster follows a legal process aimed at identifying, and if necessary, penalizing the mistakes leading to the horrifying outcome. In that way disasters are increasingly like any other event in society with major negative implications; it is evaluated and if appropriate adjudicated.

Safety regulations are too often disproportional in the sense that their costs outweigh the benefits. Although this is well known, years of trying to reduce safety related regulatory pressure has not resulted in much success. Two important causes for this have not received much attention up to now. One of these is a faulty perception of how the general public regards risk. We argue that the intractable citizen's behaviour needs better understanding. The second cause is the single-mindedness of risk experts which calls for specific instruments to be harnessed.

With the birth and rise of cryptocurrencies following the success of Bitcoin and the popularity of “Initial Coin Offerings”, public awareness of blockchain technologies has substantially increased in recent years. Many blockchain advocates claim that these software artefacts enable radically new forms of decentralised governance by relying upon computational trust created via cryptographic proof, obviating the need for reliance on conventional trusted third-party intermediaries. But these claims rest on some key assumptions, which this paper subjects to critical examination. It asks: can existing mechanisms and procedures for collective decision-making of public blockchains (which we refer to as internal blockchain governance) live up to these ambitions? By drawing upon HLA Hart’s Concept of Law, together with literature from regulatory governance studies, we argue that unless public blockchain systems establish formal and effective internal governance, they are unlikely to be taken up at scale as a tool for social coordination, and are thus likely to remain, at best, a marginal technology.

Parents of newborns and small children have recently been confronted with labels indicating that their purchases of a baby bottle, teethers or sippy cups are now ‘Bisphenol A-free’ (BPA). A synthetic chemical used in the production process of polycarbonate (plastics), Bisphenol A is currently making headline news in the US and the EU. Its questioned safety in food plastics, baby bottles and children's toys has turned plastics into a political issue as it is systematically framed as a risk in media coverage.

Apart from regulatory exposure limits (Tolerable Daily Intake levels (TDI), Bisphenol A is currently not subject to any restrictions in use yet (although BPA will be subject to a ban on the EU level from spring 2011 onwards). However, with the REACH framework (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation of Chemicals), a new regulatory framework for EU's chemical policy in place since June 2007, these exposure limits may be reviewed and BPA may face regulatory action. This article aims to analyse the regulatory process of Bisphenol A in the EU as an example of an uncertain risk dossier. On the basis of document and media analysis and interviews, the main aim is to gain an understanding of how uncertain risks are being regulated in the European Union. To that end, the self-regulatory behavior of industry is also considered. On the basis of the current regulatory tools in place and the current state of affairs, as well as developments in the controversy around BPA, the paper concludes by presenting four scenarios that illustrate the dynamics of the case and its possible regulatory outcomes.

Israel’s vaccination percentage was among the highest recorded worldwide. The Israeli government opted for a model using a proof-of-vaccine document (“Green Pass”). However, the “Green Pass” policy raises practical, legal and ethical concerns. While immunisation passports could be utilised to protect one’s health, significant legal difficulties arise from their usage as a vaccination encouragement scheme. Protecting health is a proper purpose, particularly as minimising the pandemic ameliorates the human rights violations that stem from the COVID-19 response, enables individuals to return to their daily lives and enhances economic activity. However, any privileges or restrictions guided by one’s COVID-19 immunisation status must be designed with the utmost attention to prevent a disproportionate violation of the human rights of the non-vaccinated and the public at large. Furthermore, as “Green Pass” policies might entrench existing discriminatory structures, ensuring equality is vital in moving forward. By exploring two case studies – labour rights and the right to privacy – we demonstrate the legal and public implications of the “Green Pass” regime. Despite the removal of the “Green Pass” in Israel, discussions continue regarding its modified reimplementation. The wider implications of the model might extend beyond its specific legal arrangements and limited temporal phase, requiring us to bring long-term public health into consideration.

Signed in 2009, the plant protection Commission Regulation EC No 1107/2009 created a new category of active substances, the low-risk substances, with specific status defined in Article 22. The initial and specific criteria, not suitable for microorganisms and natural substances, were modified in 2018, and the first low-risk substance, allocating Part D of Regulation EC No 540/2011, was granted in the same year. Since then, thirty-three low-risk substances have been granted with this specific status through approvals and renewals, while a larger list of potential low-risk substances from already-approved active substances was published. This list is only exploited during renewals, and this process would take another five years to complete. After four years of the implementation of this status, the number of such substances is still low, but is intended to increase slowly. Two more low-risk substances are already pending in 2021, which will bring the number of low-risk substances to thirty-five, while the initial list of potential low-risk substances (only renewals) included fifty-seven substances.

More than twenty years after the EU eliminated its internal land borders, the Union still lacks an integrated airspace. This seems to be the most immediate regulatory lesson of the recent volcanic ash crisis. Yet more research is needed before establishing its net effects. In this brief report, I will provide a first-hand analysis of the regulatory answer developed across Europe in the aftermath of the eruption of the Icelandic volcano Eyjafjallajökull. While reconstructing the unfolding of the events and the procedures followed by the regulators, I will attempt to address some of the questions that I have repeatedly asked myself when stranded in Washington DC between 16 and 25 April 2010. Who did the assessment of the hazard posed by volcanic ash to jetliners? Who was competent to take risk management decisions, such as the controversial flight bans? Is it true that the safe level of volcanic ash was zero? How to explain the shift to a new safety threshold (of 2,000 mg/m3) only five days after the event? Did regulators overact? To what extent did they manage the perceived risk rather than the actual one? At a time when the impact of the volcanic ash cloud crisis is being closely scrutinised by both public authorities and the affected industries, it seems particularly timely to establish what happened during the worst aviation crisis in European history. This report was written one week after the event and relied on a limited number of sources available by 30 April 2010.

This article discusses the role of European Union (EU) State aid law in the COVID-19 crisis. It contends that different Treaty derogations have played unique roles in addressing the core determinants of the economic risk linked to the pandemic (ie the “exposure” to lockdown measures and the “vulnerability” of certain sectors to them), and in increasing the resilience of national economies. Moreover, this article examines the extent to which EU State aid law has been used to manage and mitigate health risks, by allowing Member States to enhance the preparedness and capacity of their healthcare sector (broadly conceived) to respond to the pandemic. On the whole, this article maintains that State aid control has been used by the European Commission as an important “risk management tool”, and it highlights the role of the Commission as the crisis management authority.