On 14 November 2018, Poland’s Ministry for Agriculture and Rural Development notified the European Commission (hereinafter, Commission) of its intention to introduce mandatory country of origin labelling (hereinafter, COOL) for potatoes on the basis of a Draft Regulation of the Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development amending the Regulation on the labelling of certain foodstuffs (hereinafter, Draft Regulation).1 Poland’s notification is the most recent example of the continuously increasing number of EU Member States’ measures on COOL for foodstuffs. While the EU already provides COOL requirements for fruits and vegetables in Regulation (EU) No 543/2011 of 7 June 2011 laying down detailed rules for the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1234/2007 in respect of the fruit and vegetables and processed fruit and vegetables sectors2 (hereinafter, Regulation (EU) No 543/2011), they do not apply to fresh potatoes.

This study focuses on the dispute over Korea’s import bans and the additional testing and certification requirements for Japanese foods and analyses the relevant findings of the reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organisation’s dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Although the Panel had found that Korea’s measures were inconsistent with the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), the Appellate Body reversed most of these findings. Korea notified that it had completed the implementation of the reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body. However, the DSM has failed to contribute in settling this dispute positively and meaningfully, since it remains uncertain whether Korea’s import bans are based on scientific principles. Furthermore, the Appellate Body failed to complete its legal analysis of the inconsistency of Korea’s measures based on fact-findings and the facts uncontested between both disputing parties.

Next to Member States, European Union (EU) level organisations have come to play a larger role in enforcement in the EU during the last two decades. Analysing the roles of Member States, networks of national authorities and EU agencies in this stage of the policy cycle through multiple academic lenses could lead to a more comprehensive understanding and assessment of their design. This article sets elementary steps towards a framework that brings together prominent theoretical insights from the legal and political disciplines, to discuss their combined leverage for understanding the EU legislator's choice for these enforcement regimes.

The EU institutions and agencies have become increasingly involved in enforcing EU law directly vis-à-vis private actors. A number of such EU entities have also acquired the so-called emergency powers, which allow interference with the legal position of a private party. Given the lack of research in this area, the question that this article addresses is whether relevant safeguards have been introduced to ensure the rule of law in such situations to prevent the abuse of executive discretion by public authorities. What are the relevant safeguards in the emergency in the EU in the first place? Having analysed relevant EU legislation and case law, the article offers a complete overview of all the existing EU entities with the emergency powers and shows a great diversity in the extent to which the EU legislator has regulated procedural safeguards in relevant law. The article discusses what safeguards need to be ensured in an emergency and argues for clarity of legislative frameworks in this respect.

Responding to the need to make democratic governance more anticipatory, during recent decades parliaments have increasingly made efforts to involve elected legislators directly in addressing future risks and envisioning long-term developments. At the level of general democratic-institutional principles, engaging legislators in national-level foresight is expected to enhance the general legitimacy of future-regarding policymaking almost automatically by broadening the scope of democratic actors involved in policy work. However, even the basic mechanisms through which the impact of legislature-based foresight activities could traverse to policymaking remain largely uncharted and unknown. To develop a preliminary framework for detecting and comparing such mechanisms, we draw from the experiences of the most institutionalised and influential legislature-based foresight unit, the Committee for the Future in the Finnish Eduskunta. We extract three general mechanisms through which parliamentary future committees could make a valuable contribution to national-level strategic foresight: (1) they can improve the quality of future-regarding policymaking by broadening and consolidating national foresight “ecosystems”; (2) they can strengthen the transparency and accountability of the foresight work of political executives; and (3) they can enhance the legitimacy of anticipatory governance by connecting broader democratic publics to foresight work through more inclusive participatory processes.

The global climate crisis poses many risks; for instance, relating to the environment, to the economy and to public health. The mitigation and management of such risks create a complex and multifaceted regulatory conundrum that requires quick, flexible, efficient and adaptive policy solutions that transcend the state level. A quick look in the body of regulatory instruments employed in the field of climate change policy will reveal that soft law is used very frequently by the European Commission to aid with the application, transposition and interpretation of European Union (EU) environmental legislation relating to climate change. While soft law has become ever more prominent in the EU legal order and has been studied extensively at the ex-post phase (ie concerning its effects or effectiveness), little academic attention has been paid to the process of soft law-making. In simple terms, we know very little about how soft law instruments are made. This article peeks behind the scenes of soft law and examines the transparency and participation credentials of the articulation process of Commission Guidance Documents in the field of climate change regulation adopted under key legal acts in the field.

Given the state of the climate emergency, European Union (EU) cities must find innovative ways to achieve a sustainable and decarbonised urban mobility trajectory. This requires integrated and cross-sectoral approaches that enable all sectors influencing such mobility to contribute to this goal. Building on the concept of the climate-connected city and drawing on an extensive empirical investigation of two Dutch cities (Rotterdam and Maastricht), this study reflects on how decarbonisation targets are integrated with other sustainability objectives across all policies and levels involved in reconfiguring mobility towards an environmentally sustainable model. The study finds that spatial development tools and processes, in combination with regulatory instruments imposing strict limits on emissions, can strengthen cross-sectoral support for the behavioural changes needed to decarbonise urban mobility. However, this integrative dynamic may be countered by local economic actors and by national and EU economic and fiscal instruments, whose narrow focus on reducing vehicle emissions and expanding road capacity forces cities to dilute their sustainable mobility policies. This suggests that in order to accelerate the decarbonisation of urban mobility, these instruments should be aligned with a broader set of sustainability goals and solutions and be combined with greater attention being given to the urban dimension into national and European transport policies.