The Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 lays down the procedures for bringing complaints against the clergy. These procedures can only be commenced in relation to specified acts or omissions and the article explores the difficulties that arise in relation thereto. It not only considers the case when a complaint is one involving doctrine, ritual or ceremonial, but also the overlap between the laws ecclesiastical; neglect or inefficiency in the performance of the duties of a cleric's office; and conduct unbecoming to the office and work of a clerk in holy orders.

Society has historically viewed suicide with hostility and fear. For centuries this hostility was reflected in the English civil law, which condemned suicide as homicide, and in the Church's position towards suicide victims, which historically considered suicide to be a mortal sin. Under the current canon law, set out in Canon B 38, it is the duty of the minister to bury all parishioners, those who die in the parish, or those entered on the electoral roll of the parish according to the rites of the Church of England, except for (among others) those who ‘being of sound mind have laid violent hands upon themselves’. This canon has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years as society's attitudes towards suicide have become more tolerant. As a result, General Synod recently voted that this canon should be amended. This article explores the development of the law relating to suicide victims in order to understand the Church's current position. It then considers the shortcomings of the current canon law and reviews the position adopted by the Roman Catholic and Methodist churches. Finally, it examines the proposals for changing Canon B 38.

Schedule 1 to the Juries Act 1974 provides that ‘[a] man in holy orders; a regular minister of any religious denomination [and] [a] vowed member of any religious order living in a monastery, convent or other religious community’ is ineligible to serve on a criminal (and also a civil) jury. This has been the law since 1972. For the remainder of this century members of the clergy have been eligible, but not compellable, jurors. In practice they did not serve. The change effected in 1972 is a reversion to the position which probably prevailed in the Middle Ages. Aside from the occasional official report, the liability of religious functionaries to serve on juries in criminal trials has been rarely written about. The last time it happened was in 1882. The object of this article is to fill the lacuna by tracing the history of the clergy's ineligibility for jury service in criminal trials and the reasons for it.

During the course of 2012 two significant developments occurred in Germany that are of wider interest for those who study law and religion internationally. This brief note draws attention to a decision from Cologne that was probably wrongly decided, the effect of which will be reversed by amended legislation, and to a directive from the Catholic Bishops' Conference concerning the excommunication of those Catholics who decline to pay their church tax.

In R v NS the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) was asked to consider a straightforward question: must a Muslim woman remove a niqab (face covering leaving only the eyes showing) when giving evidence in a sexual assault case in which she is the complainant. Two justices said ‘yes’; one said ‘almost always, no’; and the majority said ‘maybe yes, maybe no – it depends’. The matter was then returned to the preliminary inquiry judge to make the actual decision, which could still be subject again to appeal to the SCC. The court divided on the three available answers to the question: yes, no and maybe. The division, however, leaned in favour of requiring removal of the niqab because the reasons for judgment favouring ‘maybe’ were concurred in in the result by those favouring removal. In the end, the court did not give a clear answer to the question, but rather provided a four-part test for trial judges who must continue to make the decision, subject to appeal. The practical utility of this response may be doubted.

In this article we discuss the recent history of the failed draft Bishops and Priests (Consecration and Ordination of Women) Measure, situating this within the broader context of the ordination of women and debates around the Equality Act exceptions for an organised religion. We aim to provide an account of the ways in which equality rights have been implemented in the relevant law; how the Church of England is responding to these rights; and how broader society understands the importance of gender equality and reacts to Synod's rejection of the draft Measure. We analyse these with reference to theories of heteronormativity and scholarship of human rights. In doing so, we aim to explain what is happening in the Church of England and broader society, and draw some conclusions about the current opportunities open to the Church and the state in matters of rights and equality.1

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects manifestations of religion or conscience from interference under Article 9(1) except insofar as such interferences can be justified under Article 9(2). This analysis asks when Article 9 will protect believers who are forced to choose between religious observance and pursuit of secular ‘goods’ and offers some conclusions about how the protection of believers from forced choices compares with the protection of manifestations of religious belief. It also considers whether cases where believers are asked to choose between religious obligations and protected goods raise particular issues under 9(2). Finally, the conclusions arrived at are applied to an illustrative hypothetical example. The objective is to demonstrate the potential reach of 9(1), and to explore the 9(2) analysis specific to protected-good cases.2

The Civil Partnership Act 2004 is a groundbreaking piece of legislation, giving legal recognition to same-sex relationships and providing equality of treatment in regard to inheritance and other financial matters with that enjoyed by married couples. The legislation was opposed by certain religious communities for a variety of reasons. This article is the text of an address delivered by Lord Falconer of Thoroton to the annual conference of the Ecclesiastical Law Society on 1 April 2006. It provides a personal reflection on the nature of the legislation and the necessity for its enactment, and seeks to demonstrate that the concept of civil partnership does not undermine the nature of marriage. It also discusses the Act in the context of law and social attitudes with particular reference to the Hart/Devlin debate of the 1950s and 1960s.

It is now generally recognised that as a matter of history the canon law was applied, subject to variations by local custom, in pre-Reformation England just as much as throughout the rest of Western Christendom. Indeed such local variations were permitted by the canon law itself. As Professor Brooke concluded in The English Church and The Papacy From The Conquest To The Reign of King John:

“The English Church recognised the same law as the rest of the Church; it possessed and used the same collections of Church law that were employed in the rest of the Church. There is no shred of evidence to show that the English Church in the eleventh and twelfth centuries was governed by laws selected by itself.”

The same was also true until the Reformation.

The word Canon means a rule or norm and it was used at quite an early stage of the Church's history to denote both general principles governing the life of the Christian society and particular enactments of Christian assemblies. The subject matter of the canons is as wide as the life of the Church itself and consequently very varied in its nature. At one end of its range it is concerned with matters fundamental to the Church's existence such as the creeds and sacraments. At the other it deals with practical arrangements such as the ownership and use of buildings. At a recent conference with German Lutherans I was asked whether the canon law was jus divinum or jus humanum, and I felt bound to reply. ‘Both’, because of this wide range which stretches from revelation to convenience.