Perhaps no other foreign policy area brought forth the emotional anti communism characteristic of the 1950s as did American relations with the People's Republic of China. The so–called “ loss of China ”issue beginning in 1949, for which the Republicans primarily blamed the Democrats, severely strained the bipartisan approach towards foreign policy. In addition, four years before he died in 1951, Republican foreign policy leader Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg excluded China policy from the area of bipartisan agreement, while his party's loyalty to the defeated Nationalists remained strong. Senator Joseph McCarthy's“communists–in– government” charges during the Korean War, when American forces were engaged in combat with the People's Liberation Army, further exacerbated relations between the Republican and Democratic parties, and between the legislative and executive branches of government. Ominously, the possibility of a preventive strike on the China mainland also became the focus of serious consideration and possible implementation during the Formosa Strait confrontation of 1954–55.

Unlike the Bolshevik revolution, the Chinese revolution had little impact on the Indian nationalist elite. The liberation of the working class from the shackles of capitalism in Russia had stirred the minds of many leaders of the Indian nationalist movement, including Nehru. The liberation of the masses of the peasantry from the shackles of feudalism in China had no comparable impact. The Indian Communist Party (CPI) hailed the Chinese revolution as an epoch-making event, but continued to regard the Soviet Union as the fountainhead of doctrinal as well as tactical directions.

10 1969 was not only the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Republic (C.P.R.); it also marked the culmination of China's fifth year as a nuclear power. During this five-year period there were 10 detonations, three of which were thermonuclear and one of which was tested underground. At least one of the warheads was fired from a guided missile. According to one estimate, current defence expenditures amount to 10 per cent. of China's gross national product, and one-fifth of this outlay is devoted to nuclear research and development alone. A large portion of China's advanced scientific and technical manpower has also been assigned to this field. Although an adequate delivery system for this limited nuclear capability, as of November 1971, is not known to be operational, China's progress in the research and development of advanced weapons has clearly been substantial. The launching of Chinese satellites in 1970 and 1971 and the likelihood of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test in the near future are further evidence of major technological achievement. Peking's entry, then, into the “nuclear club” has been a major concern of China's leaders; it has also had significant consequences for American defence planners. The explicit rationale for the Nixon Administration's expansion of the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in early 1970, for example, was to guard against the possibility of a Chinese attack in the 1980s and thus to assure the reliability of American defence commitments in East Asia and the Pacific.

We can be grateful that Edgar Snow once wrote, in his straightforward uncompromising style, a book about himself. He called it Journey to the Beginning. At a later point in the book he returned (briefly) to talk about his origins, but the “beginning” (Chapter One, line one) was: “When I first reached Shanghai. …”

Early in 1957, an event perhaps unparalleled in the world of letters was reported from China. A new monthly magazine, Shih-k'an (Poetry), made its appearance in February of that year, its inaugural issue including a collection of eighteen poems by Mao Tse-tung. The appearance of Mao's poetry was not in itself an exceptional event. From ancient times down to recent decades, Chinese statesmen and military leaders have often displayed talent in the writing of poetry; and it appeared that Mao Tse-tung was carrying on the established tradition of a long line of strong rulers in China who desired to impress the world that they were not only victorious conquerors and vigorous administrators, but also accomplished artists.

The events of the six months between October 1, 1959, and April 1, 1960—the period, roughly, between Khrushchev's visit to the U.S. and his visit to South Asia—clearly affected Communist China. What is not so clear is the direction in which China has been moved and the depth and duration of the influence which events have brought to bear on China's relations with the world around her.

Although scholars have examined the struggle between Mao Zedong and the Internationalists associated with Wang Ming and Bo Gu for control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in some detail, they have ignored the final battle between the two groups. That confrontation did not take place in the Central Committee or at the Seventh Party Congress in 1945. Rather, new source materials from the People's Republic and a close reading of the newspaper itself show that it took place in the Party's primary propaganda organ, the Liberation Daily (Jiefang ribao).

There are two sources of world civilization: one is the study, another is the prison. We the youth must make up our minds to enter the prison once out of the study, and enter the study once out of the prison. Only these provide the most lofty and sublime life. And only those civilizations born in these two places are true civilizations with life and value.

In the course of the development of Hong Kong from an over-populated refuge to an international city of state dimensions, its government and political institutions have seldom been the object of detailed analysis by outside observers. One explanation may be that hitherto foreigners have been interested mainly in the performance of the economy to the exclusion of other considerations; now that external factors are influencing the internal affairs of Hong Kong and affecting prospects for growth, the local reaction to the possibility of hard times may be carefully scrutinized. Another, equally plausible, explanation is that since the government is colonial in style with no political parties mutually contesting at regular intervals to form a new administration, the political scene lacks the punctuation marks which would stimulate outside interest. Further consideration of this latter feature suggests that while senior civil servants and appointed representatives may govern impeccably they perforce avoid public debate, and in their public appearances are in any case no substitute for the charismatic leader when it comes to attracting foreign attention. At home, the Government of Hong Kong and its political institutions do not escape scrutiny so easily. Both universities have scholars working in this field and vigorous popular comment and debate is a daily characteristic of the mass media. From a local vantage point, contrary to what may be the view from abroad of an unchanging government and political institutions, significant changes have taken place as Hong Kong has undergone rapid physical development. Although they are changes within an established tradition of government, and do not therefore constitute a fundamental reform, they represent an important advance in community involvement in the administration of Hong Kong.