Drawing on untapped, open-source commentaries from elite Chinese commentators, we show that since 2018, China has become fixated on preparations for a potential “financial war” with the United States. China appears to have adjusted its renminbi (RMB) internationalization strategy – and broader approach to financial regulation – accordingly. China's perceived vulnerability to dollar sanctions increases the urgency of RMB internationalization but also makes it unacceptably risky to liberalize the capital account. The sources suggest that China's solution is to pursue partial RMB internationalization by keeping the capital account tightly regulated while encouraging trade partners to sign up for RMB settlement platforms. As more foreign banks sign up for RMB payment systems, China is gaining confidence that its financial system could weather the sudden imposition of dollar sanctions. However, China remains vulnerable in principle to a “monetary sniping” attack on the offshore RMB market.

Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in China often struggle to secure loan financing. In response, the government has required banks to increase credit for MSMEs and incorporate digital technologies into traditional credit evaluation models. In 2018, the state introduced “credit easy loan” digital lending platforms under its social credit system to facilitate collateral-free loans for MSMEs in a bid to enhance financial inclusion and social trust. Meanwhile, the actual implementation of these initiatives remains understudied. Drawing on six months of ethnographic fieldwork, this paper examines how “packaging agencies” act as intermediaries in preparing and “beautifying” bank loan applications. These agencies may manipulate credit data and leverage close relationships (guanxi) to help clients obtain loans, while banks may tacitly approve their practices to fulfil their financial inclusion requirements. Through such processes and in a supposedly digitalized system, a single MSME loan multiplied into ten loans, large companies became small businesses, and one housewife became a creditworthy microentrepreneur.

We present findings from historical microdata that suggest former rural elites effectively preserved their socio-economic advantages into the early People's Republic of China (PRC, circa 1949–1965) by exploiting urban–rural differences in government policies. In particular, former rural elites were three to four times more likely than poor peasants to move to a nearby town, and this urbanization was highly associated with socio-economic privileges in a rapidly developing economy, including both income and educational opportunities. We also find evidence that after 1949, former rural elites who did urbanize were more likely than their poor peasant counterparts to find industrial jobs.

As relations between the United States and China have grown tenser, how has the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) portrayal of the United States changed? And what might portrayals of the United States tell us about domestic messaging in China? This study systematically investigates CCP messaging about the United States in the contemporary era. To do this, we hand code, categorize and analyse 1,761 editorials about the United States published between 2003 and 2022 in People's Daily, the Party's flagship newspaper. In addition to showing a sustained rise in critical portrayals since 2018, we identify and elaborate three distinct critical narratives about the United States: it is a dangerous hegemon abroad, it has poor values at home, and it is increasingly weak and in decline. These narratives appear both independently and in combination and are often framed to contrast with portrayals of China. We argue that these narratives are not just negative propaganda to discredit the United States but can also be a strategy to promote a positive vision of the CCP's virtues and governance at home. This study contributes empirically and theoretically to research on propaganda and legitimation in China.

The article uses the scandal surrounding Jackson Yee, a state-endorsed celebrity and household name in China, as a case study to critically examine how the “government–industry–fan–platform” alliance co-conducts what we call “collaborative celebrity PR” to rescue co-opted stars from scandal. We find that the relationship between the four agents is symbiotic but that the government plays the most important “arbitrator” role. We argue that the state-endorsed celebrities face an inherent dilemma of “power(lessness)” in which they have to dedicate more effort towards propaganda and behave in a moral and exemplary way to please the government to gain more political capital and power and minimize their own precarity. We also highlight the uncertainty and risks using celebrities in its pop propaganda can bring to the CCP: if a state-endorsed celebrity cannot be saved, the scandal can damage the legitimacy and reliability of the Party propaganda.

China has taken significant steps to combat corruption since the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, whether and how the anti-corruption efforts influence the public's evaluation of local government performance remain understudied. Using multiple data sources, including panel survey data taken from the China Family Panel Studies from 2010 to 2018, this research examines how anti-corruption efforts improve evaluations of local government performance by reducing public perception of existing corruption. Additional analysis reveals that anti-corruption efforts reduce perceived corruption primarily when the public trusts officials or has had positive experiences with them. The positive impact on local government evaluations has been more pronounced in provinces with high levels of pre-existing corruption and since the 18th CCP National Congress in 2012. Moreover, the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts has remained consistent across all time periods since 2012.

What benefits do inclusive institutions offer authoritarian rulers? Previous research has studied delegate behaviour in authoritarian institutions but has been less well-equipped to assess government reactions to it. Analysing the case of one People's Political Consultative Conference in China, I argue that an overlooked key benefit of inclusive institutions is their provision of expertise. Drawing on novel data comprising more than 9,000 policy suggestions submitted by delegates, delegates' biographies and the corresponding government responses, I illustrate that the government generally values suggestions that signal expertise. While this is especially true for departments of a more technocratic nature, I also find that members of the institutional leadership are systematically favoured. These findings provide an important addition to our understanding of the role of authoritarian institutions in policymaking processes.

In response to its severe environmental problems, China's government is pursuing a national goal to “build an ecological civilization.” One approach used to theorize about China's environmental governance is environmental authoritarianism (EA). Drawing on work in political steering theory and the governmentality tradition, this paper addresses the “soft” side of EA by analysing the eco-civilization discourse on food and eating in policy documents and consumer guidebooks. It argues that China's EA works not only through coercion but also through citizen responsibilization. The emerging discourse of eco-civilization outlines a cultural nationalist programme focused on virtue and vice, in which consumer behaviour is morally charged. Consumers are expected to cultivate themselves into models of ecological morality to fulfil their civic duty and support the state's goal of building an ecological civilization.