* I am indebted to Allen Whiting for his valuable suggestions and comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Ann Martin Pollack and Roy Grow have also been most helpful critics.Google Scholar

1. Yahuda, Michael B., “China's nuclear option,” in China After the Cultural Revolution—A Selection From The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 209.Google Scholar

2. According to the March 1971 Congressional testimony of Defence Secretary Laird, “the start of testing [in China] has not yet been confirmed, but a reduced range test of an ICBM may have occurred late in 1970.” He also noted that China “may have” deployed its first medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), although principal emphasis was apparently being given to intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). In more recent testimony, Secretary Laird indicated that he did not anticipate an initial ICBM deployment until 1975, two years later than his previous estimate, although an ICBM test was expected during 1972. See the Washington Post, 16 02 1972.Google Scholar Some additional disclosures, detailed in the New York Times, 1 02 1972, revealed that China has begun to deploy an IRBM of greater range and “with a much improved propellant system” over that previously available, while MRBMs are apparently no longer being actively deployed.Google Scholar

3. See, for example, the text of President Nixon's news conference in the New York Times, 31 January 1970: “Ten years from now, the Communist Chinese…may have a significant nuclear capability.…[Thus] it will be very important for the United States to have some kind of defense so that nuclear blackmail could not be used against the United States or against those nations … with which the United States is allied in the Pacific.” For a discussion of the potential impact of a Chinese nuclear capability, see note 50.Google Scholar

4. This is not to suggest that no serious work has been done on this topic. See, in particular, several articles by Hsieh, Alice Langley, “The military confrontation in Asia: the Chinese viewpoint,” The RAND Corporation P–1104/9740, 23 August 1968; “Communist China's military policies, doctrine, and strategy,” RAND P–3960, November 1968; and “China's nuclear-missile program: regional or intercontinental?” The China Quarterly, No. 44 (1971), pp. 85–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Hsieh's earlier study, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), remains the only systematic treatment of the entire topic and is still worthy of close consideration.Google Scholar For other views, see Clemens, Jr., Walter C., The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1968)Google Scholar, and Halperin, Morton H., “Chinese attitudes toward the use and control of nuclear weapons,” in Tsou, Tang (ed.), China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 135–13.Google Scholar

5. Although I have excluded internal constraints from this framework, I am not trying to deny the significance of domestic political and economic factors in China's pursuit of a nuclear capability. Rather, it appears that these constraints cannot assist us very much when analyzing the principal topic under investigation: attitudes towards nuclear weapons as expressed in the Chinese press.Google Scholar

6. Perceptions of hostility and capability constitute two of the four general categories of perception utilized in the early research of Dina Zinnes, Robert North, and Howard Koch. See their essay, “Capability, threat, and the outbreak of war,” in Rosenau, James N. (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy, 1st ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1961), p. 472.Google Scholar

7. NCNA, 14 May 1965, in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate General), No. 3460, p. 1.Google Scholar

8. Statement of the Government of the C.P.R., 16 10 1964, in SCMP, No. 3322, p. 3.Google Scholar

9. Ibid. p. 2. It should be noted, however, that “the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons” is considered an “ultimate aim”; there has never been any suggestion that China would unilaterally halt weapons production and testing without a guarantee that was binding upon all nuclear powers.Google Scholar

10. NCNA, 28 12 1966, in SCMP, No. 3851, p. 1.Google Scholar

11. “A brilliant victory for Mao Tse-tung's thought,” Chieh-fang-chün Pao, NCNA, 18 06 1967, in SCMP, No. 3964, p. 3.Google Scholar

12. “A triumph of Mao Tse-tung's thought,” Chieh-fang-chün Pao, NCNA, 19 06 1967, in SCMP, No. 3965, p. 13.Google Scholar

13. This argument receives further confirmation in the highly subdued communiqué of 4 October 1969 reporting the two detonations of late September. Even though these tests occurred within six days of one another and were the first successful tests in nine months they were announced jointly and with 11- and 5-day time lags, respectively. All previous tests – with the exception of the December 1967 detonation which was a likely failure and was never announced – had been reported without delay. Moreover, the initial September test was China's first underground detonation. Yet the announcement was brief and made without accompanying fanfare; the needs for “preparedness against war” and “defending the motherland” were each mentioned once, but neither theme was elaborated upon. This is a likely indication of the Chinese elite's concern over the exceedingly critical threat of nuclear war in late September and early October. It was probably decided that any undue emphasis on these successful tests would only increase the possibility of a pre-emptive Soviet attack on the Chinese nuclear facilities, then being openly discussed outside China.Google Scholar

14. Statement of the Government of the C.P.R., in SCMP, No. 3322, pp. 1–2. My emphasis.Google Scholar

15. In this respect it should be recalled that formal agreements on the stationing of American nuclear submarines in Japanese ports occurred only six weeks prior to the October 1964 detonation. Chinese comments on this event (SCMP, No. 3295, pp. 30–1) seem more rueful than inflammatory, but it seems fairly plausible that Chinese leaders interpreted this agreement as a preliminary step that would eventually lead to the nuclear arming of Japan.Google Scholar

16. NCNA, 26 08 1966, in Current Background (CB), No. 803, p. 34.Google Scholar

17. Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily) (Peking) (JMJP), NCNA, 12 01 1968, in SCMP, No. 4100, p. 27.Google Scholar

18. NCNA, 17 10 1964, in SCMP, No. 3322, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

19. “A brilliant victory for Mao Tse-tung's thought,” p. 3.Google Scholar

20. NCNA, 18 06 1967, in SCMP, No. 3970, p. 24. This document was not issued in English.Google Scholar

21. Only excerpts of this document are available. See “Resolution of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee concerning [the] anti-Party clique headed by P'eng Teh-huai,” NCNA, 15 August 1967, in SCMP, No. 4004, pp. 1–4.Google Scholar

22. Charles, David A., “The dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai,” The China Quarterly, No. 8 (10–12 1961), p. 65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

23. “Settle accounts with P'eng Teh-huai for his heinous crimes of usurping army leadership and opposing the Party (Part 2),” JMJP, NCNA, 20 08 1967, in SCMP, No. 4007, p. 13. My emphasis.Google Scholar

24. “A triumph of Mao Tse-tung's thought,” p. 13.Google Scholar

25. The case of Nieh Jung-chen, Director of the Scientific and Technological Commission for National Defence and the official chiefly responsible for the development of missiles and nuclear weapons, seems to offer further support for this conclusion. Although Nieh and other individuals involved in the national defence research programme came under strong attack in 1967 and 1968, they were never explicitly criticized for opposition to Maoist strategic doctrine. And, while there were accusations that some scientists adhered to the “expert line” rather than the “mass line” in scientific research, they were never attacked for opposing the goals of the Chinese nuclear programme. Rather, the apparent major criticism concerned the political and economic autonomy of the scientific research organizations. For example, one Red Guard publication (in SCMP, No. 4240, p. 2) complained about the “mountain stronghold” mentality of some of Nieh's followers who were establishing what amounted to “an impregnable independent kingdom” within the Commission. In addition, Nieh was specifically accused of protecting revisionist scientists from attack. In his comments at a meeting called to discuss these charges (in Selections from China Mainland Magazines (SCMM), No. 631, pp. 1–27), Chou En-lai chiefly expressed concern about the large quantity of economic resources and scientific manpower at Nieh's disposal. Yet, as Chou also said (p. 26): “The Office and Ministries of the National Defence Industry have done many things which are in correspondence with Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, and it cannot be said that all things carried out in the past … are wrong.”Google Scholar

26. For a more extended discussion of the impact of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese nuclear programme, and more particularly a description of the attacks on China's nuclear scientists, see Chang, Parris H., “China's eclipse of the moon,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 01 1969, pp. 97–9.Google Scholar

27. NCNA, 28 12 1968, in SCMP, No. 4330, p. 10.Google Scholar

28. “Speech by Premier Chou En-lai …” Tzu-Liao Chuan-chi (Special Collection of Materials), in SCMM, No. 631, pp. 22, 27. My emphasis.Google Scholar

29. Ch'en Yi Press Conference, 29 09 1965, in Peking Review, Vol. 8, No. 41 (8 10 1965), p. 8.Google Scholar

30. Young, Oran has provided a more than adequate survey of Chinese attitudes up to 1965 in his article, “Chinese views on the spread of nuclear weapons,” The China Quarterly, No. 26 (04–06 1966), pp. 136–13.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

31. In analyzing this question, it would be inadequate to argue simply that the Chinese attitude is either “for” or “against” proliferation. Instead, we must distinguish among a variety of potential policy positions which could be adopted by the Chinese leadership. That is, there could be: (1) explicit opposition to proliferation; (2) toleration, indicated either by a lack of criticism or only mild criticism of other nations' efforts to acquire nuclear weapons; (3) encouragement, evidenced by unambiguous approval of the possibility of additional nuclear powers; or (4) assistance for, or participation in, ongoing research programmes. In addition, it may be necessary to distinguish between those statements which indicate a generalized orientation towards proliferation, as opposed to those which seem directed at specific nations.Google Scholar

32. This is Morton Halperin's argument in China and Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Center for Policy Study, 1966), especially pp. 36–42.Google Scholar

33. See, for example, the NCNA press releases following Eisaku Sato's visit to Washington in 11 1969, such as in SCMP, Nos. 4548 (pp. 19–20) and 4569 (pp. 42–3).Google Scholar In addition, see the attacks of the JMJP commentator on the Japanese National Defence White Paper, in Peking Review, Vol. 13, No. 45 (6 11 1970), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar Chinese fears of Japanese nuclear development were strongly reiterated by Chou, En-lai in his interview with Reston, James, in the New York Times, 10 08 1971.Google Scholar

34. “Break nuclear monopoly, destroy nuclear weapons,” JMJP, NCNA, 22 10 1964, in SCMP, No. 3325, p. 25.Google Scholar

35. Ch'en Yi Press Conference, in Peking Review, Vol. 8, No. 41, p. 8.Google Scholar

36. Ibid.

37. Han, Tung-pi, Li, Ch'ing-kun, and Yü, Tzu-chung, “View nuclear weapons with a correct world outlook,” Kuang-ming Jih pao (Enlightenment Daily) (Peking), NCNA, 25 08 1965, in SCMP, No. 3539, p. 8.Google Scholar

38. NCNA, 30 07 1966, in SCMP, No. 3752, p. 24.Google Scholar

39. Peking Radio, 30 October 1964, cited in Young, “Chinese views on the spread of nuclear weapons,” p. 148.Google Scholar

40. “Break nuclear monopoly, destroy nuclear weapons,” p. 24.Google Scholar

41. “A new starting point for the strivings for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons,” JMJP, NCNA, 22 11 1964, in SCMP, No. 3345, p. 20. My emphasis.Google Scholar

42. See, for example, Halperin, Morton H and Perkins, Dwight A., Communist China and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Centre, 1965), ch. X.Google Scholar

43. A renewed interest in prior disarmament considerations, however, has been clearly evident in Chinese statements since November 1970. The Chinese appeal for a worldwide conference to discuss the prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons (with an agreement not to use them as a first step) was revived on 1 November 1970, in a meeting with a delegation from the Japanese Socialist Party (NCNA, 1 11 1970, in SCMP, No. 4776, pp. 64–6).Google Scholar Chou En-Iai's unambiguous commitment along these lines in his December 1970 interview with Snow, Edgar (see The New Republic, 27 03 1971, pp. 20–2)Google Scholar gave added emphasis to this development. Chou made similar proposals in later interviews with a group of visiting American newsmen in June and with James Reston in August 1971. In late July, an official statement from the Chinese Government, made public one week later, recommitted Peking to this position (NCNA, 7 August 1971, in SCMP, No. 4958, pp. 74–6); it was also restated by Ch'iao Kuan-hua in the initial Chinese address before the UN General Assembly (New York Times, 16 11 1971). The more specific reason for the July statement, however, was to reject an earlier Soviet proposal “to convene a conference of the five powers possessing nuclear weapons.” The official statement urged the United States and Soviet Union to commit themselves to a “no first use” pledge similar to China's, as well as to remove all nuclear weapons stationed on foreign soil.Google Scholar

44. Observer, “Another deal between two nuclear overlords, U.S. and Soviet Union,” JMJP, NCNA, 15 11 1966, in SCMP, No. 3823, pp. 40–4. My emphasis.Google Scholar

45. NCNA, 9 03 1968, in SCMP, No. 4137, p. 31.Google Scholar

46. “A nuclear fraud jointly hatched by the United States and the Soviet Union,” JMJP, NCNA, 13 06 1968, in SCMP, No. 4201, pp. 30–3.Google Scholar

47. NCNA, 23 06 1968, in SCMP, No. 4208, pp. 24–2.Google Scholar

48. “A nuclear fraud jointly hatched by the United States and the Soviet Union,” p. 31. My emphasis.Google Scholar

49. This hypothesis finds support in the Chinese comments on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations. As the JMJP commentator noted in July 1968: “The so-called restriction and reduction of strategic nuclear weapons systems put forward by the two sides is an out-and-out fraud. For a long time, the United States and Soviet Union have stored large quantities of strategic missiles systems. This new deal … will not deter in the least the implementation of their policies of nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail.” (NCNA, 8 07 1968, in SCMP, No. 4218, p. 22.)Google Scholar

50. The question of Peking's likely nuclear capability and the assumed possibility of a Chinese attack on major American cities, not unexpectedly, bear directly on the validity of the argument favouring an anti-Chinese ABM. In order for the latter justification to possess credibility, for example, we find that any Chinese ICBMs (assuming they are fully operational by the early 1980s) must be capable of a somewhat extended range simply to cover the air distance to the United States. That is, we must initially assume that Chinese ICBMs would be deployed from the regions closest to the United States via polar routes—namely, on or near the borders of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. If we calculate the distances (in statute miles) from 100 miles inside these borders to the United States, it becomes apparent that, with the exception of Seattle, it would be impossible for Chinese missiles with a range of less than 6,000 miles to reach any major American city, unless all the missiles were deployed from northern Manchuria. From a strategic perspective, a deployment exclusively from one region would be totally unrealistic. Even a capability of 6,000 miles for a Manchurian-based missile would still exclude certain American cities from the list of presumed targets. For example, the estimated distances between Washington, D.C., and northern Manchuria, Sinkiang, and Inner Mongolia are approximately 6,250, 6,425, and 6,925 miles, respectively. The lack of any ICBM tests (as of November 1971) precludes a precise estimate of the likely range of such a missile. According to a report in the New York Times of 31 05 1971, American analysts predict “that China could have a force of 10 to 25 [ICBMs] with a 6,000 mile range by the mid-1970s,” presumably to be equipped with a 3-megaton warhead. In view of the above calculations, however, it appears that to speak of an “operational Chinese threat”—even in the early 1980s, as argued by President Nixon—may be premature. Hence any quick conclusion about the possibility of a Chinese attack on American cities does not seem warranted. Although these considerations are critical to a careful assessment of China's likely nuclear capability (and hence future Chinese nuclear doctrine), they remain entirely unexamined in public debate. Evaluating the possibility of a Chinese attack on the basis of plotted air distances was apparently never raised in the numerous and extended controversies concerning the possible merit of an anti-Chinese area defence system. I am grateful to Allen Whiting for raising these issues with me and making me aware of their possible implications.Google Scholar

51. JMJP, NCNA, 31 12 1964, in SCMP, No. 3371, p. 35.Google Scholar

52. “Hold high the great red banner of Mao Tse-tung's thought and courageously drive ahead,” JMJP, in Peking Review, Vol. 8, No. 40 (1 10 1965), p. 10.Google Scholar

53. “U.S. imperialism's war threat must be seriously dealt with,” JMJP, NCNA, 29 01 1966, in SCMP, No. 3629, p. 30.Google Scholar

54. JMJP commentator, NCNA, 31 05 1966, in SCMP, No. 3711, p. 35.Google Scholar

55. NCNA, 29 02 1968, in SCMP, No. 4131, p. 26.Google Scholar

56. Ibid. p. 29.

57. Ibid. p. 30.

58. NCNA, 17 03 1969, in SCMP, No. 4382, p. 16.Google Scholar

59. Commentator, “Soviet revisionist ruling clique can only be digging its own grave in rabidly opposing China,” JMJP, NCNA, 11 03 1969, in SCMP, No. 4377, p. 24.Google Scholar

60. One example of such a “non-response” (in “View nuclear weapons with a correct world outlook,” in SCMP, No. 3539, p. 9) should be sufficient to demonstrate that if one wishes to investigate Chinese attitudes towards nuclear weapons declaratory norms will not suffice: “Atom bombs are of course more destructive than conventional weapons, but they cannot fight the masses of the people, because the masses of the people really form steel walls. … It is precisely because we are firmly convinced that … the masses of the people have inexhaustible strength and the awakened people will surely triumph over the reactionaries … that we – faced with a powerful enemy, regardless of whether it is nuclear weapons or any other weapons that are held in the hands of the enemy of the revolution, and no matter how perilous the situation may be – always dare to despise the enemy strategically, wage a tit-for-tat struggle against him, and have full confidence in the victory of the future of the revolution.”Google Scholar

61. “Study 'Talk with the American correspondent Anna Louise Strong,'” JMJP, 24 08 1966, in CB, No. 803, p. 6. My emphasis. This article first appeared in Chieh-fang-chün Pao.Google Scholar

62. Powell, Ralph has provided a useful summary of the major themes and implications of the paper tiger thesis in his article, “Great powers and atomic bombs are ‘paper tigers,’” The China Quarterly, No. 23 (07–09 1965), pp. 55–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

63. Liu, Yun-cheng, “The role of people's militia,” Peking Review, Vol. 8, No. 6 (5 02 1965), p. 19. My emphasis.Google Scholar

64. JMJP, NCNA, 13 07 1965, in SCMP, No. 3498, p. 22. My emphasis.Google Scholar

65. Lo Jui-ch'ing, “The people defeated Japanese fascism and they can certainly defeat U.S. imperialism, too,” NCNA, 4 September 1965, in CB, No. 770, p. 9. My emphasis. I regard this document as giving some support to the thesis that by this date Lo – at least publicly – may have undergone a partial conversion to the “people's war” strategy. In this respect I differ somewhat from Uri Ra'anan, who regards the 3 September speeches as an indication that the two “military lines” were fundamentally at odds. See his essay, “Peking's foreign policy ‘debate,’ 1965–6,” in Tsou, Tang (ed.), China's Policies in Asia, especially pp. 54–5.Google Scholar

66. Chiang, Hsueh-shan, “The paper tiger must be hit as though it is an iron tiger,” JMJP, 25 08 1966, in CB, No. 803, p. 29. My emphasis.Google Scholar

67. NCNA, 22 08 1968, in SCMP, No. 4247, p. 23. My emphasis.Google Scholar

68. JMJP, NCNA, 7 05 1969, in SCMP, No. 4415, p. 27. My emphasis.Google Scholar

69. NCNA, 24 05 1969, in SCMP, No. 4427, p. 32.Google Scholar

70. Statement of the Government of the C.P.R., NCNA, 7 10 1969, in SCMP, No. 4516, p. 23.Google Scholar This probably refers to developments such as the bellicose column by Louis, Victor, reported in the New York Times, 18 09 1969.Google Scholar

71. National Day Editorial, JMJP, Hung-ch'i (Red Flag) (Peking)Google Scholar, and Chieh-fang-chün Pao, NCNA, 30 09 1969, in CB, No. 893, pp. 48–4.Google Scholar

72. A single exception to this conclusion can be found in an article from Hung-ch'i issued after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967.Google Scholar This essay, later republished in Peking Review, does not appear to be a discussion limited to its immediate political and military context: “The Middle East events serve to show that U.S. imperialism, though at the end of its rope, is growing more reckless with the help of [the Soviet revisionist] clique. … With the Soviet revisionist clique as its big accomplice, U.S. imperialism is more likely to start new military adventures … by means of a blitzkrieg against peoples who it thinks are unprepared for war.” Chou, Tien-chih, “Lessons of the Arab war against aggression,” Peking Review, Vol. 10, No. 37 (8 09 1967), p. 23.Google Scholar

73. The 29 available issues have been edited and translated by Cheng, J. Chester in The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1966).Google Scholar

74. For a discussion of these considerations, see Lewis, John Wilson, “China's secret military papers: ‘continuities’ and ‘revelations,’” The China Quarterly, No. 18 (04–06 1964), pp. 68–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

75. This topic has been examined in Powell, Ralph L., Politico-Military Relationships in Communist China (U.S. State Department: External Research Staff, 10 1963).Google Scholar

76. This has already been done in succinct fashion by Alice Langley Hsieh in her article, “China's secret military papers: military doctrine and strategy,” The China Quarterly, No. 18 (04–06 1964), pp. 79–99.Google Scholar

77. Ra'anan, “Peking's foreign policy ‘debate,’ 1965–6”, especially pp. 54–8 and 66–8.Google Scholar

78. In order to avoid any possible confusion concerning the above analysis, it is stressed that this documentation is solely a description of Chinese strategic assumptions and alternatives expressed publicly during a period when no operational delivery system was known to exist on the Chinese mainland. Hence we should not view these statements as a timeless expression of China's nuclear doctrine, but rather as a response to external threat during a period when Chinese vulnerability to attack was high and when any Chinese response would have been ineffectual or perhaps nonexistent.Google Scholar

79. “Break nuclear monopoly, destroy nuclear weapons,” p. 23.Google Scholar

80. “Study ‘Talk with American correspondent Anna Louise Strong,’” p. 7.Google Scholar

81. See the “warning” issued in JMJP (NCNA, 31 05 1966, in SCMP, No. 3711, p. 35): “Any sober-minded Japanese knows that Japan's becoming a U.S. imperialist nuclear base can only mean the plunging of the Japanese nation again into the abyss of calamity and that there can be no ‘security’ to speak of. The pro-U.S. Sato government is leading the country onto an extremely perilous road.”Google Scholar

82. NCNA, 9 03 1969, in SCMP, No. 4376, p. 24.Google Scholar

83. Jen, Ku-p'ing, “U.S. imperialism is in essence a paper tiger because it has lost every battle,” JMJP, 27 08 1966, in CB, No. 803, p. 21.Google Scholar

84. Hsieh, “China's secret military papers,” p. 87.Google Scholar

85. Ibid.

86. Yeh Chien-ying, Speech at the Military Affairs Commission Conference on Training, cited Ibid. pp. 83–5. My emphasis.

87. “The most important and fundamental war preparation,” Chieh-fang-chün Pao, NCNA, 14 02 1966, in SCMP, No. 3641, pp. 15–16.Google Scholar

88. “Study ‘Talk with American correspondent Anna Louise Strong,’” p. 7.Google Scholar

89. “It is imperative to grasp the ‘four goods’ firmly,” Chieh-fang-chün Pao, NCNA, 13 12 1969, in SCMP, No. 4561, p. 15.Google Scholar

90. This is not to deny the possibility of an additional hypothesis which helps account for the public airing of such views. To argue in time of war that an external nuclear threat poses a severe danger to the survival of China is not the sort of argument that one would expect under crisis circumstances. It would seem far more sensible, in view of the need to maintain civilian morale, to reassure the populace that China – while lacking an adequate nuclear capability – could nevertheless be successfully defended from attack. As a result, these once-secret military evaluations were specifically directed to a mass audience within China.Google Scholar

91. The detonation of China's fourth thermonuclear device on 14 October 1970, which might have been expected to furnish further insight into Chinese attitudes, was never announced by the Chinese Government or in the Chinese press. The only official acknowledgement that a test had occurred was made by Chou En-lai in his interview with Edgar Snow in December 1970. Chou stated that “after our recent test” a delegation from the Japanese Socialist Party had expressed support for China's “no first use” pledge and for Peking's renewed interest in a world-wide disarmament conference. The New Republic, 27 03 1971, p. 23. The 12th nuclear detonation, a 20-kiloton test, took place on 18 November 1971, followed by a similar test on 7 January 1972. A 14th detonation, conducted on 18 March 1972, had a force estimated at between 20 and 200 kilotons.Google Scholar

Chou's interview with Snow also contained the comment not previously made that “our nuclear tests are still in the experimental stage.” This argument has since been reiterated and further developed in several different contexts. In an interview with a group of visiting American newsmen (New York Times, 23 06 1971)Google Scholar, Chou stated that “we cannot call ourselves a big nuclear power.” More pointedly, in response to a question from James Reston several months later, Chou flatly rejected any characterization of China as a “nuclear power”: “No, we are not a nuclear power. We are only in the experimental stage. And what is more, that has been the case throughout the period from 1964 to the present, seven years already.” New York Times, 10 08 1971. Similar remarks were made in the Chinese Government statement of 15 July 1971, and in Ch'iao Kuan-hua's address before the UN General Assembly on 15 November. This elaboration of the Chinese position suggests that Peking is strongly resisting any effort to place China's current nuclear capability on a par with that of the United States or the Soviet Union. Thus, as of the time of writing (November 1971), there is no reason to reconsider the conclusions reached for the earlier period, or to suggest that any major changes in Chinese attitudes have occurred since 1969.Google Scholar