^1. For the impact of the Soviet revolution on Indian nationalism, see Jayantuja Bandyopadhyaya, Indian Nationalism versus International Communism (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1966), chs V–VII.Google Scholar

^2. There had been little indigenous political thinking in India for a thousand years before the British conquest. Since the nineteenth century, Indian political thinking had centred round the British style of parliamentary democracy. Marxism-Leninism entered this mainstream of political thinking mainly through British socialism. Emotional responses to the Soviet revolution by men like Nehru and Tagore made the Soviet experiment minus the principal institutions of the Soviet State such as dictatorship of the proletariat and the use of regimentation and terror, part of the liberal-socialist, Indian democratic ethos. See Ghosh, Dr Sankar, Indian Communism and Socialism (Bombay, 1970)Google Scholar; also Nehru's, writings, especially his Discovery of India (New York: Doubleday, 1968)Google Scholar and An Autobiography (London: The Bodley Head, 1938Google Scholar. For Nehru's views on the Soviet revolution, see his Soviet Russia (Allahabad, 1928Google ScholarPubMed. For an interesting analysis of the social background of Indian liberal-socialist thinking, see A. R., Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1966).Google Scholar

^3. For documented accounts of this rivalry, see Kautsky, John H., Moscow and the Communist Party of India (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1956), chs 2 and 3Google Scholar; McLane, Charles B., Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), ch. 6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gupta, Bhabani Sen, The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations Among China, India, Pakistan and the USSR (New York: Pegasus, 1970), chs 2 and 3.Google Scholar

^4. Liu's speech or the relevant portions of it can be found in Kautsky as well as McLane; for a lengthier quotation, see V. B., Sinha, The Red Rebel in India (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1968), pp. 46–7Google Scholar. Liu in his Peking speech listed four pillars of success for the Chinese revolution: rural bases, broad national front, people's revolutionary army, and armed struggle. In a long article printed in Pravda of 7–9 June 1949, Liu had stressed the need to mobilize the peasantry for protracted armed struggle in the colonies and semi-colonies, and recommended for the Communist parties there, including India by name, the strategy of the broadest united front from below. See Gupta, Sen, The Fulcrum of Asia, p. 335n.Google Scholar

^5. Ch'en Po-ta claimed in 1949 that Mao had reached conclusions similar to Stalin's “on many fundamental problems through his independent thinking.” “Stalin and the Chinese revolution,” Sino-Soviet Friendship (Peking), 15 12 1949Google Scholar. In so doing, Ch'en was, in fact, asserting that Mao led the Chinese revolution Independently of Moscow, and that in creative Marxist-Leninist thinking, he was on a par with Stalin. Two years later, Ch'en Po-ta claimed with further clarity the distinctiveness of the Chinese revolution from the Soviet revolution, especially with its rural base area and guerrilla warfare. “Mao Tse-tung's theory of the Chinese revolution is the integration of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese revolution,” People's Daily, 28 06 1951Google Scholar. Lu, Tung-yi, in an article in the Cominform Journal in 1951, said that the classical model of revolution, the Soviet, held good for the imperialist (capitalist) countries, while the Chinese revolution was the model for the colonies and semi-colonies. LPPD, 29 06 1951.Google Scholar

^6. Kautsky, , Moscow and the CPI, p. 87.Google Scholar

^7. Quoted in a statement by the editorial board of Communist, monthly theoretical journal of the CPI, February–March 1950.Google Scholar

^8. Rasul, A., Krishak Sabha Itihas (History of the Kisan Sabha), chs 10–14. According to the author, the Bengal branch of the Kisan Sabha, perhaps the strongest peasant front under CPI leadership, held no annual conference between 1947 and 1951. The Bengal unit had only 30,000 primary members in 1952 (pp. 179–80). Primary membership rose to 104,000 in 1953, but there was practically no peasant struggle except two mass rallies in August–September (pp. 187–9). It was not before 1959 that the peasant protests against shortage of foodgrains assumed some mass proportions (p. 212). In 1960 the Kisan Sabha for the first time formulated demands for land reforms rather than tenancy reforms (pp. 207–12).Google Scholar

^9. For a fairly detailed summary of the main formulations of the Andhra Communists, see Ram, Mohan, Indian Communism: Split Within a Split (New Delhi: Vikas, 1969), pp. 23–9.Google Scholar

^10. Ranadive wrote about Mao: “Firstly, we must state emphatically that the Communist Party of India has accepted Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin as the authoritative sources of Marxism. It has not discovered new sources of Marxism beyond these. Nor for that matter is there any Communist Party which declares adherence to the so-called theory of new democracy alleged to be pronounced by Mao and declares it to be a new addition to Marxism.” Ibid. p. 31. “While there is no evidence to suggest that the Andhra Leadership had any communication with the Chinese party it is quite possible that Ranadive had Soviet backing when he denounced Mao.” Ibid. p. 32.

^11. For accounts of the debate, see Kautsky, , Moscow and the CPI, pp. 88–91Google Scholar, McLane, , ch. 6 and Gupta, Sen, ch. 2. Also, Overstreet, G. D.and Windmiller, M., Communism in India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), pp. 259–74.Google Scholar

^12. This suggestion is made in Vic, Victor M., Peaceful Transition to Communism in India (Bombay: Nachiketa Press, 1969), pp. 22–3.Google Scholar

^13. For the hard bargaining that took place between Stalin and Mao over Soviet interests in Sinkiang and Manchuria, see Whiting, Allen S., China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 27–30, and 179–80.Google Scholar

^14. Soviet thinking on the Chinese path had gone through several phases since 1948 which for reasons of space I shall not discuss here. For further information, see my The Fulcrum of Asia, pp. 55–62; Kautsky, , Moscow and the CPI, pp. 88–91;Google ScholarZagoria, Donald S., “Strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance,” Problems of Communism, 05–06 1960.Google Scholar

^15. For the text of R. P., Dutt's interview, see Indian Communist Party Documents 1930–36 (CPI Documents) (Bombay: Democratic Research Service, 1957), pp. 61–70.Google Scholar

^16. Gupta, Sen, The Fulcrum of Asia, p. 337.Google Scholar

^17. For the text, see CPI Documents, pp. 71–85. The report, entitled Tactical Line, was not circulated to the delegates of the congress.Google Scholar

^18. The editors of CPI Documents say “The Statement adopted by the Madurai Congress was entirely on the lines of this document received from Moscow.” This, however, is not borne out by a comparison of the two documents. The fact is that the policy statement contained very little of the major formulations of the four CPI leaders. For the text of the Madurai congress political resolutions, see CPI Documents, pp. 93–124.Google Scholar

^19. Kautsky, , Moscow and the CPI, last chapter.Google Scholar

^20. Pravda, 10 September 1959. The Tass statement was issued in spite of Peking's request to the contrary. The CCP noted in 1963 that this was the first public disclosure of Sino-Soviet differences. See “No one can save the Indian reactionaries from their political bankruptcy,” Peking Review (PR), 30 08 1963.Google Scholar

^21. “On certain questions before the International Communist Movement,” unpublished resolution of the central executive committee of the CPI, September 1960. This document was one of the three major papers before the preparatory commission of the Moscow conference which included Ghosh, the two others being a secret 84-page CPSU letter to some of the fraternal parties on the ideological disputes, and the CCP's rejoinder to it.Google Scholar

^22. The CPI claimed that it had made a major contribution to the formulation of the concept “national democracy” in the 1960 Moscow document. Mohit Sen, a CPI theoretician, described the concept as the “culmination” of the party's own formulations on the same lines since 1956. See Ram, Mohan, Maoism in India (Delhi: Vikas, 1971), pp. 27–9. Its author says, “The concept of national democracy is an innovation of Soviet-Indian revisionism.”Google Scholar

^23. The CPSU accused the dissidents of attempts to split the CPI even in 1959. See Partinya Zhizh, No. 11, part I. “The CPSU leadership raised the bogey of a split in the CPI long before the dominant right group of the CPI came across any evidence of it. It was in the Soviet interest to avert a split at the Vijaywada Congress in 1961, and Suslov worked for a compromise. But, in 1964, the CPSU seems to have felt that if a split was not forced immediately, there was every chance of the whole party going over to the left group at the next party congress.” Ram, Indian Communism: Split Within a Split, pp. 185–209.Google Scholar

^24. “Ajoy Ghosh, who had outlined a programme for a ‘national democratic front’ in India as early as February 1956 [on the eve of the 20th CPSU Congress] and had anticipated the Soviet thesis of peaceful co-existence was among those who prepared the documents for the 1960 Moscow conference. So the CPI can legitimately claim the concept of national democracy as its contribution to the international communist movement.” Maoism in India, pp. 28–9. A noted Indian intellectual believes that the friendship between India and the Soviet Union rests partly on the fact that Russia is the least occidental of the western countries and India the least oriental of the eastern societies. Sisir Gupta in Seminar, January 1965.Google Scholar

^25. In a broadcast from Delhi on 1 January 1965, Union Home Minister, Nanda, Gulzarilal said, “There is reason to believe that the new party (CPI(M)) was formed under Peking's inspiration. It was to serve as Peking's instrument in creating conditions of instability in the country and to facilitate the promotion of Chinese designs against India in furtherance of her grand strategy of establishing hegemony … over Asia and her declared aim of world revolution. There is reason to believe that the Left Communist Party has close links with the Chinese from whom it draws ideological inspiration and receives support in other forms.” Sinha, The Red Rebel in India, pp. 186–9.Google Scholar

^26. Why the Ultra- “left” Deviation?, CPI(M) (Calcutta, 1968), p. 44.Google Scholar

^27. “A Maoist line for India,” The China Quarterly, No. 33, January–March 1968. See also “Moscow, Peking, and the Indian political scene after Nehru,” Orbis, summer 1968.Google Scholar

^28. Quoted in Link (Weekly), Delhi, 23 04 1967.Google Scholar

^29. For an informative account of the various Maoist factions in India and their inter-relations during 1967–70, see Ram, , Maoism in India, as well as my forthcoming Communism in Indian Politics (New York: Columbia University Press).Google Scholar

^30. In summarizing the political resolution of the CPI(ML) Chinese media selected mainly those portions which reflected Maoist strategy and tactics. See PR, 11 July 1969. In reporting armed peasant struggles, Maoist tactics and the Maoist essentials of such struggle were carefully put forward. See reports in PR, 6 August, 19 September and 31 October 1969; 2 January, 30 January and 13 February 1970. See also: Shao Yung-hung, “Rising revolutionary storm of the Indian peasants,” PR, 9 September 1969. Shao's article was clearly designed to tell the Indian Communist revolutionaries how to organize peasant armed struggles on Maoist lines.Google Scholar

^31. For ideological perspectives of some of the prominent CPI(M) leaders in 1964, see A Contribution to Ideological Issues, New Delhi, 1964. This publication was not issued on behalf of the party evidently because the party at that time had no official ideological line.Google Scholar

^32. Political resolution adopted at the Madurai session of the CPI(M) central committee. Supplement to People's Democracy, 10 09 1967Google ScholarPubMed. Earlier, in July, the politburo issued a statement declaring that the “entire assessment” by “Peking Radio” of the Naxalbari struggle was “at complete variance with that made by our Party.” The Statesman, 2 07 1967.Google ScholarPubMed

^33. Supplement to People's Democracy, 10 09 1967.Google ScholarPubMed

^34. Ibid.

^35. Ibid.

^36. Ibid.

^37. Politburo Statement on the 9th National Congress of the CPC, CPI(M) (Calcutta, 05 1969).Google Scholar

^38. C. Rajeshwara, Rao, “Naxalite movement: origin and harmful consequences,” New Age, 29 06 1969.Google Scholar

^39. C. Rajeshwara, Rao, “Militant mass movement only answer to Naxalbari,” New Age, 5 01 1969.Google Scholar

^40. For a fuller account of Konar's interview, see my “Peasant mobilization by Indian Communists,” in Problems of Communism, 01–02 1972Google Scholar. See also Konar, Harekrishna: “What does it really mean?” People's Democracy, 31 03 and 7 04 1968Google Scholar; Millions Fighting for Land and Wages, CPI(M) (Calcutta, 1970)Google Scholar; Why the Ultra-Left Deviation?, CPI(M) (Calcutta, 1969)Google Scholar and Letter to Andhra Comrades, CPI(M) (Calcutta, 1969).Google Scholar

^41. Immediately after the 9th OCP Congress, the CPSU came to the conclusion that “the CPR's return to the path of scientific socialism will be a complicated and difficult process, attended by all sorts of unexpected occurrences.” The CPSU took an alarmist view of China's intervention in the socialist countries to foster anti-Soviet groups. “The policy of the Mao Tse-tung group in the international arena,” Kommunist, No. 5, 03 1969, pp. 104–10Google Scholar. However, two years later the CPSU apparently found Maoism to be less of a danger to international communism and to the socialist bloc. “The so-called cultural revolution in China completed a definite cycle in the evolution of the Maoist political line. It would appear that at the present stage of China's historical development, the Maoist political and ideological platform has won a temporary victory … assessing the struggle against Maoism in the broad historical perspective, it can now be said that Maoism has suffered defeat on an international scale.” “24th CPSU congress and international situation” (a symposium report), International Affairs, No. 8, 1971, pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

^42. The CCP reportedly offered four main points of criticism. Mazumdar was wrong in concentrating his activities in the Calcutta urban area and in neglecting the rural areas; he had failed to consolidate the gains made in the rural areas during 1967–9; he had been guilty of too much centralism as well as of sectarianism. The Statesman, 11 10, 1971, pp. 1 and 9.Google Scholar

^43. The name of this man is Ashim Chatterji. He was able to build a strong rural base for the CPI(ML) in Birbhum district while Mazumdar concentrated his strength on urban terrorism. Chatterji is now reported to have extended his activities to Orissa and Bihar. However, there are several other Maoist groups in West Bengal, Bihar, Punjab, Andhra, Tamilnadu and Kerala, who have either kept away from Mazumdar or have broken with him. So far these groups have made no attempt to come together or even to co-ordinate their activity.Google Scholar