This paper deals with some of the problems which confront immigrants who strive to become adjusted to a new environment in Canada's largest cities. The materials presented refer to people from the continent of Europe who have settled in Montreal or Toronto during the present century. The point of view taken here is that the experiences of European immigrants, as told by themselves or by their Canadian-born children, contribute valuable information and significant insights into the processes by which they become assimilated toward one or the other of Canada's two major cultures.

As a social term, assimilation commonly refers to a political rather than a cultural concept. As R. E. Park points out, “it is the name given to the process or the processes by which people of diverse racial origins and different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory, achieve a cultural solidarity sufficient at least to sustain a national existence.” In this country, as in the United States, an immigrant is usually considered assimilated when he has learned the language and the social usages of the native community well enough to participate in its economic, political, and social life without encountering prejudice. The emphasis is here on external indices, such as ability to speak French or English, achievement of the status of a citizen through naturalization, and adoption of the dress, the manners, and the social ritual of the Canadian-born with whom the immigrant comes in contact.

The increasing importance of institutional investors in the provision of private and public long-term credit has focused the attention of economists on the activities of these investors in the saving-investment process in the economy. Institutions have become crucial factors in the determination of the nature and the extent of the expansion that takes place in industry and business, and of the nature and extent of credit supplied, including the relationship between equity and debt in the capital structure of corporations. In addition, they are important suppliers of public credit, particularly in time of heavy government borrowing, as in wartime. Also, from the point of view of government policy, they are important in determining the nature and types of credit controls needed in inflation and deflation.

The life insurance companies merit particular attention not only because of the size but also because of the nature of the funds under their administration. Their funds, amounting to some $6 billion, represent almost 50 per cent of institutional funds, excluding those administered by the banks. The assets of these funds comprise approximately 20 per cent of the total long-term public and private debt, including mortgages, in Canada. In contrast to other institutions, life companies acquire their funds as the result of contractual saving on the part of millions of policyholders. Thus their funds exhibit, and will continue to exhibit, a sustained growth. Since they are the result of personal saving, the income arising from their investment is important to a large segment of the economy, and the way in which they are invested is important for the nation as a whole.

This paper presents some information about the two disciplines which have hitherto composed our association. It is largely a by-product of a series of studies in which I have been collaborating on the international migration of scientists and engineers. My paper arises from our research because, as I hope to suggest, many of the particular characteristics of the collectivity of political scientists and economists in Canada arise from its uncertainty about its geographical reference. This in turn is a consequence of the dependence of Canadian academic departments, and of other employers, on sources outside Canada for the training of new recruits.

The subject is by no means new. At least part of my theme was put before this association almost twenty years ago by Professor H. F. Angus in his 1949 presidential address “Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences,” in which much consideration was given to advanced study abroad. In 1952 Professor J. E. Hodgetts reviewed three contemporary reports (by Professors Dawson, Watkins and Keirstead, and Macpherson) on the teaching of political science in Canada; they make gloomy reading today. We have also had the advantage of a series of papers on research in the social sciences, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council of Canada, by Messrs. Ostry, Dawson, Clark, and others.

You will perhaps think that, with that introduction, I have already answered the question in the title. Don't jump to conclusions! Attendez un peu!

When I was elected president of this Association last year, I could scarcely have been more astonished. Obviously, there were dozens of people far better qualified. I asked myself why I had been chosen, and there was only one possible reason that seemed to me to make any sense. The Association was to become bilingual, and I was one of the few senior English-speaking members who could make a respectable noise in French. I hasten to agree that this is a most inadequate reason for my election, but it is still the only one I can think of.

Be that as it may, the twin facts that the Association is now to be officially bilingual, and that I can make a respectable noise in French, seem to me to impose upon me a double duty: first, to say something about our bicultural state (you observe how carefully I avoid, so far, the controversial word “nation”), and second, to say at least part of it in French.

In the brief for the Province of Nova Scotia, presented to the provincial Royal Commission inquiring into Nova Scotia's disabilities under the Canadian federal system, Professor Rogers includes an estimate of the regional incidence of the customs duties. This is the first study of its kind to be made in Canada. It may be expected to give rise to a good deal of controversy on account of the complexity of the problem and because other provinces are already beginning to make parallel estimates which do not altogether agree with those made for Nova Scotia. Professor Rogers's discussion of the burden of the tariff was condensed into a single chapter, owing to the large amount of general historical and argumentative material which it was necessary to include. It is therefore desirable to quote from the unpublished minutes of evidence in order to do full justice to the reservations which Professor Regers made in putting forward his estimates. In Halifax on August 13, 1934, he said:

The author wishes to show that there is a political dimension to rational action—a dimension which can be expressed in terms of the power which its possessors exert on one another. This power constrains their decisions, and may he said to limit the rationality of their action, in the same way that lack of information and conflict of values hinder rational action. This dimension is absent from economic theories of rationality, especially from the theory of games. But political man cannot be treated in terms of existing notions of economic rationality, even when these are enlarged—that is to say, enfeebled—as in the work of Downs. The reason is that the power of one man over another is inherent in politics. This power must be integrated into our idea of political rationality. The solution can be found through Dahl's formula for the measurement of one man's power over another.

The author extends Dahl's formula to cover cases in which several persons exert power over each other. After identifying sixteen “rules of power” which define all possible positions in a game where each of two persons has two alternatives, he investigates various situations with the aid of these rules, showing that conventional game theory must be modified when some players compete with one another, or when they co-operate.

The ideas of power, and of rules of power, are said to be useful for a more rigorous political science, which could be divided into “macro-politics” and “micro-politics.” The concluding paragraphs of the paper contain definitions and explorations of these two terms.

A chemist who either discussed his subject, or worked in his laboratory, on the assumption that all elements were equal, or that matter was composed of single homogeneous units called “molecules,” would not remain long in his profession. Force of ridicule, or of some even more drastic happening, would remove him. But the economics of many practical and pressing problems is continually bedevilled by discussions, and even on occasion policies, which involve a sort of stubborn simplification quite unworried by the facts. It is certainly understandable that, in the field of housing, this complaint has arisen frequently from those who have tried to deal with the subject from a social rather than a particularist viewpoint, and in its full dimensions rather than within the limits of some familiar phase. In the effort to get low-rent housing into its proper perspective, there are two obstacles which are particularly troublesome. One is the assumption that all housing “units” are the same, the kind of view which leads to the belief that “one thousand houses built” is the same contribution to national need, no matter what kind of houses they may be. The other is the argument or belief which really involves the assumption that peoples' incomes are broadly equal, and all comfortably above the average. The most frequent version is that most people, or at least a majority, can afford to own their own home, or should be encouraged to do so. A more valid but troublesome one in its “all-or-nothing” form is that cheapening the cost of construction is the “real” problem; and there are other variants. Another version, less frequently heard in these days of pressure, is that people live in slums because they like it.

In contrast to the numerous expositions and commentaries concerning the origin, history, and nature of the doctrine of the separation of powers, early theories of parliamentary government have failed to attract the attention of historians of political thought. This negligence arises from two factors which must not be under-estimated. In the first place, it is generally asserted that Walter Bagehot was the first to appreciate the true nature of parliamentarism. Indeed, the penetration and lucidity of his famous essay on the English constitution overshadowed earlier attempts to grasp theoretically the mechanism of parliamentary government. In the second place, historians of political theory have been less prone to trace the roots of the theory of parliamentarism than those of the doctrine of the separation of powers because parliamentary government, although gradually introduced into a number of countries in the course of the nineteenth century, was not reduced to writing in any organic law prior to the World War. The development of the theory of parliamentary government is, therefore, one of the most neglected chapters in the history of constitutional ideas.

While the English to the end of the fifties of the last century looked upon and appraised their constitution through the eyes of Montesquieu, Blackstone, and De Lolme, continental theorists were busy in elaborating a new theory about the nature of the English constitution. The early history of parliamentary theory is determined, therefore, to no small extent by the way in which continental theorists observed and conceived the operation of English government. It was in France and Germany that the true nature of the English constitution was first discovered and a theory of parliamentarism formulated for the direct purpose of introducing the parliamentary system into those two countries.

Upper Canada acquired a wheat-growing reputation during the 1830's comparable to that of the Genesee Valley or of Ohio. At that time, it was remarked, “the great and almost sole object of serious interest to the Canadian farmer was to grow wheat as largely, and to repeat the crop as frequently, as any decent return could be obtained.” Nor was this unreasonable. Lord Durham was informed that “in Upper Canada, the whole of the great peninsula between Lakes Erie and Huron, comprising nearly half the available land of the province, consists of gently-undulating alluvial soil, and with a smaller proportion of inferior land than probably any other tract of similar extent in that part of North America, is generally considered the best grain country on that continent.” The red and white winter wheats grown in Upper Canada in a favourable season, when exported to Great Britain, were “spoken of by millers as a grain of superior quality” and “brought the highest prices the markets would afford.” Finally, the merchants in many places were accustomed to pay cash for wheat, while they would receive other products only in trade. When he had a steady market, the wheat farmer had cause for thanksgiving; but all too often he lacked it.

The ordinary market for the surplus wheat and flour of the Canadas was the United Kingdom, but the amounts exported fluctuated widely from one year to the next. Poor crops or good crops, increases in acreage, and especially the capricious Corn Laws, were the determining factors.

This paper is an attempt to give the interested economist who is not an econometrician a general picture of some of the developments in the specialized field of econometrics. It is hoped thereby to enable him to see how this field is related to the general science of economics, and how he may be able to make use in his own work of the results obtained in econometrics. The implications of the current rapid innovations in the field of electronic computers are stressed, since these may soon help to produce an ever increasing flow of econometric results.

In an address given in 1897, Alfred Marshall suggested that economics should develop not only as a quantitative science in many of its aspects, but also as a numerical science. Professor Schumpeter, in appraising Marshall's advice, observes that it follows the line of development begun by Sir William Petty in his Political Arithmetick of 1672. Schumpeter came down firmly on the side of this prescription himself. He too emphasized the importance of economics' being able to “figure out results.” Professor Pigou also reveals how Marshall, well aware as he was that much in economics cannot be described by numbers, hoped to see the areas that could be so described brought to the same stage as physics, where the amount of an effect produced by a cause can be estimated by numerical methods, using statistical data.

Although it was not his intention, Edward Gibbon once defined the whole duty and substance of any governmental body when he wrote “a heart to resolve, a head to contrive, and a hand to execute.” Of these attributes and responsibilities the third is not the least important. Nor is this anywhere more true than in the case of the United Nations, an international organization representing and serving sixty diverse states and performing functions both unique and novel. Above all it is true of the United Nations operational agency known as the Technical Assistance Administration.

The executive, that is the organizational and operational, problems of the Technical Assistance Administration break into two distinct categories. There is, first, the exceedingly difficult situation that is created by the administrative weakness of many of the governments of the underdeveloped countries which the TAA has been organized to aid. This weakness may be the result of inexperience, corruption, the general backwardness of the national economy, the primitive cultural structure, personal incompetence, or any combination of these factors. The second type of difficulty is that found in the formidable but essentially straightforward set of problems that will inevitably face an agency staffed by men and women drawn from a variety of national and personal environments, and charged with the conduct of business of an almost unique diversity, in areas globally dispersed.

The economist J. B. Say once wrote that “our duty with regard to errors is not to revive them, but simply to forget them.” Complete acceptance of this doctrine would expose the political scientist to ruin, for the study of government is largely the study of errors and man's clumsy efforts to correct them. The history of errors, so far as government control of radio broadcasting in Canada is concerned, centres on the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission which struggled for survival between 1932 and 1936. Our concern, however, is not with this history of errors but rather with the attempt, through the creation of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, to correct these errors. In particular, our interest is focussed on the pressing problems of integrating administration and politics in the public interest, through the device of an independent government corporation.

In 1900, Professor Frank Goodnow first differentiated between politics and administration by suggesting that all activities involved in expressing the will of the state should be classified as “politics,” while all operations necessary to the execution of the will of the state should be termed “administration.” The harmonization of these two activities, according to Goodnow, depends on the subordination of one to the other. In a parliamentary system, harmonization in the public interest is presumably obtained by having the agents responsible for the execution of the will of the state dominated by the agents responsible for its expression. This simple bifurcation has been complicated by the fact that the cabinet, the supreme instrument of party government, has become responsible in large measure for both the expression and execution of the will of the state. In certain sectors of governmental activity the party (partisan) character of cabinet supervision has led to the demand for a withdrawal from its hands of the direct responsibility for “politics” and “administration.”

Resale price maintenance raises not only economic problems but also legal ones. Indeed, much of the material on the subject is legal in origin. These legal aspects are, of course, important in showing the nature of the arguments—economic and other—involved, but their importance is mainly with respect to the technique of maintaining the system. For the immediate purpose one can assume that the economic aspects of resale price maintenance are the same, irrespective of the actual technique of enforcement and therefore the legal aspects, as such, can be ignored here.

It may be pointed out, however, that the methods used to enforce compliance with the system are various. In Great Britain, for example, the trade association with contracts for its members and dealers is common. These may be enforced by legal action or economic action such as refusal to sell. In other cases it may be handled by contracts between the manufacturer and the jobber and then jobber and dealer. The actual technique used is usually dependent upon what the law permits; accordingly it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Of course, the effectiveness of the scheme depends upon enforcement. Paradoxically enough, the better the system is maintained, the greater are the gains to any one dealer in evading it. Thus success tempts the very forces which if not checked will break it.

Canadian experience in governmental compulsion in labour relations has now extended over a period of half a century. The degree of compulsion has fluctuated in relation to changing circumstances. Periods of crisis have usually called forth intensified and extended government interference and restraint on one or both of the parties to the dispute. The termination or decline of tension has not, however, resulted necessarily in a reversion to the status quo ante. Indeed there has been a tendency for legislatures to attempt to profit by experience and redraft the law so as to avoid, if possible, the repetition of similar unhappy episodes of destructive or disruptive conflict. This has been an additive process and has produced a body of law governing the behaviour of labour and management which can quite properly be described as a Canadian labour relations code. Parallel with the development of law there has been a construction and elaboration of institutions of labour, industry, and government which function in the field of labour relations. The Canadian pattern, while exhibiting similarities with those found in other industrial countries, has certain important features which render it somewhat different. These special features have had a pervading effect on the character of the industrial relationship, and have drastically influenced collective bargaining as a dynamic process. There is evidence that the imposition of the labour relations code has failed in some degree to produce the expected results, even to the extent of defeating the achievement of the objectives it was developed to accomplish.