Despite much attention, aboriginal governments in Canada have not yet been the focus of comprehensive, sustained and focussed research on the part of the academic and aboriginal communities. In this article 14 areas which require study are cited under three major headings: aboriginal communities and their governments, the components of governance and the wider policy environment. These clusters of research subjects are related in a systematic fashion. A selection of the literature is placed in context and practical suggestions for fostering co-operative approaches to research are suggested. Throughout, it is argued that a critical focus for such efforts on the part of political scientists, other scholars and analysts should be placed on the needs, experiences and goals of aboriginal peoples and their governments.

Abstract. The debate on the relationship between economic performance (sustained economic growth, saving and investment) and democracy remains unsettled. This article provides a critical review of the arguments by relying on the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle. A generalized method of moments (GMM) using 37 African countries from 1960 to 1998 reveals a close relationship among indicators of economic performance but no relationship between economic performance and democracy. Co-integration and vector error correction models contradict GMM results, however. Democracy fosters investment in eight countries, enhances saving in three other countries and sustains economic growth in five. Therefore, single country analyses using appropriate methodologies seem warranted to avoid putting forth ecological fallacies with detrimental policy implications.

Résumé. Le débat sur la relation entre performance économique (croissance économique soutenue, épargne et investissement) et démocratie est encore loin d'être clos. Cet article fait une analyse critique des thèses en présence en se basant sur le paradoxe de Feldtsein-Horioka. L'analyse de 37 pays africains de 1960 à 1998 utilisant la méthode des moments généralisée (MMG) démontre un lien étroit entre les divers indicateurs de performance économique, mais aucun lien entre ceux-ci et la démocratie. Cependant, la cointégration et les modèles vectoriels à correction d'erreurs contredisent les résultats basés sur la MMG. En effet, la démocratie favorise l'investissement dans huit pays, encourage l'épargne dans trois autres pays, et soutient la croissance économique dans cinq pays. Il semble justifié, par conséquent, de recourir à des analyses individuelles par pays utilisant des méthodologies appropriées pour éviter des erreurs écologiques aux répercussions néfastes sur la politique économique.

This article examines the presence of geographically targeted spending in the allocation of infrastructure projects in Canada. Building on formal models of distributive politics, we expect government districts, core government districts and swing districts to be advantaged in terms of infrastructure projects. We also investigate whether characteristics of Members of Parliament (MPs), such as seniority or holding a cabinet position, influence the distribution of infrastructure projects. Empirically, we analyze the amount of funding allocated by Infrastructure Canada across non-urban federal electoral districts between 2006 and 2018. Our results indicate that non-urban governmental districts receive, on average, more money than opposition districts, and that this is even more the case for core government districts. In contrast, we found little evidence that cabinet ministers or senior MPs are able to attract more funding to their constituencies compared to other representatives.

We present the results of a 2014 survey of Canadian parliamentarians, journalists and bloggers in which respondents were asked to rank competing definitions of open government. Overall, respondents preferred to define open government in terms of access to information and sources. However, controlling for age, ideology and language, we also found that respondents in the different positions ranked definitions of open government differently. Journalists are more likely than any other group to define open government in terms of access to information and sources. In contrast, parliamentarians who were members of a governing party were as likely to choose definitions of open government that emphasized public participation as they were to choose definitions that emphasized access to information. Opposition parliamentarians share more similarities with government parliamentarians than with journalists. These results suggest that key actors in the Canadian policy landscape define open government in ways that are consistent with their institutional interests. We suggest that these results reflect ways in which open government operates more like a buzzword, which helps explain the common pattern whereby opposition parties make promises to be more open and, after taking power, operate in less open ways. Moreover, these results raise questions about the extent to which open government can actually operate as an organizing principle.

Tiendra–t–on, dans quelques années, pour exemplaire de la démocratie représentative la séance du 28 juin 1999 au cours de laquelle 745 députés et sénateurs, sur 836 votants, réunis en congrès à Versailles, ont ratifié des modifications aux articles 3 et 4 de la Constitution frančaise? Ces modifications stipulent que désormais “la loi favorise 1'égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats électoraux et aux fonctions électives” et que les partis et groupements politiques “contribuent à la mise en oeuvre [de ce] principe”. Les représentants du peuple frančais — dont 90 pour cent sont de sexe masculin — auraient en effet fourni à cette occasion une illustration particulièrement magistrale du fait que l'appartenance de sexe n'entre pas en ligne de compte quand il s'agit de promouvoir le bien public! Et pourtant, après la promulgation des lois d'application, nombre d'entre eux seront empêchés de se présenter comme candidats afin de laisser la place à des candidates. Le score (89%) réussi au Congrès de Versailles dépasse les attentes populaires (un peu plus de 70% de Frančaises et de Frančais sont, selon les sondages, favorables à la parité.) I1 reflète ma1 la vivacité des débats qui ont entouré la proposition de cette mesure. Je ne reviendrai pas sur les débats qui continuent d'opposer féministes paritaristes et anti-paritaristes. Je prendrai ici en considération les positions d'auteurs masculins.

This article considers the question: should rights extended to cultural communities to help them preserve themselves include the right to discipline dissident members who violate cultural norms? The case of the Pueblo Protestants is employed to consider two important defences of cultural rights (revisionist liberal and cultural communitarian) that offer conflicting answers. Both are found unsatisfactory because of their implicit reliance on "cultural monism" (that is, the assumption that individuals identify with only one cultural community). An approach to defining cultural rights is then outlined that avoids this assumption and its application is illustrated with respect to the Pueblo case.

Résumé. Avec une méthodologie double, nous portons notre attention sur un groupe très peu étudié : les jeunes non-engagés. Grâce à des entrevues, nous distinguons quatre types de non-engagés: les critiques, ceux qui manquent de ressources politiques, les occupés, et ceux en attente de mobilisation. Les critiques ne représentent qu'une minorité des non-engagés, alors que les jeunes manquant de ressources sont plus nombreux. Cette étude démontre qu'une grande proportion de jeunes présente un potentiel d'engagement futur et que c'est principalement des barrières temporaires qui réduisent leur niveau d'engagement. L'analyse quantitative dévoile des variations d'attitudes, de profils démographiques et de volontés d'engagement entre types de non-engagés. Les non-engagés ne sont donc pas un groupe homogène.

Abstract. With a two-pronged methodology, this article takes a closer look at an understudied group: the disengaged youth. Using interviews, we discern four different types within this disengaged group: the criticals, those lacking political resources, the busy and those waiting for mobilization. The ‘criticals’ constitute only a minority of the disengaged group, while the young people who lack political resources are more common. Most importantly, a great proportion of young people show a certain potential for engagement. The quantitative analysis reveals that these types resemble distinct attitudinal and demographic profiles, and differ in their future willingness to participate. Thus the non-engaged are not a monolithic group.

Résumé. L'apparence des politiciens, leur représentation visuelle pendant un débat télévisé a-t-elle un impact sur l'évaluation que font d'eux les électeurs? Le contexte d'écoute joue-t-il sur l'identification du gagnant de la confrontation? Le niveau de sophistication politique et la fermeté de l'identité partisane de l'électeur limitent-ils l'effet de la représentation visuelle des politiciens dans son évaluation de leurs performances oratoires? S'inspirant du débat théorique qui secoue la discipline depuis la diffusion du premier débat Kennedy-Nixon en 1960, cet article présente les données tirées d'une expérience menée auprès d'électeurs québécois lors de la diffusion du débat francophone de l'élection fédérale canadienne de 2000. L'analyse démontre que la représentation visuelle des politiciens et le contexte d'écoute du débat amènent les participants à évaluer différemment la performance des politiciens et agissent également sur la capacité des électeurs à identifier clairement le vainqueur du débat télévisé. Les données indiquent de plus que la fermeté de l'identité partisane agit comme rempart aux effets de la représentation visuelle sur l'évaluation des politiciens par les téléspectateurs, alors que le niveau de sophistication des électeurs, contrairement aux attentes théoriques, ne joue pas ce rôle. Tout comme le contenu de leurs interventions verbales, les composantes de la représentation visuelle des acteurs politiques représentent des pistes d'information qui alimentent également la réflexion des électeurs lors de l'écoute d'un débat télévisé.

Abstract. Does a politician's appearance, visual representation, during a televised debate influence voters' evaluations of her performance? Does the listening context of the debate impact a voter's capacity to identify a clear winner? Are political sophistication and partisanship strong barriers to the potential effects of politicians' images on voters' evaluations of their performance? Adding a Canadian perspective to the ongoing theoretical debate on the actual impact of leaders' visual representation in televised debates on voter preferences, launched in 1960 by preliminary assesments of the first Kennedy-Nixon debate, this article presents data collected during an experiment conducted with a sample of Québec voters during the broadcast of the French language leaders' debate of the 2000 Canadian federal election. The study shows that the leaders' visual representation during the debate and the listening context of the event bring voters to evaluate politicians participating in the broadcast differently and play on voters' capacity to easily identify a clear winner of the televised confrontation. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that partisanship is a strong barrier to the effect of visual representation in voters' evaluations of the leaders but that political sophistication, contrary to theoretical expectations, is not. Like verbal arguments brought forward by the politicians in a televised debate, their visual representation also carries information cues that help define voters' evaluations of the leaders participating in the broadcast.

This paper studies the prevalence of ballot order effects in two different types of Canadian elections which differ greatly by the strength of party cues they provide to voters. Provincial elections are best described as a typical competition between well established and institutionalized parties, hence providing voters with strong party cues. Alternatively, municipal politics provide voters with much weaker party cues. We use electoral results from recent provincial and municipal elections in Québec and find ballot order effects in municipal elections but not in provincial ones. Although ballot order effects may also be the product of alphabetic preference bias, we argue that in any case these are cognitive biases that are ultimately the product of insufficient cues that voters need in order to cast well-informed votes. The paper, therefore, sheds some light on an understudied type of election in political science.

No book, least of all an edited one, speaks with a single voice. A text is disguised counterpoint, punk plus Mozart, a riff that cuts across discordant harmonies. Considered this way, a book can no more be judged as simply good or bad than a symphony can be adequately described by its key signature. Nevertheless, The New Canadian Political Economy is a good book in every conventional sense. It meets, for example, all of the challenges of an edited collection: the essays are thematically coherent, uniformly well-written, rigorous and integrated around roughly similar questions. Together, they aim at nothing less than the “first publication of a comprehensive and systematic review of the new Canadian political economy” (4). Moreover, the editors have helpfully organized this review along two axes.

Abstract. Utilitarianism is usually defined as the doctrine that morally right and legally just conduct maximizes the good for the most people, and this doctrine is usually criticized on the grounds that it licenses conduct known by other means to be wrong or unjust. Yet Jeremy Bentham, the historical prototype of a utilitarian, maintained that individuals ought to do only what promises to serve their personal interests, and he offered utility as the test not of what is right or just but of what ought to be made so by instituting better rules. Textbook utilitarianism is a better fit for the “theological utilitarians” William Paley and Henry Sidgwick.

Résumé. On définit d'habitude l'utilitarisme comme la doctrine prétendant qu'une conduite moralement bonne et légalement juste concourt au bien du plus grand nombre de personnes; en général, cette doctrine est critiquée parce qu'elle permet des conduites dont on sait, par d'autres moyens, qu'elles sont mauvaises ou injustes. Pourtant, Jeremy Bentham, le prototype historique de l'utilitariste, prétendait que l'individu se devait de faire seulement ce qui servait ses propres intérêts, et il présentait l'utilité comme le test non de ce qui est bon ou juste mais de ce qui devrait le devenir par l'institution de meilleures règles. L'utilitarisme des manuels décrit mieux les “ utilitaristes théologiens ” William Paley et Henry Sidgwick.

Disaffection of youth from politics is a well-documented phenomenon in many countries. In this article, we consider whether the social networks of young people have the same influence on political engagement as they have been found to have for older adults. We use a single dataset to test the effects of discussion and disagreement on the political engagement of young people (30 and under) and older adults. We find that social network discussion has a stronger effect on the engagement of young people but that disagreement has no clear differential effect.