¹ See “Communique of the European Community ‘Summit’ Meeting and Annexes,” European Community Background Notes, no. 29/1973 (20 December 1973).

² At the Paris summit conference in December 1974, the participants decided to meet in the future at least three times a year as “Councils of the Communities.”

³ See for example, Weil, Gordon, A Foreign Policy for Europe? (College of Europe 1970)Google Scholar; Camps, Mariam, “Sources of Strain in Transatlantic Relations,” International Affairs, 48 (1972), 559–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Greenhil, Denis, “The Future Security of Western Europe,” International Affairs, 50 (January 1974), 1–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stanley Hoffman, “Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?” The United States and Western Europe, ed. W. Hanrieder, 79–105 ; Johan Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making; The External Relations of the European Community, ed. Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau; A Nation Writ Large? ed. Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager.

⁴ In practice, application of many of the restrictions upon international conduct is marginal to the point of ineffectiveness.

⁵ The inability of the major European powers to affect materially the outcome of the Mideast conflict forced their nominal acceptance of American leadership of the oil-consuming states at the us-sponsored conference in January 1974.

⁶ Stanley Hoffmann, “Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?” 79–80

⁷ For complete studies of the Community's external policies see Weil, A Foreign Policy for Europe? and Feld, Werner, The European Common Market and the World (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1967).Google Scholar

⁸ “Political development” might occur along supranational lines or via intensified political co-operation among the EC's membership.

⁹ See for example Camps, “Sources of Strain,” 569; Hoffmann, “Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?” 86–8; Benjamin Cohen, “The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations: A Bargain Comes Unstuck,” in Hanrieder, The United States and Western Europe, 106.

¹⁰ “Cohen, “The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations,” 126–30

¹¹ For details of Community preparations for the current round of tariff negotiations see European Community Background Information, no 17/1973 (19 July 1973).

¹² An analogous case can be found in the development of automotive safety standards by the us government. These standards have required extensive alterations of imported vehicles, forcing some smaller manufacturers to withdraw from competition.

¹³ See “Programme of Environmental Action of the European Communities,” Bulletin of the European Communities, supplement 3/73.

¹⁴ Letter of 9 February 1972 from Sicco Mansholt, vice-president of the European Commission to President Malfatti: “Europe Documents” 665, 28 February 1972 (Agence international d'information pour la presse, Luxembourg and Brussels)

¹⁵ The United States, Western Europe's principal trading partner, may henceforth encounter serious opposition to the utilization of the dollar as a reserve currency. See Aron, Raymond, “The Commonwealth and the European Community: A Continental View,” Atlantic Community Quarterly, 10 (Spring 1972), 48.Google Scholar See also “Monetary Organization of the Community,” Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 12/73.

¹⁶ Camps, “Sources of Strain,” 562

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See “Renewal and Enlargement of the Association with the AASM and Certain Commonwealth Developing Countries,” Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/73.

¹⁹ The Lomé Convention was signed on 28 February 1975. European Community, no. 184 (March 1975), 5.

²⁰ Galtung maintains that EC-Third World economic relations will be characterized by continuation of the present “vertical division of labor” through the “exploitation”, “fragmentation,” and “penetration” of the latter by the Community. See Galtung, The European Community, ch. 6, especially 68–73.

²¹ European Community, no. 187 (June 1975), 18

²² European Community, no. 189 (September 1975), 12

²³ New York Times, 12 June 1975

²⁴ European Community, no. 187 (June 1975), 18

²⁵ See “Report on European Political Cooperation and Unification,” Rapporteur, Mommersteeg, J.A., European Parliament Working Documents, Document 12/73 (24 May 1973), 10 and 19.Google Scholar

²⁶ The new direction in us policy towards the Community is described in detail by Hoffmann, “Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?” 86–8 and Cohen, “The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations,” 107–12.

²⁷ It should, however, be pointed out that American governments have not been willing to apply the austerity measures usually associated with a return to a balance of international trade.

²⁸ Hoffmann, “Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?” 87 and 91

²⁹ Ibid., 91: “The combination of the old and the new amounts to the exercise of Realpolitik in a neo-Atlantic framework; to a highly skillful linkage of the security issue, which is at the heart of the old ‘Atlantic’ theme, with the economic and monetary issues raised by the Nixon Administration.”

³⁰ This point was emphasized at the Washington conference of oil consuming nations.

³¹ An unidentified European writing in Foreign Affairs stated the issue as follows: “For their part the leaders of America must recognize that the phase of unmodified US leadership of the West - a phase which lasted from 1945 to 1965 - is now over and must be replaced by a concept in which the interests of both sides receive equal consideration and there is a genuine reciprocity of advantage” (“The Year of Europe,” by “z,” Foreign Affairs, 52 [January 1974], 237–48).

³² It is somewhat ironic that the Soviet military threat should serve to buttress American leadership of the Atlantic relationship.

³³ Cohen, “The Revolution in Atlantic Economic Relations,” 120–1

³⁴ Camps, “Sources of Strain,” 563; Greenhil, “The Future Security of Western Europe,” 10

³⁵ This is probably the primary cause of De Gaulle's lack of regard for the us deterrent.

³⁶ In confrontations between the US and USSR, European statesmen have apparently had little access to the American decision-making process.

³⁷ New York Times, 26 and 27 May 1975. The striking contrast between the us and European perspectives concerning Portugal and Spain can in part be explained by American ideological bloc leadership on the one hand, and the Europeans’ first-hand acquaintance with Fascism on the other.

³⁸ France has always been careful to support the United States on issues of basic strategic importance to the latter, such as Cuba, Berlin, and NATO membership. France's near total withdrawal from participation in NATO, overt French opposition to US involvement in Indo-China, French gold conversion prior to 1968 along with continued opposition to us monetary solutions, and the French government's reluctance to accept American leadership in the determination of a solution to the energy supply problem represent tactical manoeuvres in which President De Gaulle and his successors have exhibited a marked degree of independence from the United States.

³⁹ The persistent clamour in Congress for a reduction in us troop strength in Europe has been a recurrent source of anxiety in Europe.

⁴⁰ Greenhil, “The Future Security of Western Europe,” 2

⁴¹ Ibid.: “A sense of minimum security depends essentially on the capability, intentions and opportunities of other governments.”

⁴² Ibid., 3–4

⁴³ A European deterrent would be based upon a modest nuclear force along with local replacement of us ground forces.

⁴⁴ The position of the us vis-à-vis Community independence of the Soviet Union would be decisive under such conditions. See Emanuele Gazzo, “The European Community and the United States,” in Kohnstamm and Hager, A Nation Writ Large? 159–60.

⁴⁵ Camps, “Sources of Strain,” 566; Morgan, Roger, “East-West Relations in Europe: Political Perspectives,” International Affairs, 49 (April 1973), 184.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The Soviet reaction to an autonomous EC will probably be determined by the nature of the Community's developing relationship with East Europe. According to Johan Galtung, The European Community, 53: “Whether seen in terms of language, culture, or ideology, Western Europe has always remained the center of the world, the seat of three of the world's five world languages; by definition the origin of the major cultures since these were the cultures of the imperialistic powers; and the cradle of the major ideologies of conservatism, liberalism and Marxism.” See also Michall Tatu, “East-West Relations,” in Kohnstamm and Hager, A Nation Writ Large? 172.

⁴⁶ This does not appear to be the thrust of the “Breshnev Doctrine.”

⁴⁷ Japan serves as the prime example of a state which lacks the military capacity to defend an extensive network of foreign interests.

⁴⁸ Horst Menderhausen, “Will West Germany Go Nuclear?” Orbis, 16 (Summer 1972), 415

⁴⁹ Sir Bernard Burrows, “European Security,” in Kohnstamm and Hager, A Nation Writ Large? 131

⁵⁰ Hoffmann, “Toward a Common European Foreign Policy?” 82–3

⁵¹ As the Soviet Union becomes more involved in the European economy it will acquire other options for the application of leverage against the EC.

⁵² Greenhil, “The Future Security of Western Europe,” 9–10. See also François Duchêne, “The European Community and the Uncertainties of Interdependence,” in Kohnstamm and Hager, A Nation Writ Large? 19: “The two great wars of the first half of the century have ruined Europe's traditional military and political power, which is why the super powers virtually meet in the heart of the continent. Extravagant exposure to the horrors of war has also produced one of the most resolutely amilitary populations in the world.”

⁵³ For example, the American diplomatic offensive of August 1971 was presented to the public in strong nationalistic terms.

⁵⁴ For a detailed study of joint weapons development in Western Europe, see John Simpson and Frank Gregory, “West European Collaboration in Weapons Development,” Orbis, 16 (Summer 1961), 435–61

⁵⁵ The United States is also a major competitor of its European allies in the sale of weapons.

⁵⁶ According to Simpson and Gregory, “West European Collaboration,” this includes the political sensitivity of national defence (435); the economic strain under which European defence budgets currently are operating (445); the relationship between weapons development and divergent military tactics (447); and the fact that to date joint defence efforts have relied on multilateralism rather than common enterprise. Specifically, Western Europe is lacking either a combined procurement budget or joint weapons development centre (448 and 449).

⁵⁷ Ibid., 440–2

⁵⁸ Political benefits of joint development could include the cementing of relationships among participants (ibid., 447), and the development of another closely integrated Community relationship (ibid., 460).

⁵⁹ The Nixon Doctrine, which links security with economic relationships, is a good example of such flexibility.

⁶⁰ Weil, A Foreign Policy for Europe, 42–8

⁶¹ Ibid., 58–68

⁶² “Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification,” Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 11/1970, 12

⁶³ The Davignon procedure was developed on the basis of a mandate given the foreign ministers of the member states by the heads of state and government at the Hague Summit Conference of 1 and 2 December 1969. The process is outlined in two reports by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, Ibid., 9–14; no. 2, Bulletin of the European Communities, no. 9/73, 12–21.

⁶⁴ “Second Report by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs,” 15

⁶⁵ “Report on Political Cooperation and Unification,” 21: “In regard to material content, it will be noted that nothing spectacular has been achieved so far in terms of common action on fundamental problems.”

⁶⁶ Morgan, “East-West Relations in Europe,” 179