This note argues that, widespread opinion to the contrary, Marx did not make a distinction between a class in itself and a class for itself but between a class against capital and a class for itself. Marx's formulation of a “class against capital” exhibits a political dimension lacking in a “class in itself”; political institutions and arrangements are not simply the instrument or the expression of a pre-existing class structure but rather condition or shape the class structure. The implications of the erroneous attribution to the theoretical understanding of class formation as well as practical politics are explored.

Most of the work on policy dynamics focuses on the agenda-setting stage of the policy cycle and argues that policy issues wax and wane in public attention, generating either a cyclical or evolutionary pattern of governmental activity in particular policy sectors. Anthony Downs's notion of a periodic “issue-attention cycle” and Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones's notion of a stepped or “punctuated equilibrium” pattern of policy change are prominent in the literature, but have received little empirical and virtually no cross-national verification. Utilizing the analysis of time-series data gathered on nuclear energy and acid rain issues appearing on government and public agendas in Canada over the period 1977–1992, this article elaborates the elements of the two models and subjects both to empirical testing. The article finds little support for either model in the Canadian case and argues the assumptions behind the models must be altered to account for this anomalous case.

William Livingston's idea of "federal society" is one of the leading sociological approaches to federalism. This article applies Livingston's approach in the opposite direction. It is argued that the unitary German societal structure, or the "non-federal" German society, has exerted centralist pressures on the federal system. In particular, the article examines the changes within the policy area of education. Despite explicit constitutional clauses that place education under the exclusive jurisdiction of the German Länder, an all-German educational policy has emerged. A process that started with harmonization and standardization has eventually led to the "nationalization" of education. This has largely come about through public demands for a Germany-wide public policy. Empirical research shows that political actors have differed over the contents of educational policy but have shared an all-German frame of reference.

Studies of bloc voting in the United Nations have appeared periodically since the early 1960s. This article examines the evolution of UN voting in its first four decades using multidimensional scaling, which is compared to factor analysis and found to be superior for representation and interpretation. UN voting is important for showing how world politics is reflected in that body, hence the frequent use of UN votes as a dependent variable in the analysis of foreign policy behaviour.

This article examines the conditions under which policy discourses can serve as contributing factors to policy change, even in the absence of changes in institutions and interests. It begins with a discussion of the role of ideas in policy analysis and how they can play a "constitutive role" as frames for policy. Drawing on a distinction between "augmentative" discourses that serve to reinforce an existing policy framework and "transformative discourses" that seek to persuade various publics of the need for significant policy change, four types of policy discourse are defined and a methodology is suggested for identifying these types. Two of these types, "challenging" and "truth-seeking," are hypothesized to be more conducive to the occurrence of significant policy change. Drawing then on case studies of policy change in Canada and Germany respectively, the article shows that a "challenging" discourse emerges in both countries, but leads to significant policy change only in Germany. Based on the comparison of the two cases, it is argued that three factors are relevant to whether a challenging discourse is successful or not: a broad consensus among core policy actors on the nature and gravity of the policy problem; the consistency of the discourse with broadly held normative values; and the persuasiveness of the "social facts" brought to bear in favour of proposed new solutions.

The extent of differences in mass-elite political opinion and their theoretical implications have long been a source of interest to democratic theorists. Early classical democratic theorists saw education as the solution to mass-elite political differences, with an educated mass public displaying the same support for democratic institutions as their elite counterparts. By contrast, the later democratic elitists saw little that would reduce mass-elite differences. More recently, modern elite theorists have argued that elites are more polarized on political issues than mass publics, and that political conflict can be moderated by the ability of elites to downplay potentially divisive issues. Using Australia as a case study, these three approaches to mass-elite political differences are analyzed using a matched survey of voters and candidates conducted at the Australia 1987 federal election. The results show little support for education as a factor reducing mass-elite differences and point to the democratic elitists' argument that mass-elite political differences are fixed and enduring. In line with modern elite theories, the results also confirm the existence of more intense issue polarization among elites than among voters, and elites' ability to control the issues that reach the political agenda.

The growth phenomenon is found in practically all the sciences and even in most of the arts, because almost all the objects of human study grow—crystals, molecules, cells, plants, animals, children, personalities, knowledge, ideas, cities, cultures, organizations, nations, wealth, and economic systems. It does not follow, of course, from the mere universality of the growth phenomenon that there must be a single unified theory of growth which will cover everything from the growth of a crystal to the growth of an empire. Growth itself is not a simple or a unified phenomenon, and we cannot expect all the many forms of growth to come under the umbrella of a single theory. Nevertheless all growth phenomena have something in common, and what is more important, the classifications of forms of growth and hence of theories of growth seem to cut across most of the conventional boundaries of the sciences. In addition there are a great many problems which are common to many apparently diverse growth phenomena.

“The wages fund theory is the crowning instance of an untrue abstraction … and it has probably done more injury to the reputation of economic theory than any other generalization ever received into economics textbooks and then expunged from them.” These words, by James Bonar, fairly well express the view that has dominated economic thought on the wages fund doctrine for the past century. Writing forty years after Bonar, Paul Samuelson claims he has been impressed by the “falseness and emptiness of the wage fund doctrine,” stating that the controversy it inspired “constitutes one of the most sterile chapters in that dreary gap between the classical age and the revolutionary neoclassical discoveries of that last third of the nineteenth century.”

Abstract. Everyone familiar with the study of Canadian politics knows the joke about how a French national, an Englishman and a Canadian were asked to write an essay about an elephant: the French national wrote about the culinary uses of the elephant, the Englishman wrote about the elephant and imperialism, and the Canadian wrote a paper entitled, “Elephant: Federal or Provincial Responsibility?” Though simple, the joke conveys the essence of Canadian politics: always defined by jurisdictional disputes. The joke misses the boat, however, by ignoring the fact that indigenous people are now (as they always have been) engaging in jurisdictional debates in an attempt to challenge the Canadian constitutional order and to reaffirm their own constitutional order and autonomy. This paper examines one such dispute—the Mi'kmaw claim of rights and responsibilities for the salmon fishery—and presents it as a case of contested sovereignties and a resulting jurisdictional dispute. In so doing, I pose the question: Is salmon a federal, provincial or Mi'kmaq responsibility? In seeking an answer, this paper proceeds in an exploratory manner to map both constitutional orders, and the interrelation between these orders that results in the debate over responsibility for the salmon.

Résumé. Dans le milieu de la science politique au Canada, tout le monde connaît la blague du Français, du Britannique et du Canadien qui doivent écrire une thèse sur l'éléphant. Le Français disserte sur les usages culinaires de l'éléphant, le Britannique traite de l'éléphant et de l'impérialisme et le Canadien écrit une thèse intitulée : “L'éléphant : responsabilité fédérale ou provinciale?” Cette blague, dans sa simplicité, évoque l'essence même de la politique au Canada, car la politique canadienne a toujours été définie par des conflits juridictionnels. Mais, si elle illustre bien la nature de la politique au Canada, elle n'est cependant pas satisfaisante parce qu'elle ignore qu'aujourd'hui (comme autrefois d'ailleurs) les peuples autochtones s'engagent dans les débats juridictionnels pour contester l'ordre constitutionnel du Canada et pour réaffirmer leur propre ordre constitutionnel et leur autonomie. Cet article examine l'un de ces conflits : la revendication par les Mi'kmaq de leurs droits et responsabilités concernant les pêcheries de saumon – et le présente comme un cas de souverainetés contestées, et, par conséquent, un exemple de conflit juridictionnel. Je pose donc la question : “Saumon : responsabilité fédérale, provinciale ou Mi'kmaq?” En répondant à cette question, l'article explore les caractéristiques des deux ordres constitutionnels et leur connexions, ce qui mène à un débat sur l'attribution des compétences dans le domaine du saumon.

Abstract. This paper examines the usefulness of Canadian political party labels as information shortcuts. We supplement survey data analysis with the results of an experiment that tested whether knowing a party's position on an issue influenced opinion expression. We find that, contrary to findings in other countries, among our subject pool, Canadian political parties are not consistently useful as information cues. The Liberal party cue is hardly useful, and while the Conservative party cue can be effective, it appears to push partisans toward a more liberal stance on selected opinions. Only the NDP cue appears to influence opinions in the expected direction. These mixed findings run counter to foundational works on party labels as information shortcuts (mostly focused on US politics) and, instead, are consistent with previous scholarship on Canadian politics.

Résumé. Cet article examine l'utilité des étiquettes politiques des partis canadiens comme sources d'information sommaire. Nous analysons des données d'enquête ainsi que les résultats d'un sondage visant à déterminer si le fait de connaître la position d'un parti sur une question donnée influençait l'expression des opinions. Contrairement aux résultats obtenus dans d'autres pays, nous constatons chez les sujets observés que les étiquettes des partis politiques canadiens ne sont pas uniformément utiles comme sources d'information sommaire. L'étiquette du Parti libéral s'avère à peine utile, tandis que l'étiquette du Parti conservateur, peut-être plus efficace, semble inciter les partisans à une position plus libérale. Seule l'étiquette du NPD semble influencer les avis dans la direction prévue. Ces conclusions mixtes contredisent des travaux fondamentaux sur le même sujet (portant pour la plupart sur la politique aux États-Unis) et confirment plutôt les études antérieures sur la politique canadienne.

Abstract. This paper examines the apparent contradiction between the current tendency of many Indigenous groups and their political institutions to embrace the capitalist economic model as the one and only solution in establishing contemporary Indigenous self-governance, on the one hand, and on the other, the detrimental force of the market economy on Indigenous societies, past and present. The starting point is the following question. If the global market economy historically played a significant role in the loss of political and economic autonomy of Indigenous societies and women, how meaningful or sustainable is it to seek to (re)build contemporary Indigenous governance on the very economic model that was largely responsible for undermining it in the first place? Shouldn't this history be taken into consideration when discussing and shaping models and policies for contemporary Indigenous governance and hence be more critical of the standard economic development frameworks hailed as the path toward self-governance?

Résumé. Cet article examine l'apparente contradiction entre la tendance actuelle de nombreux groupes autochtones et de leurs institutions politiques à adopter le modèle économique capitaliste contemporain en tant que seule et unique solution pour constituer une autonomie gouvernementale autochtone d'une part, et de l'autre, les forces néfastes de l'économie de marché dans les sociétés autochtones, passées et présentes. Au départ, se pose la question suivante : si l'économie de marché mondiale a historiquement joué un rôle important dans la perte d'autonomie politique et économique des sociétés autochtones et des femmes, jusqu'à quel point est-il pertinent ou viable de chercher à bâtir ou à rebâtir l'autonomie gouvernementale contemporaine des peuples autochtones sur le même modèle économique qui a été largement responsable de la saper en premier lieu? Cette dimension historique ne devrait-elle pas être prise en considération lors de l'examen et de l'élaboration des modèles et des politiques de gouvernance autochtone contemporains et, par conséquent, inciter à une vision plus critique des cadres de développement économique convenus qui sont salués comme le chemin vers l'autogouvernance?

In his widely discussed stage theory of economic growth Professor W. W. Rostow has attempted to reach a level of historical generalization somewhat similar to that essayed by the pioneers in the discipline of economic history. Herbert Heaton observed that early economic historians were interested in a search for “the laws of social development” and for conclusions “as to the character and sequence of stages through which the economic life of society has actually moved.” Their valiant attempts to put historical generalization in the place of economic theory, concluded Heaton, were not successful. One purpose of this paper is to show that Rostow's analysis, while relying more on economic theory than its predecessors, is no more successful in understanding specific cases of economic development and, more widely, contains many difficulties as a general theory of development.

Political participation is central to liberal democracy, yet there are substantial variations in the levels of participation observable among different social groups. Empirical theories explain these variations by the different socio-economic resources individuals possess and by their resulting levels of trust and efficacy in the political system. By contrast, social learning theories see these differences in participation as stemming from the values that individuals absorb from the political culture. This article uses Australia—an established liberal democracy with a large immigrant population—as a case study to evaluate these two theories. The results show that immigrants socialized in countries lacking continuous democratic traditions have greater political trust, but also display more authoritarian values. Differences emerge not only in the type of participation being analyzed, but among ethnic groups. The findings support the view that the resource and social learning theories are complementary rather than exclusive explanations for political participation.

The intensive use of paid time and space in mass media by political parties and candidates during electoral campaigns in Western democracies has given rise to the widespread opinion that advertising expenditures can and do influence the outcome of the voting process. If this were indeed so it could be argued that parties and candidates with rich coffers might, at least in some measure, buy their way into seats of power by lavish outlay on advertising. The continuous debate in Canada and other democratic countries on the desirability of limiting campaign funds attests to the importance of this issue.

This paper describes the digitization and enrichment of the Canadian House of Commons English Debates from 1901 to present. We start by laying out the general framework in which this project took place and then present the structure of the database and provide guidelines to prospective users. The paper concludes with the introduction of www.lipad.ca, an online platform designed as a hub for archiving Canadian political data, with the parliamentary proceedings at the centre of its architecture.

Abstract. Building upon the theoretical framework of new-institutionalism, this article concentrates on electoral management commissions (EMCs), which, though the raison d'être of political battles in many African countries, have attracted very little analysis in academic literature. The sample includes seven countries and I concentrate on the issue of forging institutional autonomy. I propose five modes of institutional forging that produce different levels of autonomy. At the same time, I argue that autonomy refers less to legal provisions than to the empirical self-reinforcing and lock-in processes, which may or may not take place depending on power relations in the political arena. In turn, however, these differences may explain the contrasting trajectories African states have taken vis-à-vis democratization.

Résumé. Alors qu'elles sont au cœur des luttes politiques dans plusieurs pays africains, les commissions électorales sont peu étudiées dans la littérature sur la démocratisation. Cet article utilise un cadre théorique néo-institutionnel pour analyser les commissions de sept pays en se concentrant spécifiquement sur la question de l'autonomie institutionnelle. Il met à jour cinq modes de création institutionnelle correspondant à différents niveaux d'autonomie qui, en retour, expliquent les trajectoires divergentes des pays en matière de démocratisation. L'autonomie est à rechercher moins dans les prérogatives juridiques que dans les rapports de forces entre acteurs au moment de l'émergence de l'institution et dans les processus subséquents d'autoreproduction institutionnelle.

The article proposes a simple model to explain election outcomes in Canadian federal elections. The model hypothesizes that the share of the vote obtained by the Liberal party depends on deviations from the average rate of unemployment, inflation and income growth, and on the presence or absence of a party leader from Quebec. The results confirm the hypotheses regarding the impact of unemployment and party leader, but inflation and income growth prove to be nonsignificant. The evidence also suggests that the model may be less satisfactory for elections involving governments that had been in place for less than a year (1958 and 1980).

Abstract. Many analyses of public opinion regarding global integration, and by implication global governance, are based on the material factors or interests driving individual and collective political preferences. In contrast, we show that values and ideology offer a better explanation of attitudes toward trade liberalization than do economic interests, and that the material self-interest factors that do influence opinion about trade are not relevant for opinion about globalization. We use regression analysis of original Canadian public opinion data to show that individuals of whatever skill or educational level who trust multinational corporations and the market, who like the United States, who support more immigration, who oppose a larger welfare state, and who support Canada taking a more active role in the world are more likely to support globalization. We conclude that Canadians' continued support of free trade agreements but wariness about globalization indicates that the compromise of embedded liberalism, a compelling metaphor about the foundation of twentieth-century international organization, continues to shape their understanding of the world.

Résumé. De nombreuses analyses de l'opinion publique concernant l'intégration mondiale, et logiquement la gouvernance mondiale, reposent sur les facteurs ou les intérêts matériels qui influencent les préférences politiques individuelles ou collectives. Par contraste, nous démontrons que les valeurs et l'idéologie offrent une meilleure explication des attitudes à l'égard de la libéralisation des échanges commerciaux que les intérêts économiques. Nous prouvons également que les facteurs matériels d'intérêt personnel modelant l'opinion des gens à l'égard du commerce n'ont aucun impact sur leur opinion à l'égard de la mondialisation. Nous recourons à l'analyse de régression des données originales sur l'opinion publique canadienne pour démontrer qu'indépendamment de leur niveau d'aptitudes ou d'instruction, les personnes, qui font confiance aux multinationales et au marché, qui aiment les États-Unis, qui soutiennent l'immigration, qui s'opposent à l'élargissement de l'État-providence, et qui encouragent la participation du Canada aux affaires mondiales, sont des partisans plus probables de la mondialisation. Nous concluons que le soutien continu des Canadiens pour les accords de libre-échange ainsi que leurs hésitations à l'égard de la mondialisation prouvent que le compromis du libéralisme tacitement enchâssé, métaphore puissante de la fondation de l'organisation internationale du 20e siècle, continue de façonner leur compréhension du monde.

Recent decades have been marked by increasingly divided partisan opinion in the US. This study investigates whether a similar trend might be occurring in Canada. It does so by examining redistributive preferences, using Canadian Election Studies data from every election since 1992. Results suggest that Canada has experienced a surge in partisan sorting that is comparable to that in the US. Over time, like-minded citizens have increasingly clustered into parties, with increasingly stark divisions between partisans.