How should the European Union cope with Member States that no longer respect the basic values of the Union? This article reviews the responses of the major European Union institutions to Poland and Hungary as their governments removed checks on their power, eliminated the independence of judiciaries and failed to honour their European commitments. As the article demonstrates, the responses of EU institutions have so far been ineffective in bringing these Member States back into line with European values. We examine the various proposals that have been made to do better, concluding that there is promise in some legal strategies that are available now, but have yet to be tried.

This article explains why autocrats love constitutional pluralism and constitutional identity. Though these concepts were developed by scholars and jurists with the best of intentions in mind, we explain why they are also attractive to and inherently prone to abuse by autocrats. We then describe how the regimes in Hungary and Poland have made use of these concepts in their drive to consolidate autocracy. We conclude that given the dangers inherent in constitutional pluralism and its susceptibility to abuse, it should be replaced with a more traditional understanding of the primacy of EU law.

The European Pillar of Social Rights is a high-profile political reaffirmation of twenty social rights and principles. Its implementation deploys the full EU governance arsenal: regulations, directives, recommendations, communications, new institutions, funding actions, and country-specific recommendations. As such, the static imagery evoked by a ‘pillar’ does not capture the true nature of the initiative, which is dynamic and fluid, wide-ranging, and permeating. An equation of the Pillar with the set of twenty rights and principles it proclaims similarly fails to capture its true significance, which lies in its programmatic nature. Several important measures have already been proposed as part of this new social action plan for Europe, some of which are close to adoption. This Article analyses the meaning of the Pillar and its potential significance, by considering its content sensu largo, and its broader context. It argues that even if the Pillar cannot address all the EU's social failings, it has put a surprising social spin on the Better Regulation Agenda that was threatening to erode the social acquis, it has rekindled the EU's relationship with the International Labour Organization and Council of Europe, and it helps rebalance the EU's output by reviving the use of the Treaty's Social Title.

This article maps the rise of EU spending conditionality in the 2014–20 financial period and shows how the study of this novel type of conditionality adds to the dominant legal discourse on conditionality in the EU. It also suggests that the rise of conditionality may signal more profound transformations in the deep tissue of the EU, expressed by a transition towards a conditionality-based culture within the EU internal relationships.

While the accession of the 10 former Communist states was generally greeted with enthusiasm by much of the European political elite, the trade union movement in the West was concerned that cheap Eastern European workers would flood Western European labour markets, thereby undercutting Western wage rates. As a result, a number of the old Member States (but not the UK, Ireland and Sweden) imposed transitional restrictions on the right of individuals to come to the West to work. However, these restrictions did not extend to employers—in particular service providers—coming from the new Member States, bringing with them lower paid Eastern European labour to fulfil a contract.

Leaving aside cases of overt discrimination and interventions aimed at favouring certain firms or modes of production, legislative and regulatory provisions may have such an impact on costs and prices that it will be necessary to consider with the greatest care whether, either by virtue of their own impact or by reason of disparities between two or more countries, some of them may have the effect of distorting conditions of competition among the national economies as a whole or in particular branches of economic activity … But at the same time it will be necessary to identify very precisely the limits of whatever action is necessary, and to dispel certain misunderstandings …

While ideas on ‘earned citizenship’ have been around in discussions on the coexistence of freedom of movement and nationally-bounded welfare states in the European Union, both the concept and the process it entails have hardly been explored in connection to EU (case) law. This contribution identifies earned citizenship as a technique of government in the broader political strategy of neoliberal communitarianism, requiring Union citizens to ‘earn’ access to the welfare system through an emphasis on their individual responsibility to fulfil the economic, social and cultural conditions of membership. Analysing economically inactive Union citizens’ access to social assistance benefits, it argues that earned citizenship has been visible since the Court’s early citizenship jurisprudence, but has been reconstructed with the recent Dano-line of case law.

The doctrine of the national margin of appreciation is well established in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In applying this essentially judge-made doctrine, the Court imposes self-restraint on its power of review, accepting that domestic authorities are best placed to settle a dispute. The areas in which the doctrine has most often been applied will be presented here, looking at various examples from case law. After a brief overview of the doctrine’s origin, the analysis will focus on the situations in which the margin has been allowed or denied. Does it relate merely to factual and domestic-law aspects of a case? What is the scope of the margin of appreciation when it comes to interpreting provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights? What impact does an interference (whether disproportionate or not) with a guaranteed right have on the margin allowed? Is there a second-degree or ‘reverse’ margin of appreciation, whereby discretionary powers can be distributed between executive and judicial authorities at domestic level? Lastly it is noteworthy that Protocol No 14, now ratified by all Council of Europe Member States, enshrines in Article 12—at least to some extent—an obligation to apply a margin of appreciation. One essential question remains: by allowing any margin of a certain width, is the European Court simply waiving its power of review or is it attributing responsibility to the domestic courts in the interest of a healthy subsidiarity?

There currently appears to be considerable confusion amongst regulators and stakeholders over the purpose of the EU’s directives on public procurement and lack of a clear vision of what the directives seek to achieve. Against this background this article has two objectives. First, it seeks to provide a framework for understanding the directives’ functions and their relationship with national policy. In this respect it identifies the ends and means that the directives do, or could, adopt and/or which have been ascribed to them, and considers the implications of each for national regulatory space. Secondly, for each of the ends and means it suggests a specific legal interpretation of its actual and potential role in the EU’s legal framework.

It is argued that the directives seek to promote the internal market and that they seek to do so solely by three means—prohibiting discrimination, implementing transparency, and removing barriers to access. It rejects, on the other hand, certain broader conceptions of the directives, including that they promote a single market by standardising procedures; that they replicate in the public market the competitive process of the private market; and that they seek value for taxpayers’ money. It is argued that rejection of these broader functions has important implications for the scope of national regulatory space, both as regards the ‘commercial’ aspects of public procurement—notably ensuring value for money and an efficient procurement process—and as regards ‘horizontal’ policies in the sense of policies that promote social and environmental objectives through public procurement.

This article explores the legalisation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) and its increasing use of sanctions. It argues that the breadth and depth of the numerous sanctions regimes in place shows that EU foreign policy is not merely an aspiration but produces law and legal processes which share similarities with those in the rest of the EU’s legal order. Further, the article examines the extent to which non-EU Member States in Europe have aligned themselves with EU sanctions. The argument is made that this is evidence not only of Europeanisation, but also crucially of a legalised foreign policy which has allowed Europe-wide, EU-led foreign policy to emerge.

The EU is making progress in reducing its carbon footprint. The creation of a High-Level Group on Sustainable Finance has supplemented recent market-led initiatives and provided some recommendations for future reform. This article argues that more remains to be achieved. In particular, in light of the fundamental structural uncertainties attached to climate change, precautionary approaches to the funding of GHG-intensive industries are worth contemplating. Such measures include raising the capital requirements on assets with ‘brown’ credentials. The high dependence on banks for external financing in the EU makes these reforms particularly appropriate for implementation within the bloc.

There is a growing debate about the desirability of allowing greater scope for regulatory competition inside the European Union. The argument for doing so is that competition between the Member States in the production of legal rules will lead to greater economic efficiency than can be achieved through the harmonisation of standards. The Court’s ruling in Centros appears to mark a significant move in the direction of inter-state competition in company law. In deciding that a company founded by Danish citizens in the UK, thereby avoiding Danish minimum capital requirements, could not be denied the right to register an overseas branch in Denmark for the purposes of trading there, the Court has rekindled a long-running debate about the siège réel doctrine.

This article reviews the legal and political science literatures on the extensive interpretation of the European fundamental freedoms and on possible ways out. The common market rules were originally laid down in an international treaty, the Treaty of Rome. In functional terms, this treaty became a de facto constitution, implying that its content, including the fundamental freedoms, were constitutionalised. We review how this constitutionalisation constrains legislators at the Member State and European levels. In order to identify possible ways out, we also review several reform options: institutional reforms of the European judicial system; the de-constitutionalisation of the fundamental freedoms; counterbalancing these freedoms with further strengthened social rights; and contestation of over-constitutionalisation within the given primary law framework. We conclude that reform options are available that could gradually free the legislators from the over-constitutionalisation of the common market rules. Such options should become part of the ‘Conference on the Future of Europe’ process and debates about EU reforms in general, as more flexibility is warranted in a heterogeneous EU.

The pitfalls of the relationship between European and national judges constitute a well-travelled ground in literature, especially with regard to ‘sagas’ over the reconciliation of national sovereignty with EU law primacy. Hence, the contribution that this article is attempting to make is to explore the judicial understanding and potential of the concept of constitutional identity in the light of the newly-introduced Article 4(2) TEU by the Treaty of Lisbon, which makes it explicit that national identity encompasses constitutional specificity. A number of questions are raised and discussed. For instance: How has the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) been adjudicating on issues pertaining to the constitutional identity of the Member States pre- and post-Lisbon? How far can Member States stretch the concept to avoid the tidal effect of EU law upon their legal systems? For the sake of clarity, two notions of constitutional identity are identified and presented in this article: One related to the CJEU’s case law, where ‘constitutional identity’ has been invoked by defending Member States as a qualified derogation from their EU law obligations (a ‘shield’) and another, inherent in the German Constitutional Court’s (BVerfG) use of ‘constitutional identity’ as a break to an unprecedented transfer of competences to the EU and a tool of judicial review of national implementation measures of secondary legislation (a sword). The arguments advanced hereafter suggest that the implications of identity retention as a ‘shield’ may not be far-reaching since the CJEU has, through a pragmatic use of the loyalty and proportionality principles, succeeded in reducing its effect to the bare minimum. On the other hand, as a judicial review mechanism, the German paradigm demonstrates that, as a ‘sword’, constitutional identity retention comprises, largely, a theoretical possibility. These assumptions aside, it is concluded that constitutional identity retention may provide both national judiciaries and legislatures with new opportunities to participate in trans-national constitutional development through monitoring and assessing the compatibility of the exercise of EU competence with the requirements of national constitutions.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore selected aspects of the relationship between the general principles of EU law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The chapter first looks at the expansion of fundamental rights in EU law and the importance of general principles by reference to three principles which have provided fruitful grounds for judicial activism: the right to judicial protection, the principle of non-discrimination, and the right to personal data. It then examines the sources of fundamental rights under Article 6 TEU and the relationship between Charter rights and general principles. Finally, it explores a pivotal issue in EU constitutional discourse, namely, the scope of application of the Charter and the general principles of law. The chapter concludes by observing that, far from declining in importance, the general principles of law continue to be an integral part of judicial methodology; that, following the introduction of the Charter, the CJEU applies a heightened level of judicial scrutiny; and that it favours a centralised approach opting for an autonomous interpretation of the Charter, granting it precedence over national constitutional norms, and understanding broadly its scope of application.

The article examines the legal structure and constitutional consequences of ‘Next Generation EU’ (NGEU)—the innovative recovery fund that the European Union (EU) established to address the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic. The article sheds light on the complex normative constellation that was used to erect NGEU, and explains how this was satisfactorily done within the existing Treaty framework, by resorting to current legal bases. At the same time, however, the article underlines the profound constitutional consequences that NGEU has on the EU's architecture of economic governance. To this end, the article contrasts the strategy chosen to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic to that embraced to tackle the euro-crisis a decade ago, and concludes emphasising how NGEU significantly contributes to the federalisation of the EU, endowing its fiscal union with a fiscal capacity analogous to that of other federal regimes.

It is increasingly common for the EU to include extraterritorial greenhouse gas emissions within the scope of its climate change laws. These measures have proved to be fiercely controversial and on more than one occasion the EU has been forced to back down. With this in mind, this paper asks how far the EU’s climate change responsibilities ought to extend geographically. In answering this question, the paper draws a distinction between first-order and second-order climate responsibilities, acknowledges the importance of the internationally agreed ‘system boundary’ guidelines adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and seeks to learn lessons from the consequentialist approach that was favoured by the EU in giving broad geographical scope to its decision to include extraterritorial aviation emissions within the scope of its emissions trading scheme.

The EU’s openness towards stakeholders is central to the legitimacy of its law-making. With the rapid globalisation of EU legislative activities, openness towards actors from third countries requires analysis. With reference to the notion of ‘lobbying’, this article outlines a framework for identifying the role of third country actors in EU policy processes. The two arguments brought forward suggest that third country lobbying is facilitated by the openness of Union law- and policy-making, and that third country actors contribute to EU decision-making at all stages. The article concludes with a set of questions that third country lobbying raises concerning the EU’s legitimate law-making authority in Europe and beyond.

Investment arbitration is based on international agreements and operates in parallel to the EU legal and judicial system. Therefore conflicts between EU law and investment protection are possible. These may result from the substantial investment protection standards, but also from the operation of a parallel system of judicial protection. The EU law position on such conflicts will depend on whether the investment agreement was concluded between Member States, between Member States and other countries, or between the EU and other countries.

This paper analyses how the Court of Justice of the European Union resolves conflicting situations surrounding intellectual property rights (IPR). More specifically, it looks into how it approaches clashes of IPR with other fundamental rights and economic freedoms and with what consequences. Building upon previous literature, I advance the argument that the resolution of the conflict, by means of the proportionality interest-balancing exercise, pursues a pro-harmonisation agenda not only in the obvious context of free movement, but also in the setting of fundamental rights. I show that the recent Coty Germany ruling is likely to accelerate this trend because of its recognition of positive obligations of the Member States in the context of fundamental rights. It is argued that this could also be used by national courts to improve an existing IPR framework, in particular by filing preliminary references that question legislators’ choices such as non-implementation of permissible exceptions and limitations. After highlighting the importance of maintaining a separation between different policy levels (secondary law vs Charter), I outline why Coty Germany is a very worrying reading of Article 17(2) of the EU Charter, and suggest that this could be remedied by synchronising its interpretation with the Court’s doctrine of ‘specific subject matter’ in the context of free movement.